From 8bb1d779c43566334fc2d56e38e24dcd77580272 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: adlee-was-taken Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 14:39:08 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] docs(org): pre-stage A5 living-docs for merged core+server+CLI-admin (item-CRUD/extension TODO) Pre-stages the A5 living-docs sweep for the already-merged A (relicario-core org module) + C (relicario-server pre-receive hook) + CLI admin/rotate/status-audit work, so the final A5 sweep (after Dev-B B9-B14 merges) is fast. Adds org sections to docs/FORMATS.md (org repo wire formats + wrapped-key blob layout), docs/CRYPTO.md (ECIES X25519 wrap/unwrap, no-Argon2id contrast, rotate re-encryption), docs/SECURITY.md (signature-verifying hook, owner-only elevation, audit vocabulary, honest limitations), DESIGN.md (org-master-key secrets row + server org mode + deps), core/cli ARCHITECTURE.md (org module + org_session), and an Unreleased CHANGELOG entry. B item-CRUD (org add/get/list/edit/rm/restore/purge + main.rs wiring) and extension parity are left as explicit TODO. STATUS/ROADMAP mark-shipped and extension/ARCHITECTURE are deferred to the full A5 (track not yet landed; Dev-D deferred). All cited code constants pinned with file:line per living-docs discipline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TJo44YM3UbBjro2fG6NrKy --- CHANGELOG.md | 34 ++++++ DESIGN.md | 14 +++ crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md | 24 ++++ crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md | 71 ++++++++++++ docs/CRYPTO.md | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/FORMATS.md | 54 +++++++++ docs/SECURITY.md | 111 +++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 459 insertions(+) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 7e87c7a..e487055 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,5 +1,39 @@ # Changelog +## Unreleased — enterprise org vault (in progress) + +Git-native multi-user **org vaults**: a separate org git repository alongside each +member's personal vault, with a 256-bit org master key ECIES-wrapped per member to +their ed25519 device key, collection-scoped item storage, role-based access, and a +signature-verifying pre-receive hook that makes least-privilege server-enforced. +Tracked under `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-06-enterprise-org-vault.md`. Entries +below cover the **already-merged** core (A) + server (C) + CLI admin work; item CRUD +and extension parity land subsequently. + +### Added +- **relicario-core `org` module** (`crates/relicario-core/src/org.rs`): org types + (`OrgId`, `MemberId`, `OrgRole`, `OrgMember`/`OrgMembers`, `CollectionDef`/ + `OrgCollections`, `OrgMeta`, `OrgManifest`/`OrgManifestEntry`) and ECIES X25519 + key wrap/unwrap (`generate_org_key`, `wrap_org_key`, `unwrap_org_key`) — ed25519→ + X25519 via RFC 7748 clamp, domain-separated `SHA-256(dh || eph_pk || rcpt_pk)` KDF, + XChaCha20-Poly1305 inner cipher, all key material in `Zeroizing`. Adds + `encrypt_org_manifest` / `decrypt_org_manifest` vault wrappers. New dependency + `x25519-dalek 2` (`static_secrets`). +- **relicario-server org mode**: `verify-org-commit` (signature verification against + `members.json`, path-scoped role/grant authorization, owner-only elevation judged + on the signer's pre-commit role, schema-version monotonicity) and + `generate-org-hook`; new `[lib]` target (`classify_path`, `extract_schema_version`). +- **relicario-cli org admin commands**: `org init`, `add-member` / `remove-member` / + `set-role` (owner-only escalation guard), `create-collection` / `grant` / `revoke`, + `rotate-key` (re-encrypts every item blob + manifest under a fresh key), + `status` / `audit` (verified-signer attribution + `TAMPERED` flag). Org commits are + signed (`org_git_run` preserves signing). New `ssh-key` dependency in the CLI. + +### TODO (pending merge) +- CLI item CRUD: `org add` / `get` / `list` / `edit` / `rm` / `restore` / `purge`, + and the final `Commands::Org` wiring in `main.rs` (Dev-B B9–B14). +- Extension org switch + read-only browse parity (Dev-D follow-up). + ## v0.7.0 — 2026-06-01 Completes the extension restructure (Plan C) begun under v0.6.0. Phases diff --git a/DESIGN.md b/DESIGN.md index b0759cc..5f3b2da 100644 --- a/DESIGN.md +++ b/DESIGN.md @@ -147,11 +147,25 @@ The threat model differs by codebase. This is the per-secret per-codebase reside | Master key | `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` returned by `derive_master_key` | `UnlockedVault.master_key` for the lifetime of one CLI invocation | WASM-side memory behind an opaque `SessionHandle`; JS never sees the bytes | Never sees it | | Item secret (password, card number, etc.) | `Zeroizing` / `Zeroizing>` | Same | Briefly held in WASM during `item_decrypt`; results passed to popup as plaintext for display | Held in DOM (the user is staring at it); cleared when view changes | | Device private key | — | Filesystem under `~/.config/relicario/devices/.key` (mode 0600) | `chrome.storage.local.device_private_key` | — | +| Org master key (256-bit, random) | `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` during `wrap_org_key`/`unwrap_org_key` (never derived from a passphrase) | `UnlockedOrgVault.org_key` for one CLI invocation; recovered by unwrapping `keys/.enc` with the device ed25519 seed | TODO (extension follow-up) | Never sees it | + +The org master key is **never escrowed**: each member holds it ECIES-wrapped to their device key (`keys/.enc`); an owner can always re-wrap it to a replacement device key, so there is no central key store to compromise. See `docs/CRYPTO.md` (Org-key ECIES wrap/unwrap) and `docs/FORMATS.md` (Org vault repo formats). The popup / vault / content surfaces of the extension cannot decrypt an item independently — they all message the SW. Content scripts in particular get back already-prepared payloads (e.g. `{ username, password }`) from `fill_credentials` after the SW resolved everything. The CLI keeps its master key in process memory; if the process exits or crashes, the key is gone (Zeroize on drop). There is no CLI session daemon. The `lock` subcommand exists only for UX parity with the extension and is a no-op. +## Org vault (enterprise, in progress) + +The enterprise org vault is a **second git repository** alongside each member's personal vault, with its own schema (`org.json` / `members.json` / `collections.json` / `keys/.enc` / `manifest.enc` / `items//.enc`). It reuses the same `relicario-core` AEAD; the only new crypto is the per-member ECIES key wrap. Cross-codebase additions: + +- **relicario-core** gains the `org` module (`org.rs`) and the `x25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["static_secrets"] }` dependency (`crates/relicario-core/Cargo.toml:19`); `ssh-key` 0.6 is already present (`:20`). +- **relicario-cli** gains `org_session.rs` + `commands/org.rs` and the `ssh-key = "0.6"` dependency (`crates/relicario-cli/Cargo.toml:33`). +- **relicario-server** gains an **org mode**: a new `[lib]` target (`classify_path`, `extract_schema_version`) plus the `verify-org-commit` and `generate-org-hook` subcommands — a signature-verifying, path-scoped pre-receive hook (see `docs/SECURITY.md`). +- **extension** org switch + read parity is a tracked follow-up (Dev-D) — `TODO (extension follow-up)`. + +Status: core (A) + server hook (C) merged; CLI admin/rotate/status-audit merged; CLI item-CRUD + the final command wiring are `TODO (pending Dev-B B9–B14)`. + ## Build matrix | Target | Tool | Output | When to run | diff --git a/crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md b/crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md index d1770ff..423fc8c 100644 --- a/crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md +++ b/crates/relicario-cli/ARCHITECTURE.md @@ -71,6 +71,30 @@ under `src/commands/`. Each source file has one job. hatches `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE` (`session.rs:42`) and `RELICARIO_IMAGE` (`session.rs:125`) that integration tests use to bypass the TTY. +- **`src/org_session.rs`** — `UnlockedOrgVault`, the org-vault analogue of + `session.rs`. Holds the org master key in `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` for one CLI + invocation, recovered by unwrapping `keys/.enc` with the device + ed25519 seed (`relicario_core::unwrap_org_key`). Owns the **collection-scoped** + `item_path` (`items//.enc` — the leading slug is what the + pre-receive hook authorizes against, never decrypting), fingerprint-based + member matching (`relicario_core::fingerprint`, tolerant of OpenSSH + whitespace/comment differences), `atomic_write`, and `org_git_run`. Note + `org_git_run` runs **bare git** — unlike `helpers::git_run` it does NOT inject + `commit.gpgsign=false`, because org commits MUST be signed (the hook verifies + every commit's signature); signing config is established by + `configure_git_signing` during `org init`. + +- **`src/commands/org.rs`** — the `relicario org` subcommand surface. Merged: + `init`, `add-member` / `remove-member` / `set-role` (owner-only escalation + guard), `create-collection` / `grant` / `revoke`, `rotate-key` + (`run_rotate_key`, `commands/org.rs:332` — fresh key, re-wrap for all members, + re-encrypt every item blob + manifest under the new key, concurrent-rotation + abort), and `status` / `audit` (verified-signer attribution + `TAMPERED` + flag). **TODO (pending Dev-B B9–B14):** the item-CRUD commands (`org add` / + `get` / `list` / `edit` / `rm` / `restore` / `purge`) and the final + `Commands::Org` wiring in `main.rs`. `device.rs` gains + `current_device_seed` / `current_device_pubkey` helpers for the ECIES unwrap. + - **`src/helpers.rs`** (`helpers.rs:1-101`) — pure, no-state plumbing: `find_vault_dir_from` (`helpers.rs:14-28`) walks up parent directories looking for a `.relicario/` marker; `vault_dir` and `relicario_dir` wrap it diff --git a/crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md b/crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md index dc3c3da..81d762a 100644 --- a/crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md +++ b/crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md @@ -103,6 +103,26 @@ Pipeline" and "Crate Layout"). auth factor. Owns its own `YChannel`, `EmbedRegion`, 8×8 DCT/IDCT, Quantization Index Modulation, and crop-recovery extractor. No other module imports it; it is consumed only via the public re-export from `lib.rs`. +- **`org.rs`** — Org-vault data model and ECIES key-wrapping layer + (`crates/relicario-core/src/org.rs`). Types: `OrgId` (L15), `MemberId` + (L19; `is_valid` L41 — 16 lowercase hex), `OrgRole` (L54; + `can_manage_members` L61 = Owner | Admin, `can_manage_owners` L64 = Owner + only), `OrgMember` (L72; carries `ed25519_pubkey` in OpenSSH wire format, + `collections` grant list, `role`), `OrgMembers` (L86; `schema_version: 1` + L93; `validate` L104), `CollectionDef` (L123), `OrgCollections` (L131; + `schema_version: 1` L138; `validate` L145 rejects empty / `/` / `.` slugs), + `OrgMeta` (L164; `schema_version: 1` L174), `OrgManifestEntry` (L185; + carries `collection` slug plus id/type/title/tags/modified/trashed\_at), + `OrgManifest` (L199; `schema_version: 1` L206; `filter_for_member` L210 + returns only entries whose collection slug appears in the member's grants). + All four JSON containers carry `schema_version: 1` — distinct from the + personal `Manifest` whose `MANIFEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` (`manifest.rs:12`). + Crypto: `generate_org_key` (L230) → `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` (256-bit + CSPRNG org master key); `wrap_org_key` (L265) / `unwrap_org_key` (L299) — + ECIES over X25519, described in detail under **Invariants & contracts** + below. `vault.rs` adds `encrypt_org_manifest` / `decrypt_org_manifest` typed + wrappers (JSON-serialize → `crypto::encrypt` under the org key, plaintext in + `Zeroizing`) consistent with the personal-vault pattern. - **`backup.rs`** — `.relbak` v1 container format: `pack_backup` / `unpack_backup` plus the `BackupInput` / `BackupOutput` / `BackupItem` / `BackupAttachment` shapes. Wraps a zstd-compressed JSON envelope of vault @@ -230,6 +250,28 @@ Pipeline" and "Crate Layout"). also used to derive the key for *unlock*, not just create). - **`SymbolCharset::Custom` must be ASCII-only** (`generators.rs:46-52`). Non-ASCII custom charsets are rejected with `RelicarioError::Format`. +- **ECIES wrap-blob layout is fixed** at + `ephemeral_x25519_pk(32) || version(1) || nonce(24) || ciphertext+tag` + (`org.rs:264`). The `version(1)` byte is the same `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02` + emitted by `crypto::encrypt`, which is what occupies that slot — the layout + merely names the regions for clarity. +- **KDF wrap key = `SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pk || recipient_pk)`** + (`org.rs:278-281`). The concatenation order is identical in `wrap_org_key` + and `unwrap_org_key`; a mismatch in either direction would produce a + different key and fail the AEAD open. The intermediate `kdf_input` buffer is + held in `Zeroizing>`; `org_key`, `wrap_key`, and the decrypted + `plaintext` from unwrap are also held in `Zeroizing`. +- **ed25519 → X25519 conversion** applies `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` then the + RFC 7748 scalar clamp + (`scalar[0] &= 248; scalar[31] &= 127; scalar[31] |= 64`) to derive the + private X25519 scalar (`org.rs:242`); the recipient public key is obtained + via `ed25519_dalek`'s `to_montgomery()`. This lets device ed25519 keys serve + double duty as X25519 recipients without storing a separate DH key. +- **Org crypto bypasses Argon2id.** The ECIES inner cipher delegates to + `crate::crypto::encrypt` / `decrypt` (XChaCha20-Poly1305, random 24-byte + nonce, `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02`) — no AEAD re-implementation. The X25519 KDF + output is used directly as the AEAD key; the Argon2id path in `crypto.rs` + is not invoked for org key wrapping. ## Key flows @@ -315,6 +357,35 @@ when subsequent `decrypt_*` returns `RelicarioError::Decrypt`. call `item.prune_history(&settings.field_history_retention, now_unix())` when they want to enforce the policy. +### Org key wrap / unwrap + +1. **Wrap** (`org.rs:265`): caller supplies a recipient's OpenSSH ed25519 + public key string. + - Parse the OpenSSH wire format via `ssh-key` to recover the raw 32-byte + ed25519 public key bytes; apply `to_montgomery()` (ed25519-dalek) to + obtain the recipient's X25519 public key. + - Generate an ephemeral X25519 keypair from `OsRng`. + - `dh_shared = ephemeral_secret × recipient_x25519_pk` (X25519 DH). + - `wrap_key = SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pk || recipient_pk)` + (`org.rs:278-281`), intermediates in `Zeroizing`. + - `ct = crate::crypto::encrypt(&wrap_key, &org_key)` — yields the standard + `version(1) || nonce(24) || ciphertext+tag` blob. + - Return `ephemeral_x25519_pk(32) || ct` (`org.rs:264`). +2. **Unwrap** (`org.rs:299`): caller supplies the device ed25519 seed bytes + (from `current_device_seed` in the CLI layer, not from `relicario-core`). + - Derive X25519 private scalar from seed: `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` + RFC 7748 + clamp (`org.rs:242`). + - Slice the first 32 bytes of the blob as `ephemeral_pk`; read recipient's + own X25519 public key via the same `to_montgomery()` path. + - `dh_shared = device_x25519_secret × ephemeral_pk`. + - Reconstruct `wrap_key` identically; `crypto::decrypt` recovers `org_key` + into `Zeroizing`. + +Integration tests: `crates/relicario-core/tests/org.rs` (5 acceptance tests +covering wrap/unwrap round-trip, revoked-after-rotation, and manifest +`filter_for_member`). A pinned RFC 8032 ed25519→X25519 known-answer vector +lives in the `#[cfg(test)]` block inside `org.rs` itself. + ### imgsecret embed 1. Caller passes a JPEG byte slice and a 32-byte secret to diff --git a/docs/CRYPTO.md b/docs/CRYPTO.md index 04bac34..f2c7127 100644 --- a/docs/CRYPTO.md +++ b/docs/CRYPTO.md @@ -123,6 +123,157 @@ master_key ────────►│ XChaCha20 │────── └──────────────────┘ ``` +## Org-key ECIES wrap/unwrap + +Org vaults use a different key-derivation path than personal vaults. There is no +passphrase, no reference JPEG, and no Argon2id involved. Instead, each org has a +single random **org master key** that is wrapped per-member using X25519 ECIES and +stored as an opaque blob in `keys/.enc` inside the org repo. + +### Org master key + +``` +generate_org_key() (org.rs:230) + → OsRng → 256-bit random + → Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> (held in memory; never written in the clear) +``` + +One org key per org. It is re-generated on every `org rotate-key` operation. + +### ed25519 → X25519 conversion + +Each Relicario device holds an ed25519 signing key. To participate in ECIES the +ed25519 key pair must be mapped to X25519: + +``` +Recipient public key (for wrap): + ed25519 VerifyingKey + → .to_montgomery() (birational Montgomery map, ed25519_dalek) + → X25519 PublicKey + +Recipient secret key (for unwrap): + ed25519 seed (32 bytes) + → SHA-512(seed)[..32] (org.rs:241–242) + → RFC 7748 clamp: + scalar[0] &= 248 + scalar[31] &= 127 + scalar[31] |= 64 + → x25519_dalek::StaticSecret +``` + +The RFC 7748 clamp and the `to_montgomery()` birational map are the standard +construction; a pinned RFC 8032 known-answer vector is verified in the unit tests +inside `org.rs`. + +### Wrap flow (one blob per member) + +``` + ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ wrap_org_key() │ (org.rs:265) + │ │ + org_key ──────────►│ EphemeralSecret::random (OsRng) │ + │ ephemeral_pk = PublicKey::from(eph) │ + │ │ + recipient_pk ─────►│ DH: eph_sk.diffie_hellman(rec_pk) │ + │ → dh_shared (32 bytes) │ + │ │ + │ kdf_input = dh_shared │ + │ ‖ ephemeral_pk (32 B) │ (org.rs:278–281) + │ ‖ recipient_pk (32 B) │ + │ wrap_key = SHA-256(kdf_input) │ + │ (kdf_input in Zeroizing>) │ + │ (wrap_key in Zeroizing<[u8;32]>) │ + │ │ + │ encrypted = crate::crypto::encrypt │ + │ (wrap_key, org_key) │ + │ → version(1) ‖ nonce(24) ‖ ct+tag │ + │ │ + │ output: ephemeral_pk(32) │ (org.rs:264) + │ ‖ version(1) │ + │ ‖ nonce(24) │ + │ ‖ ciphertext + tag │ + └──────────────────────────────────────┘ + │ + ▼ + keys/.enc (in org repo) +``` + +### Unwrap flow + +``` + ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ unwrap_org_key() │ (org.rs:299) + │ │ + wrapped blob ─────►│ split: ephemeral_pk(32) + rest │ + │ │ + ed25519_seed ─────►│ ed25519_seed_to_x25519_secret() │ + │ → recipient_sk + recipient_pk │ + │ │ + │ DH: recipient_sk.diffie_hellman(eph)│ + │ → dh_shared │ + │ │ + │ kdf_input + SHA-256 → wrap_key │ + │ (same domain-separated KDF as wrap) │ + │ │ + │ plaintext = crate::crypto::decrypt │ + │ (wrap_key, rest) │ + │ → Zeroizing<[u8;32]> org_key │ + └──────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +### Key distinction: no Argon2id + +Unlike the personal vault, **org crypto bypasses Argon2id entirely**: + +| | Personal vault | Org vault | +|---|---|---| +| Key origin | Argon2id(passphrase ‖ image_secret, salt) | OsRng → 256-bit random | +| Key transport | Embedded in reference JPEG (stego) | X25519 ECIES wrap blob | +| AEAD primitive | XChaCha20-Poly1305 (`crate::crypto::encrypt`) | Same primitive (delegated) | +| KDF for wrap key | Argon2id | SHA-256(DH ‖ eph_pk ‖ rec_pk) | + +The inner AEAD (`crate::crypto::encrypt` / `decrypt`) is **not re-implemented** in +the org module — it is called directly, so org item blobs share the identical +`version(1) ‖ nonce(24) ‖ ct+tag` wire format (`VERSION_BYTE = 0x02`, +`crates/relicario-core/src/crypto.rs:59`). + +### Zeroize discipline + +All intermediates that carry key material are dropped through `Zeroizing`: + +- `org_key` — `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` everywhere it is passed +- `kdf_input` — `Zeroizing>` (org.rs:278) +- `wrap_key` — `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` +- decrypt `plaintext` in `unwrap_org_key` — `Zeroizing>` + +### Key rotation and re-encryption + +`org rotate-key` (`crates/relicario-cli/src/commands/org.rs:332`) does more than +generate a fresh org key: + +``` +run_rotate_key() + 1. git pull --rebase (detect concurrent rotation → abort if non-fast-forward) + 2. generate_org_key() → new_org_key + 3. wrap_org_key(new_org_key, member_pk) for every current member + → overwrites keys/.enc + 4. re-encrypt every items//.enc blob under new_org_key + 5. re-encrypt manifest.enc under new_org_key + 6. git add + git commit via org_git_run (signed; Relicario-Action: key-rotate) +``` + +`rotate-key` pulls (`--rebase`) at the start to pick up concurrent changes and +abort on a conflicting concurrent rotation, then commits locally; it does **not** +push. Publishing the rotation to the remote is a separate step (the normal git +sync path), the same way personal-vault mutations commit locally and sync later. + +Re-encryption of every item blob (step 4) is deliberate: a removed member who holds +a local clone of the repo cannot decrypt any item written after the rotation, because +those blobs are sealed under a key they never received. Without re-encryption, all +pre-rotation blobs would remain readable to the former member indefinitely. + +> **TODO (pending Dev-B B9–B14):** item-CRUD commands (`org add`/`get`/`list`/`edit`/`rm`/`restore`/`purge`) and the final `Commands::Org` wiring in `main.rs` are not yet merged. + ## imgsecret DCT Embedding ``` diff --git a/docs/FORMATS.md b/docs/FORMATS.md index e35a63c..dae031a 100644 --- a/docs/FORMATS.md +++ b/docs/FORMATS.md @@ -71,6 +71,60 @@ An empty array (`[]`) puts the pre-receive hook in bootstrap mode (all pushes ac Commits by `public_key` at or after `revoked_at` (Unix seconds) are rejected by the pre-receive hook. Commits before `revoked_at` remain valid (they were authorized at the time). +## Org vault repo formats + +The org vault is a **separate git repository** alongside the personal vault. It is not nested inside `.relicario/`. Its layout: + +``` +org.json # OrgMeta (schema_version, org_id, display_name, created_at) +members.json # PUBLIC/unencrypted member directory +collections.json # collection definitions +keys/.enc # org master key wrapped to that member's device key +manifest.enc # OrgManifest (schema_version 1, per-member-filtered) +items//.enc # collection-scoped item blobs +``` + +### `org.json` — OrgMeta + +Unencrypted JSON (`OrgMeta`, `org.rs:164`). `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:174`). Fields: `schema_version`, `org_id`, `display_name`, `created_at` (Unix seconds). + +### `members.json` — OrgMembers + +Unencrypted JSON array of `OrgMember` records (`org.rs:72`); container type `OrgMembers` carries `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:93`). Per-member fields: `member_id` (16 lowercase hex chars), `display_name`, `role` (one of `owner | admin | member`), `ed25519_pubkey` (OpenSSH wire string), `collections` (array of granted slug strings), `added_at`, `added_by`. Roles are not secrets — authorization to read this file is not required to verify signatures. + +### `collections.json` — OrgCollections + +Unencrypted JSON; `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:138`). Contains a list of `CollectionDef` records (`org.rs:123`). Validation (`org.rs:145`) rejects slugs that are empty, contain `/`, or equal `.`. + +### `keys/.enc` — wrapped org master key + +Binary blob; NOT a standard `.enc` blob. Layout (`org.rs:264`): + +``` +┌──────────────────────────┬─────────┬────────┬──────────────────────┐ +│ ephemeral_x25519_pubkey │ version │ nonce │ ciphertext + tag │ +│ 32 bytes │ 1 byte │24 bytes│ N + 16 bytes │ +└──────────────────────────┴─────────┴────────┴──────────────────────┘ +``` + +- The wrapping key is `SHA-256(dh_shared || ephemeral_pubkey || recipient_pubkey)` (`org.rs:278–281`), held in `Zeroizing>`. +- The inner AEAD (`version || nonce || ciphertext+tag`) is produced by `crate::crypto::encrypt` — the same XChaCha20-Poly1305 framing used for personal `.enc` blobs (see **Encrypted blob** above). `VERSION_BYTE = 0x02` applies here too. +- The X25519 private scalar is derived from the device ed25519 seed via `SHA-512(seed)[..32]` with RFC 7748 clamping (`org.rs:242`). Argon2id is **not** involved — the wrapping key is derived entirely from the X25519 DH exchange. + +### `manifest.enc` — OrgManifest + +Encrypted with the org master key using `crypto::encrypt` (standard `.enc` framing). Decrypts to `OrgManifest` JSON (`org.rs:199`); `schema_version: 1` (`org.rs:206`). Each `OrgManifestEntry` (`org.rs:185`) carries: `id`, `type`, `title`, `tags`, `modified`, `trashed_at`, and a `collection` slug field. The `collection` field distinguishes this type from `ManifestEntry` in the personal vault. + +Contrast with the personal vault manifest: `Manifest` uses `MANIFEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` (`manifest.rs:12`) and `ManifestEntry` has no `collection` field. The two types are distinct and do not share a schema. + +### `items//.enc` + +Standard `.enc` blob (see **Encrypted blob** above), encrypted under the org master key. The blob itself does **not** name its collection — the directory path segment carries the slug. This allows the pre-receive hook (`relicario-server`) to authorize a write by path segment without decrypting the blob. + +**TODO (pending Dev-B B9–B14):** CLI commands for creating, reading, editing, and deleting org items (`org add` / `get` / `list` / `edit` / `rm` / `restore` / `purge`) are not yet wired in `main.rs`. + +**TODO (extension follow-up):** extension UI for browsing and editing org vault items. + ## Item IDs and Field IDs | Kind | Length | Entropy | Source | diff --git a/docs/SECURITY.md b/docs/SECURITY.md index 4899e35..5a3a86b 100644 --- a/docs/SECURITY.md +++ b/docs/SECURITY.md @@ -74,6 +74,117 @@ Without device authentication, access control is transport-layer only: Device registration is optional but recommended for shared vaults. +## Org vault security + +An org vault is a separate git repository alongside the personal vault. It +uses ed25519 commit-signing and a server-side pre-receive hook to make +least-privilege access control server-enforced, not advisory. + +### Org device-key authentication + +Every org member registers an ed25519 device key. The key appears in +`members.json` as an OpenSSH public-key string alongside the member's role +and collection grants. Fingerprint matching is done via +`relicario_core::fingerprint`, which normalises the OpenSSH format so that +whitespace and comment differences do not create phantom mismatches. + +Org access requires two things at once: a wrapped key blob (`keys/.enc`) +and the device private key that can unwrap it. There is no org passphrase — +removing a member's blob and rotating the org master key is sufficient to +revoke access (see **Key rotation** below). Device keys are completely +separate from the personal vault's KDF inputs; revoking org access does not +affect the member's personal vault. + +### Pre-receive hook enforcement + +`relicario-server generate-org-hook` (`crates/relicario-server/src/main.rs:511`) +emits a hook script that calls `relicario-server verify-org-commit` for +every pushed commit. Unsigned or structurally invalid commits are rejected +before they land. + +`verify_org_commit` (`main.rs:286`) performs four checks in order: + +1. **Signature verification** — a temporary `allowed_signers` file is + constructed from the current `members.json`; `git verify-commit --raw` + is run and the resulting SHA-256 fingerprint is matched back to a + `members.json` entry. A commit not signed by a *current* member is + rejected outright. + +2. **Path-level write authorisation** — each modified path is classified by + `classify_path` (`crates/relicario-server/src/lib.rs:19`) into + `ProtectedJson` (owner/admin write only), `CollectionItem` (the + `items//…` prefix; write allowed only if the slug appears in the + signer's `collections` grant array), or `Unrestricted`. The write is + authorised if and only if the signer's role and grants satisfy the + classification. Item blobs are authorised by the leading path segment + alone — the ciphertext is never decrypted by the hook. + +3. **Owner-only elevation guard** (`enforce_owner_only_elevation`, + `main.rs:438`) — only a member whose *pre-commit* (parent) role is Owner + may introduce a new member at Owner or Admin level, or promote an + existing member to either. Checking the pre-commit role means an Admin + cannot self-promote in the same commit that writes the escalated + `members.json`; there is no epoch in which the transition is + self-authorised. + +4. **Schema monotonicity** (`enforce_schema_monotonicity`, `main.rs:521`) + — `schema_version` values in org JSON containers may not decrease. + Merge commits are rejected. A genesis commit (no parents) is allowed + only when it is signed by the sole Owner it introduces. + +### Key rotation + +`relicario org rotate-key` generates a fresh 256-bit org master key, +re-wraps it for every current member, and re-encrypts every +`items//.enc` blob and the manifest under the new key in a single +signed commit tagged `Relicario-Action: key-rotate`. A revoked member's +wrapped blob is simply not written during rotation, so they hold a blob that +decrypts to a stale key — they cannot read items encrypted under the new +key. + +### Audit action vocabulary + +The `relicario org audit` command attributes actions to their verified +signer (not to the commit author or trailer value). Each event records two +actors: the **verified** actor resolved from the signing key (authoritative) +and the actor **claimed** by the `Relicario-Actor` trailer (advisory). When the +claimed actor disagrees with the verified signer, the event is flagged +`TAMPERED`. Trailers are advisory metadata; the trustworthy actor is always +the cryptographically verified signer. + +Actions live in two groups: + +- **Live (merged A + C streams):** `member-add`, `member-remove`, + `member-role-change`, `collection-create`, `collection-grant`, + `collection-revoke`, `key-rotate`, `org-init`, `ownership-transfer`, + `org-delete`. +- **TODO (pending Dev-B B9–B13):** `item-create`, `item-update`, + `item-delete`, `item-restore`, `item-purge` — the emitter code lands with + the item-CRUD command stream. + +### Honest limitations + +The following are deliberate design boundaries, not oversights: + +- **Shared org master key — reads are not cryptographically scoped per + collection.** The pre-receive hook scopes *writes* by collection path + and the CLI filters the manifest to each member's grants, but a single + org key opens all collection blobs. A member with any grant can, outside + the CLI, decrypt items from collections they are not granted. For true + cryptographic separation, use a separate org vault per access boundary. + Per-collection subkeys are a phase-2 non-goal. + +- **No read audit.** Git records writes only. A member who reads blobs + directly leaves no server-visible trace. + +- **No "hide value."** There is no mechanism to show a member that an item + exists without revealing its field values on decrypt. + +- **`delete-org` is a local tombstone in phase 1.** The schema-monotonicity + check causes the hook to reject protected-file deletion, so an + `org-delete` action cannot be pushed to a hook-protected remote. The + deletion is recorded locally only until a future phase addresses it. + ## Configuration env vars Relicario reads the following environment variables. Each is a trust