diff --git a/crates/relicario-cli/tests/org_authz.rs b/crates/relicario-cli/tests/org_authz.rs
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/crates/relicario-cli/tests/org_authz.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+//! Authorization regression tests for the `relicario org` item commands.
+//!
+//! These cover two gaps the B9–B14 item-CRUD work left open:
+//!   1. Grant-DENIAL on the read/mutate-by-query commands (`get`, `edit`, `rm`,
+//!      `restore`, `purge`). Only `add` had a denial test before this. An
+//!      ungranted member must be rejected by EVERY one of them, and `get` must
+//!      not leak the item's plaintext.
+//!   2. SecureNote body masking on `org get`, mirroring the Login-password
+//!      masking already asserted in `org_items.rs`.
+//!
+//! The multi-member harness mirrors `org_lifecycle.rs`'s `Dev` pattern: each
+//! `Dev` is an isolated XDG config home carrying its own ed25519 device key, so
+//! a second member can be added with their OWN keypair and then attempt commands
+//! against the shared vault.
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+/// A device home (its own XDG config + ed25519 signing key). One `Dev` is the
+/// owner; a second `Dev` plays the ungranted member.
+struct Dev {
+    xdg: PathBuf,
+    _config: TempDir,
+}
+
+impl Dev {
+    /// Generate an OpenSSH ed25519 signing key for `name` and mark it current.
+    fn new(name: &str) -> Self {
+        let config = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let xdg = config.path().to_path_buf();
+        let devices = xdg.join("relicario").join("devices").join(name);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&devices).unwrap();
+        let keyfile = devices.join("signing.key");
+        let st = Command::new("ssh-keygen")
+            .args(["-t", "ed25519", "-N", "", "-C", "relicario-test", "-f"])
+            .arg(&keyfile)
+            .stdout(Stdio::null())
+            .stderr(Stdio::null())
+            .status()
+            .expect("ssh-keygen");
+        assert!(st.success(), "ssh-keygen failed");
+        std::fs::rename(devices.join("signing.key.pub"), devices.join("signing.pub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(
+            xdg.join("relicario").join("devices").join("current"),
+            format!("{name}\n"),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        Dev { xdg, _config: config }
+    }
+
+    /// The OpenSSH public key string for one of this device's keys.
+    fn pubkey(&self, name: &str) -> String {
+        std::fs::read_to_string(
+            self.xdg.join("relicario").join("devices").join(name).join("signing.pub"),
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+        .trim()
+        .to_string()
+    }
+
+    /// Run `relicario <args>` against `vault` with this device active.
+    fn run(&self, vault: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
+        let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("relicario").unwrap();
+        cmd.env("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", &self.xdg)
+            .env("RELICARIO_ORG_DIR", vault)
+            .args(args)
+            .stdin(Stdio::null())
+            .stdout(Stdio::piped())
+            .stderr(Stdio::piped());
+        cmd.output().unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+fn owner_member_id(vault: &Path) -> String {
+    let s = std::fs::read_to_string(vault.join("members.json")).unwrap();
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap();
+    v["members"][0]["member_id"].as_str().unwrap().to_string()
+}
+
+/// Look up a member's id by display name (used to find a freshly added member).
+fn member_id_by_name(vault: &Path, name: &str) -> String {
+    let s = std::fs::read_to_string(vault.join("members.json")).unwrap();
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap();
+    v["members"]
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .find(|m| m["display_name"] == name)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("member `{name}` not found in members.json"))
+        ["member_id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+use assert_cmd::cargo::CommandCargoExt as _;
+
+#[test]
+fn org_get_edit_rm_restore_purge_reject_ungranted_member() {
+    // Owner inits an org, creates `prod`, grants ONLY the owner, and adds an
+    // item into `prod`.
+    let owner_dev = Dev::new("owner-laptop");
+    let vault_tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let vault = vault_tmp.path();
+
+    assert!(owner_dev
+        .run(vault, &["org", "init", "--dir", vault.to_str().unwrap(), "--name", "Acme"])
+        .status
+        .success());
+    let owner = owner_member_id(vault);
+    assert!(owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "create-collection", "prod", "--name", "Prod"]).status.success());
+    assert!(owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "grant", &owner, "prod"]).status.success());
+    assert!(owner_dev
+        .run(vault, &[
+            "org", "add", "login", "--collection", "prod",
+            "--title", "GitHub", "--username", "alice", "--password", "hunter2",
+        ])
+        .status
+        .success());
+
+    // A SECOND member joins with their OWN device key but is NOT granted `prod`.
+    let other_dev = Dev::new("other-laptop");
+    let other_pub = other_dev.pubkey("other-laptop");
+    assert!(owner_dev
+        .run(vault, &["org", "add-member", "--key", &other_pub, "--name", "Mallory", "--role", "member"])
+        .status
+        .success());
+    // Sanity: the member exists but holds no collection grants.
+    let mallory = member_id_by_name(vault, "Mallory");
+    assert!(!mallory.is_empty());
+
+    // EVERY read/mutate-by-query command must be rejected for the ungranted
+    // member, and `get` must NOT print the plaintext password.
+    let get = other_dev.run(vault, &["org", "get", "GitHub"]);
+    let get_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&get.stdout).to_string();
+    let get_err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&get.stderr).to_string();
+    assert!(!get.status.success(), "get must be rejected for ungranted member: {get_out}{get_err}");
+    assert!(!get_out.contains("hunter2"), "get leaked plaintext to ungranted member: {get_out}");
+    assert!(!get_out.contains("alice"), "get leaked username to ungranted member: {get_out}");
+    assert!(
+        get_err.contains("no item matches") || get_err.contains("access denied"),
+        "get error should be denial / not-found: {get_err}"
+    );
+
+    // get --show must ALSO be denied and reveal nothing.
+    let get_show = other_dev.run(vault, &["org", "get", "GitHub", "--show"]);
+    assert!(!get_show.status.success(), "get --show must be rejected for ungranted member");
+    assert!(
+        !String::from_utf8_lossy(&get_show.stdout).contains("hunter2"),
+        "get --show leaked plaintext to ungranted member"
+    );
+
+    for (label, args) in [
+        ("edit", vec!["org", "edit", "GitHub", "--username", "evil"]),
+        ("rm", vec!["org", "rm", "GitHub"]),
+        ("restore", vec!["org", "restore", "GitHub"]),
+        ("purge", vec!["org", "purge", "GitHub"]),
+    ] {
+        let out = other_dev.run(vault, &args);
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_string();
+        assert!(
+            !out.status.success(),
+            "`org {label}` must be rejected for ungranted member; stderr: {stderr}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            stderr.contains("no item matches") || stderr.contains("access denied"),
+            "`org {label}` error should be denial / not-found: {stderr}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The item is untouched: the owner can still read the original password and
+    // the username was NOT changed to the ungranted member's "evil" attempt.
+    let owner_get = owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "get", "GitHub", "--show"]);
+    let owner_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&owner_get.stdout).to_string();
+    assert!(owner_get.status.success(), "owner should still read the item");
+    assert!(owner_out.contains("hunter2"), "owner read must still show original password: {owner_out}");
+    assert!(owner_out.contains("alice"), "edit by ungranted member must not have changed username: {owner_out}");
+    assert!(!owner_out.contains("evil"), "ungranted edit leaked through: {owner_out}");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn org_get_masks_secure_note_body_until_show() {
+    let owner_dev = Dev::new("owner-laptop");
+    let vault_tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let vault = vault_tmp.path();
+
+    assert!(owner_dev
+        .run(vault, &["org", "init", "--dir", vault.to_str().unwrap(), "--name", "Acme"])
+        .status
+        .success());
+    let owner = owner_member_id(vault);
+    assert!(owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "create-collection", "prod", "--name", "Prod"]).status.success());
+    assert!(owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "grant", &owner, "prod"]).status.success());
+    assert!(owner_dev
+        .run(vault, &[
+            "org", "add", "secure-note", "--collection", "prod",
+            "--title", "Recovery", "--body", "super-secret-body",
+        ])
+        .status
+        .success());
+
+    // Default get masks the body and never prints the plaintext.
+    let masked = owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "get", "Recovery"]);
+    assert!(masked.status.success(), "get: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&masked.stderr));
+    let masked_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&masked.stdout).to_string();
+    assert!(masked_out.contains("********"), "expected masked body: {masked_out}");
+    assert!(!masked_out.contains("super-secret-body"), "masked get leaked the body: {masked_out}");
+
+    // get --show reveals the body.
+    let shown = owner_dev.run(vault, &["org", "get", "Recovery", "--show"]);
+    assert!(shown.status.success(), "get --show: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&shown.stderr));
+    let shown_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&shown.stdout).to_string();
+    assert!(shown_out.contains("super-secret-body"), "expected plaintext body with --show: {shown_out}");
+}