Both popup-only. upload_attachment encrypts via WASM, putBlobs via
GitHost (Git Data API fallback for >900 KB), persists the AttachmentRef
on the item + manifest summaries. Duplicate uploads (same content =
same id from sha256) return the existing ref without a re-upload.
download_attachment reads + decrypts and returns plaintext bytes for
the popup to wrap in a Blob. 4 new router tests (accept × 2, reject × 2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Critical bug caught in T8 code review: the SW's get_totp handler
gated on core.type === 'login' and referenced core.totp, so the
standalone Totp item type (which lands in T8 with core.type === 'totp'
and core.config) had its detail-view ticker silently rejected with
'no_totp' every second. Ticker swallowed the error; rotating code
display stayed at placeholder forever.
Fix: extend the handler to resolve TotpConfig from either carrier:
- Login items: item.core.totp (optional subfield)
- Totp items: item.core.config (required)
Also:
- Add 3 router tests covering both paths + the empty case
- Remove stale '……' placeholder check in types/totp.ts's \`t\`
keyboard shortcut (dead code — the placeholder is '·····' or
'······', never horizontal ellipses)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug: setup tab's zxcvbn meter silently stayed at score=-1 because the
router's isSetup exception only allowed save_setup, so rate_passphrase
got unauthorized_sender. Result: the "create vault" button stayed
disabled forever even with a strong passphrase.
Fix: add a narrow SETUP_ALLOWED set containing save_setup,
rate_passphrase, and is_unlocked (step-4 extension detection). Reject
everything else from the setup tab. Also clean up setup.ts's unlock
call — it was passing the raw 32-byte imageSecret where JPEG bytes with
embedded secret are required; the Rust-side unlock calls imgsecret::
extract internally.
Diagnostic logging across the message path so the next silent failure
speaks up:
- [relicario setup] staged logs through vault-init; console.error
with the failure stage name in the UI banner.
- [relicario setup] rate_passphrase lastError / rejected / threw
branches each log their own warning.
- [relicario router] console.warn on unauthorized_sender (with sender
classification) and unknown_message_type.
- [relicario sw] first-message wasm init announced; per-message
non-ok result logged; thrown errors console.error'd.
Tests: +3 setup-allowlist tests (rate_passphrase accepted, is_unlocked
accepted, fill_credentials + unlock rejected). 55/55 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After Slice 4's router split, the capture prompt's Save button was
silently failing on every site: content/capture.ts called four handlers
(get_settings, get_item, update_item, add_item) that are all in
POPUP_ONLY_TYPES, so the router rejected each with unauthorized_sender.
Fix in two parts:
Part A — get_settings: content scripts already have storage permission
via the manifest, so read relicarioSettings directly from
chrome.storage.local instead of round-tripping through the SW.
Part B — new content-callable 'capture_save_login' message that
consolidates what was previously three separate popup-only calls
(get_item + update_item or add_item) into one SW-side operation.
Content scripts no longer need to distinguish add vs update — the SW
does that itself from the manifest.
Security model (all enforced SW-side, never trusting content):
- Origin is derived from sender.tab.url by the router. The payload
contains only username + password; there is no way for content to
influence which host the new/updated item binds to.
- Update path re-verifies the existing item's core.url hostname
matches senderHost before mutating. If the manifest icon_hint ever
drifts from core.url, we return origin_mismatch rather than
silently binding a password to the wrong origin.
- Update mutates ONLY the password field + modified timestamp —
never title, url, or any other core field.
- Add path creates a new Login item whose title is senderHost and
whose url is the sender's origin.
Five new router tests cover: content-accept, popup-reject, update
path rotates only the password, add path creates bound item, and
origin_mismatch when the stored item's host disagrees with senderHost.
Tests: 47 -> 52.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three new describe blocks cover the gaps flagged during Slice 4 review:
1. fill_credentials captured-tab verification — three cases:
- tab_navigated: chrome.tabs.get returns a tab whose hostname differs
from capturedUrl → handler must return { ok: false, tab_navigated }
and not call chrome.tabs.sendMessage.
- origin_mismatch: tab matches capturedUrl but the item's
LoginCore.url hostname differs → same refusal, no delivery.
- happy path: verify the forwarded message is exactly
{ type: 'fill_credentials', username, password, expectedHost }.
2. save_setup exception scope: the setup tab gets a narrow exception
to POST save_setup, but nothing else. Prove fill_credentials from
the setup tab is rejected with unauthorized_sender.
3. isContent sender.id guard: a content-shaped sender with a bogus
sender.id (≠ chrome.runtime.id) must be rejected.
Vault/session modules are partial-mocked via vi.mock + importOriginal so
the existing tests continue to exercise real listItems/findByHostname.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
