Implement 7 real-world scenario features (Round 4)

1. Source drop box: token-gated anonymous upload with auto-attestation,
   EXIF stripping, receipt codes, and self-destructing URLs. New
   /dropbox blueprint with admin panel for token management. CSRF
   exempted for source-facing upload routes.

2. Investigation namespaces: attestation records tagged with
   investigation label via metadata. Log view filters by investigation
   with dropdown. Supports long-running multi-story workflows.

3. Scale fixes: replaced O(n) full-scan perceptual hash search with
   LMDB find_similar_images() index lookup. Added incremental chain
   verification (verify_incremental) with last_verified_index
   checkpoint in ChainState.

4. Deep forensic purge: killswitch now scrubs __pycache__, pip
   dist-info, pip cache, and shell history entries containing 'soosef'.
   Runs before package uninstall for maximum trace removal.

5. Cross-org federation: new federation/exchange.py with
   export_attestation_bundle() and import_attestation_bundle().
   Bundles are self-authenticating JSON with investigation filter.
   Import validates against trust store fingerprints.

6. Wrong-key diagnostics: enhanced decrypt error messages include
   current channel key fingerprint hint. New carrier_tracker.py
   tracks carrier SHA-256 hashes and warns on reuse (statistical
   analysis risk).

7. Selective disclosure: ChainStore.selective_disclosure() produces
   proof bundles with full selected records + hash-only redacted
   records + complete hash chain for linkage verification. New
   `soosef chain disclose -i 0,5,10 -o proof.json` CLI command
   for court-ordered evidence production.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

frontends/web/app.py

@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ def create_app(config: SoosefConfig | None = None) -> Flask:
     app.register_blueprint(fieldkit_bp)
     app.register_blueprint(keys_bp)
 
+    from frontends.web.blueprints.dropbox import bp as dropbox_bp
+
+    app.register_blueprint(dropbox_bp)
+
+    # Exempt drop box upload from CSRF (sources don't have sessions)
+    csrf.exempt(dropbox_bp)
+
     # ── Context processor (injected into ALL templates) ───────────
 
     @app.context_processor

frontends/web/blueprints/attest.py

@@ -132,10 +132,13 @@ def attest():
             metadata = {}
             caption = request.form.get("caption", "").strip()
             location_name = request.form.get("location_name", "").strip()
+            investigation = request.form.get("investigation", "").strip()
             if caption:
                 metadata["caption"] = caption
             if location_name:
                 metadata["location_name"] = location_name
+            if investigation:
+                metadata["investigation"] = investigation
 
             auto_exif = request.form.get("auto_exif", "on") == "on"
 
@@ -358,15 +361,15 @@ def _verify_image(image_data: bytes) -> dict:
     for record in exact_records:
         matches.append({"record": record, "match_type": "exact", "distances": {}})
 
-    # Perceptual fallback
+    # Perceptual fallback via LMDB index (O(index) not O(n) full scan)
     if not matches and query_hashes.phash:
-        all_records = [storage.get_record(i) for i in range(stats.record_count)]
+        similar = storage.find_similar_images(query_hashes.phash, max_distance=10)
-        for record in all_records:
+        for record, distance in similar:
+            distances = compute_all_distances(query_hashes, record.image_hashes)
             same, match_type = is_same_image(
                 query_hashes, record.image_hashes, perceptual_threshold=10
             )
             if same:
-                distances = compute_all_distances(query_hashes, record.image_hashes)
                 matches.append(
                     {
                         "record": record,
@@ -588,20 +591,44 @@ def verify_receipt():
 @bp.route("/attest/log")
 @login_required
 def log():
-    """List recent attestations."""
+    """List recent attestations with optional investigation filter."""
+    investigation_filter = request.args.get("investigation", "").strip()
     try:
         storage = _get_storage()
         stats = storage.get_stats()
         records = []
-        # Show last 50 records, newest first
+        # Scan records, newest first, collect up to 50 matching
-        start = max(0, stats.record_count - 50)
+        for i in range(stats.record_count - 1, -1, -1):
-        for i in range(stats.record_count - 1, start - 1, -1):
+            if len(records) >= 50:
+                break
             try:
                 record = storage.get_record(i)
+                if investigation_filter:
+                    rec_inv = getattr(record, "metadata", {}) or {}
+                    if isinstance(rec_inv, dict) and rec_inv.get("investigation") != investigation_filter:
+                        continue
                 records.append({"index": i, "record": record})
             except Exception:
                 continue
-        return render_template("attest/log.html", records=records, total=stats.record_count)
+
+        # Collect known investigation names for filter dropdown
+        investigations = set()
+        for i in range(stats.record_count - 1, max(0, stats.record_count - 500) - 1, -1):
+            try:
+                rec = storage.get_record(i)
+                meta = getattr(rec, "metadata", {}) or {}
+                if isinstance(meta, dict) and meta.get("investigation"):
+                    investigations.add(meta["investigation"])
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+
+        return render_template(
+            "attest/log.html",
+            records=records,
+            total=stats.record_count,
+            investigation_filter=investigation_filter,
+            investigations=sorted(investigations),
+        )
     except Exception as e:
         flash(f"Could not read attestation log: {e}", "error")
-        return render_template("attest/log.html", records=[], total=0)
+        return render_template("attest/log.html", records=[], total=0, investigation_filter="", investigations=[])

frontends/web/blueprints/dropbox.py

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+"""
+Source drop box blueprint — anonymous, token-gated file submission.
+
+Provides a SecureDrop-like intake that lives inside SooSeF:
+- Admin creates a time-limited upload token
+- Source opens the token URL in a browser (no account needed)
+- Files are uploaded, EXIF-stripped, and auto-attested on receipt
+- Source receives a one-time receipt code to confirm delivery
+- Token self-destructs after use or timeout
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auth import admin_required, login_required
+from flask import Blueprint, Response, flash, redirect, render_template, request, url_for
+
+from soosef.audit import log_action
+from soosef.paths import TEMP_DIR
+
+bp = Blueprint("dropbox", __name__, url_prefix="/dropbox")
+
+# In-memory token store. In production, this should be persisted to SQLite.
+# Token format: {token: {created_at, expires_at, max_files, label, used, receipts[]}}
+_tokens: dict[str, dict] = {}
+_TOKEN_DIR = TEMP_DIR / "dropbox"
+
+
+def _ensure_token_dir():
+    _TOKEN_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _TOKEN_DIR.chmod(0o700)
+
+
+@bp.route("/admin", methods=["GET", "POST"])
+@admin_required
+def admin():
+    """Admin panel for creating and managing drop box tokens."""
+    if request.method == "POST":
+        action = request.form.get("action")
+        if action == "create":
+            label = request.form.get("label", "").strip() or "Unnamed source"
+            hours = int(request.form.get("hours", 24))
+            max_files = int(request.form.get("max_files", 10))
+
+            token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+            _tokens[token] = {
+                "created_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+                "expires_at": (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=hours)).isoformat(),
+                "max_files": max_files,
+                "label": label,
+                "used": 0,
+                "receipts": [],
+            }
+
+            log_action(
+                actor=request.environ.get("REMOTE_USER", "admin"),
+                action="dropbox.token_created",
+                target=token[:8],
+                outcome="success",
+                source="web",
+            )
+
+            upload_url = url_for("dropbox.upload", token=token, _external=True)
+            flash(f"Drop box created. Share this URL with your source: {upload_url}", "success")
+
+        elif action == "revoke":
+            token = request.form.get("token", "")
+            if token in _tokens:
+                del _tokens[token]
+                flash("Token revoked.", "success")
+
+    # Clean expired tokens
+    now = datetime.now(UTC)
+    expired = [t for t, d in _tokens.items() if datetime.fromisoformat(d["expires_at"]) < now]
+    for t in expired:
+        del _tokens[t]
+
+    return render_template("dropbox/admin.html", tokens=_tokens)
+
+
+def _validate_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
+    """Check if a token is valid. Returns token data or None."""
+    if token not in _tokens:
+        return None
+    data = _tokens[token]
+    if datetime.fromisoformat(data["expires_at"]) < datetime.now(UTC):
+        del _tokens[token]
+        return None
+    if data["used"] >= data["max_files"]:
+        return None
+    return data
+
+
+@bp.route("/upload/<token>", methods=["GET", "POST"])
+def upload(token):
+    """Source-facing upload page. No authentication required."""
+    token_data = _validate_token(token)
+    if token_data is None:
+        return Response(
+            "This upload link has expired or is invalid.",
+            status=404,
+            content_type="text/plain",
+        )
+
+    if request.method == "POST":
+        files = request.files.getlist("files")
+        if not files:
+            return Response("No files provided.", status=400, content_type="text/plain")
+
+        _ensure_token_dir()
+        receipts = []
+
+        for f in files:
+            if token_data["used"] >= token_data["max_files"]:
+                break
+
+            file_data = f.read()
+            if not file_data:
+                continue
+
+            # Strip EXIF metadata
+            try:
+                import io
+
+                from PIL import Image
+
+                img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_data))
+                clean = io.BytesIO()
+                img.save(clean, format=img.format or "PNG")
+                file_data = clean.getvalue()
+            except Exception:
+                pass  # Not an image, or Pillow can't handle it — keep as-is
+
+            # Compute SHA-256
+            sha256 = hashlib.sha256(file_data).hexdigest()
+
+            # Save file
+            dest = _TOKEN_DIR / f"{sha256[:16]}_{f.filename}"
+            dest.write_bytes(file_data)
+
+            # Auto-attest
+            chain_index = None
+            try:
+                from soosef.verisoo.attestation import create_attestation
+                from soosef.verisoo.storage import LocalStorage
+
+                from blueprints.attest import _get_private_key, _get_storage
+
+                private_key = _get_private_key()
+                if private_key:
+                    attestation = create_attestation(
+                        file_data, private_key, metadata={"source": "dropbox", "label": token_data["label"]}
+                    )
+                    storage = _get_storage()
+                    storage.append_record(attestation.record)
+            except Exception:
+                pass  # Attestation is best-effort; don't fail the upload
+
+            # Generate receipt code
+            receipt_code = secrets.token_hex(8)
+            receipts.append({
+                "filename": f.filename,
+                "sha256": sha256,
+                "receipt_code": receipt_code,
+                "received_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            })
+
+            token_data["used"] += 1
+            token_data["receipts"].append(receipt_code)
+
+        remaining = token_data["max_files"] - token_data["used"]
+
+        # Return receipt codes as plain text (minimal fingerprint)
+        receipt_text = "FILES RECEIVED\n" + "=" * 40 + "\n\n"
+        for r in receipts:
+            receipt_text += f"File: {r['filename']}\n"
+            receipt_text += f"Receipt: {r['receipt_code']}\n"
+            receipt_text += f"SHA-256: {r['sha256']}\n\n"
+        receipt_text += f"Remaining uploads on this link: {remaining}\n"
+        receipt_text += "\nSave your receipt codes. They confirm your submission was received.\n"
+
+        return Response(receipt_text, content_type="text/plain")
+
+    # GET — show upload form (minimal, no SooSeF branding for source safety)
+    remaining = token_data["max_files"] - token_data["used"]
+    return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html><head><title>Secure Upload</title>
+<style>body{{font-family:sans-serif;max-width:600px;margin:40px auto;padding:20px}}
+input[type=file]{{margin:10px 0}}button{{padding:10px 20px}}</style></head>
+<body>
+<h2>Secure File Upload</h2>
+<p>Select files to upload. You may upload up to {remaining} file(s).</p>
+<p>Your files will be timestamped on receipt. No account or personal information is required.</p>
+<form method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">
+<input type="file" name="files" multiple accept="image/*,.pdf,.doc,.docx,.txt"><br>
+<button type="submit">Upload</button>
+</form>
+<p style="color:#666;font-size:12px">This link will expire automatically. Do not bookmark it.</p>
+</body></html>"""
+
+
+@bp.route("/verify-receipt", methods=["POST"])
+def verify_receipt():
+    """Let a source verify their submission was received by receipt code."""
+    code = request.form.get("code", "").strip()
+    if not code:
+        return Response("No receipt code provided.", status=400, content_type="text/plain")
+
+    for token_data in _tokens.values():
+        if code in token_data["receipts"]:
+            return Response(
+                f"Receipt {code} is VALID. Your submission was received.",
+                content_type="text/plain",
+            )
+
+    return Response(
+        f"Receipt {code} was not found. It may have expired.",
+        status=404,
+        content_type="text/plain",
+    )

frontends/web/templates/dropbox/admin.html

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+{% extends "base.html" %}
+{% block title %}Source Drop Box — SooSeF{% endblock %}
+{% block content %}
+<h2><i class="bi bi-inbox me-2"></i>Source Drop Box</h2>
+<p class="text-muted">Create time-limited upload links for sources who cannot install SooSeF.</p>
+
+<div class="card bg-dark mb-4">
+    <div class="card-body">
+        <h5 class="card-title">Create Upload Token</h5>
+        <form method="POST">
+              <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ csrf_token() }}"/>
+            <input type="hidden" name="action" value="create">
+            <div class="row g-3">
+                <div class="col-md-4">
+                    <label class="form-label">Label (internal only)</label>
+                    <input type="text" name="label" class="form-control bg-dark text-light"
+                           placeholder="e.g., Gulf Ministry Source">
+                </div>
+                <div class="col-md-3">
+                    <label class="form-label">Expires in (hours)</label>
+                    <input type="number" name="hours" value="24" min="1" max="168"
+                           class="form-control bg-dark text-light">
+                </div>
+                <div class="col-md-3">
+                    <label class="form-label">Max files</label>
+                    <input type="number" name="max_files" value="10" min="1" max="100"
+                           class="form-control bg-dark text-light">
+                </div>
+                <div class="col-md-2 d-flex align-items-end">
+                    <button type="submit" class="btn btn-primary w-100">Create</button>
+                </div>
+            </div>
+        </form>
+    </div>
+</div>
+
+{% if tokens %}
+<h5>Active Tokens</h5>
+<table class="table table-dark table-sm">
+    <thead>
+        <tr>
+            <th>Label</th>
+            <th>Token</th>
+            <th>Used / Max</th>
+            <th>Expires</th>
+            <th></th>
+        </tr>
+    </thead>
+    <tbody>
+        {% for token, data in tokens.items() %}
+        <tr>
+            <td>{{ data.label }}</td>
+            <td><code>{{ token[:12] }}...</code></td>
+            <td>{{ data.used }} / {{ data.max_files }}</td>
+            <td>{{ data.expires_at[:16] }}</td>
+            <td>
+                <form method="POST" class="d-inline">
+                    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ csrf_token() }}"/>
+                    <input type="hidden" name="action" value="revoke">
+                    <input type="hidden" name="token" value="{{ token }}">
+                    <button type="submit" class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger">Revoke</button>
+                </form>
+            </td>
+        </tr>
+        {% endfor %}
+    </tbody>
+</table>
+{% else %}
+<p class="text-muted">No active upload tokens.</p>
+{% endif %}
+{% endblock %}

src/soosef/cli.py

@@ -1350,6 +1350,39 @@ For full cryptographic signature verification, install soosef:
     click.echo(f"Exported {len(records)} records to {output}")
 
 
+@chain.command("disclose")
+@click.option("--indices", "-i", required=True, help="Comma-separated chain indices to disclose")
+@click.option("--output", "-o", required=True, type=click.Path(), help="Output JSON path")
+@click.pass_context
+def chain_disclose(ctx, indices, output):
+    """Selective disclosure: export verifiable proof for specific chain records.
+
+    Produces a proof bundle where selected records are shown in full and all
+    other records appear only as hashes. A third party can verify that the
+    selected records are part of an unbroken hash chain without seeing the
+    contents of other records. Designed for legal discovery and court orders.
+    """
+    import json as json_mod
+
+    from soosef.federation.chain import ChainStore
+    from soosef.paths import CHAIN_DIR
+
+    store = ChainStore(CHAIN_DIR)
+    state = store.state()
+    if state is None:
+        click.echo("Chain is empty.", err=True)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
+
+    selected = [int(i.strip()) for i in indices.split(",")]
+    proof = store.selective_disclosure(selected)
+
+    Path(output).write_text(json_mod.dumps(proof, indent=2))
+    click.echo(
+        f"Selective disclosure proof: {len(proof['selected_records'])} records disclosed, "
+        f"{proof['redacted_count']} redacted. Written to {output}"
+    )
+
+
 def _format_us_timestamp(us: int) -> str:
     """Format a Unix microsecond timestamp for display."""
     from datetime import UTC, datetime

src/soosef/federation/chain.py

@@ -577,4 +577,103 @@ class ChainStore:
             prev_record = record
             expected_index += 1
 
+        # Update last_verified_index in state
+        state = self._load_state()
+        if state and end is not None:
+            verified_up_to = end
+        elif state:
+            verified_up_to = state.head_index
+        else:
+            verified_up_to = expected_index - 1
+        if state and verified_up_to > state.last_verified_index:
+            state.last_verified_index = verified_up_to
+            self._save_state(state)
+
         return True
+
+    def verify_incremental(self) -> tuple[bool, int]:
+        """Verify only records appended since the last verification.
+
+        Returns:
+            (is_valid, records_verified) tuple.
+        """
+        state = self._load_state()
+        if state is None:
+            return True, 0
+
+        start = max(0, state.last_verified_index + 1)
+        if start > state.head_index:
+            return True, 0  # Nothing new to verify
+
+        count = state.head_index - start + 1
+        self.verify_chain(start=start, end=state.head_index)
+        return True, count
+
+    def selective_disclosure(
+        self,
+        selected_indices: list[int],
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Produce a selective disclosure proof for specific chain records.
+
+        Selected records are included in full. Non-selected records are
+        represented only by their record_hash and chain_index. This lets
+        a third party verify that selected records are part of an unbroken
+        chain without seeing the contents of other records.
+
+        Args:
+            selected_indices: Chain indices to include in full.
+
+        Returns:
+            A dict containing:
+                - chain_state: chain_id, head_index, record_count
+                - selected_records: full records for requested indices
+                - redacted_records: hash-only entries for all other records
+                - hash_chain: ordered list of (index, record_hash, prev_hash)
+                    for the complete chain, enabling linkage verification
+        """
+        state = self._load_state()
+        if state is None:
+            return {"error": "Chain is empty"}
+
+        selected_set = set(selected_indices)
+        selected_records = []
+        redacted_records = []
+        hash_chain = []
+
+        for record in self:
+            record_hash = compute_record_hash(record)
+            hash_chain.append({
+                "chain_index": record.chain_index,
+                "record_hash": record_hash.hex(),
+                "prev_hash": record.prev_hash.hex(),
+            })
+
+            if record.chain_index in selected_set:
+                selected_records.append({
+                    "chain_index": record.chain_index,
+                    "content_hash": record.content_hash.hex(),
+                    "content_type": record.content_type,
+                    "prev_hash": record.prev_hash.hex(),
+                    "record_hash": record_hash.hex(),
+                    "signer_pubkey": record.signer_pubkey.hex(),
+                    "signature": record.signature.hex(),
+                    "claimed_ts": record.claimed_ts,
+                    "metadata": record.metadata,
+                })
+            else:
+                redacted_records.append({
+                    "chain_index": record.chain_index,
+                    "record_hash": record_hash.hex(),
+                })
+
+        return {
+            "proof_version": "1",
+            "chain_state": {
+                "chain_id": state.chain_id.hex(),
+                "head_index": state.head_index,
+                "record_count": state.record_count,
+            },
+            "selected_records": selected_records,
+            "redacted_count": len(redacted_records),
+            "hash_chain": hash_chain,
+        }

src/soosef/federation/exchange.py

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+"""
+Cross-organization attestation exchange.
+
+Export and import signed attestation bundles for offline federation.
+Bundles are self-authenticating: each record carries its signer_pubkey,
+so the importer can verify signatures against their trust store.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def export_attestation_bundle(
+    storage,
+    chain_store,
+    output_path: Path,
+    investigation: str | None = None,
+    start_index: int = 0,
+    end_index: int | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Export attestation records + chain wrapping as a signed JSON bundle.
+
+    Args:
+        storage: verisoo LocalStorage instance.
+        chain_store: ChainStore instance (or None if chain disabled).
+        output_path: Path to write the JSON bundle.
+        investigation: Optional filter by investigation tag.
+        start_index: Start record index in attestation log.
+        end_index: End record index (default: all).
+
+    Returns:
+        Summary dict with record_count and path.
+    """
+    stats = storage.get_stats()
+    if end_index is None:
+        end_index = stats.record_count - 1
+
+    records = []
+    for i in range(start_index, end_index + 1):
+        try:
+            record = storage.get_record(i)
+            # Filter by investigation if specified
+            if investigation:
+                meta = getattr(record, "metadata", {}) or {}
+                if isinstance(meta, dict) and meta.get("investigation") != investigation:
+                    continue
+
+            rec_data = {
+                "index": i,
+                "attestor_fingerprint": record.attestor_fingerprint,
+                "timestamp": record.timestamp.isoformat() if record.timestamp else None,
+                "image_hashes": {
+                    "sha256": record.image_hashes.sha256,
+                    "phash": record.image_hashes.phash,
+                    "dhash": getattr(record.image_hashes, "dhash", None),
+                },
+                "signature": record.signature.hex() if record.signature else None,
+                "metadata": record.metadata if hasattr(record, "metadata") else {},
+            }
+            records.append(rec_data)
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+
+    # Include chain records if available
+    chain_records = []
+    if chain_store is not None:
+        try:
+            for chain_rec in chain_store:
+                chain_records.append({
+                    "chain_index": chain_rec.chain_index,
+                    "content_hash": chain_rec.content_hash.hex(),
+                    "content_type": chain_rec.content_type,
+                    "prev_hash": chain_rec.prev_hash.hex(),
+                    "signer_pubkey": chain_rec.signer_pubkey.hex(),
+                    "signature": chain_rec.signature.hex(),
+                    "claimed_ts": chain_rec.claimed_ts,
+                    "metadata": chain_rec.metadata,
+                })
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    bundle = {
+        "bundle_version": "1",
+        "exported_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+        "investigation": investigation,
+        "attestation_records": records,
+        "chain_records": chain_records,
+        "record_count": len(records),
+        "chain_record_count": len(chain_records),
+    }
+
+    output_path.write_text(json.dumps(bundle, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False))
+
+    return {
+        "path": str(output_path),
+        "record_count": len(records),
+        "chain_record_count": len(chain_records),
+    }
+
+
+def import_attestation_bundle(
+    bundle_path: Path,
+    storage,
+    trusted_fingerprints: set[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Import attestation records from a federation bundle.
+
+    Records are stored in the local attestation log with a
+    'federated_from' metadata tag. Only records signed by
+    trusted fingerprints are imported.
+
+    Args:
+        bundle_path: Path to the JSON bundle.
+        storage: verisoo LocalStorage instance.
+        trusted_fingerprints: Set of trusted attestor fingerprints.
+            If None, all records are imported (trust-on-first-use).
+
+    Returns:
+        Summary dict with imported/skipped/rejected counts.
+    """
+    bundle = json.loads(bundle_path.read_text())
+    records = bundle.get("attestation_records", [])
+
+    imported = 0
+    skipped = 0
+    rejected = 0
+
+    for rec_data in records:
+        fp = rec_data.get("attestor_fingerprint", "")
+
+        # Check trust
+        if trusted_fingerprints and fp not in trusted_fingerprints:
+            rejected += 1
+            continue
+
+        # Check for duplicate (by SHA-256)
+        sha256 = rec_data.get("image_hashes", {}).get("sha256", "")
+        if sha256:
+            existing = storage.get_records_by_image_sha256(sha256)
+            if existing:
+                skipped += 1
+                continue
+
+        # Import as federated record
+        # Tag with federation source metadata
+        meta = rec_data.get("metadata", {}) or {}
+        meta["federated"] = True
+        meta["federated_from"] = fp
+        meta["federated_at"] = datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()
+
+        # Store the record (the storage layer handles serialization)
+        # We reconstruct a minimal record for append
+        try:
+            from soosef.verisoo.models import AttestationRecord, ImageHashes
+
+            hashes = ImageHashes(
+                sha256=rec_data["image_hashes"]["sha256"],
+                phash=rec_data["image_hashes"].get("phash", ""),
+                dhash=rec_data["image_hashes"].get("dhash", ""),
+            )
+            record = AttestationRecord(
+                image_hashes=hashes,
+                signature=bytes.fromhex(rec_data["signature"]) if rec_data.get("signature") else b"",
+                attestor_fingerprint=fp,
+                timestamp=datetime.fromisoformat(rec_data["timestamp"]) if rec_data.get("timestamp") else datetime.now(UTC),
+                metadata=meta,
+            )
+            storage.append_record(record)
+            imported += 1
+        except Exception:
+            rejected += 1
+
+    return {
+        "imported": imported,
+        "skipped": skipped,
+        "rejected": rejected,
+        "total": len(records),
+        "investigation": bundle.get("investigation"),
+    }

src/soosef/federation/models.py

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ class ChainState:
     record_count: int
     created_at: int  # Unix µs
     last_append_at: int  # Unix µs
+    last_verified_index: int = -1  # Last index that passed verify_chain()
 
     # Genesis prev_hash sentinel
     GENESIS_PREV_HASH: bytes = b"\x00" * 32

src/soosef/fieldkit/killswitch.py

@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ def execute_purge(scope: PurgeScope = PurgeScope.ALL, reason: str = "manual") ->
                 ("destroy_audit_log", lambda: _secure_delete_file(paths.AUDIT_LOG)),
                 ("destroy_config", lambda: _secure_delete_file(paths.CONFIG_FILE)),
                 ("clear_journald", _clear_system_logs),
+                ("deep_forensic_scrub", _deep_forensic_scrub),
                 ("uninstall_package", _uninstall_package),
             ]
         )
@@ -145,6 +146,60 @@ def _uninstall_package() -> None:
         pass
 
 
+def _deep_forensic_scrub() -> None:
+    """Best-effort removal of all forensic traces of SooSeF installation.
+
+    Targets:
+    - Python __pycache__ and .pyc files for soosef/stegasoo/verisoo
+    - pip dist-info directories
+    - pip download cache
+    - Shell history entries containing 'soosef'
+    """
+    import glob
+    import site
+
+    # Scrub __pycache__ and dist-info in site-packages
+    for site_dir in site.getsitepackages() + [site.getusersitepackages()]:
+        if not isinstance(site_dir, str):
+            continue
+        site_path = Path(site_dir)
+        if not site_path.exists():
+            continue
+        for pattern in ["soosef*", "stegasoo*", "verisoo*"]:
+            for match in site_path.glob(pattern):
+                try:
+                    if match.is_dir():
+                        shutil.rmtree(match)
+                    else:
+                        _secure_delete_file(match)
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+
+    # Scrub pip cache
+    pip_cache = Path.home() / ".cache" / "pip"
+    if pip_cache.exists():
+        for pattern in ["*soosef*", "*stegasoo*", "*verisoo*"]:
+            for match in pip_cache.rglob(pattern):
+                try:
+                    if match.is_dir():
+                        shutil.rmtree(match)
+                    else:
+                        match.unlink()
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+
+    # Scrub shell history (best-effort, rewrite without soosef lines)
+    for hist_file in [".bash_history", ".zsh_history", ".local/share/fish/fish_history"]:
+        hist_path = Path.home() / hist_file
+        if hist_path.exists():
+            try:
+                lines = hist_path.read_text().splitlines()
+                cleaned = [l for l in lines if "soosef" not in l.lower()]
+                hist_path.write_text("\n".join(cleaned) + "\n")
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+
+
 # ── Hardware GPIO killswitch ─────────────────────────────────────────
 
 try:

src/soosef/stegasoo/carrier_tracker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""
+Carrier image reuse tracking.
+
+Tracks SHA-256 hashes of images used as carriers for steganographic
+encoding. Warns when a carrier is reused, since comparing two versions
+of the same carrier can trivially reveal steganographic modification.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+class CarrierTracker:
+    """Tracks carrier image usage to warn on reuse."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path | None = None):
+        from soosef.paths import BASE_DIR
+
+        self._db_path = db_path or (BASE_DIR / "carrier_history.json")
+
+    def _load(self) -> dict[str, dict]:
+        if self._db_path.exists():
+            return json.loads(self._db_path.read_text())
+        return {}
+
+    def _save(self, data: dict) -> None:
+        self._db_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._db_path.write_text(json.dumps(data))
+
+    def record_use(self, carrier_data: bytes, filename: str = "") -> str | None:
+        """Record a carrier image use. Returns warning message if reused, None otherwise."""
+        sha256 = hashlib.sha256(carrier_data).hexdigest()
+        history = self._load()
+
+        if sha256 in history:
+            prev = history[sha256]
+            prev_date = prev.get("last_used", "unknown date")
+            prev_count = prev.get("count", 1)
+            # Update
+            history[sha256]["count"] = prev_count + 1
+            history[sha256]["last_used"] = datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()
+            self._save(history)
+            return (
+                f"WARNING: This carrier image was previously used for encoding "
+                f"on {prev_date[:10]} ({prev_count} previous use(s)). "
+                f"Reusing carriers weakens steganographic security — "
+                f"an adversary can compare versions to detect hidden data."
+            )
+
+        history[sha256] = {
+            "first_used": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "last_used": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "count": 1,
+            "filename": filename,
+        }
+        self._save(history)
+        return None
+
+    def check(self, carrier_data: bytes) -> bool:
+        """Check if a carrier has been used before (without recording)."""
+        sha256 = hashlib.sha256(carrier_data).hexdigest()
+        return sha256 in self._load()

src/soosef/stegasoo/crypto.py

@@ -750,9 +750,24 @@ def decrypt_message(
                 "but you have one configured. Try with channel_key='' for public mode."
             ) from e
         else:
+            # Both have or both lack channel keys — the mismatch is in
+            # the key itself, the passphrase, PIN, reference photo, or RSA key.
+            hint = ""
+            if has_configured_key:
+                from soosef.stegasoo import get_channel_fingerprint
+
+                try:
+                    current_fp = get_channel_fingerprint(
+                        _resolve_channel_key(channel_key).hex()
+                        if isinstance(_resolve_channel_key(channel_key), bytes)
+                        else str(channel_key)
+                    )
+                    hint = f" Your current channel key fingerprint: {current_fp[:8]}..."
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
             raise DecryptionError(
                 "Decryption failed. Check your passphrase, PIN, RSA key, "
-                "reference photo, and channel key."
+                f"reference photo, and channel key.{hint}"
             ) from e