Merge feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup: Plan A security + cleanup

v0.5.0 Plan A — Security Fixes + Repo Cleanup. 7 commits, ~800 net
insertions across the Rust workspace. Four items delivered:

- S1 (HIGH-severity authentication bypass fix): rewrite verify_commit
  in relicario-server. The previous implementation accepted any
  GOODSIG/Good signature line on stderr, ignoring whether the signing
  key was registered or revoked. The new implementation:
  * builds a temp gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile from devices.json at the
    commit (no global git-config mutation)
  * parses the SHA-256 fingerprint from `git verify-commit --raw`
    stderr via regex
  * checks revocation FIRST (revoked entries may have been removed
    from devices.json), with the historical-commit case
    (committer_ts < revoked_at) explicitly allowed
  * uses committer date (GIT_COMMITTER_DATE / `git show -s
    --format=%ct`), not author date or wall clock
  * tightened the bootstrap guard to require BOTH devices and revoked
    to be empty (closes an empty-devices.json privilege-escalation
    route present in the original code)
  * 4 acceptance integration tests build real on-disk repos with
    SSH-signed commits and verify each scenario

- S2 (tar archive path-traversal hardening): replace
  tar::Archive::unpack with safe_unpack_git_archive. Located in
  relicario-core (per-spec, so integration tests can reach it without
  the bytes-in/bytes-out invariant breaking). Validates each entry's
  type (rejects symlinks/hardlinks), path components (rejects '..',
  RootDir, Windows drive Prefix), and declared size (rejects
  individual or cumulative > 100×compressed-or-1-GiB whichever is
  lower). The CLI's restore path adds a paranoid OS-level
  starts_with(.git/) check on the joined destination as
  defense-in-depth even after textual validation. 5 acceptance tests
  cover path traversal, symlinks, oversized headers (header claim of
  2 GiB tested without allocating disk).

- S3 (RELICARIO_* env-var audit): docs/SECURITY.md gains a
  "Configuration env vars" section enumerating each variable, its
  purpose, and trust assumption. Active-in-all-builds variables
  (RELICARIO_IMAGE, RELICARIO_GITEA_*) are documented; debug-only
  variables (RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE, RELICARIO_TEST_*) are gated
  behind cfg(debug_assertions) so the env-var lookup is removed from
  --release binaries.

- C1 (stale feature branch prune): 5 merged feature branches and
  3 worktrees pruned interactively per dev report.

- Bonus: 4d02a50 fixes pre-existing clippy warnings across
  crates/relicario-{core,cli} (deref operators, Option::is_none_or
  vs map_or(true, ...), iter_mut().enumerate() patterns,
  div_ceil()) so the workspace builds clean under `-D warnings`.

Merge resolution: docs/SECURITY.md had a conflict where main's F11/F12
(Device Authentication paragraph naming relicario-server + simplified
"Device registration is optional" line) collided with Plan A's S3
section. Resolved by keeping both — F11/F12's wording for the
Device Authentication section, then Plan A's "Configuration env vars"
section appended below.

Cargo.lock regenerated. The previous committed lock was stale since
commit 8855078 (--totp-qr); cargo test on both devs' worktrees
produced identical regenerated locks. Plan A genuinely added regex +
tempfile to relicario-server (both already transitively present from
relicario-cli), so no new top-level deps; the Cargo.lock churn is
catch-up of crate-version bumps that have happened since the last
commit-of-record.

Tests: 248 cargo tests pass; extension tests unchanged (336/8 with 8
pre-existing device-auth scaffolding failures).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
adlee-was-taken
2026-05-02 19:54:12 -04:00
21 changed files with 1741 additions and 65 deletions

940
Cargo.lock generated

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