v0.5.0 Plan A — Security Fixes + Repo Cleanup. 7 commits, ~800 net
insertions across the Rust workspace. Four items delivered:
- S1 (HIGH-severity authentication bypass fix): rewrite verify_commit
in relicario-server. The previous implementation accepted any
GOODSIG/Good signature line on stderr, ignoring whether the signing
key was registered or revoked. The new implementation:
* builds a temp gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile from devices.json at the
commit (no global git-config mutation)
* parses the SHA-256 fingerprint from `git verify-commit --raw`
stderr via regex
* checks revocation FIRST (revoked entries may have been removed
from devices.json), with the historical-commit case
(committer_ts < revoked_at) explicitly allowed
* uses committer date (GIT_COMMITTER_DATE / `git show -s
--format=%ct`), not author date or wall clock
* tightened the bootstrap guard to require BOTH devices and revoked
to be empty (closes an empty-devices.json privilege-escalation
route present in the original code)
* 4 acceptance integration tests build real on-disk repos with
SSH-signed commits and verify each scenario
- S2 (tar archive path-traversal hardening): replace
tar::Archive::unpack with safe_unpack_git_archive. Located in
relicario-core (per-spec, so integration tests can reach it without
the bytes-in/bytes-out invariant breaking). Validates each entry's
type (rejects symlinks/hardlinks), path components (rejects '..',
RootDir, Windows drive Prefix), and declared size (rejects
individual or cumulative > 100×compressed-or-1-GiB whichever is
lower). The CLI's restore path adds a paranoid OS-level
starts_with(.git/) check on the joined destination as
defense-in-depth even after textual validation. 5 acceptance tests
cover path traversal, symlinks, oversized headers (header claim of
2 GiB tested without allocating disk).
- S3 (RELICARIO_* env-var audit): docs/SECURITY.md gains a
"Configuration env vars" section enumerating each variable, its
purpose, and trust assumption. Active-in-all-builds variables
(RELICARIO_IMAGE, RELICARIO_GITEA_*) are documented; debug-only
variables (RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE, RELICARIO_TEST_*) are gated
behind cfg(debug_assertions) so the env-var lookup is removed from
--release binaries.
- C1 (stale feature branch prune): 5 merged feature branches and
3 worktrees pruned interactively per dev report.
- Bonus: 4d02a50 fixes pre-existing clippy warnings across
crates/relicario-{core,cli} (deref operators, Option::is_none_or
vs map_or(true, ...), iter_mut().enumerate() patterns,
div_ceil()) so the workspace builds clean under `-D warnings`.
Merge resolution: docs/SECURITY.md had a conflict where main's F11/F12
(Device Authentication paragraph naming relicario-server + simplified
"Device registration is optional" line) collided with Plan A's S3
section. Resolved by keeping both — F11/F12's wording for the
Device Authentication section, then Plan A's "Configuration env vars"
section appended below.
Cargo.lock regenerated. The previous committed lock was stale since
commit 8855078 (--totp-qr); cargo test on both devs' worktrees
produced identical regenerated locks. Plan A genuinely added regex +
tempfile to relicario-server (both already transitively present from
relicario-cli), so no new top-level deps; the Cargo.lock churn is
catch-up of crate-version bumps that have happened since the last
commit-of-record.
Tests: 248 cargo tests pass; extension tests unchanged (336/8 with 8
pre-existing device-auth scaffolding failures).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a "Configuration env vars" section listing every RELICARIO_*
variable read by production code, with purpose and trust boundary.
Splits user-facing vars from debug-only ones (cfg(debug_assertions))
to make the attack surface explicit for security reviewers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- F12: Device Authentication section now names the relicario-server crate
and its two subcommands (generate-hook, verify-commit), and notes that
signed commits without the server-side hook provide authorship only —
any pusher can still land an unsigned commit.
- F11: drop the "optional before v0.4.0" version line (v0.4.0 was never
tagged; v0.5.0 is the first release with the hook) and replace with a
one-liner: registration is optional but recommended for shared vaults.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clarifies what AEAD protects (tampering) vs. what it doesn't (deletion,
rollback). Documents that git history is the audit trail and device
authentication is the mitigation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
