docs: pin keyfile.rs/second_factor citations; state the second factor is never pushed to the remote

This commit is contained in:
adlee-was-taken
2026-06-26 22:24:57 -04:00
parent 201bf05adc
commit 73877bad78
3 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions

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@@ -39,8 +39,7 @@ Every encrypted file — `manifest.enc`, `settings.enc`, `items/<id>.enc`, `atta
Parsed via `ParamsFile { kdf: KdfParams }` in `crates/relicario-cli/src/session.rs:117`
(`KdfParams` is defined in `crates/relicario-core/src/crypto.rs:157`). `second_factor` is a
top-level sibling of `kdf` on `ParamsFile`, added by Dev-D's key-file work.
<!-- TODO(dev-e): pin exact line of the second_factor field once Dev-D's params change lands -->
top-level sibling of `kdf` on `ParamsFile` (`ParamsFile.second_factor`, `crates/relicario-cli/src/session.rs:125`; the `SecondFactor` enum is `crates/relicario-core/src/crypto.rs:69`).
The `kdf` nesting is intentional — `format_version`, `aead`, and `salt_path` co-exist for forward-compat probing. Do not flatten. Production defaults: `m=65536` (64 MiB), `t=3`, `p=4`. Tests use `m=256, t=1, p=1`.
### `second_factor` field
@@ -60,8 +59,7 @@ Exactly two lines, each terminated by a newline (`\n`). The first line is the li
- Suggested file extension: `.relkey`
- The 32 bytes are the second-factor secret **in the clear** — this file is the "something you have". It is not itself encrypted. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the threat-model implications.
- Source: `crates/relicario-core/src/keyfile.rs``keyfile_encode` / `keyfile_decode`
<!-- TODO(dev-e): pin exact line once Dev-D's keyfile.rs lands -->
- Source: `crates/relicario-core/src/keyfile.rs``keyfile_encode` (`:28`) / `keyfile_decode` (`:36`)
## `.relicario/salt`