docs(plans): v0.9.0 implementation plans — 5 streams across 2 specs

Full-TDD per-stream plans for the v0.9.0 multi-agent train:
- org-a-foundation (A0+A1): WASM org_unwrap_key + multi-context SW session +
  org config + grant-filtered manifest read.
- org-b-read-ui (A2): org switcher + grant-filtered browse/read + offline banner.
- org-c-write (A3): GO/NO-GO signing spike first, then commitSigned + org write
  handlers + UI. Spike-gated; NO-GO ships read-only.
- keyfile-core-cli (B1+B2): core armor + unlock_with_secret + params hint +
  WASM bindings + CLI init/unlock --key-file.
- keyfile-ext-positioning (B3+B4): setup container choice + unlock + the
  README/DESIGN/CRYPTO/FORMATS positioning pivot.

Cross-plan contracts pinned and self-reviewed for consistency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQbgrP6KQW5pibjbPEoTSs
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# Org Write Implementation Plan (spike-gated)
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking. **Task 1 is a GO/NO-GO spike — do not start Tasks 2+ until it passes.**
**Goal:** Let org members add, edit, and delete org items from the extension — via ed25519-signed commits the org pre-receive hook accepts.
**Architecture:** The org hook rejects unsigned commits, and the extension's Contents-API write path produces unsigned commits. So org writes go through the host **Git Data API** (blob → tree → **signed** commit → update-ref), signing the commit object with `sign_for_git` (already in WASM, unused today). `gitea.ts`/`github.ts` already use the Git Data API for large attachments, so this extends existing machinery. Whether the host API preserves a caller-supplied SSH signature through to `git verify-commit` is unproven — Task 1 proves it before anything else is built.
**Tech Stack:** TypeScript (extension SW + UI), vitest; `relicario-server` (the hook, for the spike); a live Gitea (and GitHub) repo for the spike.
## Global Constraints
- Release target: v0.9.0.
- **Task 1 gates the rest.** If the spike fails on both hosts, STOP: record the result in `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-20-extension-org-gui-design.md` and `STATUS.md`, ship org **read** (Plans 1+2) for v0.9.0, and move org write to a follow-up. Do not build Tasks 25 against a push path the server will reject.
- Consume Plan 1's context model + Plan 2's read UI. Org writes operate on the current org context.
- Manifest mutation writes BOTH `items/<slug>/<id>.enc` AND `manifest.enc` (the personal "both writes" invariant) — both inside ONE signed commit where possible.
- Org master key stays in the Zeroizing WASM handle; signing uses the device key from `chrome.storage.local.device_private_key`.
- Capitalize "Relicario" in prose.
---
## File Structure
- *(spike)* `docs/superpowers/spikes/2026-06-20-org-signed-commit-spike.md` *(new)* — the experiment + its result.
- `extension/src/service-worker/git-host.ts` — add `commitSigned(files, message, sign)` to the interface.
- `extension/src/service-worker/gitea.ts` / `github.ts` — implement `commitSigned` over the Git Data API with an attached SSH signature.
- `extension/src/service-worker/org-vault.ts``orgAddItem` / `orgUpdateItem` / `orgDeleteItem` (encrypt with org handle, collection-scoped path, manifest update, signed commit).
- `extension/src/service-worker/router/org-handlers.ts`, `shared/messages.ts``org_add_item` / `org_update_item` / `org_delete_item`.
- `extension/src/popup/components/item-list.ts`, `item-detail.ts`, `item-form.ts` — un-hide write affordances in org context; collection picker on add.
- Tests: `extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts`; component tests for the org write affordances.
---
### Task 1: GO/NO-GO spike — signed commit via the host Git Data API
**Files:**
- Create: `docs/superpowers/spikes/2026-06-20-org-signed-commit-spike.md`
This is a spike, not a TDD cycle. The deliverable is a written GO/NO-GO with evidence.
- [ ] **Step 1: Set up a throwaway org repo + hook.** On a local Gitea, create a repo, install `relicario-server generate-org-hook` as the pre-receive hook, and register a test device's ed25519 public key in `members.json` (use `relicario org init`/`add-member` from the CLI to bootstrap a valid org repo).
- [ ] **Step 2: Construct and sign a commit object in a Node/SW-like harness.** Build a canonical git commit object (tree + parent + author/committer) for a small `items/<slug>/<id>.enc` change, sign the commit payload with the device key via `sign_for_git` (export it the way the SW would call WASM), and format the SSH signature into the commit (`gpgsig`-style SSH signature block).
- [ ] **Step 3: Push it via the Gitea Git Data API.** `POST /git/blobs``POST /git/trees``POST /git/commits` (with the `signature` field if Gitea supports it; otherwise the raw signed commit object) → `PATCH /git/refs/heads/{branch}`. Record the exact API shape that carries the signature.
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify server-side.** Confirm the pushed commit passes `git verify-commit <sha>` on the server AND is accepted by `relicario-server verify-org-commit`. Repeat Steps 24 against **GitHub** (create-commit `signature` field).
- [ ] **Step 5: Record the verdict.** Write the spike doc with: GO/NO-GO per host, the exact Git Data API call sequence that worked (or the failure mode), and any constraints (e.g., committer identity must match). Commit it.
```bash
git add docs/superpowers/spikes/2026-06-20-org-signed-commit-spike.md
git commit -m "spike: org signed-commit push via host Git Data API — <GO|NO-GO> result"
```
**Decision gate:** GO on at least one host → continue to Task 2 (ship write for the passing host(s), note any host-specific limitation). NO-GO on both → update the spec + `STATUS.md`, ship org read only, stop here.
---
### Task 2: `commitSigned` GitHost method
**Files:**
- Modify: `extension/src/service-worker/git-host.ts`, `gitea.ts`, `github.ts`
- Test: `extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/git-host-signed.test.ts`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `wasm.sign_for_git(data: Uint8Array)`; device key from `chrome.storage.local`.
- Produces: `commitSigned(files: Array<{ path: string; content: Uint8Array }>, message: string, sign: (payload: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<void>` on the `GitHost` interface — builds one commit containing all `files` via the Git Data API, signs the commit object, pushes per the Task-1 sequence.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test** (mock fetch to the Git Data API endpoints; assert the call sequence + that the commit body includes the signature)
```ts
test('commitSigned creates a blob+tree+signed-commit and updates the ref', async () => {
const calls: string[] = [];
globalThis.fetch = vi.fn(async (url: string) => { calls.push(String(url)); return okJson({ sha: 'x' }); }) as any;
const host = new GiteaHost('https://git.example', 'o/r', 'tok');
await host.commitSigned([{ path: 'items/c/i.enc', content: new Uint8Array([1]) }], 'add', () => 'SSHSIG...');
expect(calls.some(u => u.includes('/git/blobs'))).toBe(true);
expect(calls.some(u => u.includes('/git/commits'))).toBe(true);
expect(calls.some(u => u.includes('/git/refs/'))).toBe(true);
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/service-worker/__tests__/git-host-signed.test.ts`
Expected: FAIL — `commitSigned` not defined.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implement** — extend the existing Git Data API code (the large-attachment path) into `commitSigned`, following the exact sequence the spike proved. Add `commitSigned` to the `GitHost` interface and both hosts.
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/service-worker/__tests__/git-host-signed.test.ts`
Expected: PASS.
- [ ] **Step 5: Type-check + commit**
Run: `cd extension && npm run build:all`
```bash
git add extension/src/service-worker/git-host.ts extension/src/service-worker/gitea.ts extension/src/service-worker/github.ts extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/git-host-signed.test.ts
git commit -m "feat(ext/sw): commitSigned — signed multi-file commit via Git Data API"
```
---
### Task 3: Org write SW handlers
**Files:**
- Modify: `extension/src/service-worker/org-vault.ts`, `router/org-handlers.ts`, `router/popup-only.ts`, `shared/messages.ts`
- Test: `extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `commitSigned` (Task 2); the org `OrgHandleState` (Plan 1); `wasm.item_encrypt`, `wasm.manifest_encrypt`.
- Produces: SW messages `org_add_item { collection, item }`, `org_update_item { id, item }`, `org_delete_item { id }`. Each encrypts with the org handle, writes the collection-scoped `items/<slug>/<id>.enc` AND the updated `manifest.enc` in ONE signed commit, and refuses writes to ungranted collections client-side (the hook is the backstop).
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
```ts
test('org_add_item refuses a collection the member is not granted', async () => {
const state = { ...orgStateWithGrants(['prod-infra']) };
const resp = await handleOrgAddItem({ collection: 'secret-ops', item: fakeLogin }, state);
expect(resp).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'collection_not_granted' });
});
test('org_add_item writes item + manifest in one signed commit to the granted path', async () => {
const state = { ...orgStateWithGrants(['prod-infra']) };
const commit = vi.spyOn(state.host, 'commitSigned').mockResolvedValue();
await handleOrgAddItem({ collection: 'prod-infra', item: fakeLogin }, state);
const [files] = commit.mock.calls[0];
expect(files.map((f: any) => f.path).sort()).toEqual(['items/prod-infra/' + expect.any(String), 'manifest.enc'].sort());
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts`
Expected: FAIL — handlers undefined.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implement** the three handlers in `org-vault.ts` (encrypt, collection-scoped path, manifest update, single `commitSigned`), wire the three messages (union + `POPUP_ONLY_TYPES` + dispatch), and the grant check.
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/service-worker/`
Expected: PASS (org read + write + personal all green).
- [ ] **Step 5: Type-check + commit**
Run: `cd extension && npm run build:all`
```bash
git add extension/src/service-worker/org-vault.ts extension/src/service-worker/router/org-handlers.ts extension/src/service-worker/router/popup-only.ts extension/src/shared/messages.ts extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts
git commit -m "feat(ext/sw): org_add/update/delete_item via signed commits"
```
---
### Task 4: Org write UI
**Files:**
- Modify: `extension/src/popup/components/item-list.ts`, `item-detail.ts`, `item-form.ts`
- Test: `extension/src/popup/components/__tests__/item-form.test.ts` (org additions)
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `org_add_item`/`org_update_item`/`org_delete_item`; `PopupState.orgCollections`, `PopupState.orgOffline`.
- Produces: in org context — the "+ new item" button reappears (Plan 2 hid it) with a granted-collection picker; edit + delete in the org item detail; all write affordances disabled when `orgOffline`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
```ts
test('org add form requires a granted collection and sends org_add_item', async () => {
vi.spyOn(state, 'getState').mockReturnValue({ orgContext: 'org-1', orgOffline: false,
orgCollections: [{ slug: 'prod-infra', display_name: 'Prod' }] } as any);
const send = vi.spyOn(state, 'sendMessage').mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, data: {} } as any);
await renderItemForm(document.createElement('div'), { type: 'Login' });
// fill + pick collection 'prod-infra' + save → assert message
// ...
expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ type: 'org_add_item', collection: 'prod-infra' }));
});
test('write affordances are disabled when org is offline', async () => {
vi.spyOn(state, 'getState').mockReturnValue({ orgContext: 'org-1', orgOffline: true } as any);
const el = document.createElement('div'); await renderItemDetail(el, fakeItem);
expect(el.querySelector('[data-action="edit"]')?.hasAttribute('disabled')).toBe(true);
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/popup/components/__tests__/item-form.test.ts`
Expected: FAIL — no org collection picker / no save routing / not disabled offline.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implement** — in org context, the save path sends the `org_*` messages (route via a small helper paralleling Plan 2's `messageForList`), add a collection `<select>` (from `orgCollections`) to the add form, and gate edit/delete/add on `!orgOffline`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/popup/components/`
Expected: PASS.
- [ ] **Step 5: Type-check + commit**
Run: `cd extension && npm run build:all`
```bash
git add extension/src/popup/components/item-list.ts extension/src/popup/components/item-detail.ts extension/src/popup/components/item-form.ts extension/src/popup/components/__tests__/item-form.test.ts
git commit -m "feat(ext): org write UI — collection picker, edit/delete, offline-gated"
```
---
### Task 5: Org write acceptance tests
**Files:**
- Create/extend: `extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the acceptance tests** — (a) a write produces a `commitSigned` call whose commit the org hook contract would accept (assert a signature is attached); (b) an ungranted-collection write is refused client-side; (c) every org write touches BOTH the item path and `manifest.enc`; (d) offline context blocks writes before any network call.
- [ ] **Step 2: Run them**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts`
Expected: PASS.
- [ ] **Step 3: Full suite + commit**
Run: `cd extension && npx vitest run && npm run build:all`
```bash
git add extension/src/service-worker/__tests__/org-write.test.ts
git commit -m "test(ext/sw): org write acceptance — signature, grants, dual-write, offline"
```
---
## Notes
- The spike (Task 1) is the project risk concentrated into one day. Treat a NO-GO as a legitimate, value-preserving outcome: org read (Plans 1+2) + the entire key-file lift (Plans 4+5) still ship in v0.9.0.
- Committer identity: the org hook attributes the audit entry to the verified signing key; make sure the commit's committer/author and the signature key are consistent with the member's `members.json` record (the spike must confirm the hook's matching rule).