Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Aaron D. Lee
2629aabcc5 Fix 12 security findings from adversarial audit
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CRITICAL:
- #1+#2: Consistency proof verification no longer a stub — implements
  actual hash chain reconstruction from proof hashes, rejects proofs
  that don't reconstruct to the expected root. GossipNode._verify_consistency
  now calls verify_consistency_proof() instead of just checking sizes.
- #3: Remove passphrase.lower() from KDF — was silently discarding
  case entropy from mixed-case passphrases. Passphrases are now
  case-sensitive as users would expect.
- #4: Federation gossip now applies record_filter (trust store check)
  on every received record before appending to the log. Untrusted
  attestor fingerprints are rejected with a warning.
- #5: Killswitch disables all logging BEFORE activation to prevent
  audit log from recording killswitch activity that could survive an
  interrupted purge. Audit log destruction moved to position 4 (right
  after keys + flask secret, before other data).

HIGH:
- #6: CSRF exemption narrowed from entire dropbox blueprint to only
  the upload view function. Admin routes retain CSRF protection.
- #7: /health endpoint returns only {"status":"ok"} to anonymous
  callers. Full operational report requires authentication.
- #8: Metadata stripping now reconstructs image from pixel data only
  (Image.new + putdata), stripping XMP, IPTC, and ICC profiles — not
  just EXIF.
- #9: Same as #6 (CSRF scope fix).

MEDIUM:
- #11: Receipt HMAC key changed from public upload token to server-side
  secret key, making valid receipts unforgeable by the source or anyone
  who captured the upload URL.
- #12: Docker CMD no longer defaults to --no-https. HTTPS with
  self-signed cert is the default; --no-https requires explicit opt-in.
- #14: shred return code now checked — non-zero exit falls through to
  the zero-overwrite fallback instead of silently succeeding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-01 23:31:03 -04:00
Aaron D. Lee
496198d49a Add three-tier deployment infrastructure
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Platform pivot from Raspberry Pi to three-tier model:
- Tier 1: Bootable Debian Live USB for field reporters
- Tier 2: Docker/K8s org server for newsrooms
- Tier 3: Docker/K8s federation relay for VPS

Tier 1 — Live USB (deploy/live-usb/):
- build.sh: live-build based image builder for amd64
- Package list: Python + system deps + minimal GUI (openbox + Firefox)
- Install hook: creates venv, pip installs soosef[web,cli,attest,...]
- Hardening hook: disable swap/coredumps, UFW, auto-login to web UI
- systemd service with security hardening (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem)
- Auto-opens Firefox kiosk to http://127.0.0.1:5000 on boot

Tier 2+3 — Docker (deploy/docker/):
- Multi-stage Dockerfile with two targets:
  - server: full web UI + stego + attestation + federation (Tier 2)
  - relay: lightweight FastAPI attestation API only (Tier 3)
- docker-compose.yml with both services and persistent volumes
- .dockerignore for clean builds

Kubernetes (deploy/kubernetes/):
- namespace.yaml, server-deployment.yaml, relay-deployment.yaml
- PVCs, services, health checks, resource limits
- Single-writer strategy (Recreate, not RollingUpdate) for SQLite safety
- README with architecture diagram and deployment instructions

Config presets (deploy/config-presets/):
- low-threat.json: press freedom country (no killswitch, 30min sessions)
- medium-threat.json: restricted press (48h deadman, USB monitoring)
- high-threat.json: conflict zone (12h deadman, tamper monitoring, 5min sessions)
- critical-threat.json: targeted surveillance (127.0.0.1 only, 6h deadman, 3min sessions)

Deployment guide rewritten for three-tier model with RPi as legacy appendix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-01 22:52:38 -04:00