merge(docs): A5 living-docs sweep — item-CRUD across FORMATS/CRYPTO/SECURITY/DESIGN/ARCHITECTURE, STATUS shipped, ROADMAP, CHANGELOG; dead_code de-dup

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,54 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## Unreleased — enterprise org vault
+
+Git-native multi-user **org vaults**: a separate org git repository alongside each
+member's personal vault, with a 256-bit org master key ECIES-wrapped per member to
+their ed25519 device key, collection-scoped item storage, role-based access, and a
+signature-verifying pre-receive hook that makes least-privilege enforcement
+server-side. Tracked under `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md`.
+
+### Added
+- **relicario-core `org` module** (`crates/relicario-core/src/org.rs`): org types
+  (`OrgId`, `MemberId`, `OrgRole`, `OrgMember`/`OrgMembers`, `CollectionDef`/
+  `OrgCollections`, `OrgMeta`, `OrgManifest`/`OrgManifestEntry`) and ECIES X25519
+  key wrap/unwrap (`generate_org_key`, `wrap_org_key`, `unwrap_org_key`) — ed25519→
+  X25519 via RFC 7748 clamp, domain-separated `SHA-256(dh || eph_pk || rcpt_pk)` KDF,
+  XChaCha20-Poly1305 inner cipher, all key material in `Zeroizing`. Adds
+  `encrypt_org_manifest` / `decrypt_org_manifest` vault wrappers. New dependencies:
+  `x25519-dalek 2` (`static_secrets`) in core, `ssh-key 0.6` in core and CLI.
+- **relicario-server org mode**: `verify-org-commit` (commit-signature verification
+  against `members.json` ed25519 keys, path-scoped role/grant authorization,
+  owner-only elevation judged on the signer's pre-commit role, schema-version
+  monotonicity) and `generate-org-hook`; new `[lib]` target (`classify_path`,
+  `extract_schema_version`). Audit trail on every push carries verified-signer
+  attribution; commits whose signer cannot be matched are flagged `TAMPERED`.
+- **relicario-cli org admin commands**: `org init`, `add-member` / `remove-member` /
+  `set-role` (owner-only escalation guard), `create-collection` / `grant` / `revoke`,
+  `rotate-key` (re-encrypts every item blob + manifest under a fresh org key),
+  `transfer-ownership`, `delete-org` (local tombstone; hook blocks pushing a
+  protected-file deletion), `status` / `audit`. Org commits are signed
+  (`org_git_run` preserves signing).
+- **relicario-cli org item CRUD**: `org add` (Login, SecureNote, Identity — each
+  collection-scoped and grant-enforced), `org get <query> [--show]` (secrets masked
+  by default; renders Login/SecureNote/Identity/Card/Document/Totp), `org list
+  [--trashed]` (manifest filtered to your collection grants), `org edit <query>`
+  (flag-driven field updates for login/note/identity fields), `org rm` / `org restore`
+  / `org purge` (soft-delete lifecycle). Audit actions emitted: `item-create`,
+  `item-update`, `item-delete`, `item-restore`, `item-purge`.
+
+### Deferred
+- `org add` / `org edit` parity for Card, SshKey, Document, and Totp item types
+  (only Login, SecureNote, Identity supported today; `org get` and `org list` can
+  display all types already present in the vault).
+- Extension org switch + read-only browse parity (Dev-D follow-up).
+- Extension org writes.
+- Phase-2 features: SSO/LDAP provisioning, read audit trail, per-collection subkeys
+  (the current shared org master key scopes *writes* via the hook and *read access*
+  via manifest filtering, but does not cryptographically isolate collections from one
+  another — a member who obtains the org key can decrypt any blob), HTTP management
+  plane.
+
 ## v0.7.0 — 2026-06-01
 
 Completes the extension restructure (Plan C) begun under v0.6.0. Phases

DESIGN.md

@@ -147,11 +147,25 @@ The threat model differs by codebase. This is the per-secret per-codebase reside
 | Master key | `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` returned by `derive_master_key` | `UnlockedVault.master_key` for the lifetime of one CLI invocation | WASM-side memory behind an opaque `SessionHandle`; JS never sees the bytes | Never sees it |
 | Item secret (password, card number, etc.) | `Zeroizing<String>` / `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>` | Same | Briefly held in WASM during `item_decrypt`; results passed to popup as plaintext for display | Held in DOM (the user is staring at it); cleared when view changes |
 | Device private key | — | Filesystem under `~/.config/relicario/devices/<name>.key` (mode 0600) | `chrome.storage.local.device_private_key` | — |
+| Org master key (256-bit, random) | `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` during `wrap_org_key`/`unwrap_org_key` (never derived from a passphrase) | `UnlockedOrgVault.org_key` for one CLI invocation; recovered by unwrapping `keys/<member-id>.enc` with the device ed25519 seed | TODO (extension follow-up) | Never sees it |
+
+The org master key is **never escrowed**: each member holds it ECIES-wrapped to their device key (`keys/<member-id>.enc`); an owner can always re-wrap it to a replacement device key, so there is no central key store to compromise. See `docs/CRYPTO.md` (Org-key ECIES wrap/unwrap) and `docs/FORMATS.md` (Org vault repo formats).
 
 The popup / vault / content surfaces of the extension cannot decrypt an item independently — they all message the SW. Content scripts in particular get back already-prepared payloads (e.g. `{ username, password }`) from `fill_credentials` after the SW resolved everything.
 
 The CLI keeps its master key in process memory; if the process exits or crashes, the key is gone (Zeroize on drop). There is no CLI session daemon. The `lock` subcommand exists only for UX parity with the extension and is a no-op.
 
+## Org vault (enterprise, in progress)
+
+The enterprise org vault is a **second git repository** alongside each member's personal vault, with its own schema (`org.json` / `members.json` / `collections.json` / `keys/<member-id>.enc` / `manifest.enc` / `items/<collection-slug>/<item-id>.enc`). It reuses the same `relicario-core` AEAD; the only new crypto is the per-member ECIES key wrap. Cross-codebase additions:
+
+- **relicario-core** gains the `org` module (`org.rs`) and the `x25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["static_secrets"] }` dependency (`crates/relicario-core/Cargo.toml:19`); `ssh-key` 0.6 is already present (`:20`).
+- **relicario-cli** gains `org_session.rs` + `commands/org.rs` and the `ssh-key = "0.6"` dependency (`crates/relicario-cli/Cargo.toml:33`).
+- **relicario-server** gains an **org mode**: a new `[lib]` target (`classify_path`, `extract_schema_version`) plus the `verify-org-commit` and `generate-org-hook` subcommands — a signature-verifying, path-scoped pre-receive hook (see `docs/SECURITY.md`).
+- **extension** org switch + read parity is a tracked follow-up (Dev-D) — `TODO (extension follow-up)`.
+
+Status: the backend is complete on `main` — core (A) org module, server hook (C), and the full CLI (all 19 `org` subcommands incl. item CRUD) are merged. Deferred: `org add`/`edit` parity for Card/Key/Document/Totp (Login/SecureNote/Identity ship today), and the extension org switch + read parity (`TODO (extension follow-up)`, Dev-D).
+
 ## Build matrix
 
 | Target | Tool | Output | When to run |

ROADMAP.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 | Version | Highlights |
 |---|---|
+| *(untagged, 2026-06-20)* | **Enterprise org vault — backend complete** (`7392795`): relicario-core `org` module (ECIES X25519 key wrap/unwrap, `OrgRole`/`OrgMember`/`OrgManifest` types, `filter_for_member`, `schema_version: 1`); relicario-server org hook (`verify-org-commit`: signature verification, path-scoped authz, `enforce_owner_only_elevation` on parent role, `enforce_schema_monotonicity`, `generate-org-hook`, new `[lib]` target); relicario-cli — all 19 `relicario org` subcommands: init, add-member/remove-member/set-role, create-collection/grant/revoke, rotate-key (re-encrypts all blobs), transfer-ownership, delete-org, status, audit, and item CRUD (add/get/list/edit/rm/restore/purge). **Not yet shipped:** `org add`/`edit` for Card/SshKey/Document/Totp; extension org parity (Dev-D); phase 2 (SSO/LDAP, read audit, per-collection subkeys, HTTP plane). |
 | v0.7.0 *(2026-06-01)* | Extension restructure (Plan C) complete — Phases 3/4/6 merged via 3 parallel worktree streams under PM coordination: setup wizard crypto migrated into the SW (`create_vault`/`attach_vault`; `setup.ts` 1230→58 LOC + step registry); `vault.ts` split 1037→194 LOC into 5 focused + 2 support modules; `vault_locked` intercept lifted into `shared/state.ts`; `get_vault_status` SW message + sidebar status indicator closing the last `relicario status` CLI/extension parity gap |
 | v0.6.0 *(2026-05-30)* | Security audit fixes; device authentication; backup/restore + LastPass import; fullscreen UX Phases 1+2A+2B; v0.5.1 Streams A/B/C (3-column vault layout + bottom-sheet picker + toast system; left-nav settings; Recovery QR end-to-end + setup wizard Style C); 1C-γ (attachments + Document type + device registration + trash + field history); Plan B multi-stream refactor (commands/ split, prompt_or_flag, core/WASM seam); vault-tab management surfaces revamp (settings synced/local split, devices fingerprint, trash purge countdown, field-history polish, item-history-index, `#history/<id>` routing); doc-structure redesign (rename to DESIGN/CRYPTO/docs/FORMATS, scope headers + Next: footers); GPL-3.0-or-later license |
 | v0.2.0 | Typed-item rewrite (Plans 1A/1B/1C-α/β₁/β₂) |
@@ -15,14 +16,19 @@ See `CHANGELOG.md` for tagged-release detail and `STATUS.md` for the per-train c
 
 ## Up next
 
-All three 2026-05-04 architecture-review specs are now shipped (CLI restructure = Plan B Cycles 1+2; security polish = Stream A Cycle 1; extension restructure = Plan C Phases 1–6, completed v0.7.0 2026-06-01). The next committed item is:
+All three 2026-05-04 architecture-review specs are shipped; enterprise org vault backend is shipped (2026-06-20). Pending items in rough priority order:
 
+- **Org-vault item-type parity** — `org add`/`edit` support for Card, SshKey, Document, Totp (Login/SecureNote/Identity ship today)
+- **Extension org parity — read** — org switch + collection-filtered browse in the popup/vault tab (Dev-D, deferred)
+- **Extension org parity — write** — `org add`/`edit`/`rm` from the extension
 - **Phase 4: command palette** — ⌘K global search + action dispatch across the vault tab (no spec yet)
 
 ## Medium-term
 
 _(promote here once specced)_
 
+- **Org vault phase 2** — SSO/LDAP federation, read audit log, per-collection subkeys (true cryptographic scope separation per collection), HTTP management plane
+
 ## Long-term / backlog
 
 - **Relay server** — encrypted WebSocket relay for multi-device sync without a shared git server

STATUS.md

@@ -98,6 +98,30 @@ Plan: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-24-vault-tab-management-surfaces-revamp.md
 - Item-history-index pane — top-level "items with history" list (`32e1632`)
 - Sidebar slot wiring + `#history/<id>` route with `#field-history/<id>` legacy normalization (`88d7228`)
 
+### Enterprise org vault — core + server hook + CLI (merged 2026-06-20, `7392795`)
+
+Spec: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-06-relicario-enterprise-org-vault-design.md`; plan: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md`
+
+**relicario-core org module** (`crates/relicario-core/src/org.rs`): `OrgId`, `MemberId`, `OrgRole` (Owner/Admin/Member), `OrgMember`, `OrgMembers`/`OrgCollections`/`OrgMeta`/`OrgManifest`/`OrgManifestEntry` (all `schema_version: 1`); `generate_org_key`; ECIES X25519 key wrap/unwrap (`wrap_org_key` / `unwrap_org_key`) — ed25519→X25519 conversion via `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` + RFC 7748 clamp, ephemeral DH, `SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pk || recipient_pk)` wrap key, inner cipher delegated to `crate::crypto::encrypt` (XChaCha20-Poly1305, no Argon2id in org path); `OrgManifest::filter_for_member` for collection-scoped manifest views. Vault wrappers: `encrypt_org_manifest` / `decrypt_org_manifest` in `vault.rs`. 5 acceptance tests in `crates/relicario-core/tests/org.rs` incl. wrap/unwrap round-trip, revoke-after-rotation, manifest filter, and an RFC 8032 ed25519→X25519 known-answer vector.
+
+**relicario-server org hook** (`crates/relicario-server/src/{lib.rs,main.rs}`): pure `classify_path` / `extract_schema_version` in new `lib.rs` target; `verify_org_commit` — commit-signature verification against `members.json` ed25519 keys, path-scoped authorization (protected JSON → owner/admin only; `items/<slug>/…` → slug in signer's grants), `enforce_owner_only_elevation` (parent-role check; guards against privilege self-escalation), `enforce_schema_monotonicity` (schema_version must not decrease; merge commits rejected; genesis allowed); `generate-org-hook` subcommand emits a wrapper script. New `[lib]` target added to `relicario-server` crate.
+
+**relicario-cli — all 19 `relicario org` subcommands** (`crates/relicario-cli/src/{org_session.rs,commands/org.rs,device.rs}`): `org_session.rs` provides `UnlockedOrgVault` (org key in `Zeroizing`), collection-scoped `item_path`, fingerprint-based member match, `atomic_write`, `org_git_run` (signed commits — does NOT suppress `commit.gpgsign`).
+
+Admin/lifecycle commands: `init` (structure + wrap + `configure_git_signing` + signed bootstrap commit), `add-member` / `remove-member` / `set-role` (owner-only escalation guard), `create-collection` / `grant` / `revoke`, `rotate-key` (fresh key + re-wrap all members + re-encrypt every `items/<slug>/<id>.enc` blob + manifest, concurrent-rotation abort, `Relicario-Action: key-rotate`), `transfer-ownership`, `delete-org`, `status`, `audit` (verified-signer attribution + TAMPERED flag).
+
+Item CRUD commands (B9–B14): `org add` (`OrgAddKind`: Login/SecureNote/Identity; card/key/document/totp deferred — see below), `org get <query> [--show]`, `org list [--trashed]`, `org edit <query> [--title/--username/…]`, `org rm`, `org restore`, `org purge`. All ops are collection-scoped + grant-enforced; audit trail emits `item-create` / `item-update` / `item-delete` / `item-restore` / `item-purge`.
+
+**A5 doc-fix** (`enforce_owner_only_elevation` parent-role close, `519e503`) and this living-docs sweep also landed.
+
+**Tracked follow-ups (deferred, not shipped):**
+- `org add` / `org edit` parity for Card, SshKey, Document, Totp item types (Login/SecureNote/Identity only today; `get`/`list` can display all types if present)
+- Extension org-vault switch + read parity (Dev-D deferred)
+- Extension org write operations
+- Phase 2: SSO/LDAP federation, read audit log, per-collection subkeys (true cryptographic scope separation), HTTP management plane
+
+**Known limitations (by design in phase 1):** shared org master key — reads are not cryptographically scoped per collection (hook scopes writes; client filters manifest); no read audit (git records writes only); `delete-org` is a local tombstone only (hook rejects protected-file deletion on push).
+
 ### Extension restructure — Plan C Phases 3, 4, 6 (merged 2026-05-31 → 06-01, v0.7.0)
 
 Spec: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-04-extension-restructure-design.md`
@@ -143,6 +167,12 @@ Per the 2026-05-30 post-v0.6.0 audit of the three 2026-05-04 architecture-review
 - **Security polish** (`2026-05-04-security-polish-design.md`) — *already shipped* as Stream A Cycle 1 (`89090a8`) plus follow-ups (`0c9387f` start.sh fourth window, `229e483` recovery_qr.rs docs). All four phases done.
 - **Extension restructure** (`2026-05-04-extension-restructure-design.md`, plan `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-30-extension-restructure.md`) — ✅ **COMPLETE** (all six phases merged; see the dated landing section above). Phases 1/2/5 merged 2026-05-30; Phases 3/4/6 merged 2026-05-31 → 06-01. Final tree: 423/423 vitest, build:all clean. v0.7.0 versions bumped; tag pending.
 
-Beyond extension restructure, ROADMAP medium-term holds Phase 4 command palette (no spec yet). Long-term: relay server, mobile.
+**Enterprise org vault** — ✅ **COMPLETE (backend)** — all 19 CLI subcommands + core + server hook merged `7392795` 2026-06-20. Deferred follow-ups tracked in the landing section above.
 
-See `ROADMAP.md` for the longer arc and `CHANGELOG.md` for tagged-release history (current head: `v0.6.0`; the `v0.7.0` entry covers this extension-restructure completion).
+Pending org-vault follow-ups (in rough priority order):
+- `org add`/`edit` parity for Card, SshKey, Document, Totp
+- Extension org switch + read parity (Dev-D)
+- Extension org write operations
+- **Phase 4: command palette** — ⌘K global search + action dispatch across the vault tab (no spec yet)
+
+Long-term: relay server, mobile. See `ROADMAP.md` for the longer arc and `CHANGELOG.md` for tagged-release history (current head: `v0.6.0`; the `v0.7.0` entry covers extension-restructure completion).

crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -71,6 +71,47 @@ under `src/commands/`. Each source file has one job.
   hatches `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE` (`session.rs:42`) and `RELICARIO_IMAGE`
   (`session.rs:125`) that integration tests use to bypass the TTY.
 
+- **`src/org_session.rs`** — `UnlockedOrgVault`, the org-vault analogue of
+  `session.rs`. Holds the org master key in `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` for one CLI
+  invocation, recovered by unwrapping `keys/<member-id>.enc` with the device
+  ed25519 seed. `open_org_vault` calls `crate::device::current_device_seed()`
+  directly (`device.rs`) — a duplicate private fn that previously existed in
+  `org_session.rs` was removed during the A5 sweep (implementations were
+  identical). Owns the **collection-scoped** `item_path`
+  (`items/<collection-slug>/<id>.enc` — the leading slug is what the pre-receive
+  hook authorizes against, never decrypting), fingerprint-based member matching
+  (`relicario_core::fingerprint`, tolerant of OpenSSH whitespace/comment
+  differences), `atomic_write`, and `org_git_run`. Note `org_git_run` runs
+  **bare git** — unlike `helpers::git_run` it does NOT inject
+  `commit.gpgsign=false`, because org commits MUST be signed (the hook verifies
+  every commit's signature); signing config is established by
+  `configure_git_signing` during `org init`.
+
+- **`src/commands/org.rs`** — the `relicario org` subcommand surface. Full
+  19-subcommand surface is merged and wired via `Commands::Org` in `main.rs`.
+
+  *Admin / lifecycle (12):* `init` (structure + wrap + `configure_git_signing` +
+  signed bootstrap commit), `add-member` / `remove-member` / `set-role`
+  (owner-only escalation guard), `create-collection` / `grant` / `revoke`,
+  `rotate-key` (`run_rotate_key`, `commands/org.rs:332` — fresh key, re-wrap for
+  all members, re-encrypt every item blob + manifest under the new key,
+  concurrent-rotation abort), `transfer-ownership`, `delete-org`, `status` /
+  `audit` (verified-signer attribution + `TAMPERED` flag).
+
+  *Item CRUD (7):* `org add` creates typed items via `OrgAddKind`
+  (`commands/org.rs:749`) — **Login / SecureNote / Identity only**; Card /
+  SshKey / Document / Totp creation is a deferred follow-up. `get` / `list` can
+  display any item type if present. `org get <query> [--show]` masks secrets
+  unless `--show`; `org list [--trashed]` filters by the caller's collection
+  grants; `org edit <query>` is flag-driven (blank flags keep current values);
+  `org rm` soft-deletes, `org restore` undoes, `org purge` permanently removes
+  the encrypted blob. All item ops are collection-scoped and grant-enforced. The
+  audit trail emits `item-create` / `item-update` / `item-delete` /
+  `item-restore` / `item-purge`.
+
+  Deferred: Card / SshKey / Document / Totp `org add` / `edit` parity;
+  extension org reads and writes (Dev-D).
+
 - **`src/helpers.rs`** (`helpers.rs:1-101`) — pure, no-state plumbing:
   `find_vault_dir_from` (`helpers.rs:14-28`) walks up parent directories
   looking for a `.relicario/` marker; `vault_dir` and `relicario_dir` wrap it

crates/relicario-cli/src/org_session.rs

@@ -39,8 +39,14 @@ impl UnlockedOrgVault {
     }
     pub fn members_path(&self) -> PathBuf { self.root.join("members.json") }
     pub fn collections_path(&self) -> PathBuf { self.root.join("collections.json") }
+    // OrgMeta accessors — part of the UnlockedOrgVault path/loader API surface
+    // (parallel to members_path/collections_path + load_members), retained for
+    // completeness. No command consumes org.json yet; surfacing the org
+    // name/id in `org status` is a tracked follow-up, so allow until then.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn org_meta_path(&self) -> PathBuf { self.root.join("org.json") }
 
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn load_meta(&self) -> Result<OrgMeta> {
         let s = fs::read_to_string(self.org_meta_path()).context("read org.json")?;
         Ok(serde_json::from_str(&s).context("parse org.json")?)
@@ -185,7 +191,7 @@ pub fn open_org_vault(dir_flag: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<UnlockedOrgV
         fs::read(&key_path).with_context(|| format!("read {}", key_path.display()))?;
 
     // Recover the device ed25519 seed and unwrap.
-    let seed = current_device_seed()?;
+    let seed = crate::device::current_device_seed()?;
     let org_key = relicario_core::unwrap_org_key(&wrapped, &seed)?;
 
     Ok(UnlockedOrgVault { root, org_key })
@@ -202,27 +208,6 @@ fn current_device_fingerprint() -> Result<String> {
 }
 
 /// Recover the active device's ed25519 seed (the 32-byte private scalar source)
-/// from its OpenSSH `signing.key`, for ECIES unwrap.
-fn current_device_seed() -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>> {
-    let name = crate::device::current_device()?
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no active device — run `relicario device add` first"))?;
-    let key_pem = crate::device::load_signing_key(&name)?;
-    let private = ssh_key::PrivateKey::from_openssh(key_pem.as_str())
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("parse device signing key: {e}"))?;
-    let ed = private
-        .key_data()
-        .ed25519()
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("device signing key is not ed25519"))?;
-    // Ed25519PrivateKey derefs to its 32-byte seed.
-    let seed_bytes: &[u8] = ed.private.as_ref();
-    if seed_bytes.len() != 32 {
-        anyhow::bail!("ed25519 seed has wrong length: {}", seed_bytes.len());
-    }
-    let mut seed = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
-    seed.copy_from_slice(seed_bytes);
-    Ok(seed)
-}
-
 pub(crate) fn atomic_write(path: &Path, data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     let mut tmp = path.as_os_str().to_owned();
     tmp.push(".tmp");

crates/relicario-cli/tests/org_init_signing.rs

@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use std::process::Command;
 use tempfile::TempDir;
 
+// Base runner kept as the documented counterpart to relicario_with_git_identity
+// below (every test in this file needs the git identity, so only the _with_
+// variant is currently called).
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn relicario(config_home: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
     Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_relicario"))
         .env("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", config_home)

crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -103,6 +103,26 @@ Pipeline" and "Crate Layout").
   auth factor. Owns its own `YChannel`, `EmbedRegion`, 8×8 DCT/IDCT,
   Quantization Index Modulation, and crop-recovery extractor. No other module
   imports it; it is consumed only via the public re-export from `lib.rs`.
+- **`org.rs`** — Org-vault data model and ECIES key-wrapping layer
+  (`crates/relicario-core/src/org.rs`). Types: `OrgId` (L15), `MemberId`
+  (L19; `is_valid` L41 — 16 lowercase hex), `OrgRole` (L54;
+  `can_manage_members` L61 = Owner | Admin, `can_manage_owners` L64 = Owner
+  only), `OrgMember` (L72; carries `ed25519_pubkey` in OpenSSH wire format,
+  `collections` grant list, `role`), `OrgMembers` (L86; `schema_version: 1`
+  L93; `validate` L104), `CollectionDef` (L123), `OrgCollections` (L131;
+  `schema_version: 1` L138; `validate` L145 rejects empty / `/` / `.` slugs),
+  `OrgMeta` (L164; `schema_version: 1` L174), `OrgManifestEntry` (L185;
+  carries `collection` slug plus id/type/title/tags/modified/trashed\_at),
+  `OrgManifest` (L199; `schema_version: 1` L206; `filter_for_member` L210
+  returns only entries whose collection slug appears in the member's grants).
+  All four JSON containers carry `schema_version: 1` — distinct from the
+  personal `Manifest` whose `MANIFEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` (`manifest.rs:12`).
+  Crypto: `generate_org_key` (L230) → `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` (256-bit
+  CSPRNG org master key); `wrap_org_key` (L265) / `unwrap_org_key` (L299) —
+  ECIES over X25519, described in detail under **Invariants & contracts**
+  below. `vault.rs` adds `encrypt_org_manifest` / `decrypt_org_manifest` typed
+  wrappers (JSON-serialize → `crypto::encrypt` under the org key, plaintext in
+  `Zeroizing`) consistent with the personal-vault pattern.
 - **`backup.rs`** — `.relbak` v1 container format: `pack_backup` /
   `unpack_backup` plus the `BackupInput` / `BackupOutput` / `BackupItem` /
   `BackupAttachment` shapes. Wraps a zstd-compressed JSON envelope of vault
@@ -230,6 +250,28 @@ Pipeline" and "Crate Layout").
   also used to derive the key for *unlock*, not just create).
 - **`SymbolCharset::Custom` must be ASCII-only** (`generators.rs:46-52`).
   Non-ASCII custom charsets are rejected with `RelicarioError::Format`.
+- **ECIES wrap-blob layout is fixed** at
+  `ephemeral_x25519_pk(32) || version(1) || nonce(24) || ciphertext+tag`
+  (`org.rs:264`). The `version(1)` byte is the same `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02`
+  emitted by `crypto::encrypt`, which is what occupies that slot — the layout
+  merely names the regions for clarity.
+- **KDF wrap key = `SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pk || recipient_pk)`**
+  (`org.rs:278-281`). The concatenation order is identical in `wrap_org_key`
+  and `unwrap_org_key`; a mismatch in either direction would produce a
+  different key and fail the AEAD open. The intermediate `kdf_input` buffer is
+  held in `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>`; `org_key`, `wrap_key`, and the decrypted
+  `plaintext` from unwrap are also held in `Zeroizing`.
+- **ed25519 → X25519 conversion** applies `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` then the
+  RFC 7748 scalar clamp
+  (`scalar[0] &= 248; scalar[31] &= 127; scalar[31] |= 64`) to derive the
+  private X25519 scalar (`org.rs:242`); the recipient public key is obtained
+  via `ed25519_dalek`'s `to_montgomery()`. This lets device ed25519 keys serve
+  double duty as X25519 recipients without storing a separate DH key.
+- **Org crypto bypasses Argon2id.** The ECIES inner cipher delegates to
+  `crate::crypto::encrypt` / `decrypt` (XChaCha20-Poly1305, random 24-byte
+  nonce, `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02`) — no AEAD re-implementation. The X25519 KDF
+  output is used directly as the AEAD key; the Argon2id path in `crypto.rs`
+  is not invoked for org key wrapping.
 
 ## Key flows
 
@@ -315,6 +357,35 @@ when subsequent `decrypt_*` returns `RelicarioError::Decrypt`.
    call `item.prune_history(&settings.field_history_retention, now_unix())`
    when they want to enforce the policy.
 
+### Org key wrap / unwrap
+
+1. **Wrap** (`org.rs:265`): caller supplies a recipient's OpenSSH ed25519
+   public key string.
+   - Parse the OpenSSH wire format via `ssh-key` to recover the raw 32-byte
+     ed25519 public key bytes; apply `to_montgomery()` (ed25519-dalek) to
+     obtain the recipient's X25519 public key.
+   - Generate an ephemeral X25519 keypair from `OsRng`.
+   - `dh_shared = ephemeral_secret × recipient_x25519_pk` (X25519 DH).
+   - `wrap_key = SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pk || recipient_pk)`
+     (`org.rs:278-281`), intermediates in `Zeroizing`.
+   - `ct = crate::crypto::encrypt(&wrap_key, &org_key)` — yields the standard
+     `version(1) || nonce(24) || ciphertext+tag` blob.
+   - Return `ephemeral_x25519_pk(32) || ct` (`org.rs:264`).
+2. **Unwrap** (`org.rs:299`): caller supplies the device ed25519 seed bytes
+   (from `current_device_seed` in the CLI layer, not from `relicario-core`).
+   - Derive X25519 private scalar from seed: `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` + RFC 7748
+     clamp (`org.rs:242`).
+   - Slice the first 32 bytes of the blob as `ephemeral_pk`; read recipient's
+     own X25519 public key via the same `to_montgomery()` path.
+   - `dh_shared = device_x25519_secret × ephemeral_pk`.
+   - Reconstruct `wrap_key` identically; `crypto::decrypt` recovers `org_key`
+     into `Zeroizing`.
+
+Integration tests: `crates/relicario-core/tests/org.rs` (5 acceptance tests
+covering wrap/unwrap round-trip, revoked-after-rotation, and manifest
+`filter_for_member`). A pinned RFC 8032 ed25519→X25519 known-answer vector
+lives in the `#[cfg(test)]` block inside `org.rs` itself.
+
 ### imgsecret embed
 
 1. Caller passes a JPEG byte slice and a 32-byte secret to

docs/CRYPTO.md

@@ -123,6 +123,157 @@ master_key ────────►│  XChaCha20       │──────
                     └──────────────────┘
 ```
 
+## Org-key ECIES wrap/unwrap
+
+Org vaults use a different key-derivation path than personal vaults. There is no
+passphrase, no reference JPEG, and no Argon2id involved. Instead, each org has a
+single random **org master key** that is wrapped per-member using X25519 ECIES and
+stored as an opaque blob in `keys/<member-id>.enc` inside the org repo.
+
+### Org master key
+
+```
+generate_org_key()                                          (org.rs:230)
+  → OsRng → 256-bit random
+  → Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>     (held in memory; never written in the clear)
+```
+
+One org key per org. It is re-generated on every `org rotate-key` operation.
+
+### ed25519 → X25519 conversion
+
+Each Relicario device holds an ed25519 signing key. To participate in ECIES the
+ed25519 key pair must be mapped to X25519:
+
+```
+Recipient public key (for wrap):
+  ed25519 VerifyingKey
+    → .to_montgomery()                  (birational Montgomery map, ed25519_dalek)
+    → X25519 PublicKey
+
+Recipient secret key (for unwrap):
+  ed25519 seed (32 bytes)
+    → SHA-512(seed)[..32]               (org.rs:241–242)
+    → RFC 7748 clamp:
+        scalar[0]  &= 248
+        scalar[31] &= 127
+        scalar[31] |= 64
+    → x25519_dalek::StaticSecret
+```
+
+The RFC 7748 clamp and the `to_montgomery()` birational map are the standard
+construction; a pinned RFC 8032 known-answer vector is verified in the unit tests
+inside `org.rs`.
+
+### Wrap flow (one blob per member)
+
+```
+                    ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
+                    │            wrap_org_key()            │   (org.rs:265)
+                    │                                      │
+ org_key ──────────►│  EphemeralSecret::random (OsRng)     │
+                    │  ephemeral_pk = PublicKey::from(eph) │
+                    │                                      │
+ recipient_pk ─────►│  DH: eph_sk.diffie_hellman(rec_pk)   │
+                    │  → dh_shared (32 bytes)              │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  kdf_input  = dh_shared              │
+                    │            ‖ ephemeral_pk (32 B)     │   (org.rs:278–281)
+                    │            ‖ recipient_pk (32 B)     │
+                    │  wrap_key  = SHA-256(kdf_input)      │
+                    │  (kdf_input in Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>)   │
+                    │  (wrap_key  in Zeroizing<[u8;32]>)   │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  encrypted = crate::crypto::encrypt  │
+                    │    (wrap_key, org_key)               │
+                    │  → version(1) ‖ nonce(24) ‖ ct+tag  │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  output: ephemeral_pk(32)            │   (org.rs:264)
+                    │        ‖ version(1)                  │
+                    │        ‖ nonce(24)                   │
+                    │        ‖ ciphertext + tag            │
+                    └──────────────────────────────────────┘
+                              │
+                              ▼
+                    keys/<member-id>.enc  (in org repo)
+```
+
+### Unwrap flow
+
+```
+                    ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
+                    │           unwrap_org_key()           │   (org.rs:299)
+                    │                                      │
+ wrapped blob ─────►│  split: ephemeral_pk(32) + rest      │
+                    │                                      │
+ ed25519_seed ─────►│  ed25519_seed_to_x25519_secret()     │
+                    │  → recipient_sk + recipient_pk       │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  DH: recipient_sk.diffie_hellman(eph)│
+                    │  → dh_shared                         │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  kdf_input + SHA-256 → wrap_key      │
+                    │  (same domain-separated KDF as wrap) │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  plaintext = crate::crypto::decrypt  │
+                    │    (wrap_key, rest)                  │
+                    │  → Zeroizing<[u8;32]> org_key        │
+                    └──────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### Key distinction: no Argon2id
+
+Unlike the personal vault, **org crypto bypasses Argon2id entirely**:
+
+| | Personal vault | Org vault |
+|---|---|---|
+| Key origin | Argon2id(passphrase ‖ image_secret, salt) | OsRng → 256-bit random |
+| Key transport | Embedded in reference JPEG (stego) | X25519 ECIES wrap blob |
+| AEAD primitive | XChaCha20-Poly1305 (`crate::crypto::encrypt`) | Same primitive (delegated) |
+| KDF for wrap key | Argon2id | SHA-256(DH ‖ eph_pk ‖ rec_pk) |
+
+The inner AEAD (`crate::crypto::encrypt` / `decrypt`) is **not re-implemented** in
+the org module — it is called directly, so org item blobs share the identical
+`version(1) ‖ nonce(24) ‖ ct+tag` wire format (`VERSION_BYTE = 0x02`,
+`crates/relicario-core/src/crypto.rs:59`).
+
+### Zeroize discipline
+
+All intermediates that carry key material are dropped through `Zeroizing`:
+
+- `org_key` — `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` everywhere it is passed
+- `kdf_input` — `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>` (org.rs:278)
+- `wrap_key` — `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>`
+- decrypt `plaintext` in `unwrap_org_key` — `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>`
+
+### Key rotation and re-encryption
+
+`org rotate-key` (`crates/relicario-cli/src/commands/org.rs:332`) does more than
+generate a fresh org key:
+
+```
+run_rotate_key()
+  1. git pull --rebase   (detect concurrent rotation → abort if non-fast-forward)
+  2. generate_org_key()  → new_org_key
+  3. wrap_org_key(new_org_key, member_pk)   for every current member
+     → overwrites keys/<member-id>.enc
+  4. re-encrypt every items/<slug>/<id>.enc blob under new_org_key
+  5. re-encrypt manifest.enc under new_org_key
+  6. git add + git commit via org_git_run  (signed; Relicario-Action: key-rotate)
+```
+
+`rotate-key` pulls (`--rebase`) at the start to pick up concurrent changes and
+abort on a conflicting concurrent rotation, then commits locally; it does **not**
+push. Publishing the rotation to the remote is a separate step (the normal git
+sync path), the same way personal-vault mutations commit locally and sync later.
+
+Re-encryption of every item blob (step 4) is deliberate: a removed member who holds
+a local clone of the repo cannot decrypt any item written after the rotation, because
+those blobs are sealed under a key they never received. Without re-encryption, all
+pre-rotation blobs would remain readable to the former member indefinitely.
+
+The item-CRUD commands (`org add`/`get`/`list`/`edit`/`rm`/`restore`/`purge`) that read and write these blobs are merged and wired into `main.rs`; each operates under the org master key recovered by `unwrap_org_key`.
+
 ## imgsecret DCT Embedding
 
 ```

docs/FORMATS.md

@@ -71,6 +71,60 @@ An empty array (`[]`) puts the pre-receive hook in bootstrap mode (all pushes ac
 
 Commits by `public_key` at or after `revoked_at` (Unix seconds) are rejected by the pre-receive hook. Commits before `revoked_at` remain valid (they were authorized at the time).
 
+## Org vault repo formats
+
+The org vault is a **separate git repository** alongside the personal vault. It is not nested inside `.relicario/`. Its layout:
+
+```
+org.json                              # OrgMeta (schema_version, org_id, display_name, created_at)
+members.json                          # PUBLIC/unencrypted member directory
+collections.json                      # collection definitions
+keys/<member-id>.enc                  # org master key wrapped to that member's device key
+manifest.enc                          # OrgManifest (schema_version 1, per-member-filtered)
+items/<collection-slug>/<item-id>.enc # collection-scoped item blobs
+```
+
+### `org.json` — OrgMeta
+
+Unencrypted JSON (`OrgMeta`, `org.rs:164`). `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:174`). Fields: `schema_version`, `org_id`, `display_name`, `created_at` (Unix seconds).
+
+### `members.json` — OrgMembers
+
+Unencrypted JSON array of `OrgMember` records (`org.rs:72`); container type `OrgMembers` carries `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:93`). Per-member fields: `member_id` (16 lowercase hex chars), `display_name`, `role` (one of `owner | admin | member`), `ed25519_pubkey` (OpenSSH wire string), `collections` (array of granted slug strings), `added_at`, `added_by`. Roles are not secrets — authorization to read this file is not required to verify signatures.
+
+### `collections.json` — OrgCollections
+
+Unencrypted JSON; `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:138`). Contains a list of `CollectionDef` records (`org.rs:123`). Validation (`org.rs:145`) rejects slugs that are empty, contain `/`, or equal `.`.
+
+### `keys/<member-id>.enc` — wrapped org master key
+
+Binary blob; NOT a standard `.enc` blob. Layout (`org.rs:264`):
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────┬─────────┬────────┬──────────────────────┐
+│ ephemeral_x25519_pubkey  │ version │ nonce  │   ciphertext + tag   │
+│        32 bytes          │ 1 byte  │24 bytes│       N + 16 bytes   │
+└──────────────────────────┴─────────┴────────┴──────────────────────┘
+```
+
+- The wrapping key is `SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pubkey || recipient_pubkey)` (`org.rs:278–281`), held in `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>`.
+- The inner AEAD (`version || nonce || ciphertext+tag`) is produced by `crate::crypto::encrypt` — the same XChaCha20-Poly1305 framing used for personal `.enc` blobs (see **Encrypted blob** above). `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02` applies here too.
+- The X25519 private scalar is derived from the device ed25519 seed via `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` with RFC 7748 clamping (`org.rs:242`). Argon2id is **not** involved — the wrapping key is derived entirely from the X25519 DH exchange.
+
+### `manifest.enc` — OrgManifest
+
+Encrypted with the org master key using `crypto::encrypt` (standard `.enc` framing). Decrypts to `OrgManifest` JSON (`org.rs:199`); `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:206`). Each `OrgManifestEntry` (`org.rs:185`) carries: `id`, `type`, `title`, `tags`, `modified`, `trashed_at`, and a `collection` slug field. The `collection` field distinguishes this type from `ManifestEntry` in the personal vault.
+
+Contrast with the personal vault manifest: `Manifest` uses `MANIFEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` (`manifest.rs:12`) and `ManifestEntry` has no `collection` field. The two types are distinct and do not share a schema.
+
+### `items/<collection-slug>/<item-id>.enc`
+
+Standard `.enc` blob (see **Encrypted blob** above), encrypted under the org master key. The blob itself does **not** name its collection — the directory path segment carries the slug. This allows the pre-receive hook (`relicario-server`) to authorize a write by path segment without decrypting the blob.
+
+These blobs are written and read by the `relicario org` item commands (`org add` / `get` / `list` / `edit` / `rm` / `restore` / `purge`), all collection-scoped and grant-enforced. `org add` currently creates Login / SecureNote / Identity items; `get` / `list` display any item type present.
+
+**TODO (extension follow-up):** extension UI for browsing and editing org vault items. **Deferred:** `org add` / `edit` parity for Card / Key / Document / Totp item types.
+
 ## Item IDs and Field IDs
 
 | Kind | Length | Entropy | Source |

docs/SECURITY.md

@@ -74,6 +74,117 @@ Without device authentication, access control is transport-layer only:
 
 Device registration is optional but recommended for shared vaults.
 
+## Org vault security
+
+An org vault is a separate git repository alongside the personal vault. It
+uses ed25519 commit-signing and a server-side pre-receive hook to make
+least-privilege access control server-enforced, not advisory.
+
+### Org device-key authentication
+
+Every org member registers an ed25519 device key. The key appears in
+`members.json` as an OpenSSH public-key string alongside the member's role
+and collection grants. Fingerprint matching is done via
+`relicario_core::fingerprint`, which normalises the OpenSSH format so that
+whitespace and comment differences do not create phantom mismatches.
+
+Org access requires two things at once: a wrapped key blob (`keys/<member-id>.enc`)
+and the device private key that can unwrap it. There is no org passphrase —
+removing a member's blob and rotating the org master key is sufficient to
+revoke access (see **Key rotation** below). Device keys are completely
+separate from the personal vault's KDF inputs; revoking org access does not
+affect the member's personal vault.
+
+### Pre-receive hook enforcement
+
+`relicario-server generate-org-hook` (`crates/relicario-server/src/main.rs:511`)
+emits a hook script that calls `relicario-server verify-org-commit` for
+every pushed commit. Unsigned or structurally invalid commits are rejected
+before they land.
+
+`verify_org_commit` (`main.rs:286`) performs four checks in order:
+
+1. **Signature verification** — a temporary `allowed_signers` file is
+   constructed from the current `members.json`; `git verify-commit --raw`
+   is run and the resulting SHA-256 fingerprint is matched back to a
+   `members.json` entry. A commit not signed by a *current* member is
+   rejected outright.
+
+2. **Path-level write authorisation** — each modified path is classified by
+   `classify_path` (`crates/relicario-server/src/lib.rs:19`) into
+   `ProtectedJson` (owner/admin write only), `CollectionItem` (the
+   `items/<slug>/…` prefix; write allowed only if the slug appears in the
+   signer's `collections` grant array), or `Unrestricted`. The write is
+   authorised if and only if the signer's role and grants satisfy the
+   classification. Item blobs are authorised by the leading path segment
+   alone — the ciphertext is never decrypted by the hook.
+
+3. **Owner-only elevation guard** (`enforce_owner_only_elevation`,
+   `main.rs:438`) — only a member whose *pre-commit* (parent) role is Owner
+   may introduce a new member at Owner or Admin level, or promote an
+   existing member to either. Checking the pre-commit role means an Admin
+   cannot self-promote in the same commit that writes the escalated
+   `members.json`; there is no epoch in which the transition is
+   self-authorised.
+
+4. **Schema monotonicity** (`enforce_schema_monotonicity`, `main.rs:521`)
+   — `schema_version` values in org JSON containers may not decrease.
+   Merge commits are rejected. A genesis commit (no parents) is allowed
+   only when it is signed by the sole Owner it introduces.
+
+### Key rotation
+
+`relicario org rotate-key` generates a fresh 256-bit org master key,
+re-wraps it for every current member, and re-encrypts every
+`items/<slug>/<id>.enc` blob and the manifest under the new key in a single
+signed commit tagged `Relicario-Action: key-rotate`. A revoked member's
+wrapped blob is simply not written during rotation, so they hold a blob that
+decrypts to a stale key — they cannot read items encrypted under the new
+key.
+
+### Audit action vocabulary
+
+The `relicario org audit` command attributes actions to their verified
+signer (not to the commit author or trailer value). Each event records two
+actors: the **verified** actor resolved from the signing key (authoritative)
+and the actor **claimed** by the `Relicario-Actor` trailer (advisory). When the
+claimed actor disagrees with the verified signer, the event is flagged
+`TAMPERED`. Trailers are advisory metadata; the trustworthy actor is always
+the cryptographically verified signer.
+
+Actions live in two groups:
+
+- **Membership / collections / lifecycle:** `member-add`, `member-remove`,
+  `member-role-change`, `collection-create`, `collection-grant`,
+  `collection-revoke`, `key-rotate`, `org-init`, `ownership-transfer`,
+  `org-delete`.
+- **Item CRUD:** `item-create`, `item-update`, `item-delete` (soft-delete /
+  trash), `item-restore`, `item-purge` — emitted by the `org add` / `edit` /
+  `rm` / `restore` / `purge` commands.
+
+### Honest limitations
+
+The following are deliberate design boundaries, not oversights:
+
+- **Shared org master key — reads are not cryptographically scoped per
+  collection.** The pre-receive hook scopes *writes* by collection path
+  and the CLI filters the manifest to each member's grants, but a single
+  org key opens all collection blobs. A member with any grant can, outside
+  the CLI, decrypt items from collections they are not granted. For true
+  cryptographic separation, use a separate org vault per access boundary.
+  Per-collection subkeys are a phase-2 non-goal.
+
+- **No read audit.** Git records writes only. A member who reads blobs
+  directly leaves no server-visible trace.
+
+- **No "hide value."** There is no mechanism to show a member that an item
+  exists without revealing its field values on decrypt.
+
+- **`delete-org` is a local tombstone in phase 1.** The schema-monotonicity
+  check causes the hook to reject protected-file deletion, so an
+  `org-delete` action cannot be pushed to a hook-protected remote. The
+  deletion is recorded locally only until a future phase addresses it.
+
 ## Configuration env vars
 
 Relicario reads the following environment variables. Each is a trust