diff --git a/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md
index d3b0b2e..acd3686 100644
--- a/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md
+++ b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md
@@ -4546,6 +4546,14 @@ fn verify_org_commit(commit: &str) -> Result<()> {
 /// role elevated up to Owner/Admin). On genesis (root), the sole bootstrap
 /// owner the commit introduces is allowed (it has no parent baseline).
 ///
+/// CRITICAL: the signer's authority is judged on their role in the PARENT
+/// commit (`parent_role(signer)`), NOT the post-change `signer.role` carried in
+/// the commit under verification. Reading `signer.role` would let an Admin
+/// self-promote to Owner in the same commit and then self-authorize that very
+/// promotion (the gate would see the already-elevated role and pass) — the
+/// exact escalation this exists to stop. A signer absent from the parent
+/// (`None`) has no prior authority and is rejected.
+///
 /// `git_show_parent` is defined in Task C2 (same file, same crate).
 fn enforce_owner_only_elevation(
     commit: &str,
@@ -4579,6 +4587,12 @@ fn enforce_owner_only_elevation(
         parent_members.iter().find(|(mid, _)| mid == id).map(|(_, r)| *r)
     };
 
+    // The signer's authority = their PARENT role. A member absent from the parent
+    // (brand new) has no prior authority and cannot mint owners/admins. This is
+    // judged BEFORE the loop and never reads the post-change `signer.role`.
+    let signer_parent = parent_role(signer.member_id.as_str());
+    let signer_may_manage_owners = signer_parent.map_or(false, |r| r.can_manage_owners());
+
     for m in &new_members.members {
         if !is_privileged(m.role) {
             continue;
@@ -4592,12 +4606,14 @@ fn enforce_owner_only_elevation(
         if parent_role(m.member_id.as_str()) == Some(m.role) {
             continue; // unchanged role — not an introduction or elevation
         }
-        // A new owner/admin, or a member elevated to owner/admin → owner-only.
-        if !signer.role.can_manage_owners() {
+        // A new owner/admin, or a member elevated to owner/admin → owner-only,
+        // judged by the signer's PRE-commit (parent) authority — never the
+        // post-change `signer.role`.
+        if !signer_may_manage_owners {
             eprintln!(
-                "REJECT: org commit {commit} — member '{}' (role {:?}) may not introduce or \
+                "REJECT: org commit {commit} — member '{}' (parent role {:?}) may not introduce or \
                  elevate owner/admin '{}' to {:?}; only an owner may",
-                signer.display_name, signer.role, m.display_name, m.role
+                signer.display_name, signer_parent, m.display_name, m.role
             );
             std::process::exit(1);
         }
diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-06-relicario-enterprise-org-vault-design.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-06-relicario-enterprise-org-vault-design.md
index 4413ad4..53b4a1c 100644
--- a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-06-relicario-enterprise-org-vault-design.md
+++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-06-relicario-enterprise-org-vault-design.md
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ Parses `git log` (record separator `%x1e`, field separator `%x1f` to survive mul
 
 1. **Verifies the signature** by building a temporary `allowed_signers` from `members.json` ed25519 keys, injecting `gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile` via `GIT_CONFIG_*`, running `git verify-commit --raw`, and parsing the `SHA256:` fingerprint from stderr — the same mechanism the existing `verify-commit` uses. A commit with no good signature, or whose signer is not a current member, is rejected. (Bare `git %GF` is **not** used — it returns empty without an allowed-signers file.)
 2. **Authorizes the change** by inspecting `git diff-tree` paths:
-   - `members.json` / `collections.json` / `org.json` → signer must be owner/admin; a `member-role-change` granting owner/admin must be signed by an owner.
+   - `members.json` / `collections.json` / `org.json` → signer must be owner/admin; a `member-role-change` granting owner/admin must be signed by an owner. The signer's authority here is judged on their role in the **parent** commit (their pre-change role), never the post-change role carried in the commit under verification — otherwise an Admin could self-promote to Owner in one commit and have the gate read the already-elevated role and self-authorize. A signer absent from the parent has no prior authority and is rejected. (Genesis is the sole exception — see §4 below.)
    - `items/<slug>/<id>.enc` → `<slug>` must be in the signing member's grants.
 3. **Validates schema** — `schema_version` must not decrease for any of the three JSON files (compared against `{commit}^:<file>`), and `members.json`/`collections.json` must pass `validate()`.
 4. **Handles genesis and merges** — the root commit (no parent) is the org-init genesis: it is allowed if signed by the sole owner it introduces. Merge commits are rejected (org history is linear) to avoid first-parent-only diff blind spots.