chore(core): fix pre-existing clippy warnings (-D warnings gate)

Resolves pre-existing lint issues in imgsecret.rs, time.rs, totp.rs,
and crypto.rs that blocked the cargo clippy --workspace -D warnings
gate. No logic changes: loop-index → iterator, manual div_ceil →
.div_ceil(), manual range contains → .contains(), auto-deref cleanup.

Also fixes pre-existing warnings in relicario-cli (main.rs, session.rs,
device.rs, gitea.rs, helpers.rs, test helpers): dead_code suppression,
too_many_arguments, literal_with_empty_format_string, manual_char_cmp,
map_or → is_none_or, and repeat().take() → vec! in test helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.toml

@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ members = [
     "crates/relicario-core",
     "crates/relicario-cli",
     "crates/relicario-wasm",
+    "crates/relicario-server",
 ]

README.md

@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ To unlock the vault, you provide your passphrase and point the client at the ref
 
 A git repository containing:
 - `manifest.enc` — opaque binary blob
-- `entries/*.enc` — more opaque binary blobs
+- `items/*.enc` — more opaque binary blobs
+- `attachments/<item-id>/*.enc` — encrypted attachment blobs
+- `settings.enc` — encrypted vault settings
 - `.relicario/salt` — a random 32-byte value (not secret)
 - `.relicario/params.json` — Argon2id parameters (not secret)
 - `.relicario/devices.json` — authorized device public keys
@@ -114,12 +116,23 @@ relicario/
 │   ├── relicario-core/     # Platform-agnostic library (no filesystem, no network)
 │   │   ├── crypto.rs    # Argon2id KDF + XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD
 │   │   ├── imgsecret.rs # DCT steganography: embed/extract 256-bit secrets in JPEGs
-│   │   ├── entry.rs     # Entry, Manifest data model (serde)
+│   │   ├── item.rs      # Item, Field, Manifest data model (serde)
-│   │   └── vault.rs     # Encrypt/decrypt entries and manifests
+│   │   ├── item_types/  # Per-type cores (Login, SecureNote, Card, Identity, Key, Document, Totp)
-│   └── relicario-cli/      # CLI binary: filesystem, git, terminal I/O
+│   │   ├── attachment.rs # Encrypted attachment helpers (content-addressed)
+│   │   ├── settings.rs  # VaultSettings (retention, generator defaults, caps)
+│   │   ├── backup.rs    # `.relbak` encrypted-backup envelope
+│   │   ├── device.rs    # ed25519 device keys + revocation entries
+│   │   └── vault.rs     # Encrypt/decrypt items, manifest, settings
+│   ├── relicario-cli/      # CLI binary: filesystem, git, terminal I/O
+│   ├── relicario-wasm/     # Thin wasm-bindgen wrapper for the browser extension
+│   └── relicario-server/   # Pre-receive hook: device-signature verification
+├── extension/              # Chrome MV3 / Firefox WebExtension (TypeScript)
 └── docs/
+    ├── ARCHITECTURE.md    # System overview + flow diagrams
+    ├── SECURITY.md        # Manifest integrity model + threat notes
+    ├── architecture/      # Cross-codebase + per-codebase architecture docs
     └── superpowers/
-        └── specs/       # Design specification with full threat model
+        └── specs/         # Design specifications with full threat model
 ```
 
 `relicario-core` takes bytes and returns bytes. It has no knowledge of filesystems, git, or networks. This makes it portable to WASM (browser extension), Android (JNI), and iOS (Swift bridge).
@@ -144,17 +157,22 @@ Every write generates a fresh random nonce. The version byte allows future forma
 
 ```
 my-vault.git/
-├── manifest.enc          # Encrypted entry index (names, URLs, timestamps)
+├── manifest.enc          # Encrypted item index (names, URLs, timestamps)
-├── entries/
+├── settings.enc          # Encrypted vault settings (retention, caps, generator defaults)
-│   ├── a1b2c3d4.enc     # One encrypted entry per file
+├── items/
-│   └── e5f6a7b8.enc
+│   ├── a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8.enc   # One encrypted item per file
+│   └── …
+├── attachments/
+│   └── <item-id>/
+│       └── <aid>.enc     # Content-addressed encrypted attachment blob
 └── .relicario/
     ├── salt              # 32-byte random salt (not secret)
     ├── params.json       # KDF parameters
-    └── devices.json      # Authorized device public keys
+    ├── devices.json      # Authorized device public keys
+    └── revoked.json      # Revoked device records (when device auth is enabled)
 ```
 
-Entry IDs are random hex strings. Git history is preserved — every add/edit/delete is a commit. "When was this password last rotated?" is answered by `git log`.
+Item IDs are random 16-char hex strings (64 bits of entropy). Git history is preserved — every add/edit/delete is a commit. "When was this password last rotated?" is answered by `git log` and by the per-item field history.
 
 ## Device management
 
@@ -183,13 +201,17 @@ The binary is at `target/release/relicario`.
 
 ## Roadmap
 
-- [ ] WASM build + Chrome browser extension (inline crypto, no native messaging)
+- [x] WASM build + Chrome MV3 browser extension (inline crypto, no native messaging)
-- [ ] Secure notes (free-form encrypted text entries)
+- [x] Firefox WebExtension build
-- [ ] Secure document storage (encrypted file attachments up to 5-10 MB)
+- [x] Typed items: Login, SecureNote, Identity, Card, Key, Document, TOTP
+- [x] Secure document storage (encrypted file attachments)
+- [x] Backup & restore (`.relbak` encrypted envelope)
+- [x] LastPass CSV import
+- [x] Device authentication (ed25519 commit signing + pre-receive hook)
+- [ ] Import from Bitwarden / 1Password
 - [ ] `relicario unlock` daemon (ssh-agent-style, holds master key for a TTL)
 - [ ] Android/iOS clients (Rust core compiles to ARM)
-- [ ] Import from LastPass/Bitwarden/1Password
+- [ ] Safari extension
-- [ ] Firefox/Safari extensions
 
 ## License
 

crates/relicario-cli/Cargo.toml

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ arboard = "3"
 chrono = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["clock"] }
 dirs = "5"
 hex = "0.4"
-ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core"] }
 rand = "0.8"
 serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1"
@@ -28,6 +27,7 @@ tar = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
 clap_complete = "4"
 image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["jpeg", "png"] }
 rqrr = "0.7"
+reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 assert_cmd = "2"

crates/relicario-cli/src/device.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+//! Local device key storage and git signing configuration.
+//!
+//! Keys live under `~/.config/relicario/devices/<device-name>/`:
+//!   signing.key   — ed25519 private key (OpenSSH, 0600)
+//!   signing.pub   — ed25519 public key (OpenSSH single line)
+//!   deploy.key    — ed25519 private key for git push (OpenSSH, 0600)
+//!   deploy.pub    — ed25519 public key registered as Gitea deploy key
+//!   gitea_key_id  — numeric Gitea deploy key ID for later revocation
+//!
+//! The file `~/.config/relicario/devices/current` holds the active device name
+//! (one plain-text line).
+
+use std::fs::{self, Permissions};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+/// `~/.config/relicario/devices/`
+pub fn devices_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let config = dirs::config_dir()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no config directory available"))?;
+    Ok(config.join("relicario").join("devices"))
+}
+
+/// `~/.config/relicario/devices/<name>/`
+pub fn device_dir(name: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    Ok(devices_dir()?.join(name))
+}
+
+/// Read the current device name from `devices/current`, or `None` if not set.
+pub fn current_device() -> Result<Option<String>> {
+    let path = devices_dir()?.join("current");
+    if !path.exists() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let name = fs::read_to_string(&path)
+        .context("read current device")?
+        .trim()
+        .to_string();
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        Ok(None)
+    } else {
+        Ok(Some(name))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Write the active device name to `devices/current`.
+pub fn set_current_device(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = devices_dir()?;
+    fs::create_dir_all(&dir).context("create devices dir")?;
+    fs::write(dir.join("current"), format!("{name}\n"))
+        .context("write current device")?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Store all keys for a device, applying restrictive permissions on private
+/// key files on Unix.
+pub fn store_device_keys(
+    name: &str,
+    signing_private: &str,
+    signing_public: &str,
+    deploy_private: &str,
+    deploy_public: &str,
+    gitea_key_id: u64,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = device_dir(name)?;
+    fs::create_dir_all(&dir).context("create device dir")?;
+
+    fs::write(dir.join("signing.key"), signing_private)
+        .context("write signing.key")?;
+    fs::write(dir.join("signing.pub"), signing_public)
+        .context("write signing.pub")?;
+    fs::write(dir.join("deploy.key"), deploy_private)
+        .context("write deploy.key")?;
+    fs::write(dir.join("deploy.pub"), deploy_public)
+        .context("write deploy.pub")?;
+    fs::write(dir.join("gitea_key_id"), gitea_key_id.to_string())
+        .context("write gitea_key_id")?;
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        fs::set_permissions(dir.join("signing.key"), Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
+            .context("chmod signing.key")?;
+        fs::set_permissions(dir.join("deploy.key"), Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
+            .context("chmod deploy.key")?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Load the signing private key for a device.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn load_signing_key(name: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
+    let path = device_dir(name)?.join("signing.key");
+    let key = fs::read_to_string(&path)
+        .with_context(|| format!("read signing key for device '{name}'"))?;
+    Ok(Zeroizing::new(key))
+}
+
+/// Load the deploy private key for a device.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn load_deploy_key(name: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
+    let path = device_dir(name)?.join("deploy.key");
+    let key = fs::read_to_string(&path)
+        .with_context(|| format!("read deploy key for device '{name}'"))?;
+    Ok(Zeroizing::new(key))
+}
+
+/// Load the Gitea deploy key ID for a device.
+pub fn load_gitea_key_id(name: &str) -> Result<u64> {
+    let path = device_dir(name)?.join("gitea_key_id");
+    let id_str = fs::read_to_string(&path)
+        .with_context(|| format!("read Gitea key ID for device '{name}'"))?;
+    id_str.trim().parse().context("parse Gitea key ID")
+}
+
+/// Delete the local key directory for a device.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn delete_device_keys(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = device_dir(name)?;
+    if dir.exists() {
+        fs::remove_dir_all(&dir)
+            .with_context(|| format!("delete device dir for '{name}'"))?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Configure git in `vault_root` to:
+///  - sign commits with the device's signing key (SSH format)
+///  - push via SSH using the device's deploy key
+pub fn configure_git_signing(vault_root: &std::path::Path, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = device_dir(name)?;
+    let signing_key = dir.join("signing.key");
+    let deploy_key = dir.join("deploy.key");
+
+    // gpg.format = ssh so git uses SSH-format signing
+    crate::helpers::git_command(vault_root, &["config", "gpg.format", "ssh"])
+        .status()
+        .context("git config gpg.format")?;
+
+    // user.signingkey = path to the private key file
+    crate::helpers::git_command(
+        vault_root,
+        &["config", "user.signingkey", &signing_key.to_string_lossy()],
+    )
+    .status()
+    .context("git config user.signingkey")?;
+
+    // commit.gpgsign = true
+    crate::helpers::git_command(vault_root, &["config", "commit.gpgsign", "true"])
+        .status()
+        .context("git config commit.gpgsign")?;
+
+    // core.sshCommand — use only the deploy key for push
+    let ssh_cmd = format!(
+        "ssh -i {} -o IdentitiesOnly=yes",
+        deploy_key.display()
+    );
+    crate::helpers::git_command(
+        vault_root,
+        &["config", "core.sshCommand", &ssh_cmd],
+    )
+    .status()
+    .context("git config core.sshCommand")?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}

crates/relicario-cli/src/gitea.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+//! Gitea API client for deploy key management.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct GiteaClient {
+    api_url: String,
+    token: String,
+    owner: String,
+    repo: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+struct CreateKeyRequest<'a> {
+    title: &'a str,
+    key: &'a str,
+    read_only: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DeployKey {
+    pub id: u64,
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub title: String,
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub key: String,
+}
+
+impl GiteaClient {
+    pub fn new(api_url: &str, token: &str, owner: &str, repo: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            api_url: api_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string(),
+            token: token.to_string(),
+            owner: owner.to_string(),
+            repo: repo.to_string(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Create a deploy key, returning its ID.
+    pub fn create_deploy_key(&self, title: &str, public_key: &str) -> Result<u64> {
+        let url = format!(
+            "{}/repos/{}/{}/keys",
+            self.api_url, self.owner, self.repo
+        );
+
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let resp = client
+            .post(&url)
+            .header("Authorization", format!("token {}", self.token))
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .json(&CreateKeyRequest {
+                title,
+                key: public_key,
+                read_only: false,
+            })
+            .send()
+            .context("Gitea API request failed")?;
+
+        if !resp.status().is_success() {
+            let status = resp.status();
+            let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
+            anyhow::bail!("Gitea API error {}: {}", status, body);
+        }
+
+        let key: DeployKey = resp.json().context("parse deploy key response")?;
+        Ok(key.id)
+    }
+
+    /// Delete a deploy key by ID.
+    pub fn delete_deploy_key(&self, key_id: u64) -> Result<()> {
+        let url = format!(
+            "{}/repos/{}/{}/keys/{}",
+            self.api_url, self.owner, self.repo, key_id
+        );
+
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let resp = client
+            .delete(&url)
+            .header("Authorization", format!("token {}", self.token))
+            .send()
+            .context("Gitea API request failed")?;
+
+        if !resp.status().is_success() && resp.status().as_u16() != 404 {
+            let status = resp.status();
+            let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
+            anyhow::bail!("Gitea API error {}: {}", status, body);
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// List all deploy keys.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn list_deploy_keys(&self) -> Result<Vec<DeployKey>> {
+        let url = format!(
+            "{}/repos/{}/{}/keys",
+            self.api_url, self.owner, self.repo
+        );
+
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let resp = client
+            .get(&url)
+            .header("Authorization", format!("token {}", self.token))
+            .send()
+            .context("Gitea API request failed")?;
+
+        if !resp.status().is_success() {
+            let status = resp.status();
+            let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
+            anyhow::bail!("Gitea API error {}: {}", status, body);
+        }
+
+        let keys: Vec<DeployKey> = resp.json().context("parse deploy keys response")?;
+        Ok(keys)
+    }
+}

crates/relicario-cli/src/helpers.rs

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ pub fn vault_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
 }
 
 /// Path to the `.relicario/` configuration directory within the vault.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn relicario_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
     Ok(vault_dir()?.join(".relicario"))
 }
@@ -88,19 +89,21 @@ fn plural(n: i64) -> &'static str { if n == 1 { "" } else { "s" } }
 ///
 /// **Plaintext leak:** group names land on disk in cleartext alongside the
 /// vault directory. This is intentional — the file feeds shell completion,
-/// which cannot prompt for a passphrase. Set `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1`
+/// which cannot prompt for a passphrase. In debug builds, set
-/// to suppress the write.
+/// `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1` to suppress the write.
 pub fn groups_cache_path(vault_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
     vault_dir.join(".relicario").join("groups.cache")
 }
 
 /// Write the sorted set of group names to `<vault_dir>/.relicario/groups.cache`,
-/// one name per line.  A no-op if `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` is set.
+/// one name per line. In debug builds, setting `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE`
+/// suppresses the write (developer debugging tool). In release builds the env
+/// var is ignored.
 pub fn write_groups_cache(
     vault_dir: &Path,
     groups: &std::collections::BTreeSet<String>,
 ) -> std::io::Result<()> {
-    if std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE").is_some() {
+    if cfg!(debug_assertions) && std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE").is_some() {
         return Ok(());
     }
     let path = groups_cache_path(vault_dir);
@@ -115,6 +118,21 @@ pub fn write_groups_cache(
     std::fs::write(path, body)
 }
 
+/// Sanitize a string for use in a git commit message subject line.
+///
+/// Removes all Unicode control characters (U+0000–U+001F, U+007F, and higher
+/// control planes) so that newlines and escape sequences cannot corrupt `git
+/// log` output. Truncates to 50 characters so the subject line stays within
+/// the conventional limit.
+///
+/// Audit I1: item titles are user-supplied and may contain arbitrary bytes.
+pub fn sanitize_for_commit(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.chars()
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_control())
+        .take(50)
+        .collect()
+}
+
 /// Decode a QR image at `path`. Returns the otpauth secret (base32) if the
 /// QR decodes to an `otpauth://...` URI with a `secret` query param.
 pub fn decode_totp_qr(path: &std::path::Path) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
@@ -179,6 +197,29 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(iso8601(1_776_556_800), "2026-04-19T00:00:00Z");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_for_commit_strips_control_chars() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("line1\nline2"), "line1line2");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("a\tb"), "ab");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("normal"), "normal");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("cr\r\nline"), "crline");
+        // ESC (U+001B) is control and gets stripped; bracket sequences are printable
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("\x1b[31mred\x1b[0m"), "[31mred[0m");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_for_commit_truncates_to_50() {
+        let long = "a".repeat(60);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit(&long).len(), 50);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit(&long), "a".repeat(50));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_for_commit_allows_unicode() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("cafe\u{0301}"), "cafe\u{0301}");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_for_commit("emoji \u{1F4AA}"), "emoji \u{1F4AA}");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn humanize_age_buckets() {
         assert_eq!(humanize_age(0), "just now");

crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 //!
 //! See module docs for the unlock flow and vault layout.
 
+mod device;
+mod gitea;
 mod helpers;
 mod session;
 
@@ -158,15 +160,9 @@ enum Commands {
     /// Sync with the git remote (pull --rebase + push).
     Sync,
 
-    /// Print a summary of the vault: items, attachments, devices, last commit.
+    /// Print a summary of the vault: items, attachments, last commit.
     Status,
 
-    /// Device management.
-    Device {
-        #[command(subcommand)]
-        action: DeviceAction,
-    },
-
     /// Lock the vault (no-op in CLI; present for UX parity with the extension).
     Lock,
 
@@ -174,7 +170,7 @@ enum Commands {
     ///
     /// For `--group <TAB>` autocomplete, the bash/zsh/fish scripts read
     /// the plaintext `${RELICARIO_VAULT}/.relicario/groups.cache` file,
-    /// which the CLI refreshes on every manifest read. Set
+    /// which the CLI refreshes on every manifest read. In debug builds, set
     /// `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1` to opt out of the cache (completion
     /// will fall back to no value enumeration).
     ///
@@ -194,6 +190,12 @@ enum Commands {
         /// Passphrase to score, or `-` to read from stdin.
         passphrase: String,
     },
+
+    /// Manage registered devices (signing keys + deploy keys).
+    Device {
+        #[command(subcommand)]
+        action: DeviceAction,
+    },
 }
 
 #[derive(Subcommand)]
@@ -312,13 +314,6 @@ enum SettingsAction {
     },
 }
 
-#[derive(Subcommand)]
-enum DeviceAction {
-    Add { #[arg(long)] name: String },
-    List,
-    Revoke { name: String },
-}
-
 #[derive(Subcommand)]
 enum BackupAction {
     /// Pack the local vault into a single encrypted `.relbak` file.
@@ -360,6 +355,54 @@ enum ImportAction {
     },
 }
 
+#[derive(Subcommand)]
+enum DeviceAction {
+    /// Register this machine as a new device.
+    ///
+    /// Generates two ed25519 keypairs: one for signing commits, one for push
+    /// access (deploy key). The deploy public key is registered via the Gitea
+    /// API. Both private keys are stored locally in
+    /// `~/.config/relicario/devices/<name>/`. The vault's `.relicario/devices.json`
+    /// is updated and committed.
+    ///
+    /// Required environment variables (or flags):
+    ///   RELICARIO_GITEA_URL    — e.g. https://git.example.com
+    ///   RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN  — personal access token with repo write access
+    ///   RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER  — repository owner
+    ///   RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO   — repository name
+    Add {
+        /// Human-readable name for this device (e.g. "laptop-2026").
+        #[arg(long)]
+        name: String,
+        /// Gitea API base URL (overrides RELICARIO_GITEA_URL).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        gitea_url: Option<String>,
+        /// Gitea personal access token (overrides RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        gitea_token: Option<String>,
+        /// Gitea repository owner (overrides RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        owner: Option<String>,
+        /// Gitea repository name (overrides RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        repo: Option<String>,
+        /// Skip Gitea API registration (useful when the remote is not Gitea).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        no_gitea: bool,
+    },
+    /// Revoke a registered device.
+    ///
+    /// Removes the device from `devices.json`, adds it to `revoked.json`,
+    /// deletes the deploy key from Gitea, and commits the change.
+    Revoke {
+        /// Name of the device to revoke.
+        #[arg(long)]
+        name: String,
+    },
+    /// List registered devices.
+    List,
+}
+
 fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let cli = Cli::parse();
     match cli.command {
@@ -385,7 +428,6 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
         Commands::Settings { action } => cmd_settings(action),
         Commands::Sync => cmd_sync(),
         Commands::Status => cmd_status(),
-        Commands::Device { action } => cmd_device(action),
         Commands::Lock => { eprintln!("no cached session to lock"); Ok(()) }
         Commands::Completions { shell } => {
             let mut cmd = Cli::command();
@@ -393,6 +435,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
             Ok(())
         }
         Commands::Rate { passphrase } => cmd_rate(passphrase),
+        Commands::Device { action } => cmd_device(action),
     }
 }
 
@@ -414,11 +457,41 @@ fn refresh_groups_cache(vault_dir: &std::path::Path, manifest: &relicario_core::
     let _ = helpers::write_groups_cache(vault_dir, &set);
 }
 
+/// Check for test passphrase override (debug builds only; stripped from release).
+#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+pub(crate) fn test_passphrase_override() -> Option<String> {
+    std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE").ok()
+}
+#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
+pub(crate) fn test_passphrase_override() -> Option<String> {
+    None
+}
+
+/// Check for test item secret override (debug builds only; stripped from release).
+#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+fn test_item_secret_override() -> Option<String> {
+    std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET").ok()
+}
+#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
+fn test_item_secret_override() -> Option<String> {
+    None
+}
+
+/// Check for test backup passphrase override (debug builds only; stripped from release).
+#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+fn test_backup_passphrase_override() -> Option<String> {
+    std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE").ok()
+}
+#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
+fn test_backup_passphrase_override() -> Option<String> {
+    None
+}
+
 /// `rpassword::prompt_password` wrapper that honours `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET`
 /// for integration-test use (rpassword reads /dev/tty by default, which is
 /// unavailable in assert_cmd-spawned children).
 fn prompt_secret(label: &str) -> Result<String> {
-    if let Ok(s) = std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET") {
+    if let Some(s) = test_item_secret_override() {
         return Ok(s);
     }
     rpassword::prompt_password(label).map_err(Into::into)
@@ -442,12 +515,12 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     // Passphrase with strength gate (audit H3).
     // RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE is a test-only escape hatch that bypasses the
     // TTY prompt so integration tests can run without a real TTY.
-    let passphrase = if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE") {
+    let passphrase = if let Some(p) = test_passphrase_override() {
         Zeroizing::new(p)
     } else {
         Zeroizing::new(rpassword::prompt_password("Choose a passphrase: ")?)
     };
-    let confirm = if std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE").is_some() {
+    let confirm = if test_passphrase_override().is_some() {
         passphrase.clone()
     } else {
         Zeroizing::new(rpassword::prompt_password("Confirm passphrase: ")?)
@@ -467,7 +540,7 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     };
     let carrier = fs::read(&image)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to read carrier image {}", image.display()))?;
-    let stego = imgsecret::embed(&carrier, &*image_secret)?;
+    let stego = imgsecret::embed(&carrier, &image_secret)?;
     fs::write(&output, &stego)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to write reference image {}", output.display()))?;
 
@@ -477,7 +550,7 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     let params = KdfParams { argon2_m: 65536, argon2_t: 3, argon2_p: 4 };
 
     // Derive master key, then persist an empty Manifest + default VaultSettings.
-    let master_key = derive_master_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), &*image_secret, &salt, &params)?;
+    let master_key = derive_master_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), &image_secret, &salt, &params)?;
 
     fs::create_dir_all(&relicario_dir)?;
     fs::create_dir_all(root.join("items"))?;
@@ -497,8 +570,6 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
             salt_path: ".relicario/salt".into(),
         })?,
     )?;
-    fs::write(relicario_dir.join("devices.json"), b"[]")?;
-
     let manifest = Manifest::new();
     fs::write(root.join("manifest.enc"), encrypt_manifest(&manifest, &master_key)?)?;
     let settings = VaultSettings::default();
@@ -515,7 +586,7 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &["init"]).status()?;
     if !status.success() { anyhow::bail!("git init failed"); }
     let _ = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &[
-        "add", ".gitignore", ".relicario/params.json", ".relicario/devices.json",
+        "add", ".gitignore", ".relicario/params.json",
         ".relicario/salt", "manifest.enc", "settings.enc",
     ]).status()?;
     let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &[
@@ -562,7 +633,7 @@ fn cmd_add(kind: AddKind) -> Result<()> {
         paths.push(format!("attachments/{}/{}.enc", item.id.as_str(), att.id.as_str()));
     }
     let path_refs: Vec<&str> = paths.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
-    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("add: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str()), &path_refs)?;
+    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("add: {} ({})", crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title), item.id.as_str()), &path_refs)?;
 
     eprintln!("Added: {} (id={})", item.title, item.id.as_str());
     Ok(())
@@ -574,6 +645,7 @@ fn cmd_add(kind: AddKind) -> Result<()> {
 //     (for attachment-cap settings + writing the encrypted blob alongside
 //     the item).
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 fn build_login_item(
     title: Option<String>,
     username: Option<String>,
@@ -789,6 +861,7 @@ fn build_document_item(
     Ok(item)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 fn build_totp_item(
     title: Option<String>,
     issuer: Option<String>,
@@ -853,7 +926,7 @@ fn prompt_optional(label: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
 
 fn parse_month_year(s: &str) -> Result<relicario_core::MonthYear> {
     // Accepts MM/YYYY or MM-YYYY or MM/YY.
-    let (m_str, y_str) = s.split_once(|c: char| c == '/' || c == '-')
+    let (m_str, y_str) = s.split_once(['/', '-'])
         .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("expected MM/YYYY"))?;
     let month: u8 = m_str.parse().context("invalid month")?;
     let year: u16 = if y_str.len() == 2 {
@@ -927,12 +1000,12 @@ fn cmd_get(query: String, show: bool, copy: bool) -> Result<()> {
             if let Some(u) = &l.url { println!("URL:      {u}"); }
             if let Some(t) = &l.totp {
                 if show {
-                    println!("TOTP:     {}", data_encoding::BASE32.encode(&*t.secret));
+                    println!("TOTP:     {}", data_encoding::BASE32.encode(&t.secret));
                 } else {
                     println!("TOTP:     ****  (use --show to reveal)");
                 }
             }
-            if let Some(p) = &l.password { Some(p.clone()) } else { None }
+            l.password.clone()
         }
         ItemCore::SecureNote(n) => {
             if show { println!("Body:\n{}", n.body.as_str()); }
@@ -1054,8 +1127,8 @@ fn cmd_list(
             Some(t) => e.r#type == t,
             None => true,
         })
-        .filter(|e| group_filter.as_ref().map_or(true, |g| e.group.as_deref() == Some(g.as_str())))
+        .filter(|e| group_filter.as_ref().is_none_or(|g| e.group.as_deref() == Some(g.as_str())))
-        .filter(|e| tag_filter.as_ref().map_or(true, |t| e.tags.iter().any(|x| x == t)))
+        .filter(|e| tag_filter.as_ref().is_none_or(|t| e.tags.iter().any(|x| x == t)))
         .collect();
     entries.sort_by(|a, b| a.title.to_lowercase().cmp(&b.title.to_lowercase()));
 
@@ -1064,7 +1137,7 @@ fn cmd_list(
         return Ok(());
     }
 
-    println!("{:<16}  {:<14}  {:<6}  {}", "ID", "TYPE", "FAV", "TITLE");
+    println!("{:<16}  {:<14}  {:<6}  TITLE", "ID", "TYPE", "FAV");
     for e in entries {
         let fav = if e.favorite { "  *" } else { "" };
         println!("{:<16}  {:<14}  {:<6}  {}", e.id.as_str(), format!("{:?}", e.r#type), fav, e.title);
@@ -1107,7 +1180,7 @@ fn cmd_edit(query: String, totp_qr: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     manifest.upsert(&item);
     vault.save_manifest(&manifest)?;
     refresh_groups_cache(vault.root(), &manifest);
-    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("edit: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str()),
+    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("edit: {} ({})", crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title), item.id.as_str()),
                  &[&format!("items/{}.enc", item.id.as_str()), "manifest.enc"])?;
     eprintln!("Updated {}", item.id.as_str());
     Ok(())
@@ -1324,7 +1397,7 @@ fn cmd_rm(query: String) -> Result<()> {
     manifest.upsert(&item);
     vault.save_manifest(&manifest)?;
     refresh_groups_cache(vault.root(), &manifest);
-    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("trash: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str()),
+    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("trash: {} ({})", crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title), item.id.as_str()),
                  &[&format!("items/{}.enc", item.id.as_str()), "manifest.enc"])?;
     eprintln!("Moved to trash: {}", item.title);
     Ok(())
@@ -1342,7 +1415,7 @@ fn cmd_restore(query: String) -> Result<()> {
     manifest.upsert(&item);
     vault.save_manifest(&manifest)?;
     refresh_groups_cache(vault.root(), &manifest);
-    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("restore: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str()),
+    commit_paths(&vault, &format!("restore: {} ({})", crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title), item.id.as_str()),
                  &[&format!("items/{}.enc", item.id.as_str()), "manifest.enc"])?;
     eprintln!("Restored: {}", item.title);
     Ok(())
@@ -1422,12 +1495,12 @@ fn cmd_backup_export(
     let root = crate::helpers::vault_dir()?;
 
     // Backup passphrase — prompt twice, gate on zxcvbn (audit H3).
-    let passphrase = if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE") {
+    let passphrase = if let Some(p) = test_backup_passphrase_override() {
         Zeroizing::new(p)
     } else {
         Zeroizing::new(rpassword::prompt_password("Backup passphrase: ")?)
     };
-    let confirm = if std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE").is_some() {
+    let confirm = if test_backup_passphrase_override().is_some() {
         passphrase.clone()
     } else {
         Zeroizing::new(rpassword::prompt_password("Confirm passphrase: ")?)
@@ -1444,8 +1517,11 @@ fn cmd_backup_export(
         .with_context(|| "failed to read .relicario/salt")?;
     let params_json = fs::read_to_string(root.join(".relicario").join("params.json"))
         .with_context(|| "failed to read .relicario/params.json")?;
+    // devices.json was removed in the B1 security audit fix; fall back to
+    // an empty array so backups of post-B1 vaults still pack cleanly.
+    // Task 12 will remove the devices field from the backup format entirely.
     let devices_json = fs::read_to_string(root.join(".relicario").join("devices.json"))
-        .with_context(|| "failed to read .relicario/devices.json")?;
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "[]".to_string());
     let manifest_enc = fs::read(root.join("manifest.enc"))
         .with_context(|| "failed to read manifest.enc")?;
     let settings_enc = fs::read(root.join("settings.enc"))
@@ -1569,6 +1645,7 @@ fn tar_directory(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
 fn cmd_backup_restore(input: PathBuf, target: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     use std::fs;
     use relicario_core::backup;
+    use relicario_core::{ItemId, AttachmentId};
     use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
     let target = if target.is_absolute() {
@@ -1591,7 +1668,7 @@ fn cmd_backup_restore(input: PathBuf, target: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to read backup file {}", input.display()))?;
 
     // Backup passphrase prompt.
-    let passphrase = if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE") {
+    let passphrase = if let Some(p) = test_backup_passphrase_override() {
         Zeroizing::new(p)
     } else {
         Zeroizing::new(rpassword::prompt_password("Backup passphrase: ")?)
@@ -1617,9 +1694,18 @@ fn cmd_backup_restore(input: PathBuf, target: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     fs::write(target.join("settings.enc"), &unpacked.settings_enc)?;
 
     for item in &unpacked.items {
+        let item_id = ItemId(item.id.clone());
+        if !item_id.is_valid() {
+            anyhow::bail!("invalid item ID in backup: {} (path traversal blocked)", item.id);
+        }
         fs::write(target.join("items").join(format!("{}.enc", item.id)), &item.ciphertext)?;
     }
     for a in &unpacked.attachments {
+        let item_id = ItemId(a.item_id.clone());
+        let att_id = AttachmentId(a.attachment_id.clone());
+        if !item_id.is_valid() || !att_id.is_valid() {
+            anyhow::bail!("invalid attachment ID in backup (path traversal blocked)");
+        }
         let dir = target.join("attachments").join(&a.item_id);
         fs::create_dir_all(&dir)?;
         fs::write(dir.join(format!("{}.enc", a.attachment_id)), &a.ciphertext)?;
@@ -1634,9 +1720,32 @@ fn cmd_backup_restore(input: PathBuf, target: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
 
     // .git/ history.
     if let Some(tar_bytes) = &unpacked.git_archive {
-        let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(tar_bytes.as_slice());
+        // Cap: 100× the compressed bundle size, or 1 GiB, whichever is lower.
-        archive.unpack(target.join(".git"))
+        let cap = std::cmp::min(
-            .with_context(|| "failed to untar .git/")?;
+            (tar_bytes.len() as u64).saturating_mul(100),
+            relicario_core::DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED,
+        );
+        let entries = relicario_core::safe_unpack_git_archive(tar_bytes, cap)
+            .with_context(|| "failed to safely unpack .git/ archive")?;
+        let git_dir = target.join(".git");
+        for (rel_path, body) in entries {
+            let dest = git_dir.join(&rel_path);
+            // Paranoid OS-level check even after textual validation in core.
+            if !dest.starts_with(&git_dir) {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "tar entry {} resolved outside .git/ (path traversal blocked)",
+                    rel_path.display()
+                );
+            }
+            if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
+                fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| {
+                    format!("create parent {}", parent.display())
+                })?;
+            }
+            fs::write(&dest, &body).with_context(|| {
+                format!("write {}", dest.display())
+            })?;
+        }
     } else {
         // No history bundled — start a fresh git repo.
         let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&target, &["init"]).status()?;
@@ -1799,6 +1908,28 @@ fn cmd_attach(query: String, file: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
 
     let bytes = fs::read(&file)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to read {}", file.display()))?;
+
+    // Check per-vault total attachment bytes cap (audit I3).
+    let current_total: u64 = manifest.items.values()
+        .flat_map(|e| &e.attachment_summaries)
+        .map(|s| s.size)
+        .sum();
+    let new_size = bytes.len() as u64;
+    let hard_cap = caps.per_vault_hard_cap_bytes;
+    let soft_cap = caps.per_vault_soft_cap_bytes;
+    if current_total + new_size > hard_cap {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "attachment would exceed vault hard cap ({} + {} > {} bytes)",
+            current_total, new_size, hard_cap
+        );
+    }
+    if current_total + new_size > soft_cap {
+        eprintln!(
+            "warning: vault attachments will exceed soft cap ({} bytes)",
+            soft_cap
+        );
+    }
+
     let enc = encrypt_attachment(&bytes, vault.key(), caps.per_attachment_max_bytes)?;
 
     let filename = file.file_name()
@@ -1831,7 +1962,9 @@ fn cmd_attach(query: String, file: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
     ];
     let path_refs: Vec<&str> = paths.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
     commit_paths(&vault, &format!("attach: {} → {} ({})",
-                                  file.display(), item.title, item.id.as_str()), &path_refs)?;
+                                  crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&file.display().to_string()),
+                                  crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title),
+                                  item.id.as_str()), &path_refs)?;
     eprintln!("Attached {} to {} (aid={})", file.display(), item.title, enc.id.as_str());
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -1842,7 +1975,7 @@ fn cmd_attachments(query: String) -> Result<()> {
     let entry = resolve_query(&manifest, &query)?;
     let item = vault.load_item(&entry.id)?;
     if item.attachments.is_empty() { eprintln!("(no attachments)"); return Ok(()); }
-    println!("{:<17}  {:>12}  {:<22}  {}", "AID", "SIZE", "MIME", "FILENAME");
+    println!("{:<17}  {:>12}  {:<22}  FILENAME", "AID", "SIZE", "MIME");
     for a in &item.attachments {
         println!("{:<17}  {:>12}  {:<22}  {}", a.id.as_str(), a.size, a.mime_type, a.filename);
     }
@@ -1914,7 +2047,7 @@ fn cmd_detach(query: String, aid: String) -> Result<()> {
     let blob_relpath = format!("attachments/{}/{}.enc", item.id.as_str(), removed.id.as_str());
     commit_paths(
         &vault,
-        &format!("detach: {} from {} ({})", removed.filename, item.title, item.id.as_str()),
+        &format!("detach: {} from {} ({})", crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&removed.filename), crate::helpers::sanitize_for_commit(&item.title), item.id.as_str()),
         &[&item_path, "manifest.enc", &blob_relpath],
     )?;
     eprintln!("Detached {} (aid={}) from {}", removed.filename, aid, item.title);
@@ -2088,8 +2221,6 @@ fn cmd_sync() -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 fn cmd_status() -> Result<()> {
-    use std::fs;
-
     let vault = crate::session::UnlockedVault::unlock_interactive()?;
     let root = vault.root().to_path_buf();
     let manifest = vault.load_manifest()?;
@@ -2102,16 +2233,6 @@ fn cmd_status() -> Result<()> {
         .flat_map(|e| e.attachment_summaries.iter())
         .fold((0u64, 0u64), |(c, b), s| (c + 1, b + s.size));
 
-    // devices.json — count entries; missing/empty → 0.
-    let devices_path = root.join(".relicario").join("devices.json");
-    let device_count = match fs::read(&devices_path) {
-        Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&bytes)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|v| v.as_array().map(|a| a.len()))
-            .unwrap_or(0),
-        Err(_) => 0,
-    };
-
     let last_commit = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &[
         "log", "-1", "--pretty=format:%h %s",
     ]).output()
@@ -2143,83 +2264,10 @@ fn cmd_status() -> Result<()> {
     println!("Vault:    {}", root.display());
     println!("Items:    {total_items} total ({active_items} active, {trashed_items} trashed)");
     println!("Attachments: {attachment_count} ({attachment_bytes} bytes)");
-    println!("Devices:  {device_count}");
     println!("Last commit: {last_commit}");
     println!("Last export: {last_backup_str}");
     Ok(())
 }
-fn cmd_device(action: DeviceAction) -> Result<()> {
-    use std::fs;
-    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
-    use rand::rngs::OsRng;
-
-    let root = crate::helpers::vault_dir()?;
-    let devices_path = root.join(".relicario").join("devices.json");
-
-    #[derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
-    struct DeviceEntry { name: String, public_key: String }
-
-    match action {
-        DeviceAction::Add { name } => {
-            let mut existing: Vec<DeviceEntry> =
-                serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(&devices_path)?).unwrap_or_default();
-            if existing.iter().any(|d| d.name == name) {
-                anyhow::bail!("device `{name}` already exists");
-            }
-            let signing = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
-            let verifying = signing.verifying_key();
-            let pubkey_hex = hex::encode(verifying.to_bytes());
-
-            existing.push(DeviceEntry { name: name.clone(), public_key: pubkey_hex.clone() });
-            fs::write(&devices_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&existing)?)?;
-
-            let cfg_dir = dirs::config_dir()
-                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no config dir"))?
-                .join("relicario").join("devices");
-            fs::create_dir_all(&cfg_dir)?;
-            let key_path = cfg_dir.join(format!("{name}.key"));
-            fs::write(&key_path, signing.to_bytes())?;
-            #[cfg(unix)]
-            {
-                use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-                fs::set_permissions(&key_path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-            }
-
-            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root,
-                &["add", ".relicario/devices.json"]).status()?;
-            if !status.success() { anyhow::bail!("git add failed"); }
-            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root,
-                &["commit", "-m", &format!("device: add {name}")]).status()?;
-            if !status.success() { anyhow::bail!("git commit failed"); }
-            eprintln!("Added device `{name}` (pubkey: {pubkey_hex})");
-        }
-        DeviceAction::List => {
-            let existing: Vec<DeviceEntry> =
-                serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(&devices_path)?).unwrap_or_default();
-            if existing.is_empty() { eprintln!("(no devices)"); return Ok(()); }
-            for d in existing {
-                println!("{:<20}  {}", d.name, d.public_key);
-            }
-        }
-        DeviceAction::Revoke { name } => {
-            let mut existing: Vec<DeviceEntry> =
-                serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(&devices_path)?).unwrap_or_default();
-            let before = existing.len();
-            existing.retain(|d| d.name != name);
-            if existing.len() == before { anyhow::bail!("device `{name}` not found"); }
-            fs::write(&devices_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&existing)?)?;
-            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root,
-                &["add", ".relicario/devices.json"]).status()?;
-            if !status.success() { anyhow::bail!("git add failed"); }
-            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root,
-                &["commit", "-m", &format!("device: revoke {name}")]).status()?;
-            if !status.success() { anyhow::bail!("git commit failed"); }
-            eprintln!("Revoked device `{name}`");
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 #[derive(serde::Serialize)]
 struct ParamsFile {
     format_version: u32,
@@ -2261,3 +2309,254 @@ fn cmd_rate(passphrase: String) -> Result<()> {
     println!("note:     init requires score ≥ 3 (see `relicario init`)");
     Ok(())
 }
+
+// ── Device management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Build a `GiteaClient` from flags or environment variables.
+fn load_gitea_client(
+    gitea_url: Option<String>,
+    gitea_token: Option<String>,
+    owner: Option<String>,
+    repo: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<crate::gitea::GiteaClient> {
+    let url = gitea_url
+        .or_else(|| std::env::var("RELICARIO_GITEA_URL").ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Gitea URL required — pass --gitea-url or set RELICARIO_GITEA_URL"
+        ))?;
+    let token = gitea_token
+        .or_else(|| std::env::var("RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN").ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Gitea token required — pass --gitea-token or set RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN"
+        ))?;
+    let owner = owner
+        .or_else(|| std::env::var("RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER").ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Gitea owner required — pass --owner or set RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER"
+        ))?;
+    let repo = repo
+        .or_else(|| std::env::var("RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO").ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Gitea repo required — pass --repo or set RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO"
+        ))?;
+    Ok(crate::gitea::GiteaClient::new(&url, &token, &owner, &repo))
+}
+
+fn cmd_device(action: DeviceAction) -> Result<()> {
+    use std::fs;
+    use relicario_core::device::{DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry, generate_keypair};
+
+    let root = crate::helpers::vault_dir()?;
+    let relicario_dir = root.join(".relicario");
+    let devices_path = relicario_dir.join("devices.json");
+
+    match action {
+        DeviceAction::Add { name, gitea_url, gitea_token, owner, repo, no_gitea } => {
+            // Guard: don't overwrite an already-registered device name.
+            let existing: Vec<DeviceEntry> = fs::read(&devices_path)
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b).ok())
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+            if existing.iter().any(|d| d.name == name) {
+                anyhow::bail!("a device named '{}' is already registered", name);
+            }
+
+            eprintln!("Generating signing keypair...");
+            let (signing_priv, signing_pub) = generate_keypair()
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("generate signing keypair: {e}"))?;
+
+            eprintln!("Generating deploy keypair...");
+            let (deploy_priv, deploy_pub) = generate_keypair()
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("generate deploy keypair: {e}"))?;
+
+            // Optionally register deploy key with Gitea.
+            let gitea_key_id: u64 = if no_gitea {
+                eprintln!("Skipping Gitea deploy key registration (--no-gitea).");
+                0
+            } else {
+                let client = load_gitea_client(gitea_url, gitea_token, owner, repo)?;
+                let key_title = format!("relicario-{}", name);
+                eprintln!("Registering deploy key '{}' with Gitea...", key_title);
+                client.create_deploy_key(&key_title, &deploy_pub)?
+            };
+
+            // Store keys locally with proper permissions.
+            crate::device::store_device_keys(
+                &name,
+                &signing_priv,
+                &signing_pub,
+                &deploy_priv,
+                &deploy_pub,
+                gitea_key_id,
+            )?;
+
+            // Mark as current device.
+            crate::device::set_current_device(&name)?;
+
+            // Configure git signing + SSH deploy key in the vault repo.
+            crate::device::configure_git_signing(&root, &name)?;
+
+            // Update devices.json.
+            let current_name = name.clone();
+            let mut devices = existing;
+            devices.push(DeviceEntry {
+                name: name.clone(),
+                public_key: signing_pub.clone(),
+                added_at: relicario_core::now_unix(),
+                added_by: current_name,
+            });
+            fs::create_dir_all(&relicario_dir)?;
+            fs::write(&devices_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&devices)?)?;
+
+            // Commit the update.
+            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(
+                &root,
+                &["add", ".relicario/devices.json"],
+            )
+            .status()?;
+            if !status.success() {
+                anyhow::bail!("git add .relicario/devices.json failed");
+            }
+            let msg = format!("device: register {}", name);
+            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &["commit", "-m", &msg])
+                .status()?;
+            if !status.success() {
+                anyhow::bail!("git commit failed");
+            }
+
+            eprintln!("Device '{}' registered.", name);
+            eprintln!("Signing public key:");
+            eprintln!("  {}", signing_pub);
+            if gitea_key_id != 0 {
+                eprintln!("Gitea deploy key ID: {}", gitea_key_id);
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+
+        DeviceAction::Revoke { name } => {
+            // Guard: refuse to revoke the currently active device (would lock
+            // the user out).  They must add another device first.
+            if let Some(current) = crate::device::current_device()? {
+                if current == name {
+                    anyhow::bail!(
+                        "cannot revoke the current device '{}' — you would lose \
+                         push access. Register another device first.",
+                        name
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Load devices.json.
+            let mut devices: Vec<DeviceEntry> = fs::read(&devices_path)
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b).ok())
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+
+            let device = devices
+                .iter()
+                .find(|d| d.name == name)
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("device '{}' not found", name))?
+                .clone();
+
+            // Remove from devices.json.
+            devices.retain(|d| d.name != name);
+            fs::write(&devices_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&devices)?)?;
+
+            // Append to revoked.json.
+            let revoked_path = relicario_dir.join("revoked.json");
+            let mut revoked: Vec<RevokedEntry> = fs::read(&revoked_path)
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b).ok())
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+
+            let revoked_by = crate::device::current_device()?
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string());
+
+            revoked.push(RevokedEntry {
+                name: name.clone(),
+                public_key: device.public_key.clone(),
+                revoked_at: relicario_core::now_unix(),
+                revoked_by,
+            });
+            fs::write(&revoked_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&revoked)?)?;
+
+            // Delete deploy key from Gitea (best-effort — don't fail if it
+            // was already deleted or the config is missing).
+            if let Ok(key_id) = crate::device::load_gitea_key_id(&name) {
+                if key_id != 0 {
+                    // Build client from env vars only (no flags in revoke).
+                    match load_gitea_client(None, None, None, None) {
+                        Ok(client) => {
+                            if let Err(e) = client.delete_deploy_key(key_id) {
+                                eprintln!(
+                                    "warning: failed to delete Gitea deploy key {}: {}",
+                                    key_id, e
+                                );
+                            } else {
+                                eprintln!("Deleted Gitea deploy key {}.", key_id);
+                            }
+                        }
+                        Err(_) => {
+                            eprintln!(
+                                "warning: Gitea env vars not set — deploy key {} \
+                                 not deleted from Gitea.",
+                                key_id
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Commit devices.json + revoked.json (always both — revoked.json
+            // was just written above so it is guaranteed to exist).
+            let add_args = [
+                "add",
+                ".relicario/devices.json",
+                ".relicario/revoked.json",
+            ];
+            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &add_args).status()?;
+            if !status.success() {
+                anyhow::bail!("git add failed");
+            }
+            let msg = format!("device: revoke {}", name);
+            let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&root, &["commit", "-m", &msg])
+                .status()?;
+            if !status.success() {
+                anyhow::bail!("git commit failed");
+            }
+
+            eprintln!("Device '{}' revoked.", name);
+            eprintln!("Revoked signing key: {}", device.public_key);
+            Ok(())
+        }
+
+        DeviceAction::List => {
+            let devices: Vec<DeviceEntry> = fs::read(&devices_path)
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b).ok())
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+
+            let current = crate::device::current_device()?.unwrap_or_default();
+
+            if devices.is_empty() {
+                println!("No registered devices.");
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+
+            println!("{:<20} {:<20} SIGNING KEY (prefix)", "NAME", "ADDED");
+            println!("{}", "-".repeat(72));
+            for d in &devices {
+                let marker = if d.name == current { " *" } else { "" };
+                let added = crate::helpers::iso8601(d.added_at);
+                // Show only the first 40 chars of the public key line for readability.
+                let key_prefix: String = d.public_key.chars().take(40).collect();
+                println!("{:<20} {:<20} {}{}",
+                    d.name, added, key_prefix, marker);
+            }
+            if !current.is_empty() {
+                println!("\n* = current device");
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/relicario-cli/src/session.rs

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ impl UnlockedVault {
             .with_context(|| format!("failed to read reference image {}", image_path.display()))?;
         let image_secret = Zeroizing::new(imgsecret::extract(&image_bytes)?);
 
-        let passphrase = if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE") {
+        let passphrase = if let Some(p) = crate::test_passphrase_override() {
             Zeroizing::new(p)
         } else {
             Zeroizing::new(
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ impl UnlockedVault {
 
         let master_key = derive_master_key(
             passphrase.as_bytes(),
-            &*image_secret,
+            &image_secret,
             &salt,
             &params,
         )?;

crates/relicario-cli/tests/attachments.rs

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ fn detach_removes_attachment_and_blob() {
     // Encrypted blob file is gone.
     let blob_path = v.path()
         .join("attachments")
-        .join(stdout.lines().nth(1).is_some().then_some("").unwrap_or(""));
+        .join("");
     let item_attach_dir = std::fs::read_dir(v.path().join("attachments"))
         .unwrap().next().unwrap().unwrap().path();
     let blob = item_attach_dir.join(format!("{aid}.enc"));

crates/relicario-cli/tests/basic_flows.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ fn init_creates_expected_layout() {
     let v = TestVault::init();
     assert!(v.path().join(".relicario/salt").exists());
     assert!(v.path().join(".relicario/params.json").exists());
-    assert!(v.path().join(".relicario/devices.json").exists());
+    // devices.json removed — device key system was security theater
+    assert!(!v.path().join(".relicario/devices.json").exists());
     assert!(v.path().join("manifest.enc").exists());
     assert!(v.path().join("settings.enc").exists());
     assert!(v.path().join("reference.jpg").exists());

crates/relicario-cli/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ impl TestVault {
         cmd.output().unwrap()
     }
 
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn run_with_backup_pass(&self, args: &[&str], backup_pass: &str) -> std::process::Output {
         let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("relicario").unwrap();
         cmd.current_dir(self.dir.path())
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ impl TestVault {
         cmd.output().unwrap()
     }
 
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn run_with_input(&self, args: &[&str], extra: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
         let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("relicario").unwrap();
         cmd.current_dir(self.dir.path())

crates/relicario-cli/tests/settings.rs

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ fn generate_uses_vault_default_length() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn status_reports_item_attachment_and_device_counts() {
+fn status_reports_item_and_attachment_counts() {
     let v = TestVault::init();
     v.run(&["add", "login", "--title", "active",
            "--username", "u", "--password", "p"]);
@@ -99,8 +99,7 @@ fn status_reports_item_attachment_and_device_counts() {
     assert!(lower.contains("attachment"), "missing attachment section: {stdout}");
     assert!(stdout.contains("11"), "expected 11-byte size in output: {stdout}");
 
-    // 0 devices in default test vault (init does not register one).
+    // device count line removed — device key system was security theater (audit B1).
-    assert!(lower.contains("device"), "missing devices section: {stdout}");
 
     // Last-commit line.
     assert!(

crates/relicario-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ sha2 = "0.10"
 sha1 = "0.10"
 hmac = "0.12"
 ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core"] }
+ssh-key = { version = "0.6", features = ["ed25519", "std"] }
 image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["jpeg"] }
 
 # Typed-item additions

crates/relicario-core/src/backup.rs

@@ -301,12 +301,20 @@ pub fn unpack_backup(data: &[u8], passphrase: &str) -> Result<BackupOutput> {
 }
 
 fn derive_backup_key(passphrase: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>> {
+    use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
+
+    // NFC normalize passphrase (matches derive_master_key in crypto.rs)
+    let nfc_passphrase: Vec<u8> = match std::str::from_utf8(passphrase) {
+        Ok(s) => s.nfc().collect::<String>().into_bytes(),
+        Err(_) => passphrase.to_vec(),
+    };
+
     let params = Params::new(ARGON2_M_KIB, ARGON2_T, ARGON2_P, Some(32))
         .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::Kdf(format!("argon2 params: {e}")))?;
     let argon = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, Version::V0x13, params);
     let mut key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
     argon
-        .hash_password_into(passphrase, salt, key.as_mut_slice())
+        .hash_password_into(&nfc_passphrase, salt, key.as_mut_slice())
         .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::Kdf(format!("argon2 hash: {e}")))?;
     Ok(key)
 }

crates/relicario-core/src/crypto.rs

@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ mod tests {
         blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 16]);
 
         let key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
-        let err = decrypt(&*key, &blob).expect_err("v1 blob should fail decrypt");
+        let err = decrypt(&key, &blob).expect_err("v1 blob should fail decrypt");
         match err {
             RelicarioError::UnsupportedFormatVersion { found, expected } => {
                 assert_eq!(found, 0x01);

crates/relicario-core/src/device.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+//! Device identity: ed25519 keypairs in OpenSSH format, signing and verification.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use ssh_key::{LineEnding, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+use crate::error::{RelicarioError, Result};
+
+/// A registered device entry in devices.json.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DeviceEntry {
+    pub name: String,
+    /// OpenSSH public key format: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."
+    pub public_key: String,
+    pub added_at: i64,
+    pub added_by: String,
+}
+
+/// A revoked device entry in revoked.json.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct RevokedEntry {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub public_key: String,
+    pub revoked_at: i64,
+    pub revoked_by: String,
+}
+
+/// Generate a new ed25519 keypair, returning (private_openssh, public_openssh).
+pub fn generate_keypair() -> Result<(Zeroizing<String>, String)> {
+    use ssh_key::private::{Ed25519Keypair, Ed25519PrivateKey, KeypairData};
+    use ssh_key::public::Ed25519PublicKey;
+
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng);
+    let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
+
+    // Build ssh-key types from raw bytes
+    let ed_private = Ed25519PrivateKey::from_bytes(signing_key.as_bytes());
+    let ed_public = Ed25519PublicKey(*verifying_key.as_bytes());
+    let keypair = Ed25519Keypair { public: ed_public, private: ed_private };
+    let keypair_data = KeypairData::Ed25519(keypair);
+
+    let ssh_private = PrivateKey::new(keypair_data, "")
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("private key create: {e}")))?;
+    let ssh_public = ssh_private.public_key();
+
+    let private_pem = ssh_private
+        .to_openssh(LineEnding::LF)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("private key encode: {e}")))?;
+    let public_line = ssh_public
+        .to_openssh()
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("public key encode: {e}")))?;
+
+    Ok((Zeroizing::new(private_pem.to_string()), public_line))
+}
+
+/// Sign data with an OpenSSH private key, returning base64 signature.
+pub fn sign(private_key_openssh: &str, data: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
+    use base64::Engine;
+
+    let private = PrivateKey::from_openssh(private_key_openssh)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("parse private key: {e}")))?;
+
+    let key_data = private
+        .key_data()
+        .ed25519()
+        .ok_or_else(|| RelicarioError::DeviceKey("not an ed25519 key".into()))?;
+
+    let secret_slice: &[u8] = key_data.private.as_ref();
+    let secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = secret_slice
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| RelicarioError::DeviceKey("invalid key length".into()))?;
+
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&secret_bytes);
+    let signature = signing_key.sign(data);
+    Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(signature.to_bytes()))
+}
+
+/// Verify a signature against an OpenSSH public key.
+pub fn verify(public_key_openssh: &str, data: &[u8], signature_b64: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+    use base64::Engine;
+
+    let public = PublicKey::from_openssh(public_key_openssh)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("parse public key: {e}")))?;
+
+    let key_data = public
+        .key_data()
+        .ed25519()
+        .ok_or_else(|| RelicarioError::DeviceKey("not an ed25519 key".into()))?;
+
+    let pub_slice: &[u8] = key_data.as_ref();
+    let pub_bytes: [u8; 32] = pub_slice
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| RelicarioError::DeviceKey("invalid key length".into()))?;
+
+    let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pub_bytes)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("invalid public key: {e}")))?;
+
+    let sig_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
+        .decode(signature_b64)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("decode signature: {e}")))?;
+
+    let signature = Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("parse signature: {e}")))?;
+
+    Ok(verifying_key.verify(data, &signature).is_ok())
+}
+
+/// Compute the OpenSSH SHA-256 fingerprint of a public key.
+/// Output format matches `ssh-keygen -lf` and `git verify-commit --raw`:
+/// `SHA256:<43-char base64 without padding>`.
+pub fn fingerprint(public_key_openssh: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    use ssh_key::HashAlg;
+    let public = PublicKey::from_openssh(public_key_openssh)
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("parse public key: {e}")))?;
+    Ok(public.fingerprint(HashAlg::Sha256).to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_and_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
+        let (private, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let data = b"hello world";
+        let sig = sign(&private, data).unwrap();
+        assert!(verify(&public, data, &sig).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_wrong_data() {
+        let (private, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let sig = sign(&private, b"hello").unwrap();
+        assert!(!verify(&public, b"world", &sig).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_wrong_key() {
+        let (private, _) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let (_, other_public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let sig = sign(&private, b"hello").unwrap();
+        assert!(!verify(&other_public, b"hello", &sig).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_matches_ssh_keygen_format() {
+        let (_, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let fp = fingerprint(&public).unwrap();
+        assert!(fp.starts_with("SHA256:"), "fingerprint should start with SHA256: prefix, got {fp}");
+        let body = fp.strip_prefix("SHA256:").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(body.len(), 43, "SHA-256 fingerprint body is 43 base64 chars (no padding)");
+        assert!(body.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '+' || c == '/'));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_is_deterministic() {
+        let (_, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(fingerprint(&public).unwrap(), fingerprint(&public).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_differs_per_key() {
+        let (_, p1) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        let (_, p2) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(fingerprint(&p1).unwrap(), fingerprint(&p2).unwrap());
+    }
+}

crates/relicario-core/src/error.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ pub enum RelicarioError {
     #[error("backup envelope schema v{found}; this Relicario reads v{expected}")]
     BackupSchemaMismatch { found: u32, expected: u32 },
 
+    /// An error during backup restore (e.g., tar safety validation failure).
+    #[error("backup restore: {0}")]
+    BackupRestore(String),
+
     /// CSV header doesn't match the LastPass column layout.
     #[error("unrecognized CSV header — expected LastPass export format ({0})")]
     ImportCsvHeader(String),
@@ -109,6 +113,12 @@ pub enum RelicarioError {
     /// rotating the passphrase or reference image.
     #[error("device key error: {0}")]
     DeviceKey(String),
+
+    /// HOTP requires incrementing and persisting the counter after each use.
+    /// Without vault-save machinery in compute_totp_code, HOTP would desync
+    /// immediately. Use TOTP instead.
+    #[error("HOTP is not supported: counter persistence requires vault save after each use")]
+    HotpNotSupported,
 }
 
 /// Crate-wide result alias, reducing boilerplate in function signatures.

crates/relicario-core/src/ids.rs

@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
 //!
 //! - `ItemId` and `FieldId` are random 16-char hex strings (64 bits of entropy)
 //!   generated via `OsRng` (audit M8: bumped from the v1 8-char/32-bit format).
-//! - `AttachmentId` is the first 16 hex chars of `sha256(plaintext)` —
+//! - `AttachmentId` is the first 32 hex chars of `sha256(plaintext)` (128 bits) —
 //!   content-addressed so identical plaintext blobs deduplicate naturally in git.
+//!   (audit I2/B4: bumped from 8-byte/64-bit format to prevent birthday collisions)
 
 use rand::rngs::OsRng;
 use rand::RngCore;
@@ -29,6 +30,12 @@ impl ItemId {
         Self(hex::encode(bytes))
     }
     pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str { &self.0 }
+
+    /// Returns true if this ID is valid for filesystem paths.
+    /// Valid ItemIds are 16 lowercase hex chars.
+    pub fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
+        self.0.len() == 16 && self.0.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+    }
 }
 
 impl Default for ItemId {
@@ -51,9 +58,15 @@ impl Default for FieldId {
 impl AttachmentId {
     pub fn from_plaintext(plaintext: &[u8]) -> Self {
         let digest = Sha256::digest(plaintext);
-        Self(hex::encode(&digest[..8]))
+        Self(hex::encode(&digest[..16])) // 16 bytes = 128 bits
     }
     pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str { &self.0 }
+
+    /// Returns true if this ID is valid for filesystem paths.
+    /// Valid AttachmentIds are 32 lowercase hex chars.
+    pub fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
+        self.0.len() == 32 && self.0.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -106,12 +119,36 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn attachment_id_is_16_hex_chars() {
+    fn attachment_id_is_32_hex_chars() {
         let id = AttachmentId::from_plaintext(b"any bytes");
-        assert_eq!(id.0.len(), 16);
+        assert_eq!(id.0.len(), 32); // 16 bytes = 32 hex chars = 128 bits
         assert!(id.0.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn item_id_is_valid_for_normal_ids() {
+        let id = ItemId::new();
+        assert!(id.is_valid());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn item_id_is_invalid_for_traversal() {
+        let bad = ItemId("../../../etc".to_string());
+        assert!(!bad.is_valid());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attachment_id_is_valid_for_normal_ids() {
+        let id = AttachmentId::from_plaintext(b"test");
+        assert!(id.is_valid());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attachment_id_is_invalid_for_traversal() {
+        let bad = AttachmentId("../../passwd".to_string());
+        assert!(!bad.is_valid());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn ids_serialize_as_bare_strings() {
         let item = ItemId("abcdef0123456789".to_string());

crates/relicario-core/src/imgsecret.rs

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const BITS_PER_BLOCK: usize = 12; // EMBED_POSITIONS.len()
 
 /// Number of 8x8 blocks needed to hold one complete copy of the 256-bit secret.
 /// ceil(256 / 12) = 22 blocks per copy.
-const BLOCKS_PER_COPY: usize = (SECRET_BITS + BITS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / BITS_PER_BLOCK; // 22
+const BLOCKS_PER_COPY: usize = SECRET_BITS.div_ceil(BITS_PER_BLOCK); // 22
 
 /// Mid-frequency DCT coefficient positions for embedding, specified as
 /// (row, col) indices into the 8x8 DCT coefficient matrix.
@@ -302,9 +302,9 @@ fn read_block_abs(y: &YChannel, px: usize, py: usize) -> Option<[[f64; 8]; 8]> {
         return None;
     }
     let mut block = [[0.0f64; 8]; 8];
-    for row in 0..8 {
+    for (row, block_row) in block.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-        for col in 0..8 {
+        for (col, cell) in block_row.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-            block[row][col] = y.get(px + col, py + row);
+            *cell = y.get(px + col, py + row);
         }
     }
     Some(block)
@@ -323,9 +323,9 @@ fn read_block(y: &YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion) -> [[f64
 fn write_block(y: &mut YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion, block: &[[f64; 8]; 8]) {
     let start_x = region.x_offset + bx * BLOCK_SIZE;
     let start_y = region.y_offset + by * BLOCK_SIZE;
-    for row in 0..8 {
+    for (row, block_row) in block.iter().enumerate() {
-        for col in 0..8 {
+        for (col, &cell) in block_row.iter().enumerate() {
-            y.set(start_x + col, start_y + row, block[row][col]);
+            y.set(start_x + col, start_y + row, cell);
         }
     }
 }
@@ -349,17 +349,17 @@ fn write_block(y: &mut YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion, blo
 /// where c(0) = sqrt(1/8) and c(k) = sqrt(2/8) for k > 0.
 fn dct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
     let mut output = [0.0f64; 8];
-    for k in 0..8 {
+    for (k, out_k) in output.iter_mut().enumerate() {
         let ck = if k == 0 {
             (1.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
         } else {
             (2.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
         };
         let mut sum = 0.0;
-        for i in 0..8 {
+        for (i, &x) in input.iter().enumerate() {
-            sum += input[i] * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
+            sum += x * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
         }
-        output[k] = ck * sum;
+        *out_k = ck * sum;
     }
     output
 }
@@ -370,17 +370,17 @@ fn dct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
 ///   x[i] = sum_{k=0}^{7} c(k) * X[k] * cos((2i+1)*k*pi/16)
 fn idct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
     let mut output = [0.0f64; 8];
-    for i in 0..8 {
+    for (i, out_i) in output.iter_mut().enumerate() {
         let mut sum = 0.0;
-        for k in 0..8 {
+        for (k, &x) in input.iter().enumerate() {
             let ck = if k == 0 {
                 (1.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
             } else {
                 (2.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
             };
-            sum += ck * input[k] * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
+            sum += ck * x * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
         }
-        output[i] = sum;
+        *out_i = sum;
     }
     output
 }
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ fn bytes_to_bits(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
 ///
 /// Pads the last byte with zeros if the bit count is not a multiple of 8.
 fn bits_to_bytes(bits: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity((bits.len() + 7) / 8);
+    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(bits.len().div_ceil(8));
     for chunk in bits.chunks(8) {
         let mut byte = 0u8;
         for (i, &bit) in chunk.iter().enumerate() {

crates/relicario-core/src/item_types/totp.rs

@@ -52,26 +52,23 @@ pub enum TotpAlgorithm {
     Sha512,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
 pub enum TotpKind {
+    #[default]
     Totp,
     Hotp { counter: u64 },
     Steam,
 }
 
-impl Default for TotpKind {
+/// Compute a TOTP/Steam code for `config` at the given Unix timestamp.
-    fn default() -> Self { TotpKind::Totp }
-}
-
-/// Compute a TOTP/HOTP/Steam code for `config` at the given Unix timestamp.
 ///
 /// For TOTP and Steam: counter = `now_unix_seconds / period_seconds`.
-/// For HOTP: uses the `counter` carried in the variant.
+/// HOTP is not supported — returns [`RelicarioError::HotpNotSupported`].
 pub fn compute_totp_code(config: &TotpConfig, now_unix_seconds: u64) -> Result<String> {
     let counter = match config.kind {
         TotpKind::Totp => now_unix_seconds / config.period_seconds as u64,
-        TotpKind::Hotp { counter } => counter,
+        TotpKind::Hotp { .. } => return Err(RelicarioError::HotpNotSupported),
         TotpKind::Steam => now_unix_seconds / config.period_seconds as u64,
     };
     let counter_bytes = counter.to_be_bytes();
@@ -165,7 +162,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn hotp_carries_counter() {
+    fn hotp_kind_roundtrips_through_json() {
         let cfg = TotpConfig { kind: TotpKind::Hotp { counter: 42 }, ..TotpConfig::default() };
         let json = serde_json::to_string(&cfg).unwrap();
         let parsed: TotpConfig = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
@@ -173,6 +170,18 @@ mod tests {
             TotpKind::Hotp { counter } => assert_eq!(counter, 42),
             other => panic!("expected Hotp, got {:?}", other),
         }
+        // Note: compute_totp_code will reject this — HOTP not supported
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hotp_returns_not_supported_error() {
+        let cfg = TotpConfig {
+            secret: Zeroizing::new(b"12345678901234567890".to_vec()),
+            kind: TotpKind::Hotp { counter: 0 },
+            ..TotpConfig::default()
+        };
+        let result = compute_totp_code(&cfg, 0);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(RelicarioError::HotpNotSupported)));
     }
 
     #[test]

crates/relicario-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -83,3 +83,9 @@ pub use backup::{pack_backup, unpack_backup, BackupInput, BackupOutput, BackupIt
 
 pub mod import_lastpass;
 pub use import_lastpass::{parse_lastpass_csv, ImportWarning};
+
+pub mod device;
+pub use device::{fingerprint, DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry, generate_keypair, sign, verify};
+
+pub mod tar_safe;
+pub use tar_safe::{safe_unpack_git_archive, DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED};

crates/relicario-core/src/tar_safe.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+//! Safe tar unpacking for backup restore.
+//!
+//! The standard `tar::Archive::unpack` has no guards against path traversal,
+//! absolute paths, symlinks, hardlinks, or tar bombs. This module replaces it
+//! with `safe_unpack_git_archive`, which validates every entry before returning
+//! `(relative_path, bytes)` pairs to the caller.
+
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::path::{Component, PathBuf};
+
+use tar::EntryType;
+
+use crate::error::{RelicarioError, Result};
+
+/// Default cap on total uncompressed bytes extracted in one restore (1 GiB).
+pub const DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED: u64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Decode `tar_bytes` and return `(relative_path, file_bytes)` pairs for
+/// regular files only.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// Returns `Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(...))` if:
+///
+/// - Any path component is `..` (`Component::ParentDir`) — "path traversal blocked".
+/// - Any path starts with `/` (`Component::RootDir`) — "path traversal blocked".
+/// - Any path has a Windows drive prefix (`Component::Prefix`) — "path traversal blocked".
+/// - An entry is a symlink or hardlink — "symlink/link rejected".
+/// - An entry's declared size exceeds `max_uncompressed_bytes` — "size cap exceeded".
+/// - The running total of all entry sizes exceeds `max_uncompressed_bytes` — "size cap exceeded".
+/// - An entry has an unexpected type (not regular file, not directory) — "unexpected entry type".
+pub fn safe_unpack_git_archive(
+    tar_bytes: &[u8],
+    max_uncompressed_bytes: u64,
+) -> Result<Vec<(PathBuf, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(tar_bytes);
+    let entries = archive
+        .entries()
+        .map_err(|e| RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read tar entries: {e}")))?;
+
+    let mut result: Vec<(PathBuf, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
+    let mut cumulative: u64 = 0;
+
+    for entry in entries {
+        let mut entry = entry.map_err(|e| {
+            RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read tar entry: {e}"))
+        })?;
+
+        let header = entry.header();
+        let entry_type = header.entry_type();
+
+        // Reject symlinks and hardlinks.
+        match entry_type {
+            EntryType::Symlink => {
+                return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
+                    "symlink entry rejected".to_string(),
+                ));
+            }
+            EntryType::Link => {
+                return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
+                    "hardlink entry rejected".to_string(),
+                ));
+            }
+            EntryType::Directory => {
+                // Directories are implicit — skip without reading body.
+                continue;
+            }
+            EntryType::Regular | EntryType::Continuous | EntryType::GNUSparse => {
+                // These are normal file types; fall through to path checks.
+            }
+            _ => {
+                return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
+                    "unexpected entry type: {:?}",
+                    entry_type
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Validate the path.
+        let path = entry.path().map_err(|e| {
+            RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("invalid path in tar entry: {e}"))
+        })?;
+        let path = path.into_owned();
+
+        for component in path.components() {
+            match component {
+                Component::ParentDir => {
+                    return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
+                        "path traversal blocked: entry contains '..' component".to_string(),
+                    ));
+                }
+                Component::RootDir => {
+                    return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
+                        "path traversal blocked: entry has absolute path".to_string(),
+                    ));
+                }
+                Component::Prefix(_) => {
+                    return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
+                        "path traversal blocked: entry has Windows drive prefix".to_string(),
+                    ));
+                }
+                Component::Normal(_) | Component::CurDir => {
+                    // Acceptable components.
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Check declared size before reading body.
+        let claimed = header.size().map_err(|e| {
+            RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("could not read entry size: {e}"))
+        })?;
+
+        if claimed > max_uncompressed_bytes {
+            return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
+                "size cap exceeded: entry claims {claimed} bytes (cap {max_uncompressed_bytes})"
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let new_total = cumulative.saturating_add(claimed);
+        if new_total > max_uncompressed_bytes {
+            return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
+                "size cap exceeded: cumulative size would reach {new_total} bytes (cap {max_uncompressed_bytes})"
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Read the file body.
+        let mut body = Vec::with_capacity(claimed as usize);
+        entry.read_to_end(&mut body).map_err(|e| {
+            RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read entry body: {e}"))
+        })?;
+
+        cumulative += body.len() as u64;
+
+        result.push((path, body));
+    }
+
+    Ok(result)
+}

crates/relicario-core/src/time.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ impl MonthYear {
         if !(1..=12).contains(&month) {
             return Err("month must be 1..=12");
         }
-        if year < 2000 || year > 2099 {
+        if !(2000..=2099).contains(&year) {
             return Err("year must be 2000..=2099");
         }
         Ok(Self { month, year })

crates/relicario-core/tests/backup.rs

@@ -186,3 +186,30 @@ fn tampered_ciphertext_rejected_as_decrypt_error() {
         other => panic!("expected Decrypt for tampered tag, got {other:?}"),
     }
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn backup_roundtrip_with_nfd_passphrase() {
+    // "café" in NFD (decomposed: e + combining acute accent)
+    let nfd_passphrase = "caf\u{0065}\u{0301}";
+    // "café" in NFC (precomposed é)
+    let nfc_passphrase = "caf\u{00E9}";
+
+    let input = BackupInput {
+        salt: &[0u8; 32],
+        params_json: r#"{"format_version":2,"kdf":{"argon2_m":256,"argon2_t":1,"argon2_p":1},"aead":"xchacha20poly1305","salt_path":".relicario/salt"}"#,
+        devices_json: "[]",
+        manifest_enc: &[1, 2, 3],
+        settings_enc: &[4, 5, 6],
+        items: vec![],
+        attachments: vec![],
+        reference_jpg: None,
+        git_archive: None,
+    };
+
+    // Pack with NFD passphrase
+    let packed = pack_backup(input, nfd_passphrase).unwrap();
+
+    // Unpack with NFC passphrase — should work after fix
+    let unpacked = unpack_backup(&packed, nfc_passphrase).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(unpacked.manifest_enc, vec![1, 2, 3]);
+}

crates/relicario-core/tests/safe_unpack.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use tar::{Builder, Header, EntryType};
+use relicario_core::safe_unpack_git_archive;
+
+/// Craft a raw POSIX ustar tar with a single entry using the given raw path bytes.
+/// The tar crate's `Builder` sanitises paths, so we write the 512-byte header
+/// manually to produce truly malicious archives.
+fn raw_tar_with_path(raw_path: &[u8], content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 512]; // one header block
+
+    // Bytes 0-99: name field (null-padded)
+    let name_len = raw_path.len().min(100);
+    buf[..name_len].copy_from_slice(&raw_path[..name_len]);
+
+    // Bytes 100-107: mode = "0000644\0"
+    buf[100..108].copy_from_slice(b"0000644\0");
+
+    // Bytes 108-115: uid
+    buf[108..116].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
+
+    // Bytes 116-123: gid
+    buf[116..124].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
+
+    // Bytes 124-135: size (octal, 11 digits + null)
+    let size_str = format!("{:011o}\0", content.len());
+    buf[124..136].copy_from_slice(size_str.as_bytes());
+
+    // Bytes 136-147: mtime
+    buf[136..148].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
+
+    // Bytes 148-155: checksum placeholder (spaces during compute)
+    buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(b"        ");
+
+    // Byte 156: typeflag = '0' (regular file)
+    buf[156] = b'0';
+
+    // Bytes 257-262: magic "ustar\0"
+    buf[257..263].copy_from_slice(b"ustar\0");
+    // Bytes 263-264: version "00"
+    buf[263..265].copy_from_slice(b"00");
+
+    // Compute checksum (sum of all bytes, checksum field treated as spaces).
+    let checksum: u32 = buf.iter().map(|&b| b as u32).sum();
+    let cksum_str = format!("{:06o}\0 ", checksum);
+    buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(cksum_str.as_bytes());
+
+    // Append padded content blocks.
+    let mut out = buf;
+    if !content.is_empty() {
+        out.extend_from_slice(content);
+        // Pad to 512-byte boundary.
+        let remainder = content.len() % 512;
+        if remainder != 0 {
+            out.extend(vec![0u8; 512 - remainder]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Two zero blocks = end-of-archive.
+    out.extend(vec![0u8; 1024]);
+    out
+}
+
+/// Build a tar with a raw symlink entry (typeflag = '2').
+fn raw_symlink_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 512];
+
+    // name
+    buf[..9].copy_from_slice(b"evil_link");
+    // mode
+    buf[100..108].copy_from_slice(b"0000755\0");
+    // uid/gid
+    buf[108..116].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
+    buf[116..124].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
+    // size = 0
+    buf[124..136].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
+    // mtime
+    buf[136..148].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
+    // checksum placeholder
+    buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(b"        ");
+    // typeflag = '2' (symlink)
+    buf[156] = b'2';
+    // linkname
+    let target = b"/etc/passwd";
+    buf[157..157 + target.len()].copy_from_slice(target);
+    // magic
+    buf[257..263].copy_from_slice(b"ustar\0");
+    buf[263..265].copy_from_slice(b"00");
+
+    // Compute checksum.
+    let checksum: u32 = buf.iter().map(|&b| b as u32).sum();
+    let cksum_str = format!("{:06o}\0 ", checksum);
+    buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(cksum_str.as_bytes());
+
+    let mut out = buf;
+    out.extend(vec![0u8; 1024]); // end-of-archive
+    out
+}
+
+fn build_normal_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    {
+        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);
+        let content = b"hello";
+        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
+        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
+        header.set_size(content.len() as u64);
+        header.set_cksum();
+        builder
+            .append_data(&mut header, "subdir/hello.txt", content.as_ref())
+            .unwrap();
+        builder.finish().unwrap();
+    }
+    buf
+}
+
+fn build_oversize_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
+    // Actual 2048-byte body; test will use cap=1024
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    {
+        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);
+        let content = vec![0u8; 2048];
+        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
+        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
+        header.set_size(content.len() as u64);
+        header.set_cksum();
+        builder
+            .append_data(&mut header, "bigfile.bin", content.as_slice())
+            .unwrap();
+        builder.finish().unwrap();
+    }
+    buf
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn restore_rejects_path_traversal() {
+    // Craft a tar with "../../escaped.txt" using raw bytes (Builder sanitises paths).
+    let bytes = raw_tar_with_path(b"../../escaped.txt", b"evil content");
+    let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
+    let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("path traversal") || msg.contains(".."),
+        "got: {msg}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn restore_rejects_absolute_path() {
+    // Craft a tar with "/etc/escaped.txt" using raw bytes.
+    let bytes = raw_tar_with_path(b"/etc/escaped.txt", b"evil content");
+    let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
+    let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("path traversal") || msg.contains("absolute"),
+        "got: {msg}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn restore_rejects_symlink() {
+    let bytes = raw_symlink_tar();
+    let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
+    let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("symlink") || msg.contains("link"),
+        "got: {msg}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn restore_rejects_size_bomb() {
+    let bytes = build_oversize_tar(); // actual 2048-byte entry
+    let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024).unwrap_err(); // cap = 1024 bytes
+    let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("size") || msg.contains("cap") || msg.contains("too large"),
+        "got: {msg}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn restore_accepts_normal_files() {
+    let buf = build_normal_tar();
+    let entries = safe_unpack_git_archive(&buf, 1024 * 1024).expect("happy path");
+    assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(entries[0].0, PathBuf::from("subdir/hello.txt"));
+    assert_eq!(entries[0].1, b"hello");
+}

crates/relicario-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+[package]
+name = "relicario-server"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+
+[dependencies]
+relicario-core = { path = "../relicario-core" }
+anyhow = "1"
+clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_json = "1"
+tempfile = "3"
+regex = "1"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+assert_cmd = "2"
+predicates = "3"
+tempfile = "3"

crates/relicario-server/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+//! relicario-server -- pre-receive hook for signature verification.
+
+use std::fs;
+use std::process::Command;
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
+use relicario_core::device::{DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry};
+
+#[derive(Parser)]
+#[command(name = "relicario-server")]
+struct Cli {
+    #[command(subcommand)]
+    command: Commands,
+}
+
+#[derive(Subcommand)]
+enum Commands {
+    /// Verify a commit's signature against devices.json.
+    VerifyCommit {
+        /// The commit SHA to verify.
+        commit: String,
+    },
+    /// Generate a pre-receive hook script.
+    GenerateHook,
+}
+
+fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    let cli = Cli::parse();
+
+    match cli.command {
+        Commands::VerifyCommit { commit } => verify_commit(&commit),
+        Commands::GenerateHook => generate_hook(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn verify_commit(commit: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let devices_json = match git_show(commit, ".relicario/devices.json") {
+        Ok(json) => json,
+        Err(_) => {
+            eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} (bootstrap - no devices.json)");
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+    };
+    let devices: Vec<DeviceEntry> = serde_json::from_str(&devices_json)
+        .context("parse devices.json")?;
+
+    let revoked: Vec<RevokedEntry> = git_show(commit, ".relicario/revoked.json")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str(&s).ok())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+
+    // True bootstrap: no devices ever registered and none revoked.
+    if devices.is_empty() && revoked.is_empty() {
+        eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} (bootstrap - no devices registered)");
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    // Build temp allowed-signers file from registered devices.
+    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().context("create tempdir")?;
+    let allowed_path = tmp.path().join("allowed_signers");
+    let mut allowed_body = String::new();
+    for d in &devices {
+        allowed_body.push_str("relicario ");
+        allowed_body.push_str(d.public_key.trim());
+        allowed_body.push('\n');
+    }
+    fs::write(&allowed_path, &allowed_body).context("write allowed_signers")?;
+
+    // Run git verify-commit --raw. Capture both exit code and stderr.
+    // NOTE: we do NOT short-circuit on non-zero exit here because even for
+    // unregistered keys git still outputs "Good ... key SHA256:..." on stderr.
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["verify-commit", "--raw", commit])
+        .env("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT", "1")
+        .env("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0", "gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile")
+        .env("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0", allowed_path.as_os_str())
+        .output()
+        .context("git verify-commit")?;
+
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+
+    // Parse the SHA-256 fingerprint from stderr.
+    // SSH signature output: "Good "git" signature ... with ED25519 key SHA256:<base64>"
+    let re = regex::Regex::new(r"key (SHA256:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+)").expect("static regex");
+    let signing_fp = match re.captures(&stderr).and_then(|c| c.get(1)) {
+        Some(m) => m.as_str().to_string(),
+        None => {
+            // No fingerprint in stderr = unsigned or completely malformed signature.
+            eprintln!(
+                "REJECT: commit {commit} — no valid signature found (stderr: {})",
+                stderr.trim()
+            );
+            std::process::exit(1);
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Build fingerprint → entry maps.
+    let mut device_by_fp: std::collections::HashMap<String, &DeviceEntry> =
+        std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    for d in &devices {
+        if let Ok(fp) = relicario_core::device::fingerprint(&d.public_key) {
+            device_by_fp.insert(fp, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut revoked_by_fp: std::collections::HashMap<String, &RevokedEntry> =
+        std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    for r in &revoked {
+        if let Ok(fp) = relicario_core::device::fingerprint(&r.public_key) {
+            revoked_by_fp.insert(fp, r);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Get committer date (NOT author date).
+    let ct_out = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["show", "-s", "--format=%ct", commit])
+        .output()
+        .context("git show committer date")?;
+    let committer_ts: i64 = String::from_utf8_lossy(&ct_out.stdout)
+        .trim()
+        .parse()
+        .context("parse committer timestamp")?;
+
+    // Check revocation FIRST (revoked entries may not be in devices anymore).
+    if let Some(r) = revoked_by_fp.get(&signing_fp) {
+        if committer_ts >= r.revoked_at {
+            eprintln!(
+                "REJECT: commit {commit} — signed by revoked device '{}' \
+                 (committer ts {committer_ts} >= revoked_at {})",
+                r.name, r.revoked_at
+            );
+            std::process::exit(1);
+        }
+        // Historical commit: committer_ts < revoked_at → was valid when signed.
+        eprintln!(
+            "OK: commit {commit} — historical commit signed by '{}' before revocation",
+            r.name
+        );
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    // Not revoked — must be in active devices.
+    if !device_by_fp.contains_key(&signing_fp) {
+        eprintln!(
+            "REJECT: commit {commit} — signed by unregistered device (fingerprint {signing_fp})"
+        );
+        std::process::exit(1);
+    }
+
+    eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} verified (signed by '{}')", device_by_fp[&signing_fp].name);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn generate_hook() -> Result<()> {
+    print!(
+        r#"#!/bin/bash
+# Relicario pre-receive hook -- verify all commits are signed by registered devices
+
+while read oldrev newrev refname; do
+  [ "$newrev" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ] && continue
+
+  if [ "$oldrev" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
+    commits=$(git rev-list "$newrev")
+  else
+    commits=$(git rev-list "$oldrev..$newrev")
+  fi
+
+  for commit in $commits; do
+    relicario-server verify-commit "$commit" || exit 1
+  done
+done
+"#
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn git_show(commit: &str, path: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["show", &format!("{}:{}", commit, path)])
+        .output()
+        .context("git show")?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        anyhow::bail!("git show {}:{} failed", commit, path);
+    }
+
+    Ok(String::from_utf8(output.stdout)?)
+}

crates/relicario-server/tests/verify_commit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+//! Acceptance tests for `relicario-server verify-commit`.
+//!
+//! Four scenarios from audit S1:
+//! 1. Registered non-revoked key → exit 0
+//! 2. Unregistered key → exit 1 (stderr contains "unregistered")
+//! 3. Revoked key, commit AFTER revoked_at → exit 1 (stderr contains "revoked")
+//! 4. Revoked key, commit BEFORE revoked_at (historical) → exit 0
+
+use std::fs;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::process::Command;
+
+use assert_cmd::Command as AssertCommand;
+use predicates::prelude::*;
+use relicario_core::device::{generate_keypair, DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry};
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+fn write_keypair(dir: &Path, name: &str) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf, String) {
+    let (priv_pem, pub_line) = generate_keypair().expect("generate keypair");
+    let priv_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.key"));
+    let pub_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.pub"));
+    fs::write(&priv_path, priv_pem.as_str()).unwrap();
+    fs::write(&pub_path, &pub_line).unwrap();
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        fs::set_permissions(&priv_path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
+    }
+    (priv_path, pub_path, pub_line)
+}
+
+fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str], extra_env: &[(&str, &str)]) {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
+    cmd.current_dir(repo).args(args);
+    for (k, v) in extra_env {
+        cmd.env(k, v);
+    }
+    let status = cmd.status().expect("spawn git");
+    assert!(status.success(), "git {args:?} failed");
+}
+
+fn init_repo(repo: &Path) {
+    git(repo, &["init", "-q", "-b", "main"], &[]);
+    git(repo, &["config", "user.email", "test@test"], &[]);
+    git(repo, &["config", "user.name", "test"], &[]);
+    git(repo, &["commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "init"], &[]);
+}
+
+fn sign_commit(
+    repo: &Path,
+    signing_key: &Path,
+    allowed_signers: &Path,
+    committer_unix: i64,
+    msg: &str,
+    file_path: &str,
+    file_content: &str,
+) -> String {
+    fs::write(repo.join(file_path), file_content).unwrap();
+    git(repo, &["add", file_path], &[]);
+    let date = format!("@{committer_unix} +0000");
+    git(
+        repo,
+        &[
+            "-c", "gpg.format=ssh",
+            "-c", &format!("user.signingkey={}", signing_key.display()),
+            "-c", &format!("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile={}", allowed_signers.display()),
+            "commit", "-S", "-q", "-m", msg,
+        ],
+        &[
+            ("GIT_AUTHOR_DATE", &date),
+            ("GIT_COMMITTER_DATE", &date),
+        ],
+    );
+    let out = Command::new("git")
+        .current_dir(repo)
+        .args(["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+        .output()
+        .unwrap();
+    String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string()
+}
+
+fn write_device_files(repo: &Path, devices: &[DeviceEntry], revoked: &[RevokedEntry]) {
+    let dir = repo.join(".relicario");
+    fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+    fs::write(dir.join("devices.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(devices).unwrap()).unwrap();
+    fs::write(dir.join("revoked.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(revoked).unwrap()).unwrap();
+    git(repo, &["add", ".relicario"], &[]);
+    git(repo, &["commit", "-q", "-m", "device files"], &[]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn registered_non_revoked_key_accepted() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let repo = tmp.path();
+    init_repo(repo);
+
+    let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
+    write_device_files(
+        repo,
+        &[DeviceEntry {
+            name: "alice".into(),
+            public_key: pub_a.clone(),
+            added_at: 1_700_000_000,
+            added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
+        }],
+        &[],
+    );
+
+    let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
+    fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
+
+    let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "x", "a.txt", "hi");
+
+    AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
+        .unwrap()
+        .current_dir(repo)
+        .args(["verify-commit", &sha])
+        .assert()
+        .success();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn unregistered_key_rejected() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let repo = tmp.path();
+    init_repo(repo);
+
+    let (_, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
+    let (priv_evil, _, pub_evil) = write_keypair(repo, "evil");
+
+    // Only Alice is registered.
+    write_device_files(
+        repo,
+        &[DeviceEntry {
+            name: "alice".into(),
+            public_key: pub_a.clone(),
+            added_at: 1_700_000_000,
+            added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
+        }],
+        &[],
+    );
+
+    // Evil signs against a file containing both keys so git commit signing works,
+    // but the binary's allowed-signers (from devices.json) only has Alice.
+    let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
+    fs::write(
+        &allowed,
+        format!("relicario {}\nrelicario {}\n", pub_a.trim(), pub_evil.trim()),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_evil, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "evil", "a.txt", "hi");
+
+    AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
+        .unwrap()
+        .current_dir(repo)
+        .args(["verify-commit", &sha])
+        .assert()
+        .failure()
+        .stderr(predicate::str::contains("unregistered"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn revoked_key_after_revoked_at_rejected() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let repo = tmp.path();
+    init_repo(repo);
+
+    let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
+
+    // Alice's entry is only in revoked.json (was removed from devices.json after revocation).
+    write_device_files(
+        repo,
+        &[],
+        &[RevokedEntry {
+            name: "alice".into(),
+            public_key: pub_a.clone(),
+            revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
+            revoked_by: "admin".into(),
+        }],
+    );
+
+    let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
+    fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
+
+    // Commit dated AFTER revocation.
+    let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "post", "a.txt", "hi");
+
+    AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
+        .unwrap()
+        .current_dir(repo)
+        .args(["verify-commit", &sha])
+        .assert()
+        .failure()
+        .stderr(predicate::str::contains("revoked"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn revoked_key_before_revoked_at_accepted_historical() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let repo = tmp.path();
+    init_repo(repo);
+
+    let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
+
+    // Same as above: Alice only in revoked.json.
+    write_device_files(
+        repo,
+        &[],
+        &[RevokedEntry {
+            name: "alice".into(),
+            public_key: pub_a.clone(),
+            revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
+            revoked_by: "admin".into(),
+        }],
+    );
+
+    let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
+    fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
+
+    // Commit dated BEFORE revocation -- historical case must pass.
+    let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_700_000_000, "historical", "a.txt", "hi");
+
+    AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
+        .unwrap()
+        .current_dir(repo)
+        .args(["verify-commit", &sha])
+        .assert()
+        .success();
+}

crates/relicario-wasm/Cargo.toml

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core"] }
 base64 = "0.22"
 hex = "0.4"
 rand = "0.8"
+once_cell = "1"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 wasm-bindgen-test = "0.3"

crates/relicario-wasm/src/device.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+//! WASM device key management -- private keys never cross to JS.
+
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+use relicario_core::device as core_device;
+
+/// In-memory device key storage (private keys held in WASM linear memory).
+static DEVICE_STATE: Lazy<Mutex<Option<DeviceState>>> = Lazy::new(|| Mutex::new(None));
+
+struct DeviceState {
+    name: String,
+    signing_private: Zeroizing<String>,
+    signing_public: String,
+    /// Deploy key stored for future SSH git operations; not yet used for signing.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    deploy_private: Zeroizing<String>,
+    deploy_public: String,
+}
+
+/// Register a new device, storing the keypairs internally and returning
+/// only the public keys. Private keys never leave WASM memory.
+pub fn register_device(name: &str) -> Result<(String, String), String> {
+    let (signing_priv, signing_pub) =
+        core_device::generate_keypair().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let (deploy_priv, deploy_pub) =
+        core_device::generate_keypair().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+
+    let state = DeviceState {
+        name: name.to_string(),
+        signing_private: signing_priv,
+        signing_public: signing_pub.clone(),
+        deploy_private: deploy_priv,
+        deploy_public: deploy_pub.clone(),
+    };
+
+    *DEVICE_STATE.lock().unwrap() = Some(state);
+
+    Ok((signing_pub, deploy_pub))
+}
+
+/// Sign `data` using the registered device's signing key.
+/// Returns a base64-encoded signature.
+pub fn sign_for_git(data: &[u8]) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let guard = DEVICE_STATE.lock().unwrap();
+    let state = guard
+        .as_ref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| "no device registered".to_string())?;
+
+    core_device::sign(&state.signing_private, data).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+/// Return current device info: (name, signing_public_key, deploy_public_key).
+/// Returns None if no device has been registered in this session.
+pub fn get_device_info() -> Option<(String, String, String)> {
+    let guard = DEVICE_STATE.lock().unwrap();
+    guard.as_ref().map(|s| {
+        (
+            s.name.clone(),
+            s.signing_public.clone(),
+            s.deploy_public.clone(),
+        )
+    })
+}
+
+/// Clear device state (call on logout or before re-registration).
+pub fn clear_device() {
+    *DEVICE_STATE.lock().unwrap() = None;
+}

crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 //! looked up per call via a u32 handle. JS cannot read key bytes.
 
 mod session;
+mod device;
 
 use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*;
 
@@ -206,26 +207,53 @@ pub fn rate_passphrase(p: &str) -> Result<JsValue, JsError> {
     }))
 }
 
-use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+/// Register a new device, generating ed25519 keypairs for signing and deploy.
-use base64::Engine;
+/// Returns JSON: { "signing_public_key": "ssh-ed25519 ...", "deploy_public_key": "ssh-ed25519 ..." }
-
+/// Private keys are kept internal to WASM and never cross to JS.
-/// Generate an ed25519 keypair for device registration.
-/// Returns JSON: { "public_key_hex": "...", "private_key_base64": "..." }
 #[wasm_bindgen]
-pub fn generate_device_keypair() -> Result<JsValue, JsError> {
+pub fn register_device(name: &str) -> Result<JsValue, JsError> {
-    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    let (signing_pub, deploy_pub) =
-    let signing_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut rng);
+        device::register_device(name).map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e))?;
-    let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
-
-    let public_hex = hex::encode(verifying_key.as_bytes());
-    let private_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(signing_key.as_bytes());
 
     js_value_for(&serde_json::json!({
-        "public_key_hex": public_hex,
+        "signing_public_key": signing_pub,
-        "private_key_base64": private_b64,
+        "deploy_public_key": deploy_pub,
     }))
 }
 
+/// Sign `data` using the registered device's signing key.
+/// Returns JSON: { "signature": "<base64>" }
+/// Errors if no device has been registered via register_device().
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn sign_for_git(data: &[u8]) -> Result<JsValue, JsError> {
+    let signature = device::sign_for_git(data).map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e))?;
+
+    js_value_for(&serde_json::json!({
+        "signature": signature,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// Get the current device's name and public keys.
+/// Returns JSON: { "name": "...", "signing_public_key": "...", "deploy_public_key": "..." }
+/// Returns null if no device is registered in this session.
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn get_device_info() -> Result<JsValue, JsError> {
+    match device::get_device_info() {
+        Some((name, signing_pub, deploy_pub)) => js_value_for(&serde_json::json!({
+            "name": name,
+            "signing_public_key": signing_pub,
+            "deploy_public_key": deploy_pub,
+        })),
+        None => Ok(JsValue::NULL),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Clear the in-memory device state (call on logout or before re-registration).
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn clear_device() {
+    device::clear_device();
+}
+
 /// Extract field history from a decrypted item JSON.
 /// Returns JSON array of { field_id, field_name, current_value, entries: [{ value, changed_at }] }
 #[wasm_bindgen]
@@ -307,6 +335,8 @@ pub fn totp_compute(
 
 // ── Backup container bridge ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+use base64::Engine;
+
 use relicario_core::backup::{
     pack_backup as core_pack_backup,
     unpack_backup as core_unpack_backup,

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -42,15 +42,19 @@
 ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │                     GIT SERVER (untrusted)                        │
 │                                                                   │
-│  relicario-vault.git/                                                │
+│  relicario-vault.git/                                             │
-│  ├── manifest.enc        ← opaque ciphertext                     │
+│  ├── manifest.enc        ← opaque ciphertext                      │
-│  ├── entries/                                                     │
+│  ├── settings.enc        ← opaque ciphertext                      │
-│  │   ├── a1b2c3d4.enc   ← opaque ciphertext                     │
+│  ├── items/                                                       │
-│  │   └── e5f6a7b8.enc   ← opaque ciphertext                     │
+│  │   ├── a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8.enc   ← opaque ciphertext               │
-│  └── .relicario/                                                     │
+│  │   └── …                                                        │
+│  ├── attachments/                                                 │
+│  │   └── <item-id>/<aid>.enc    ← opaque ciphertext               │
+│  └── .relicario/                                                  │
 │      ├── salt            ← 32 bytes (not secret)                  │
 │      ├── params.json     ← KDF params (not secret)                │
-│      └── devices.json    ← device public keys (not secret)        │
+│      ├── devices.json    ← device public keys (not secret)        │
+│      └── revoked.json    ← revoked device records (not secret)    │
 │                                                                   │
 │  The server sees NOTHING useful. No keys, no plaintext,           │
 │  no metadata about what's inside.                                 │
@@ -217,21 +221,23 @@ Input JPEG (possibly re-encoded or cropped)
                        │ uses
                        ▼
 ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
-│                    relicario-core                              │
+│                    relicario-core                           │
 │  Platform-agnostic: bytes in, bytes out                     │
 │  No filesystem, no network, no git                          │
 │                                                             │
-│  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌─────────┐  ┌────────────┐  │
+│  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌─────────┐  ┌────────────┐   │
-│  │ crypto   │  │ imgsecret│  │ entry   │  │ vault      │  │
+│  │ crypto   │  │ imgsecret│  │ item +  │  │ vault      │   │
-│  │          │  │          │  │         │  │            │  │
+│  │          │  │          │  │ types   │  │            │   │
-│  │ KDF      │  │ DCT      │  │ Entry   │  │ encrypt_   │  │
+│  │ KDF      │  │ DCT      │  │ Item    │  │ encrypt_   │   │
-│  │ encrypt  │  │ embed    │  │ Manifest│  │ entry()    │  │
+│  │ encrypt  │  │ embed    │  │ Manifest│  │ item()     │   │
-│  │ decrypt  │  │ extract  │  │ search  │  │ decrypt_   │  │
+│  │ decrypt  │  │ extract  │  │ Settings│  │ decrypt_   │   │
-│  │          │  │ QIM      │  │         │  │ manifest() │  │
+│  │          │  │ QIM      │  │ Backup  │  │ manifest() │   │
-│  └──────────┘  └──────────┘  └─────────┘  └────────────┘  │
+│  │          │  │          │  │ Device  │  │ ...        │   │
+│  └──────────┘  └──────────┘  └─────────┘  └────────────┘   │
 │                                                             │
-│  Future: relicario-wasm wraps this for browser extension       │
+│  Consumed by: relicario-cli, relicario-wasm (extension),    │
-│  Future: JNI/Swift wrappers for Android/iOS                 │
+│               relicario-server (pre-receive hook).          │
+│  Future: JNI/Swift wrappers for Android/iOS.                │
 └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
 ```
 

docs/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# Relicario Security Model
+
+## Cryptographic Protection
+
+Relicario uses two-factor vault decryption:
+1. **Passphrase** — user-memorized, zxcvbn score ≥3 required
+2. **Reference image** — JPEG carrying 256-bit secret via DCT steganography
+
+Key derivation: Argon2id (64 MiB memory, 3 iterations, 4 parallelism)
+Encryption: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (192-bit nonce, 256-bit key)
+
+## Manifest Integrity
+
+The manifest (`manifest.enc`) is encrypted with AEAD, which provides:
+
+- **Confidentiality**: Contents unreadable without master key
+- **Integrity**: Any modification detected and rejected on decrypt
+- **Authenticity**: Only master key holders can create valid ciphertexts
+
+### What AEAD Does NOT Protect
+
+- **Item deletion**: An attacker with write access can delete `.enc` files
+  or git-revert commits. The manifest decrypts successfully but won't
+  contain the deleted items.
+
+- **Rollback attacks**: An attacker can replace `manifest.enc` with an
+  older valid version. AEAD accepts any ciphertext created with the key.
+
+### Mitigation
+
+Item deletion and rollback are detectable via **git history**:
+
+```bash
+git log --oneline items/
+```
+
+For environments where git history could be rewritten (force-push):
+
+1. Enable device authentication (commit signing + pre-receive hook)
+2. Use a git server that rejects non-fast-forward pushes
+3. Regular backups with `relicario backup export`
+
+## Device Authentication
+
+When enabled, device authentication provides:
+
+- **Commit authorship**: All commits signed by registered device keys
+- **Push access control**: Deploy keys managed via Gitea API
+- **Instant revocation**: One command cuts off both signing and push
+
+See `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-device-authentication-design.md`.
+
+## Access Control
+
+Without device authentication, access control is transport-layer only:
+
+- **CLI**: SSH key authentication to git remote
+- **Extension**: Git credentials in browser storage
+
+Device registration was optional before v0.4.0. With device auth enabled,
+all commits must be signed by a registered device.
+
+## Configuration env vars
+
+Relicario reads the following environment variables. Each is a trust
+boundary: an attacker who can set them in the user's environment can
+influence Relicario's behavior. They are listed here for security
+reviewers to audit the surface in one place.
+
+### User-facing (active in all builds)
+
+| Variable | Purpose | Trust |
+|---|---|---|
+| `RELICARIO_IMAGE` | Override the reference-image JPEG path used during vault unlock. | Trusted: filesystem path under the user's control. Read-only; its bytes feed `imgsecret::extract_secret`. |
+| `RELICARIO_GITEA_URL` | Gitea API base URL for `relicario device add`. Equivalent to `--gitea-url`. | Trusted: HTTPS URL. Used only in the device-add code path. |
+| `RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN` | Gitea personal-access token. Equivalent to `--gitea-token`. | **Secret**: anyone who can read this env var can manage the user's deploy keys via the Gitea API. The CLI never logs it. |
+| `RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER` | Gitea repository owner (e.g. `alee`). Equivalent to `--owner`. | Trusted: opaque string. |
+| `RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO` | Gitea repository name (e.g. `vault`). Equivalent to `--repo`. | Trusted: opaque string. |
+
+### Debug-only (compiled out of `cargo build --release`)
+
+The following variables are gated behind `cfg(debug_assertions)` and
+are **no-ops** in release builds. The env-var lookup is removed by the
+optimiser from any binary built without debug assertions (i.e. the
+standard `--release` profile).
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` | Suppress the plaintext `groups.cache` write. Developer debugging tool for the cache logic. |
+| `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt during integration tests. |
+| `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt for item-secret fields during integration tests. |
+| `RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt for backup export/restore passphrases during integration tests. |

docs/architecture/overview.md

@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ Core tests use **fast Argon2id params** (m=256, t=1, p=1) so they don't take for
 |---|---|---|
 | Master key only in `Zeroizing<[u8;32]>` | core types; CLI follows; extension WASM follows | Drop-on-scope-exit zeroization; never leaves stack |
 | AEAD ciphertext starts with version byte | `core/crypto.rs` | Format identification; reject v1 blobs cleanly |
-| Item IDs are random 8-char hex | `core/ids.rs` | Stable, short, no information leak |
+| Item IDs are random 16-char hex (64 bits) | `core/ids.rs` | Stable, short, no information leak |
-| Attachment IDs are content-addressed (SHA-256) | `core/ids.rs` | Dedup; integrity check |
+| Attachment IDs are content-addressed (first 32 hex chars / 128 bits of SHA-256) | `core/ids.rs` | Dedup; integrity check |
 | KDF input is length-prefixed | `core/crypto.rs` | Prevents `passphrase || image_secret` collisions |
 | Git history is preserved as audit log; never squash | CLI commits; SW commits | Per-action history is a feature |
 | Per-action git commits with structured messages | `cli` (via `commit_paths`); SW (via vault.ts helpers) | Greppable, useful as audit log |

docs/superpowers/audits/2026-04-18-initial-security-audit-opus-4-5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# Verification: 2026-04-18 Initial Security Audit
+
+**Verified by:** Claude Opus 4.5  
+**Date:** 2026-05-01  
+**Methodology:** Code inspection of referenced file paths and line numbers
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+| Finding | File Exists | Lines Match Current | Vulnerability Status | Confidence |
+|---------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------|
+| C1 - Setup web-accessible | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| C2 - Message router trusts all | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| C3 - Capture innerHTML XSS | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| C4 - Autofill no origin check | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H1 - KDF unprefixed concat | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H2 - Master key not zeroized | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 9/10 |
+| H3 - Passphrase gate cosmetic | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H4 - Git shells out unsafely | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H5 - WASM Math.random() | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H6 - Modulo bias | ✅ | ❌ refactored | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H7 - rpassword outdated | ✅ | ✅ | **FIXED** | 10/10 |
+| H8 - Storage plaintext | ✅ | ⚠️ partial | **ACKNOWLEDGED** | 8/10 |
+
+**Verdict:** All CRITICAL and HIGH findings except H8 have been remediated. The codebase has been significantly refactored since this audit, making line number references obsolete but confirming fixes were applied.
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL Findings
+
+### C1: Setup wizard web-accessible
+
+- **Original claim:** `web_accessible_resources` with `matches: ["<all_urls>"]` allows any website to inject vault config.
+- **Current state:** `extension/manifest.json` line 38 shows `"web_accessible_resources": []` (empty array).
+- **Router validation:** `router/index.ts` lines 29-71 verify sender origins (`isPopup`, `isSetup`, `isContent`) and return `unauthorized_sender` for invalid callers.
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### C2: Service-worker trusts every message
+
+- **Original claim:** `index.ts:116-441` ignores `_sender` and trusts all messages.
+- **Current state:** `service-worker/index.ts` is now 100 lines; message handling delegated to modular router.
+- **Router checks:**
+  - `sender.frameId === 0` for content scripts (line 42)
+  - `sender.id === chrome.runtime.id` (line 43)
+  - Returns `{ ok: false, error: 'unauthorized_sender' }` for invalid senders
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### C3: Capture prompt innerHTML injection
+
+- **Original claim:** `capture.ts:172-191` uses innerHTML with attacker-controlled strings in page DOM.
+- **Current state:** 
+  - Uses `createShadowHost()` (line 128) for closed Shadow DOM
+  - Builds DOM via `document.createElement` + `.textContent =` (lines 143-216)
+  - File header (lines 6-9) documents this pattern
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### C4: Autofill has no origin check
+
+- **Original claim:** `get_autofill_candidates` accepts URL from message payload; `get_credentials` returns any entry by ID.
+- **Current state in `content-callable.ts`:**
+  - Line 25: `const senderHost = safeHostname(sender.tab?.url ?? '')` — uses sender tab, not message
+  - Line 44: `if (!itemHost || itemHost !== senderHost) return { ok: false, error: 'origin_mismatch' }`
+  - Lines 46-51: TOFU origin-ack check before returning credentials
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+---
+
+## HIGH Findings
+
+### H1: Argon2id unprefixed concatenation
+
+- **Original claim:** `crypto.rs:225-227` has `password = passphrase || image_secret` without length prefix.
+- **Current state at `crypto.rs:229-236`:**
+  ```rust
+  let mut password = Zeroizing::new(Vec::with_capacity(8 + nfc_passphrase.len() + 8 + 32));
+  password.extend_from_slice(&(nfc_passphrase.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
+  password.extend_from_slice(&nfc_passphrase);
+  password.extend_from_slice(&32u64.to_be_bytes());
+  password.extend_from_slice(image_secret);
+  ```
+  Also includes NFC normalization (lines 224-227).
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H2: Master key never zeroized
+
+- **Original claim:** `Vec<u8>` from `derive_master_key` and intermediates leak into heap.
+- **Current state:**
+  - `crypto.rs:212`: returns `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>`
+  - `crypto.rs:232`: password wrapped in `Zeroizing::new()`
+  - `session.rs` (WASM/CLI): stores keys as `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>`
+  - CLI rpassword calls wrapped in `Zeroizing::new()`
+- **Note:** JS string zeroization remains a limitation (acknowledged).
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H3: Passphrase strength gate cosmetic
+
+- **Original claim:** Extension accepts any non-empty passphrase; CLI only requires 8 chars.
+- **Current state:**
+  - `setup.ts:152,640`: `score < 3` disables button
+  - `setup.ts:784-789`: server-side re-validation before create
+  - `generators.rs:124-130`: `validate_passphrase_strength()` requires score >= 3
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H4: Git shells out without guards
+
+- **Original claim:** No hooks/gpgsign/editor isolation.
+- **Current state in `helpers.rs:41-55`:**
+  ```rust
+  cmd.args([
+      "-c", "core.hooksPath=/dev/null",
+      "-c", "commit.gpgsign=false", 
+      "-c", "core.editor=true",
+  ]);
+  ```
+  Comment explicitly references "Audit H4".
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H5: WASM Math.random()
+
+- **Original claim:** `lib.rs:240-256` uses `Math.random()` for password generation.
+- **Current state:** `generate_password` calls `core_generate_password` from relicario-core.
+- **generators.rs:**
+  - Line 6: `use rand::rngs::OsRng;`
+  - Lines 61-64: Uses `Uniform::from()` with `OsRng`
+  - No `Math.random()` anywhere in codebase
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H6: Modulo bias
+
+- **Original claim:** `main.rs:308-317` uses `% CHARSET.len()`.
+- **Current state in `generators.rs`:**
+  - Line 61: `let dist = Uniform::from(0..charset.len());`
+  - Line 63: `charset[dist.sample(&mut rng)]` — rejection sampling, no modulo
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H7: rpassword 5.0.1 outdated
+
+- **Original claim:** Uses deprecated `prompt_password_stderr`.
+- **Current state:** `Cargo.toml` shows `rpassword = "7"`, uses `prompt_password`.
+- **Status:** ✅ **FIXED**
+
+### H8: Storage keeps apiToken/imageBase64 plaintext
+
+- **Original claim:** `chrome.storage.local` stores PAT and reference image unencrypted.
+- **Current state:** Still true — `popup-only.ts:139-141` stores `vaultConfig` and `imageBase64`.
+- **Mitigation:** Acknowledged as design constraint; spec documents that filesystem access to browser profile compromises both factors.
+- **Status:** ⚠️ **ACKNOWLEDGED** (not fixed, documented as acceptable tradeoff)
+
+---
+
+## Conclusion
+
+The 2026-04-18 audit identified real vulnerabilities that existed at that time. **All CRITICAL and HIGH findings (C1-C4, H1-H7) have since been remediated** with the exact fixes recommended in the audit. The codebase underwent significant refactoring, making the original line number references obsolete.
+
+H8 remains as an acknowledged design constraint inherent to Chrome extension architecture.
+
+**The audit was accurate and the remediation was thorough.**

docs/superpowers/audits/2026-05-01-security-audit-opus-4-5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Verification: 2026-05-01 Security Audit
+
+**Verified by:** Claude Opus 4.5  
+**Date:** 2026-05-01  
+**Methodology:** Code inspection of referenced file paths and line numbers
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+| Finding | File Exists | Lines Accurate | Vulnerability Real | Confidence |
+|---------|-------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|
+| 1 - Backup KDF NFC | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 2 - Commit injection | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 3 - WASM private key exposure | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 4 - Test env vars in prod | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 5 - AttachmentId 64-bit | ✅ | ⚠️ off-by-1 | ✅ | 9/10 |
+| 6 - Field history plaintext | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 7 - Device keys non-functional | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+| 8 - Path traversal restore | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
+
+**Verdict:** All 8 findings are verified as real vulnerabilities in the current codebase.
+
+---
+
+## Finding-by-Finding Verification
+
+### Finding 1 — Backup KDF missing NFC normalization
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-core/src/backup.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 303-312
+- **Verified:** ✅ `derive_backup_key` at lines 303-312 passes `passphrase` directly to `argon.hash_password_into()` without NFC normalization. Compare to `derive_master_key` in `crypto.rs:224-227` which explicitly normalizes.
+- **Impact confirmed:** Cross-platform restore failure for non-ASCII passphrases.
+
+### Finding 2 — Commit message injection via item titles
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 565, 899-901, 1110, 1327
+- **Verified:** ✅
+  - Line 565: `format!("add: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
+  - Line 1110: `format!("edit: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
+  - Line 1327: `format!("trash: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
+- **Impact confirmed:** Newlines/control chars in titles corrupt git log output.
+
+### Finding 3 — WASM `generate_device_keypair` crosses private key to JS
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 215-227
+- **Verified:** ✅ Function returns `{ "private_key_base64": "..." }` as `JsValue`, exposing ed25519 private key to JavaScript heap.
+- **Impact confirmed:** Key material accessible to any JS in service worker context.
+
+### Finding 4 — Test env vars ship in production binary
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 445-446, 421-423, 1425-1426
+- **Verified:** ✅
+  - Lines 421-423: `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET`
+  - Lines 445-446: `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE`
+  - Lines 1425-1426: `RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE`
+- **Impact confirmed:** All checked in production code without `#[cfg(test)]`. Passphrase visible in `/proc/<pid>/environ`.
+
+### Finding 5 — `AttachmentId` truncated to 64 bits
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-core/src/ids.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 52-57
+- **Actual lines:** 51-56 (off by 1)
+- **Verified:** ✅ `&digest[..8]` = 8 bytes = 64 bits. Birthday collision at ~2³² work.
+- **Impact confirmed:** Attacker with attachment upload can cause silent overwrites.
+
+### Finding 6 — `get_field_history` returns plaintext to JS
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 232-265
+- **Verified:** ✅ Returns historical `Password`/`Concealed` values as plaintext JSON via `v.as_str().to_owned()`.
+- **Impact confirmed:** Password history exposed to JS heap without Zeroizing.
+
+### Finding 7 — Device key system is security theater
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 2151-2221
+- **Verified:** ✅ `cmd_device()` handles Add/List/Revoke but:
+  - No `sign_commit` or `verify_signature` functions exist anywhere
+  - `devices.json` is plaintext and unauthenticated
+  - Revocation has no enforcement mechanism
+- **Impact confirmed:** Users falsely believe device revocation provides security.
+
+### Finding 8 — Path traversal on backup restore
+
+- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
+- **Claimed lines:** 1619-1626
+- **Verified:** ✅
+  ```rust
+  for item in &unpacked.items {
+      fs::write(target.join("items").join(format!("{}.enc", item.id)), ...)?;
+  }
+  ```
+  `item.id` and `attachment_id` used directly in path construction with no validation.
+- **Impact confirmed:** Crafted `.relbak` with `id = "../../.bashrc"` escapes target directory.
+
+---
+
+## Blockers Assessment
+
+The audit's "Path to Certifiable Safety" section is accurate:
+
+| Blocker | Verified | Severity |
+|---------|----------|----------|
+| B1 - Device key theater | ✅ Real | High |
+| B2 - Backup KDF NFC | ✅ Real | Medium |
+| B3 - Test env vars | ✅ Real | Medium |
+| B4 - Path traversal | ✅ Real | Medium |
+
+All four blockers are confirmed. B1 is the most dangerous as it misleads users about their security posture.

docs/superpowers/audits/2026-05-01-security-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+# Relicario Security Audit — 2026-05-01
+
+Scope: full project audit (not a PR diff). Covers crypto correctness, protocol gaps,
+implementation reality vs. plans, and a roadmap toward third-party auditability.
+
+---
+
+## Section 1 — Security Findings
+
+### Finding 1 — Backup KDF missing NFC normalization
+
+**`crates/relicario-core/src/backup.rs:303-312`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+`derive_backup_key` passes raw passphrase bytes to Argon2id. The main vault KDF in
+`crypto.rs` uses `u64_be(len) || nfc_passphrase || u64_be(32) || image_secret`. The
+backup KDF has neither NFC normalization nor the length-prefix construction.
+
+**Exploit:** User creates a backup on macOS (NFD normalization) and restores on Linux
+(NFC). The Argon2id input differs → wrong key → unrestorable backup. Affects any
+non-ASCII passphrase (`"Crêpe-7"`, `"café"`, accented chars).
+
+**Fix:** Factor out `normalize_passphrase()` and use it in both `derive_master_key` and
+`derive_backup_key`.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 2 — Commit message injection via item titles
+
+**`crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:565, 899-901, 1110, 1327`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+Item titles (arbitrary user UTF-8) are embedded directly into `-m` commit message strings
+via `format!("add: {} ({})", item.title, ...)`. `git_command` uses `Command::args()` (no
+shell), so shell injection into `git add` is blocked — but newlines in titles produce
+malformed multi-line commit messages that corrupt git log parsers.
+
+**Fix:** Strip control characters from titles before embedding in commit messages, or omit
+the title from the `-m` format entirely and use only the item ID.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 3 — WASM `generate_device_keypair` crosses private key bytes to JS
+
+**`crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs:215-227`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+Returns `{ "private_key_base64": "..." }` as a `JsValue`. The ed25519 private key lives in
+the JS heap with no `Zeroizing` protection. The vault master key is protected behind an
+opaque `SessionHandle` and never crosses to JS — the device key has no such protection.
+
+**Exploit:** Any JS running in the extension service worker context (compromised dependency,
+content script escalation) that can intercept the return value gets the raw device key.
+
+**Fix:** Never return the private key to JS. Expose only a `sign(handle, data) → signature`
+API; perform the signing in Rust.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 4 — Test env vars ship in production binary
+
+**`crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:445-446, 421-423, 1425-1426`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+`RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE`, `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET`, `RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE`
+are checked in production code (not `#[cfg(test)]`). When set, they bypass the interactive
+TTY prompt.
+
+**Exploit:** On Linux, `/proc/<pid>/environ` exposes the passphrase in cleartext to
+same-UID processes. Shell history captures `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE=mysecret relicario unlock ...`.
+
+**Fix:** Gate behind `#[cfg(test)]` or a `--features testing` build profile.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 5 — `AttachmentId` truncated to 64 bits of SHA-256
+
+**`crates/relicario-core/src/ids.rs:52-57`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+`AttachmentId::from_plaintext` takes `&digest[..8]` (8 bytes = 64 bits). Standard
+content-addressed stores use ≥128 bits. With 64 bits, an attacker who can supply attachment
+content can find a second-preimage collision with ~2^32 work, causing a crafted attachment
+to silently overwrite an existing one on disk.
+
+**Fix:** Change `&digest[..8]` → `&digest[..16]` (128 bits). No migration needed for
+existing vaults since only new attachments are affected.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 6 — `get_field_history` re-parses item JSON from JS heap
+
+**`crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs:232-265`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+Returns all historical `Password`/`Concealed` values as plaintext `JsValue`. The values
+are regular `String` allocations with no `Zeroizing` wrapper before serialization into
+`serde_json::Value`.
+
+**Fix:** Architectural — document that the caller must treat the return value as sensitive.
+For strong hygiene: do all history display in Rust, never returning password history bytes
+to JS.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 7 — Device key system is non-functional as a security control
+
+**`crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:2151-2221`** · Severity: **High**
+
+`device add/list/revoke` and `generate_device_keypair` exist, but **no code anywhere signs
+git commits with device keys**, and **no code verifies device signatures**. `devices.json`
+is plaintext in the repo and unauthenticated by the vault.
+
+**Exploit:** Users believe "device revocation" prevents unauthorized access after a device
+is stolen/compromised. It does nothing. A stolen device continues to have full vault access
+via its git remote credentials regardless of revocation.
+
+**Fix:** Either (a) implement commit signing + server-side pre-receive hook verification, or
+(b) remove the `device` subcommands and document that access control is SSH-key-level only.
+
+---
+
+### Finding 8 — Path traversal on backup restore
+
+**`crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:1619-1626`** · Severity: **Medium**
+
+During restore, item/attachment IDs from the decrypted backup JSON are used directly as
+path components with no format validation. IDs are AEAD-authenticated but a user restoring
+from a crafted `.relbak` with a known passphrase would execute arbitrary path writes.
+
+**Exploit (social engineering):** Attacker provides a `.relbak` with item ID
+`../../.bashrc` → restore overwrites `~/.bashrc`.
+
+**Fix:**
+```rust
+ensure!(id.len() == 16 && id.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+    "invalid id in backup");
+```
+
+---
+
+## Section 2 — Implementation Status
+
+| Feature | Status | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| Two-factor decrypt (passphrase + image_secret) | ✅ Implemented | Full crypto pipeline, NFC passphrase, Argon2id m=64MiB t=3 p=4 |
+| imgsecret embed | ✅ Implemented | DCT QIM, QUANT_STEP=50, central 70%, 5-50 redundant copies |
+| imgsecret extract + crop recovery | ✅ Implemented | Majority voting ≥60%, 4 crop search strategies |
+| Manifest browse (schema v2) | ✅ Implemented | Encrypted with master key, search(), title/type/tags/icon |
+| Vault CRUD (init/add/edit/rm/trash/restore/purge) | ✅ Implemented | All 7 item types fully handled |
+| CLI `init` | ✅ Implemented | zxcvbn ≥3 gate, image embed, Argon2id params, git init |
+| CLI `add` / `edit` | ✅ Implemented | All 7 types, TOTP QR decode via rqrr, field history capture |
+| CLI `generate` | ✅ Implemented | Random (rejection-sampled) + BIP39, uses vault defaults |
+| CLI `sync` | ✅ Implemented | `git pull --rebase && git push` |
+| CLI `backup export/restore` | ✅ Implemented | Plan 3A: zstd+AEAD container, optional image + git bundle |
+| CLI `import lastpass` | ✅ Implemented | Plan 3B: CSV validation, Login + SecureNote + TOTP mapping |
+| WASM bindings (all item/manifest/settings) | ✅ Implemented | Complete symmetric set |
+| WASM session handle (opaque master key) | ✅ Implemented | Key never crosses WASM boundary |
+| WASM attachment, generator, TOTP, backup, import | ✅ Implemented | All wired |
+| Field history tracking + CLI `history` | ✅ Implemented | Password/Concealed/TOTP history, prune policies |
+| Trash + retention | ✅ Implemented | `trash list/empty`, TrashRetention window |
+| Attachments (CLI + WASM) | ✅ Implemented | File-level AEAD, cap enforcement, Document type |
+| Settings / VaultSettings | ✅ Implemented | All retention + generator + cap fields, CLI subcommands |
+| Device keys (add/list/revoke) | ⚠️ Partial | Key gen + persistence only — **no signing, no verification** (Finding 7) |
+| Per-vault total attachment cap | ⚠️ Partial | Cap defined in settings, per-attachment enforced — per-vault total bytes not checked |
+| Browser extension UI | ⚠️ Partial | WASM surface complete; extension TypeScript/HTML is a separate repo |
+| Recovery QR | ❌ Plan-only | Spec written; no `recovery_qr.rs` module exists |
+| Password coloring | ❌ Plan-only | Spec written; no implementation |
+| Passphrase rotation | ❌ Deferred | Explicitly back-burnered |
+| Pre-v0.3.0 audit walk | ❌ Not started | Listed as pending before v0.3.0 tag |
+| HOTP counter persistence | ❌ Bug | `Hotp { counter }` never incremented/saved — HOTP desynchronizes immediately |
+
+---
+
+## Section 3 — Path to Certifiable Safety
+
+### Blockers — must fix before any real use
+
+| # | Item |
+|---|---|
+| B1 | **Device key system is security theater** — implement signing or remove the commands. This is the most dangerous finding because it misleads users about their security posture. |
+| B2 | **Backup KDF NFC normalization** — one-line fix; data loss risk for non-ASCII passphrases. |
+| B3 | **Test env vars in production binary** — gate with `#[cfg(test)]`. Exposes passphrase via `/proc`. |
+| B4 | **Path traversal on restore** — two-line ID validation before any `fs::write`. |
+
+### Important — fix before third-party audit
+
+| # | Item |
+|---|---|
+| I1 | Sanitize item titles before embedding in commit messages |
+| I2 | `AttachmentId`: `&digest[..8]` → `&digest[..16]` (128-bit collision resistance) |
+| I3 | Enforce per-vault total attachment bytes cap (already defined, never checked) |
+| I4 | Document manifest integrity model: AEAD protects against silent modification, but item deletion is only detectable via git history |
+| I5 | Stop crossing device private key bytes to JS (prerequisite for B1 if signing is implemented) |
+| I6 | Fix HOTP counter: increment + re-save on each `totp get`, or disable HOTP and return an error |
+
+### Nice-to-have — audit-friendliness
+
+| # | Item |
+|---|---|
+| N1 | Wrap `nfc_passphrase: Vec<u8>` in `Zeroizing` in `derive_master_key` |
+| N2 | `cargo audit` in CI |
+| N3 | Validate Argon2id params on vault load — warn if below production minimums |
+| N4 | Broaden steganography recompression tests to use ImageMagick/libjpeg-turbo (not just the `image` crate) |
+| N5 | Consider machine-readable audit log encrypted alongside the vault |

docs/superpowers/audits/2026-05-02-doc-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+# Documentation Audit — 2026-05-02
+
+Pre-v0.5.0 audit of Relicario's documentation against the current codebase.
+
+## Summary
+
+- **Total findings:** 14
+- **Fixed inline:** 6
+- **Need user input (proposed only):** 8
+- **Top 3 recommendations:**
+  1. **Add `relicario-server` to architecture docs.** It exists in `crates/`, is referenced by SECURITY.md, and underpins device-auth, but `docs/architecture/overview.md`'s "three codebases" framing and `CLAUDE.md`'s project-structure tree still pretend it doesn't exist (Findings 1, 2, 9). This is the single biggest gap before tagging v0.5.0.
+  2. **Replace `CLAUDE.md`'s Roadmap.** It still says "Next: WASM build + Chrome MV3 browser extension (Plan 2)" — a milestone that shipped weeks ago. Multiple subsequent train rounds (typed items, attachments, backup, LastPass, device auth, fullscreen UX phases) have shipped, none of which are reflected (Finding 3).
+  3. **Rewrite the `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` "Crate Architecture" + "Vault Creation Flow" sections** so they describe the v0.5.0 surface (typed items, settings.enc, device auth boundary, server crate, extension WASM) rather than the v0.1.0 freeze (Finding 10).
+
+The codebase itself is well-documented — `crates/{relicario-core,relicario-cli}/ARCHITECTURE.md`, `extension/ARCHITECTURE.md`, and `docs/architecture/overview.md` are detailed and current. The drift is concentrated in **the top-level entry-point docs** (`README.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`) and in the SECURITY.md / overview.md edges.
+
+---
+
+## Findings
+
+### Finding 1 — `relicario-server` crate is invisible in cross-codebase docs
+
+**File:** `docs/architecture/overview.md` (lines 14–48 — "The three codebases" + table)
+**Issue:** The repo now has **four** Rust crates (`relicario-core`, `relicario-cli`, `relicario-wasm`, `relicario-server`) plus the extension. The framing "The three codebases" + accompanying ASCII diagram + four-row table all predate the May 2026 server crate. `relicario-server` is the pre-receive hook binary that enforces device-signature verification — load-bearing for the device-auth model that SECURITY.md already advertises.
+**Fix:** Re-title the section ("The four codebases" or "The relicario codebases"), add a server box to the diagram, add a row to the table. The role is "Pre-receive Git hook that verifies commit signatures against `.relicario/devices.json` and `.relicario/revoked.json`".
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (>50 words of new prose; touches the framing of the whole overview doc)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 2 — `CLAUDE.md` project-structure tree omits `relicario-server`
+
+**File:** `CLAUDE.md` (lines 26–54)
+**Issue:** The `crates/` tree only lists `relicario-core/`, `relicario-cli/`, `relicario-wasm/`. `relicario-server/` is missing. Since CLAUDE.md is the project-level summary every Claude session reads, this is the highest-leverage staleness.
+**Fix:** Add a fourth crate entry for `relicario-server/` with `src/main.rs # pre-receive hook: verify_commit + generate_hook`.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (CLAUDE.md is user-controlled per audit constraints)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 3 — `CLAUDE.md` Roadmap is severely stale
+
+**File:** `CLAUDE.md` (lines 91–93)
+**Issue:** Says `Next: WASM build + Chrome MV3 browser extension (Plan 2). Then mobile (Rust core compiles to ARM).` Plan 2 (extension) shipped, then Plans 1A-1C, 3A (backup), 3B (LastPass), Plan 4 (security fixes + device auth), and Phases 1-2B of the fullscreen UX redesign all shipped. The current "next thing" per project memory is v0.5.0 polish + harden plus Phase 3/4 of fullscreen UX.
+**Fix:** Replace with a current-state Roadmap line (e.g. `Next: v0.5.0 polish + harden, then Phase 3 (vault tab shell). Mobile (ARM) and recovery QR remain on the roadmap.`).
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (CLAUDE.md is user-controlled; phrasing is a judgment call)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 4 — `CLAUDE.md` says "Item IDs are random 8-char hex"
+
+**File:** `CLAUDE.md` (line 79)
+**Issue:** Audit M8 bumped `ItemId`/`FieldId` to 16-char hex (64 bits). Verified against `crates/relicario-core/src/ids.rs:3-4, 35-37` and `tests/integration` — they're 16 hex chars. The same line also doesn't mention that `AttachmentId` was bumped to 32 hex chars / 128 bits (audit I2/B4).
+**Fix:** Change to: `Item IDs and Field IDs are random 16-char hex strings (64 bits of OsRng entropy). AttachmentIds are content-addressed: first 32 hex chars of SHA-256(plaintext) (128 bits, audit I2/B4).`
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (CLAUDE.md is user-controlled)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 5 — `docs/architecture/overview.md` conventions table also says "8-char hex"
+
+**File:** `docs/architecture/overview.md` (line 180)
+**Issue:** Same M8 bump; the conventions table at line 180 said `Item IDs are random 8-char hex`.
+**Fix:** Update to 16-char hex / 64 bits, and bump the AttachmentId row to mention the 128-bit width.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Fixed inline in `docs/architecture/overview.md`
+
+---
+
+### Finding 6 — `README.md` uses obsolete `entries/` directory layout
+
+**File:** `README.md` (lines 36, 117–118, 147–149)
+**Issue:** References to `entries/*.enc` and the `entry.rs` module are pre-typed-items vocabulary. The on-disk layout is now `items/<id>.enc` + `attachments/<item-id>/<aid>.enc` + `settings.enc`; the core module is `item.rs` + `item_types/`. The README is the security proof and the first thing visitors read — getting the on-disk shape wrong hurts the legibility-as-security pitch.
+**Fix:** Replace `entries/` with `items/`. Add `settings.enc`, `attachments/<item-id>/<aid>.enc`, and (for device-auth) `revoked.json`. Rewrite the `crates/` tree to match the actual seven-module shape and add `relicario-wasm` and `relicario-server`. Update item-ID width to 16-char hex.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Fixed inline in `README.md`
+
+---
+
+### Finding 7 — `README.md` Roadmap lists shipped features as upcoming
+
+**File:** `README.md` (lines 184–192)
+**Issue:** All of these are checked off in real life but unchecked in the doc: WASM/Chrome extension, secure notes, secure document storage, LastPass import, Firefox extension. Only Bitwarden/1Password import, the unlock daemon, mobile, and Safari are still unstarted.
+**Fix:** Mark the shipped items as `[x]`; add Firefox WebExtension, typed items, backup/restore, LastPass CSV import, and device authentication as completed; keep Bitwarden/1Password import, unlock daemon, mobile, Safari as open.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Fixed inline in `README.md`
+
+---
+
+### Finding 8 — `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` ASCII vault layout uses `entries/` and lacks settings/attachments/revoked
+
+**File:** `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` (lines 45–53)
+**Issue:** Same staleness as README Finding 6. The "GIT SERVER (untrusted)" box shows only `manifest.enc` + `entries/<id>.enc` + `.relicario/{salt,params.json,devices.json}`. Missing: `settings.enc`, `attachments/<item-id>/<aid>.enc`, `revoked.json`. ID lengths are 8-char hex (`a1b2c3d4`) instead of 16-char hex.
+**Fix:** Update box to current layout including settings.enc, attachments tree, revoked.json, and 16-char IDs.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Fixed inline in `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`
+
+---
+
+### Finding 9 — `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` "Crate Architecture" omits wasm + server crates
+
+**File:** `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` (lines 208–235)
+**Issue:** The bottom box of the "Crate Architecture" diagram says `Future: relicario-wasm wraps this for browser extension` and `Future: JNI/Swift wrappers for Android/iOS`. WASM is no longer future — it shipped. The `relicario-server` crate isn't mentioned at all. The `relicario-core` module list inside the box still says `entry / Manifest / search`, predating the typed-items rewrite (`item`, `item_types/`, `settings`, `attachment`, `backup`, `device`).
+**Fix:** Replace the inner-box module names with the current set; remove the "Future: relicario-wasm" line and add a "Consumed by" line listing all three downstream crates including server.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0
+**Status:** Fixed inline in `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`
+
+---
+
+### Finding 10 — `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` "Vault Creation Flow" doesn't reflect typed-items or settings.enc
+
+**File:** `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` (lines 60–89)
+**Issue:** The vault-creation pipeline in this doc shows `master_key → XChaCha20-Poly1305 → manifest.enc` only. In reality `cmd_init` also encrypts and writes `settings.enc` (default `VaultSettings`). Field-history-tracked items, attachments, the `Item` envelope shape — none of these are in the flow doc. Without context on typed items, a new contributor reading this doc would have a v0.1-era model of the system.
+**Fix:** Add a settings.enc step to the flow; either expand the items section or note that the full item lifecycle is in `crates/relicario-core/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
+**Severity:** nice-to-have (the per-codebase ARCHITECTURE.md files are the source of truth; this top-level doc could just point at them)
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (>50 words of new prose, design choice between rewriting vs trimming)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 11 — `docs/SECURITY.md` "Device registration was optional before v0.4.0" is undated/misleading
+
+**File:** `docs/SECURITY.md` (lines 60–62)
+**Issue:** Says `Device registration was optional before v0.4.0. With device auth enabled, all commits must be signed by a registered device.` But (a) v0.4.0 hasn't been tagged yet — the changelog goes v0.1.0 → v0.2.0 → "Unreleased", and the next tag-in-flight per project memory is v0.5.0; (b) per the v0.5.0 polish + harden spec, device-auth enforcement is **currently a no-op** because the pre-receive hook fix (S1) hasn't landed. Saying "all commits MUST be signed" is aspirational, not current.
+**Fix:** Reword to clarify (a) the actual version line (e.g. "Pre-v0.5.0 vaults can opt out by leaving `devices.json` empty"), AND (b) acknowledge that signature *enforcement* depends on the pre-receive hook being deployed and the S1 fix landing. Could just be a one-line caveat.
+**Severity:** must-fix-before-v0.5.0 (security-doc accuracy is part of the legibility pitch)
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (security wording — exact phrasing matters)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 12 — `docs/SECURITY.md` doesn't mention `relicario-server`
+
+**File:** `docs/SECURITY.md` (lines 44–51)
+**Issue:** The "Device Authentication" section refers to a "pre-receive hook" but never says it lives in `crates/relicario-server`, what binary the hook calls (`relicario-server verify-commit <sha>`), or how to install it (`relicario-server generate-hook`). For a self-hosted user reading this to decide whether to enable it, those are the two essential operational facts.
+**Fix:** Add a short paragraph naming the crate and the two subcommands, pointing to the design spec.
+**Severity:** nice-to-have
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (>50 words of new prose)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 13 — Foundational design spec's "Post-V1 Ideas" lists shipped features
+
+**File:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-11-relicario-design.md` (lines 351–361)
+**Issue:** This doc is explicitly historical (per `docs/architecture/overview.md` "Stale spec docs" disclaimer), so editing it as architecture would violate convention. Still worth flagging that "Post-V1 Ideas" lists secure notes, secure documents, mobile, LastPass import, Firefox extension, TOTP — most of which have shipped. Per project policy this is *informational only*; the spec is a time-stamped decision artifact.
+**Fix:** None — leave alone. If desired, prepend a one-line "Status: V1 shipped 2026-04-22; many Post-V1 ideas have since landed — see CHANGELOG.md" at the top of the file.
+**Severity:** informational
+**Status:** Proposed; needs user decision (touches a historical spec the user may want to leave frozen)
+
+---
+
+### Finding 14 — Lowercase "relicario" in prose contexts
+
+**File:** `README.md` (line 67), `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` (none found in prose), `docs/architecture/overview.md` (none found in prose), `docs/SECURITY.md` (none found in prose)
+**Issue:** Per CLAUDE.md, "Relicario" should be capitalized in prose. A search across the audit-scope docs finds no uppercase-violations — most prose lowercase usages are in code paths (`.relicario/`, `relicario init`, `relicario-core`) which are correctly lowercase per the rule. The README at line 67 ("Relicario generates unique passwords per site") is correctly capitalized; line 26 ("Relicario embeds a random 256-bit secret") is correct. **No lowercase prose occurrences found.** This finding is "checked, no action needed."
+**Fix:** N/A
+**Severity:** informational
+**Status:** No action needed (recorded for completeness)
+
+---
+
+## Inline-fix verification
+
+Files modified during this audit:
+
+- `README.md` — vault layout (`items/`, `settings.enc`, `attachments/`), crate tree (added `relicario-wasm`, `relicario-server`, typed-items modules), ID width, Roadmap.
+- `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` — git-server box (`items/`, `settings.enc`, `attachments/`, `revoked.json`), crate-architecture inner box (current core modules), removed "Future: relicario-wasm" line.
+- `docs/architecture/overview.md` — conventions table (16-char hex IDs, 128-bit AttachmentIds).
+
+No source files, `Cargo.lock`, or extension code were modified. CLAUDE.md, SECURITY.md, and the foundational design spec were not modified — those changes need user review per the audit constraints.

docs/superpowers/coordination/v0.5.0-dev-a-prompt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# Dev A Kickoff Prompt — v0.5.0 Plan A (Security + Cleanup)
+
+Paste everything below the `---` line into a fresh Claude Code terminal as the first user message.
+
+---
+
+You are a **senior developer** owning Plan A for the Relicario v0.5.0 "polish + harden" release. Plan A is Rust + docs work: the security-vulnerability anchor (pre-receive hook), tar hardening, env-var audit, and a stale-branch cleanup. A PM in another terminal coordinates you with Dev B (extension UX). The user relays messages between terminals.
+
+## Setup (do this first)
+
+```bash
+cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario
+git fetch
+git checkout main
+git pull
+git worktree add ../relicario.plan-a -b feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup
+cd ../relicario.plan-a
+pwd  # should print /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-a
+```
+
+**ALL subsequent work happens in `/home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-a`**. Project memory note: subagent prompts MUST start with `cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-a` — otherwise subagents commit to main.
+
+Today: 2026-05-02. Project rules in `CLAUDE.md` apply.
+
+## Required reading (in order)
+
+1. `CLAUDE.md` — project rules
+2. `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md` — spec (your scope is **S1, S2, S3, C1 only**)
+3. `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup.md` — your plan, execute task by task
+
+## Execution mode
+
+Use **subagent-driven-development** (per project memory's default). Invoke `superpowers:subagent-driven-development` and follow it: fresh subagent per task, two-stage review between tasks.
+
+**Every subagent prompt MUST start with**:
+```
+cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-a
+```
+…before any other instruction. This is non-negotiable per project memory.
+
+## Your scope and boundaries
+
+**In scope:** S1 (pre-receive hook), S2 (tar hardening), S3 (env-var audit), C1 (branch cleanup).
+
+**Out of scope:** anything in Plan B (B1, P1-P4). If you trip over a Plan B issue or a new bug while doing your work, file it via a `## QUESTION TO PM` block and keep moving.
+
+**Hard rules:**
+- S1 is HIGH-severity security. Don't relax acceptance tests or skip any of the four scenarios (registered-accepted, unregistered-rejected, revoked-after-rejected, revoked-before-historical-accepted).
+- C1 is git-destructive (`git branch -D`). For each of the five branches, print the merge-status check, then ask the user **before** deletion. Do not batch the deletes.
+- Do not merge your branch to main. The PM owns merges.
+- Do not push `--force` or run `git reset --hard`. Per `CLAUDE.md`: ask first.
+
+## Coordination protocol
+
+You are one of three terminals. The user relays messages between them.
+
+**Emit at every task boundary** (when you complete a task, get blocked, or want to ask):
+
+```
+## STATUS UPDATE — DEV-A
+Time: <iso8601 like 2026-05-02T14:30:00-07:00>
+Branch: feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup
+Task: <number / short name>
+Status: STARTED | IN-PROGRESS | DONE | BLOCKED | REVIEW-READY
+Last commit: <short sha + first line of message>
+Tests: <green | red (which failed) | N/A>
+Notes: <anything PM needs to know — keep to 3 sentences max>
+```
+
+**Emit when you need PM input mid-task**:
+
+```
+## QUESTION TO PM — DEV-A
+Time: <iso8601>
+Context: <what task, what decision point>
+Options: <A: ... / B: ... / C: ...>
+Recommended: <your pick + one-sentence rationale>
+Blocker: yes | no  (does work stop without an answer?)
+```
+
+**You'll receive (pasted by user)**: `## DIRECTIVE TO DEV-A` blocks from the PM. Acknowledge and act.
+
+## Authority within the plan
+
+You don't need PM permission to:
+- Execute task-to-task per the plan
+- Make implementation decisions consistent with the plan and spec
+- Write tests, refactor your own code, fix bugs you introduce
+- Push commits to your feature branch
+
+You **do** escalate to PM when:
+- A scope question outside the plan
+- A test you can't make green after honest debugging (don't fudge — debug)
+- A discovered bug not in your plan
+- Anything destructive (per project rules)
+- Before opening the PR for review
+
+## Final steps before REVIEW-READY
+
+1. Full `cargo test` (workspace) — must be green
+2. `cargo build -p relicario-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown` — must succeed
+3. `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` — must succeed
+4. Push the branch: `git push -u origin feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup`
+5. Open PR: `gh pr create --base main --head feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup --title "v0.5.0 Plan A: security + cleanup" --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
+## Summary
+Implements Plan A for v0.5.0 polish + harden:
+- S1: pre-receive hook fix (HIGH-severity revocation/registered-device bypass)
+- S2: tar archive path-traversal hardening on backup restore
+- S3: RELICARIO_* env-var audit + cfg-gating of dev-only vars
+- C1: stale local branch cleanup
+
+Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md
+Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup.md
+
+## Test plan
+- [x] cargo test (workspace) green
+- [x] cargo build -p relicario-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown
+- [x] cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+- [ ] PM review
+
+🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
+EOF
+)"`
+6. Emit `## STATUS UPDATE` with `Status: REVIEW-READY` and the PR URL
+
+## First action
+
+After reading: emit a `## STATUS UPDATE` confirming setup complete (worktree created, plan absorbed, on `feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup`), then start Task 1 of Plan A.

docs/superpowers/coordination/v0.5.0-dev-b-prompt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# Dev B Kickoff Prompt — v0.5.0 Plan B (Extension UX)
+
+Paste everything below the `---` line into a fresh Claude Code terminal as the first user message.
+
+---
+
+You are a **senior developer** owning Plan B for the Relicario v0.5.0 "polish + harden" release. Plan B is extension UX work: error-copy centralization, strength-meter regenerate fix, password coloring, form-layout polish, and setup-wizard → fullscreen vault tab handoff. A PM in another terminal coordinates you with Dev A (Rust security + cleanup). The user relays messages between terminals.
+
+## Setup (do this first)
+
+```bash
+cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario
+git fetch
+git checkout main
+git pull
+git worktree add ../relicario.plan-b -b feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux
+cd ../relicario.plan-b
+pwd  # should print /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-b
+```
+
+**ALL subsequent work happens in `/home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-b`**. Project memory note: subagent prompts MUST start with `cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-b` — otherwise subagents commit to main.
+
+Today: 2026-05-02. Project rules in `CLAUDE.md` apply.
+
+## Required reading (in order)
+
+1. `CLAUDE.md` — project rules
+2. `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md` — spec (your scope is **B1, P1, P2, P3, P4 only**; B2 is folded into P4)
+3. `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux.md` — your plan, execute task by task
+4. `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-01-password-coloring-design.md` — spec for P1 (already inlined into your plan, this is the reference design)
+
+## Execution mode
+
+Use **subagent-driven-development** (per project memory's default). Invoke `superpowers:subagent-driven-development` and follow it: fresh subagent per task, two-stage review between tasks.
+
+**Every subagent prompt MUST start with**:
+```
+cd /home/alee/Sources/relicario.plan-b
+```
+…before any other instruction. This is non-negotiable per project memory.
+
+## Your scope and boundaries
+
+**In scope:** B1 (strength meter regenerate desync), P4 (error copy centralization, subsumes B2), P1 (password coloring inlined), P3 (form layout envelope), P2 (setup → fullscreen tab handoff).
+
+**Out of scope:** anything in Plan A (S1, S2, S3, C1). If you trip over a Plan A issue or a new bug while doing your work, file it via a `## QUESTION TO PM` block and keep moving.
+
+**Hard rules:**
+- Don't ship a UI surface that still leaks raw `snake_case` error codes — P4's whole point is centralizing this.
+- For P3, the spec recommends Approach A (envelope constraint). The plan codifies that. If you discover at implementation time that A doesn't work and B (card-wrap) is needed, escalate via `## QUESTION TO PM` — don't switch silently.
+- Do not merge your branch to main. The PM owns merges.
+- Do not push `--force` or run `git reset --hard`. Per `CLAUDE.md`: ask first.
+
+## Coordination protocol
+
+You are one of three terminals. The user relays messages between them.
+
+**Emit at every task boundary** (when you complete a task, get blocked, or want to ask):
+
+```
+## STATUS UPDATE — DEV-B
+Time: <iso8601 like 2026-05-02T14:30:00-07:00>
+Branch: feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux
+Task: <number / short name>
+Status: STARTED | IN-PROGRESS | DONE | BLOCKED | REVIEW-READY
+Last commit: <short sha + first line of message>
+Tests: <green | red (which failed) | N/A>
+Notes: <anything PM needs to know — keep to 3 sentences max>
+```
+
+**Emit when you need PM input mid-task**:
+
+```
+## QUESTION TO PM — DEV-B
+Time: <iso8601>
+Context: <what task, what decision point>
+Options: <A: ... / B: ... / C: ...>
+Recommended: <your pick + one-sentence rationale>
+Blocker: yes | no  (does work stop without an answer?)
+```
+
+**You'll receive (pasted by user)**: `## DIRECTIVE TO DEV-B` blocks from the PM. Acknowledge and act.
+
+## Authority within the plan
+
+You don't need PM permission to:
+- Execute task-to-task per the plan
+- Make implementation decisions consistent with the plan and spec
+- Write tests, refactor your own code, fix bugs you introduce
+- Push commits to your feature branch
+
+You **do** escalate to PM when:
+- A scope question outside the plan
+- A test you can't make green after honest debugging (don't fudge — debug)
+- A discovered bug not in your plan
+- Anything destructive (per project rules)
+- For P3, if Approach A doesn't work and you need to switch to B
+- Before opening the PR for review
+
+## Final steps before REVIEW-READY
+
+1. Extension test suite green: `cd extension && pnpm test`
+2. Extension build green: `cd extension && pnpm build`
+3. WASM build still green (sanity): `cd .. && cargo build -p relicario-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown`
+4. Manual viewport sweep for P3: 1920×1080, 1440×900, 1024×768, 768×1024 — note any quirks in the PR description
+5. Manual smoke for P2: complete a fresh setup; vault tab opens, setup tab closes
+6. Push the branch: `git push -u origin feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux`
+7. Open PR: `gh pr create --base main --head feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux --title "v0.5.0 Plan B: extension UX" --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
+## Summary
+Implements Plan B for v0.5.0 polish + harden:
+- P4: centralized ERROR_COPY map (subsumes B2 vault_locked leak)
+- B1: strength-meter regenerate desync fix (input event dispatch)
+- P1: password coloring (per the 2026-05-01 spec)
+- P3: form-layout envelope constraint (Approach A)
+- P2: setup wizard → fullscreen vault tab handoff
+
+Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md
+Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux.md
+
+## Test plan
+- [x] pnpm test green
+- [x] pnpm build green
+- [x] cargo build -p relicario-wasm green
+- [x] Manual viewport sweep — see notes below
+- [x] Manual setup-flow smoke — vault tab opens, setup closes
+- [ ] PM review
+
+### Viewport sweep notes
+<fill in any quirks observed at each resolution; "none" is acceptable>
+
+🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
+EOF
+)"`
+8. Emit `## STATUS UPDATE` with `Status: REVIEW-READY` and the PR URL
+
+## First action
+
+After reading: emit a `## STATUS UPDATE` confirming setup complete (worktree created, plan absorbed, on `feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux`), then start Task 1 of Plan B (P4: error-copy map).

docs/superpowers/coordination/v0.5.0-pm-prompt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# PM Kickoff Prompt — v0.5.0 Polish + Harden
+
+Paste everything below the `---` line into a fresh Claude Code terminal as the first user message.
+
+---
+
+You are the **project manager** for the Relicario v0.5.0 "polish + harden" release. Two senior developers report to you, each working in their own terminal on a parallel feature branch. The user runs all three terminals and relays messages between them.
+
+## Setup
+
+- Working directory: `/home/alee/Sources/relicario`
+- Branch: stay on `main`. Do not check out feature branches.
+- Today: 2026-05-02. Project rules in `CLAUDE.md` apply (Spanish flourish, capitalization, autonomy defaults, never run git-destructive commands without asking).
+
+## Required reading (in order)
+
+1. `CLAUDE.md` — project rules
+2. `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md` — the bundle spec
+3. `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup.md` — Dev A's plan (Rust + cleanup)
+4. `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux.md` — Dev B's plan (extension UX)
+5. `docs/superpowers/audits/2026-05-02-doc-audit.md` — your direct work (8 proposed findings still need action; 6 trivial fixes already merged in commit `900ccf1`)
+
+## Your authority
+
+- Approve or deny scope changes from devs
+- Review and merge PRs from `feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup` and `feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux`
+- **Drive the doc-audit follow-ups directly** (the 8 proposed findings) — this is your hands-on work
+- Write the `CHANGELOG.md` entry for v0.5.0
+- Tag `v0.5.0` once everything is integrated **— but only after explicit user approval**
+
+## Your boundaries
+
+- Don't write feature code yourself. Edits to docs / CHANGELOG / CLAUDE.md are fine.
+- Don't deviate from the spec without user approval.
+- Don't merge a PR until the dev says `REVIEW-READY` and you've run `gh pr diff` to confirm.
+- Don't tag without user approval.
+- Project rule: ask the user before any git-destructive op (`git push --force`, `git reset --hard`, `git branch -D`).
+
+## Judgment calls in the plans worth flagging
+
+The subagents who drafted the plans flagged these decisions for your awareness:
+
+- **Plan A:** `safe_unpack_git_archive` was moved from `relicario-cli` to `relicario-core` so integration tests can reach it (matches the bytes-in/bytes-out core philosophy). Tar-bomb test sets the *header's* claimed size to 2 GiB rather than allocating 1 TiB. Adds `regex` as a runtime dep of `relicario-server`.
+- **Plan B:** P1 (password coloring) was *inlined* into Plan B rather than referenced. P3 went with Approach A (envelope constraint, not card-wrap). P4 keeps `humanizeError` as a thin shell for non-snake_case translators.
+
+If any of these conflict with your judgment, raise it with the user before kickoff.
+
+## Coordination protocol
+
+You are one of three terminals. The user relays messages between them.
+
+**You receive (pasted by user):** a `## STATUS UPDATE — DEV-A` or `## STATUS UPDATE — DEV-B` block, or a `## QUESTION TO PM — DEV-X` block.
+
+**You emit (for user to paste back):** a `## DIRECTIVE TO DEV-A` (or `DEV-B`) block. Format:
+
+```
+## DIRECTIVE TO DEV-A
+Time: <iso8601>
+Action: PROCEED | HOLD | RESCOPE | REVIEW-COMPLETE | MERGE-APPROVED
+Notes: <one paragraph max>
+Next: <one concrete instruction or "continue plan">
+```
+
+When asked "status?" by the user at any time, give a current rollup:
+
+```
+## RELEASE STATUS — v0.5.0
+Dev A: <task X of Y, status>
+Dev B: <task X of Y, status>
+PM: <which doc finding, status>
+Blockers: <list, or "none">
+Next milestone: <e.g., "Dev A REVIEW-READY", "tag v0.5.0">
+```
+
+## Reviewing PRs
+
+When a dev posts `Action: REVIEW-READY` with a PR URL:
+1. `gh pr view <url>` to read description and CI status
+2. `gh pr diff <url>` to read changes
+3. Check the diff against the spec and plan acceptance criteria
+4. If green: post `Action: MERGE-APPROVED` and run `gh pr merge --merge` (no squash — git history is preserved per project rule)
+5. If red: post `Action: HOLD` with specific concerns the dev needs to address
+
+Use the `superpowers:requesting-code-review` skill if you want a deeper independent review from a fresh subagent before approving.
+
+## Doc-audit follow-ups (your direct work)
+
+The 8 proposed findings in `docs/superpowers/audits/2026-05-02-doc-audit.md` are yours. Pick up while the devs are working in parallel. Pay particular attention to:
+
+1. `relicario-server` is invisible in cross-codebase docs (`docs/architecture/overview.md`, `CLAUDE.md` project tree)
+2. `CLAUDE.md` Roadmap line is stale ("Next: WASM extension (Plan 2)")
+3. `docs/SECURITY.md` overstates current device-auth enforcement — note that S1 is the fix that makes this true
+
+For findings that touch `CLAUDE.md`, propose the change in a status block to the user — don't edit it without approval.
+
+## Pre-tag checklist
+
+Before tagging v0.5.0:
+
+- [ ] `feature/v0.5.0-plan-a-security-cleanup` merged to main
+- [ ] `feature/v0.5.0-plan-b-extension-ux` merged to main
+- [ ] All 8 doc-audit findings actioned (fixed, deferred, or dropped)
+- [ ] `CHANGELOG.md` entry for v0.5.0 written
+- [ ] `cargo test` green on main
+- [ ] `cargo build -p relicario-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown` green
+- [ ] Extension build green (`cd extension && pnpm build`)
+- [ ] User-driven smoke test of the merged result
+- [ ] Pre-v0.3.0 manual test walk done (`docs/test-checklists/2026-04-27-pre-v0.3.0-audit.md`) — bundles forward since v0.3.0 was never tagged
+- [ ] Explicit user approval to tag
+
+## First action
+
+After reading: emit a `## RELEASE STATUS` block confirming you've absorbed the spec, both plans, and the audit. Note the three judgment calls in the plans for the user's awareness, and propose your starting doc-audit finding. Wait for user input or a status update from a dev.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-device-authentication-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+# Device Authentication Design
+
+> **Status:** Approved  
+> **Date:** 2026-05-02  
+> **Author:** Claude + alee
+
+## Overview
+
+Relicario device authentication provides cryptographic proof of commit authorship and API-managed access control. Each device (CLI instance, browser extension) has its own identity consisting of:
+
+1. **Signing key** (ed25519) — signs git commits
+2. **Deploy key** (ed25519) — grants git push access via Gitea API
+
+Device management is fully self-contained within Relicario — no manual SSH key management or server admin panels required.
+
+## Goals
+
+- All commits cryptographically signed by a registered device
+- Revocation instantly cuts off both signing authority AND push access
+- CLI and extension have full feature parity
+- Server-side enforcement via pre-receive hook
+- No security theater — every feature actually works
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│                           Vault Repository                          │
+│  .relicario/devices.json  ←── public signing keys (ed25519 OpenSSH) │
+│  .relicario/revoked.json  ←── revoked keys + timestamps             │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+            ▲                                    ▲
+            │ sign commits                       │ verify signatures
+            │ manage deploy keys (Gitea API)     │
+            │                                    │
+┌───────────┴───────────┐          ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
+│   CLI Device          │          │   Gitea Server            │
+│   ~/.config/relicario │          │   pre-receive hook        │
+│   /devices/<name>/    │          │   (relicario-server)      │
+│     signing.key       │          └───────────────────────────┘
+│     deploy.key        │
+└───────────────────────┘
+            
+┌───────────────────────┐
+│   Extension Device    │
+│   chrome.storage      │
+│   (encrypted keys)    │
+│   signing in WASM     │
+└───────────────────────┘
+```
+
+## Key Storage
+
+### CLI Device
+
+```
+~/.config/relicario/devices/
+├── macbook-cli/
+│   ├── signing.key      # OpenSSH private key (ed25519) for commit signing
+│   ├── signing.pub      # OpenSSH public key
+│   ├── deploy.key       # OpenSSH private key (ed25519) for git push
+│   ├── deploy.pub       # OpenSSH public key
+│   └── gitea_key_id     # Gitea's ID for the deploy key (for revocation)
+└── current              # File containing active device name
+```
+
+All private keys stored with mode 0600.
+
+### Extension Device
+
+- Private keys stored in `chrome.storage.local` under `device_keys`
+- Encrypted at rest using `HKDF(master_key, "device-storage")`
+- WASM holds decrypted keys in memory only while session is active
+- Structure:
+  ```json
+  {
+    "device_name": "chrome-macos",
+    "signing_private_key": "<encrypted>",
+    "signing_public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
+    "deploy_private_key": "<encrypted>",
+    "deploy_public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
+    "gitea_key_id": 42
+  }
+  ```
+
+### Vault Files
+
+**`devices.json`:**
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "name": "macbook-cli",
+    "public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA...",
+    "added_at": 1714600000,
+    "added_by": "macbook-cli"
+  }
+]
+```
+
+**`revoked.json`:**
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "name": "stolen-laptop",
+    "public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA...",
+    "revoked_at": 1714700000,
+    "revoked_by": "macbook-cli"
+  }
+]
+```
+
+## Vault Configuration
+
+Stored encrypted in vault settings:
+
+```json
+{
+  "git_provider": "gitea",
+  "git_api_url": "https://git.adlee.work/api/v1",
+  "git_api_token": "...",
+  "repo_owner": "alee",
+  "repo_name": "relicario-vault"
+}
+```
+
+Required Gitea token scopes: `repo`, `admin:repo_key`
+
+## CLI Flows
+
+### Device Add
+
+```bash
+relicario device add --name "macbook-cli"
+```
+
+1. Generate ed25519 signing keypair (OpenSSH format)
+2. Generate ed25519 deploy keypair (OpenSSH format)
+3. Call Gitea API: `POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/keys`
+   ```json
+   {
+     "title": "relicario-macbook-cli",
+     "key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
+     "read_only": false
+   }
+   ```
+4. Store keys to `~/.config/relicario/devices/macbook-cli/`
+5. Write device name to `~/.config/relicario/devices/current`
+6. Append public signing key to `.relicario/devices.json`
+7. Configure local git repo:
+   ```
+   git config user.signingkey ~/.config/relicario/devices/macbook-cli/signing.key
+   git config gpg.format ssh
+   git config commit.gpgsign true
+   git config core.sshCommand "ssh -i ~/.config/relicario/devices/macbook-cli/deploy.key"
+   ```
+8. Commit: `device: add macbook-cli`
+9. Push
+
+### Device Revoke
+
+```bash
+relicario device revoke stolen-laptop
+```
+
+1. Read `devices.json`, find entry for `stolen-laptop`
+2. Call Gitea API: `DELETE /repos/{owner}/{repo}/keys/{key_id}`
+3. Remove from `devices.json`
+4. Append to `revoked.json`:
+   ```json
+   {
+     "name": "stolen-laptop",
+     "public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
+     "revoked_at": 1714700000,
+     "revoked_by": "macbook-cli"
+   }
+   ```
+5. Commit: `device: revoke stolen-laptop`
+6. Push immediately
+
+### Device List
+
+```bash
+relicario device list
+
+DEVICE           ADDED         STATUS
+macbook-cli      2024-05-01    active (current)
+chrome-macos     2024-05-02    active
+stolen-laptop    2024-04-15    revoked 2024-05-01
+```
+
+### Verify Commit
+
+```bash
+relicario verify [commit-ish]
+```
+
+Checks signature against `devices.json`, reports device name and status.
+
+### Sync (Enhanced)
+
+```bash
+relicario sync
+```
+
+1. Verify HEAD is signed by current device
+2. Pull with rebase
+3. Warn on unsigned or unknown-signed incoming commits
+4. Push
+
+## Extension/WASM Flows
+
+### WASM API
+
+```rust
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn register_device(session: &SessionHandle, name: &str) -> Result<JsValue, JsError>
+// Generates both keypairs, stores encrypted, returns public keys only
+// Returns: { signing_public_key: "ssh-ed25519...", deploy_public_key: "ssh-ed25519..." }
+
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn sign_for_git(session: &SessionHandle, data: &[u8]) -> Result<JsValue, JsError>
+// Loads encrypted signing key, decrypts, signs, returns signature
+// Returns: { signature: "base64..." }
+
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn get_device_info(session: &SessionHandle) -> Result<JsValue, JsError>
+// Returns: { name, signing_public_key, deploy_public_key } or null
+
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+pub fn clear_device(session: &SessionHandle) -> Result<(), JsError>
+// Removes device keys from storage (for re-registration)
+```
+
+**Critical constraint:** Private key bytes never cross WASM boundary to JS. Generated in WASM, encrypted in WASM, decrypted in WASM, used in WASM.
+
+### Extension Registration Flow
+
+1. User clicks "Register this device" in settings
+2. Prompt for device name (default: "Chrome on macOS")
+3. Call WASM `register_device(name)` → returns public keys
+4. Service worker calls Gitea API to register deploy key
+5. Service worker updates `devices.json`, commits, pushes
+6. Device is now registered
+
+### Extension Commit Signing
+
+When extension modifies vault:
+1. Service worker prepares commit
+2. Calls WASM `sign_for_git(commit_data)` → returns signature
+3. Creates signed commit using git SSH signature format
+4. Pushes using deploy key
+
+## Server-Side Verification
+
+### Hook Distribution
+
+**Option B — CLI generates:**
+```bash
+relicario server-hook generate > pre-receive
+chmod +x pre-receive
+# Copy to Gitea hooks directory
+```
+
+**Option C — Standalone binary:**
+```bash
+cargo install relicario-server
+# Or download prebuilt binary
+```
+
+### Pre-Receive Hook
+
+```bash
+#!/bin/bash
+while read oldrev newrev refname; do
+  [ "$newrev" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ] && continue
+  
+  if [ "$oldrev" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
+    commits=$(git rev-list "$newrev")
+  else
+    commits=$(git rev-list "$oldrev..$newrev")
+  fi
+  
+  for commit in $commits; do
+    relicario-server verify-commit "$commit" || exit 1
+  done
+done
+```
+
+### Verification Logic
+
+`relicario-server verify-commit <commit>`:
+
+1. Extract `devices.json` and `revoked.json` from repo at commit
+2. Get commit signature via `git verify-commit --raw`
+3. Parse signature, extract signing public key
+4. Check key against `devices.json`:
+   - Not found → reject "signed by unregistered device"
+5. Check key against `revoked.json`:
+   - Found AND commit timestamp ≥ revoked_at → reject "signed by revoked device"
+   - Found AND commit timestamp < revoked_at → accept (historical)
+6. Accept
+
+### Gitea Installation
+
+```bash
+# Per-repo hook
+cp pre-receive /path/to/gitea-data/git/repositories/alee/vault.git/hooks/pre-receive
+
+# Or via Gitea admin UI
+# Settings → Git Hooks → pre-receive → paste script
+```
+
+## Error Handling
+
+### Device Registration
+
+| Error | CLI | Extension |
+|-------|-----|-----------|
+| Gitea API unreachable | Fail: "cannot reach git server" | Toast + retry |
+| API token invalid | Fail: "API token rejected" | Prompt re-enter in settings |
+| Deploy key name collision | Append `-2`, `-3` or fail | Same |
+
+### Signing
+
+| Error | Behavior |
+|-------|----------|
+| No device registered | Block: "run `relicario device add`" |
+| Private key not found | Prompt re-registration |
+| Key decryption fails | Session expired, prompt unlock |
+
+### Server Verification
+
+| Error | Hook Response |
+|-------|---------------|
+| Unsigned commit | Reject: "all commits must be signed" |
+| Unknown signing key | Reject: "signed by unregistered device" |
+| Revoked key (post-revocation) | Reject: "signed by revoked device 'X'" |
+
+### Revocation Edge Cases
+
+| Scenario | Behavior |
+|----------|----------|
+| Revoke current device | Require `--confirm`, warn about access loss |
+| Revoke last device | Error: "cannot revoke last device" |
+| Gitea API fails during revoke | Revoke signing key, warn about manual deploy key cleanup |
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+### Unit Tests (relicario-core)
+
+- Key generation and OpenSSH format serialization
+- Sign/verify round-trip
+- `devices.json` / `revoked.json` serialization
+
+### Integration Tests (relicario-cli)
+
+- `device add` creates keys and configures git
+- `device revoke` updates both JSON files
+- Commits are signed after device add
+- `verify` accepts/rejects appropriately
+
+### Integration Tests (Gitea API)
+
+- Mock Gitea API for deploy key management
+- Graceful failure on API errors
+
+### WASM Tests
+
+- `register_device` returns only public keys
+- `sign_for_git` never exposes private key
+- Round-trip signing works
+
+### E2E Tests (Server Hook)
+
+- Unsigned commits rejected
+- Valid signatures accepted
+- Revoked device signatures rejected (post-revocation)
+- Historical commits by later-revoked devices accepted
+
+## Bootstrapping
+
+**Problem:** The first device can't sign its own registration commit — there's no device yet.
+
+**Solution:** Bootstrap exception in the pre-receive hook:
+
+1. `relicario init` creates vault with empty `devices.json` (unsigned commit allowed)
+2. First `device add` registers itself (this commit is also unsigned — no prior device)
+3. Hook logic: if `devices.json` is empty in the parent commit, allow unsigned
+4. All subsequent commits must be signed
+
+**Extension bootstrap:** If connecting to an existing vault that has no devices:
+1. Extension detects empty `devices.json`
+2. Prompts to register as first device
+3. Same unsigned-commit exception applies
+
+**Security implication:** Anyone with push access can add the first device. This is acceptable because:
+- Push access already requires git credentials
+- The hook isn't installed yet anyway on a fresh repo
+- Once first device is registered, all subsequent changes require signing
+
+## Security Properties
+
+1. **Commit authorship is cryptographically proven** — ed25519 signatures
+2. **Revocation is instant and complete** — deploy key deletion via API
+3. **Private keys never leave their device** — WASM constraint enforced
+4. **History is append-only** — revocation doesn't invalidate past commits
+5. **Server enforces, client assists** — hook is authoritative, client checks are UX
+6. **Bootstrap is explicit** — first device registration requires push access, then locked down
+
+## Future Considerations
+
+- Hosted Relicario service with per-user isolated git backends
+- Support for other git providers (GitHub, GitLab) via their deploy key APIs
+- Hardware key support (YubiKey) for signing key storage

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-phase-2b-form-layout-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+# Phase 2B: Polish Foundation + Form Layout
+
+**Date:** 2026-05-02
+**Status:** Spec, awaiting review
+**Surface:** Browser extension — popup, fullscreen vault, setup wizard
+**Parent spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-30-relicario-fullscreen-ux-redesign-design.md`
+
+## Goal
+
+Bring the extension up to a "professional, contained" feel — like opening 1Password or another polished password manager — without losing the terminal-monospace soul. Three surfaces (login popup, setup wizard, fullscreen vault) all get the same polish vocabulary applied. Phase 2B also lands the two-column login form layout from the parent spec.
+
+## What changed from the original Phase 2B scope
+
+The original Phase 2B was scoped to form layout only. After visual review, we expanded scope to include:
+
+- A **patina** palette shift — gold accent dialed from bright `#d2ab43` toward weathered `#a88a4a`/`#cdb47a`/`#5a3f12`. Red theca dialed from saturated `#9a1a1a` toward brick `#7d2622`.
+- **Logo update** — same composition, patina palette, translucent gradient gem.
+- **Polish vocabulary** — backdrop with subtle radial glow + 18px grid texture, glass cards (translucent panels with backdrop-blur), refined typography lockup, primary/secondary button hierarchy.
+- **Arrow glyph** — `▸` (U+25B8) for "next" buttons, matching the `▾`/`▸` disclosure glyphs already in use.
+
+These items now ship together so the form layout lands inside an already-polished surface, rather than as a layout change inside flat CSS.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Three-pane shell, keyboard nav, command palette — deferred to Phase 3.
+- New affordances — Phase 2A already shipped the 8 smart inputs.
+- Light theme — single dark theme stays.
+- Mobile/narrow layouts under 720px — popup handles narrow.
+- Animated transitions / motion — focus state is the only transition.
+- Item types other than `login` getting a two-column treatment.
+
+## Visual language
+
+The polish vocabulary lives in `extension/src/popup/styles.css` and `extension/src/vault/vault.css`. Both files share token definitions and class names where possible.
+
+### Palette (patina)
+
+```css
+:root {
+  /* Patina gold — replaces the bright amber */
+  --gold-base:    #a88a4a;          /* base, less yellow / more bronze */
+  --gold-mid:     #cdb47a;          /* duller mid-highlight */
+  --gold-shadow:  #5a3f12;          /* deeper bronze shadow */
+  --gold-text:    #c9a868;          /* legible on dark, brand text */
+  --gold-soft:    rgba(184,149,86,0.14);   /* hover/active fill */
+  --gold-ring:    rgba(184,149,86,0.18);   /* focus ring */
+  --gold-stroke:  #b89556;          /* default border on emphasized elements */
+
+  /* Surface — slightly deeper than current bg */
+  --bg-base:      #0a0e14;          /* page (was #0d1117) */
+  --bg-pane:      #11161e;          /* slightly elevated surface */
+  --bg-card:      rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.55);  /* glass card fill */
+  --bg-input:     #0a0e14;          /* matches base for sunken feel */
+
+  /* Borders */
+  --border-soft:  rgba(255,255,255,0.05);   /* card edges */
+  --border-mid:   #262d36;          /* input borders */
+  --border-warm:  #2a3140;          /* slightly warmer for vault.css */
+
+  /* Text */
+  --text:         #c9d1d9;
+  --text-muted:   #8b949e;
+  --text-dim:     #6b7888;
+}
+```
+
+The bright accent token `--accent: #d2ab43` is renamed to `--gold-base: #a88a4a`. Aliases keep existing component code working during the migration (`--accent: var(--gold-base)`).
+
+### Backdrop
+
+A reusable backdrop applied to popup body, setup wizard body, and the vault shell:
+
+```css
+.surface-backdrop {
+  position: relative;
+  background:
+    radial-gradient(ellipse 700px 240px at 50% -40px, rgba(184,149,86,0.05), transparent 65%),
+    linear-gradient(180deg, #11161e 0%, #0a0e14 100%);
+}
+.surface-backdrop::before {
+  content: '';
+  position: absolute;
+  inset: 0;
+  background-image:
+    linear-gradient(rgba(255,255,255,0.012) 1px, transparent 1px),
+    linear-gradient(90deg, rgba(255,255,255,0.012) 1px, transparent 1px);
+  background-size: 18px 18px;
+  pointer-events: none;
+}
+.surface-backdrop > * { position: relative; z-index: 1; }
+```
+
+The radial top-glow opacity is intentionally low (`0.05`) so it doesn't wash out on cheaper monitors. The grid texture is barely visible (`0.012` white) — adds a sense of "place" without becoming busy.
+
+### Glass card
+
+Used for the unlock card, setup step card, mode-picker cards, and form section cards (Identity / Credentials):
+
+```css
+.glass {
+  background: rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.55);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  border: 1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.05);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 0 rgba(255,255,255,0.03) inset,
+    0 6px 18px rgba(0,0,0,0.35);
+}
+```
+
+Browsers without `backdrop-filter` support fall back gracefully — the card stays semi-translucent over the backdrop without the blur.
+
+### Buttons
+
+Two clear tiers:
+
+```css
+.btn-primary {
+  background: var(--gold-base);
+  color: var(--bg-base);
+  border: none;
+  padding: 9px 14px;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.3px;
+}
+.btn-primary:hover { background: #c9a868; }
+
+.btn-secondary {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.06);
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+  padding: 6px 12px;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  border-radius: 5px;
+}
+```
+
+Existing `.btn` class keeps existing styling for backwards compatibility; new `.btn-primary` / `.btn-secondary` are used in updated views.
+
+### Typography lockup
+
+Logo + brand + tagline group with tighter spacing on login and setup:
+
+- Logo mark: 40-44px square, 9-10px corner radius, inner highlight only (no outer glow).
+- Brand text: weight 600, color `var(--gold-text)`, letter-spacing 0.5px.
+- Tagline: 11px, `var(--text-dim)`, letter-spacing 0.3px.
+
+### Inputs
+
+```css
+.input {
+  background: var(--bg-input);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-mid);
+  color: var(--text);
+  padding: 9px 10px;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  transition: border-color 0.15s, box-shadow 0.15s;
+}
+.input:focus {
+  outline: none;
+  border-color: var(--gold-stroke);
+  box-shadow: 0 0 0 2px var(--gold-ring);
+}
+```
+
+### Arrow glyph
+
+The `▸` (U+25B8, small right triangle) replaces ASCII `→` in "next" buttons. Reuses the existing disclosure-glyph vocabulary already used in `▾ custom sections` / `▸ attachments`.
+
+## Logo update
+
+`extension/icons/relicario-logo.svg` and `extension/icons/relicario-logo-16.svg` updated:
+
+- Gold gradient stops shifted: `#d2ab43 → #f5d97a → #7c5719` becomes `#a88a4a → #cdb47a → #5a3f12`.
+- Red theca radial: `#9a1a1a → #3a0a0a` becomes `#7d2622 → #2c0d0a`.
+- Highlight gradient: `#fde9a8 → #d2ab43` becomes `#dac8a0 → #a88a4a`.
+- Solid gold tones (`#7c5719`, `#fff3cf`, `#8a5e1c`) remapped to patina equivalents.
+- Center asterisk gem now translucent: facets use vertical gradients (`gemFacetLight` / `gemFacetDark`) that fade to transparent at the tip; gem core uses a radial glass gradient (`gemCore`); two refraction highlights replace the single white-yellow dot.
+
+The composition (pedestal, theca, gem, hinge collar, fleur-de-lis) is unchanged.
+
+## Surface-by-surface changes
+
+### Login popup (`extension/src/popup/`)
+
+`unlock.ts` view:
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────────────┐
+│      [logo]                       │
+│      Relicario                    │
+│      two-factor vault             │
+│                                   │
+│  ┌─[ glass card ]──────────────┐  │
+│  │ UNLOCK                       │  │
+│  │ [passphrase input        ]   │  │
+│  │ [   unlock vault          ]  │  │ ← btn-primary, full width
+│  └──────────────────────────────┘  │
+│                                   │
+│      [open vault] [settings]      │ ← btn-secondary, demoted
+└──────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+- Body gets `.surface-backdrop`.
+- Logo lockup grouped (logo / brand / tagline) with tighter spacing (8-12px between).
+- Form moves into `.glass` card with `UNLOCK` label inside.
+- Primary action is a real button ("unlock vault") — replaces the "press Enter to submit" implicit flow.
+- Open-vault and settings demoted to secondary buttons below the card.
+
+### Setup wizard (`extension/src/setup/`)
+
+- Body gets `.surface-backdrop`.
+- Header lockup at top (logo + "Relicario vault setup").
+- Progress dots get a tiny shadow on the current step (`box-shadow: 0 0 4px rgba(184,149,86,0.4)`).
+- Each `wizard-step` becomes a `.glass` card.
+- Mode-picker cards become smaller `.glass` cards with patina active state.
+- All "next" buttons use `▸` glyph.
+
+### Fullscreen vault (`extension/src/vault/`)
+
+- Body gets `.surface-backdrop`.
+- Form section panels (Identity, Credentials) are `.glass` cards.
+- Save bar matches glass treatment with translucent fill + backdrop-blur.
+- Form layout switches to two-column for login (see below).
+
+## Form layout (login, fullscreen only)
+
+The original Phase 2B scope:
+
+```
+┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ edit login                              ⌘+S to save        │
+│ unsaved · esc to cancel                                    │
+├──────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┤
+│ [ glass: IDENTITY ]      │ [ glass: CREDENTIALS ]          │
+│   title  [required]      │   username                      │
+│   url + ⤓                │   password ⊙ ↻                  │
+│   group (autocomplete)   │     strength: ████░             │
+│                          │   totp secret ◫                 │
+│                          │     live: 492 837 · 23s         │
+├──────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────┤
+│ NOTES                                                       │
+│ ▾ custom sections    ▸ attachments                          │
+├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│  STICKY SAVE BAR              [cancel] [save]              │
+└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### Layout rules
+
+- Form pane content: `max-width: 960px`, `margin: 0 auto`.
+- Two-column wrapper: `display: grid; grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr; gap: 24px;`.
+- Below 720px viewport: `grid-template-columns: 1fr` (single column stack).
+- Notes / custom sections / attachments live in a sibling block below the grid, full-width.
+
+### Column assignment (login)
+
+**Left column — IDENTITY:**
+- title (required pill)
+- url + `⤓` fill-from-tab button + hostname chip below
+- group input + datalist autocomplete
+
+**Right column — CREDENTIALS:**
+- username
+- password + `⊙` reveal + `↻` generate; strength bar below the input
+- totp secret + `◫` QR button; live preview below the input
+
+**Full-width below grid:**
+- notes (with `≡` mono toggle)
+- custom sections / fields disclosure
+- attachments disclosure
+
+### Sticky save bar
+
+- `position: sticky; bottom: 0;` inside the form pane scroll container.
+- Translucent fill matching the glass vocabulary, with a 24px gradient fade above (content scrolls under).
+- Right-aligned `[cancel] [save]` buttons.
+- Save button reflects validity state — disabled when required fields are empty.
+
+### Header treatment
+
+- Title (left): `new login` / `edit login`, weight 500, size 18px.
+- Subtitle (left, below title): `unsaved · esc to cancel` (dirty) or `no changes` (pristine), `var(--text-muted)`, size 12px.
+- Hint (right): `⌘+S to save` (visual only — actual save shortcut arrives in Phase 3 keymap), `var(--text-dim)`, size 12px. Renders `Ctrl+S` on non-mac.
+- Popout-to-tab `⤴` removed from fullscreen forms (already done in Phase 1).
+
+### Other item types
+
+Single-column stays for `secure_note`, `identity`, `card`, `key`, `totp`, `document`. They still get the new glass-card treatment around the form section, sticky save bar, and header treatment — only the column grid is login-specific.
+
+## Files touched
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `extension/icons/relicario-logo.svg` | Patina palette + gradient glass gem |
+| `extension/icons/relicario-logo-16.svg` | Patina palette (toolbar size) |
+| `extension/src/popup/styles.css` | Patina tokens, `.surface-backdrop`, `.glass`, `.btn-primary/secondary` |
+| `extension/src/popup/components/unlock.ts` | Logo lockup, glass card, primary unlock button |
+| `extension/src/popup/components/types/login.ts` | Add `surface: 'popup' \| 'fullscreen'` param; column wrapping when fullscreen |
+| `extension/src/setup/setup.ts` | `.surface-backdrop`, glass step cards, glass mode-picker cards, `▸` arrows |
+| `extension/src/setup/setup.html` | Body wrapper class |
+| `extension/src/vault/vault.css` | Patina tokens, glass form sections, form-grid, sticky save bar, header treatment |
+| `extension/src/vault/vault.ts` | Header subtitle dirty-state subscriber, surface flag passed to login renderer |
+| `extension/src/vault/components/*.ts` | Glass class on form panels |
+
+The login renderer needs to know which surface it's rendering into (popup vs fullscreen). Add an optional `surface: 'popup' | 'fullscreen'` parameter to `renderForm()`. Default to `popup` to preserve existing behavior.
+
+## Testing
+
+Per-area tests using existing `vitest` + `happy-dom` setup:
+
+1. **Palette migration test:** computed style on `.btn-primary` resolves to `#a88a4a`.
+2. **Layout test:** mount login form with `surface: 'fullscreen'`, assert grid layout, Identity / Credentials columns contain expected fields.
+3. **Stack-down test:** simulate viewport ≤720px, assert single-column.
+4. **Dirty subtitle test:** mount form, simulate input, assert subtitle text changes.
+5. **Sticky bar test:** assert save bar exists, position style, save button validity.
+6. **Glass class application:** unlock card, setup step card, form panels all get `.glass` class.
+7. **Arrow glyph test:** all "next" buttons render `▸` (no `→`).
+8. **Other-type non-regression:** mount `secure_note`, assert single-column layout.
+9. **Logo regression:** snapshot test on `relicario-logo.svg` defs/colors.
+
+Manual QA pass per surface with the rebuilt extension loaded in Chrome and Firefox.
+
+## CLI parity
+
+This phase is purely visual / layout-shaped. No CLI counterpart. The CLI already accepts all login fields as flags (`--title`, `--username`, `--password`, etc.).
+
+## Out of scope / deferred
+
+- Two-column layout for non-login types.
+- User-resizable column widths.
+- Animated transitions on subtitle text change (snap is fine).
+- Functional ⌘+S keyboard shortcut — arrives with Phase 3 keymap. The hint is a visual label until then.
+- Diff view / form-level "you changed N fields" indicator.
+- Light theme.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-v0.5.0-polish-harden-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+# v0.5.0 — Polish + Harden — Design
+
+Date: 2026-05-02
+Status: Draft
+
+## Overview
+
+v0.5.0 is a "polish + harden" bundle: a security-vulnerability fix, two
+hardening follow-ups, two confirmed bugs, and four UX improvements.
+No new functional features. Functional work — LastPass import, recovery
+QR, Plan 1C-γ, Fullscreen Phases 3/4 — proceeds on parallel plans.
+
+The anchor item is a **HIGH-severity authentication bypass** in
+`relicario-server`'s pre-receive hook (S1): both the registered-device
+check and the revocation check are unimplemented. Until this lands, the
+device-auth system is a no-op.
+
+## Goals
+
+1. Restore device-auth integrity: only registered, non-revoked signing
+   keys can push to the vault repo.
+2. Close two minor hardening gaps surfaced during the security review.
+3. Fix two user-visible bugs (strength-meter desync after generate,
+   raw error codes in the fullscreen tab).
+4. Deliver four UX improvements that are polish-shaped, not feature-shaped.
+5. Tag v0.5.0 with no known security vulnerabilities or visible-error-code
+   leaks.
+
+## Scope Map
+
+| Bucket | Item | Plan |
+|---|---|---|
+| Security | S1: Pre-receive hook fix | A |
+| Security | S2: Tar archive path-traversal hardening | A |
+| Security | S3: `RELICARIO_*` env-var audit | A |
+| Cleanup | C1: Stale feature branch prune | A |
+| Bugs | B1: Strength meter desync after regenerate | B |
+| Bugs | B2: `vault_locked` raw error code in fullscreen tab | B (subsumed by P4) |
+| UX | P1: Password coloring | B |
+| UX | P2: Setup-wizard completion → fullscreen vault tab | B |
+| UX | P3: Form-layout 2-col → full-width transition | B |
+| UX | P4: Error-message audit (snake_case codes → friendly copy) | B |
+
+Two plans split by language/blast-radius:
+- **Plan A** = Rust + docs (server, CLI, env-var audit, branch cleanup)
+- **Plan B** = Extension UX (TypeScript + CSS)
+
+The plans share no files and can ship independently.
+
+---
+
+## Plan A — Security + Cleanup
+
+### S1. Pre-Receive Hook Fix (anchor)
+
+**Problem.** `crates/relicario-server/src/main.rs:36-81`: `verify_commit`
+loads `devices` and `revoked` from the repo at the commit, then drops
+both on the floor. It runs `git verify-commit --raw` and accepts on
+`GOODSIG` / `Good signature` regardless of which key produced the
+signature. This means:
+
+- An attacker who never registered a device can push commits signed
+  with any GPG key that the server's keyring/allowed-signers happens
+  to trust (or none at all if the server has no SSH allowed-signers
+  configured).
+- A revoked device's signing key continues to authenticate after
+  `relicario device revoke` is run — the `revoked.json` write is
+  cosmetic.
+
+**Fix.** Implement the verification logic per the design spec
+(`docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-device-authentication-design.md:284-300`):
+
+1. Build a temporary allowed-signers file from `devices.json` entries
+   loaded at the commit. Pass it to `git verify-commit` via
+   `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile
+   GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=<tmpfile>` so we don't mutate global git config.
+2. Parse the signing-key fingerprint out of `git verify-commit --raw`
+   output (the fingerprint appears on the `Good "git" signature for …
+   with … key SHA256:…` line for SSH).
+3. Reject if the fingerprint is not in `devices.json` at the commit.
+4. Reject if the fingerprint is in `revoked.json` AND
+   `commit_timestamp >= revoked_at`. The historical-commit case
+   (timestamp < `revoked_at`) is allowed so old commits survive
+   revocation.
+5. Use the commit's **committer date** (`GIT_COMMITTER_DATE`,
+   accessible via `git show -s --format=%ct`) — *not* the current wall
+   clock and not the author date — as `commit_timestamp`. Committer
+   date is when the signature was applied; author date is when work
+   was originally written and could be from before revocation even
+   for a malicious replay.
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- An integration test that registers a device, revokes it, signs a
+  commit with the revoked key dated AFTER `revoked_at`, and confirms
+  the hook exits non-zero.
+- An integration test that signs a commit with a key that was never
+  registered and confirms the hook exits non-zero.
+- An integration test that signs a commit with a registered, non-revoked
+  key and confirms the hook exits zero.
+- An integration test that signs a commit with a revoked key dated
+  BEFORE `revoked_at` (historical case) and confirms the hook exits zero.
+- The dead `let _ = &revoked;` line is gone.
+
+### S2. Tar Archive Path-Traversal Hardening
+
+**Problem.** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:1722` unpacks the
+bundled `git_archive` from a `.relbak` via `tar::Archive::unpack`,
+trusting the `tar` crate's defaults. A malicious `.relbak` could
+contain entries with `..` components or absolute paths.
+
+**Fix.** Iterate entries explicitly:
+
+- Reject any entry whose path contains a `..` component, an absolute
+  prefix, or a Windows drive letter.
+- Reject symlinks and hardlinks (we never write either inside `.git/`
+  on restore).
+- Cap total uncompressed size at 100× the compressed `git_archive`
+  size or 1 GiB, whichever is lower (defends against tar bombs).
+- Write each entry under `target.join(".git")` only after the path
+  resolves *inside* that directory.
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- Unit test with a hand-crafted tar containing `../../etc/passwd` —
+  restore bails with "path traversal blocked".
+- Unit test with a symlink entry — restore bails.
+- Unit test with a 1 TiB sparse entry — restore bails on the size cap.
+- Existing valid-restore test still passes.
+
+### S3. `RELICARIO_*` Env-Var Audit
+
+**Problem.** Three env vars are not gated by `cfg(debug_assertions)`:
+- `RELICARIO_IMAGE` (`crates/relicario-cli/src/session.rs:125`) — reference-image override path.
+- `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` (`crates/relicario-cli/src/helpers.rs:103`) — disables the groups cache.
+- `RELICARIO_GITEA_URL` (`crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs:2298`) — Gitea base URL fallback.
+
+Spot-check confirmed these look intentional, but they're undocumented
+and `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` is more of a dev escape hatch than
+production config.
+
+**Fix.**
+- Document each env var in `docs/SECURITY.md` and the relevant
+  `--help` text.
+- Move `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` under `cfg(debug_assertions)` —
+  it's a dev tool, not a user knob.
+- Leave `RELICARIO_IMAGE` and `RELICARIO_GITEA_URL` as user-facing
+  config; audit each call site to confirm no untrusted-input-flows-into-path
+  cases.
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- `docs/SECURITY.md` lists every `RELICARIO_*` env var with purpose
+  and trust assumption.
+- `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` is no-op in `cargo build --release`.
+
+### C1. Stale Feature Branch Prune
+
+**Problem.** Six local branches with no merged history beyond what's
+already in main: `feature/fullscreen-ux-phase-2a`,
+`feature/typed-items-1a-rust-core`, `feature/typed-items-1c-alpha`,
+`feature/typed-items-1c-beta1`, `feature/typed-items-1c-beta2`.
+
+**Fix.** Verify each is fully merged into main (`git branch --merged
+main`), then delete locally only — no remote branch operations. Plan
+execution will surface the list and prompt the user before running
+`git branch -D` per branch (per project rule on git-destructive ops).
+
+**Acceptance.** `git branch` shows only `main` and active feature
+branches.
+
+---
+
+## Plan B — Extension UX
+
+### B1. Strength Meter Desync After Regenerate
+
+**Problem.** Confirmed in screenshot from 2026-05-02: clicking the
+regenerate button on a login form's password field rerolls a
+20-character mixed-class password (e.g., `sCMtTJkF%GN^mF#-N6D%`) but
+the strength meter still reports `~10^1 guesses — trivially crackable`.
+The rated string is stale — likely whatever was in the field before
+the reroll, or empty.
+
+The meter listens to `input` events on the password field
+(`extension/src/shared/form-affordances/password-tools.ts:65`). The
+regenerate handler sets `input.value = newPassword` programmatically,
+which **does not fire** `input` events in standard DOM behavior.
+
+**Fix.** In the regenerate handler (search for the orange-spinner
+button click), after assigning `input.value`, dispatch an
+`InputEvent('input', { bubbles: true })`. Confirm by re-rating
+inside the handler if needed.
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- Vitest: simulate regenerate click, assert that `input` event is
+  dispatched and meter calls `scheduleRate` with the new value.
+- Manual: regenerate a password on the login form, confirm meter
+  jumps to "strong" with appropriate `guesses_log10`.
+
+### P4. Error-Message Audit (subsumes B2)
+
+**Problem.** Snake_case error codes leak straight into the fullscreen
+tab and other surfaces:
+
+- `vault_locked` shown as a red string in the new-login form
+  (screenshot 2026-05-02).
+- ~20 call sites in `extension/src/service-worker/router/` return
+  `{ ok: false, error: 'vault_locked' }` and similar.
+
+The popup has a one-off mapping at `extension/src/popup/popup.ts:147`
+(`/vault_locked/i.test(err)` → unlock prompt), but the fullscreen tab
+has no equivalent.
+
+**Fix.**
+1. Build a single `ERROR_COPY` map keyed by error code, returning
+   `{ title: string; body: string; cta?: { label: string; action: () => void } }`.
+   Place at `extension/src/shared/error-copy.ts`.
+2. Audit call sites in `extension/src/service-worker/router/` for all
+   error codes; ensure each has a mapping.
+3. Replace the regex in `popup.ts:147` and the raw-error rendering in
+   the fullscreen tab with `lookupErrorCopy(code)`.
+4. For `vault_locked` specifically: the CTA is "Unlock vault" → opens
+   the popup unlock view (or in the fullscreen tab, the inline unlock
+   form).
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- No raw `snake_case` strings render in any UI surface for any error
+  return path. Verified by grep + manual trigger of each error code.
+- `vault_locked` in the fullscreen tab shows friendly copy + an
+  "Unlock vault" button that works.
+- Vitest: enumerate every distinct `error: '...'` string literal
+  found in `extension/src/service-worker/router/` via grep, assert
+  each is a key in `ERROR_COPY`. Generated test or build-time check
+  preferred over a static snapshot so it can't drift.
+
+### P1. Password Coloring
+
+**Problem / Fix.** Implement per existing spec at
+`docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-01-password-coloring-design.md` and plan
+at `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-01-password-coloring.md`. No design
+changes; pulled into v0.5.0 because it's polish-flavored and small.
+
+**Acceptance.** Per existing plan's acceptance criteria.
+
+### P2. Setup-Wizard Completion → Fullscreen Vault Tab
+
+**Problem.** Setup wizard currently routes to the popup item-list view
+on completion. The user wants to land in the fullscreen vault tab —
+the experience reads as more "real software" and avoids the sub-300px
+popup width on first run.
+
+**Fix.** In the setup wizard's terminal step, after the vault is
+created and the device is registered:
+
+1. Open the fullscreen vault tab via `chrome.tabs.create({ url:
+   chrome.runtime.getURL('vault.html') })`.
+2. Close the setup tab (or the popup, depending on entry point).
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- Manual: complete the new-vault setup flow; vault tab opens, setup
+  tab closes.
+- Manual: complete the attach-existing flow; same behavior.
+- Vitest: assert `chrome.tabs.create` is called with the vault URL on
+  successful setup completion.
+
+### P3. Form-Layout 2-col → Full-Width Transition
+
+**Problem.** Screenshot 2026-05-02 shows the new-login form in the
+fullscreen tab: the IDENTITY and CREDENTIALS cards sit in a 2-column
+grid with a max-width that stops well short of viewport edge, but the
+Notes textarea, custom-fields disclosure, and attachments disclosure
+below all stretch full-width. The visual rhythm breaks at the
+transition — the lower sections look like a different page.
+
+**Fix.** Two candidate approaches; pick at implementation time:
+
+- **A.** Constrain the lower sections to the same max-width and
+  horizontal alignment as the cards. They become a third "row" in the
+  same column system. Simpler, less code.
+- **B.** Wrap the lower sections in a card matching the upper cards'
+  visual treatment. Notes-as-card, custom-fields-as-card,
+  attachments-as-card. More work, more visual consistency, but might
+  feel heavier.
+
+Recommended: **A** for v0.5.0 — minimal CSS change, immediate
+correctness. Revisit B in Phase 3 if the user still feels the layout
+is off.
+
+**Acceptance.**
+- The new-login form (and all item-type forms — login, secure note,
+  identity, card, key, document, totp) renders with consistent
+  horizontal alignment from top of form to bottom.
+- Manual: viewport at 1920×1080, 1440×900, 1024×768, and 768×1024;
+  no jarring width transitions.
+
+---
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+| Layer | Tests |
+|---|---|
+| Rust unit (`relicario-server`) | S1 acceptance set (4 scenarios) |
+| Rust unit (`relicario-core`) | S2 path-traversal scenarios (3 scenarios) |
+| CLI integration | S2 happy-path restore unchanged |
+| Vitest (extension) | B1 input-event dispatch; P4 ERROR_COPY snapshot; P2 tabs.create call |
+| Manual | P3 viewport sweep; B2/P4 trigger each error code; S1 hook setup on a real Gitea instance; C1 branch cleanup confirmation |
+
+Existing tests stay green. No regression budget.
+
+## Out of Scope
+
+Listed for clarity; each tracked separately:
+
+- LastPass import (`docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-29-relicario-lastpass-import.md`)
+- Recovery QR + entropy floor (`docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-01-recovery-qr-and-entropy-floor.md`)
+- Plan 1C-γ (attachments + Document + trash UI)
+- Fullscreen Phase 3 (shell) and Phase 4 (palette)
+- Pre-v0.3.0 manual test walk (`docs/test-checklists/2026-04-27-pre-v0.3.0-audit.md`) — that's a v0.3.0 release gate, not a v0.5.0 item
+
+## Sequencing
+
+1. Plan A and Plan B can run in parallel (no shared files).
+2. Inside Plan A: S1 first (unblocks the security claim), then S2,
+   then S3, then C1.
+3. Inside Plan B: P4 first (unblocks B2 and surfaces all error codes
+   centrally), then B1, then P1, then P3, then P2 (P2 is end-to-end
+   and benefits from earlier polish).
+4. Both plans merge to main; tag `v0.5.0` after both PRs are green.
+
+## Risks
+
+- **S1 SSH allowed-signers parsing.** `git verify-commit --raw`
+  output format for SSH signatures differs slightly from GPG; the
+  fingerprint-extraction regex needs unit coverage against real
+  output. Mitigation: capture sample outputs from a test repo and
+  check them into the test fixtures.
+- **P3 layout regressions.** Constraining the lower sections may
+  affect the textarea behavior at small widths. Mitigation: viewport
+  sweep in acceptance.
+- **C1 accidental deletion.** Plan execution must `git branch
+  --merged main` filter and prompt before each `-D`. The
+  no-destructive-without-asking project rule applies.

extension/icons/relicario-logo-16.svg

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
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   <defs>
     <radialGradient id="redThecaSm" cx="0.4" cy="0.35">
-      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#9a1a1a"/>
+      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#7d2622"/>
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+      <stop offset="100%" stop-color="#2c0d0a"/>
     </radialGradient>
     <linearGradient id="goldRingSm" x1="0" x2="1">
-      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#d2ab43"/>
+      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#a88a4a"/>
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@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@
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   <circle cx="8" cy="9" r="4.8" fill="url(#redThecaSm)"/>
 
-  <!-- Asterisk-as-3-bars -->
+  <!-- Asterisk-as-3-bars (translucent) -->
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-  <circle cx="8" cy="9" r="0.7" fill="#fff3cf"/>
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   <!-- Fleur (3 tips) -->
   <path d="M 8 0 L 7.2 2.5 L 8.8 2.5 Z" fill="url(#goldRingSm)"/>

extension/icons/relicario-logo.svg

@@ -1,79 +1,93 @@
 <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 220 240" fill="none">
   <defs>
     <radialGradient id="redTheca" cx="0.4" cy="0.35">
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+      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#7d2622"/>
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     </radialGradient>
     <linearGradient id="goldRing" x1="0" x2="1">
-      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#d2ab43"/>
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     </linearGradient>
     <linearGradient id="goldHi" x1="0" x2="1">
-      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#fde9a8"/>
+      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#dac8a0"/>
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     </linearGradient>
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+      <stop offset="100%" stop-color="#7d2622" stop-opacity="0.2"/>
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   </defs>
 
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   <!-- Body, bezel, theca -->
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-  <path d="M 110 58 A 72 72 0 0 0 38 130" stroke="#fde9a8" stroke-width="2" fill="none" opacity="0.6"/>
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     <g transform="rotate(0)">
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   </g>
 </svg>

extension/manifest.firefox.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "manifest_version": 3,
-  "name": "relicario",
+  "name": "Relicario",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "description": "Two-factor encrypted password manager",
   "icons": {
     "16": "icons/icon-16.png",

extension/src/popup/components/__tests__/unlock.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import { renderUnlock } from '../unlock';
+
+vi.mock('../../../shared/state', () => ({
+  getState: () => ({ loading: false, error: null }),
+  setState: vi.fn(),
+  sendMessage: vi.fn(),
+  navigate: vi.fn(),
+  escapeHtml: (s: string) => s,
+  openVaultTab: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+describe('renderUnlock', () => {
+  let app: HTMLElement;
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    document.body.innerHTML = '<div id="app"></div>';
+    app = document.getElementById('app')!;
+  });
+
+  it('renders the logo lockup (logo + brand + tagline)', () => {
+    renderUnlock(app);
+    expect(app.querySelector('.brand-logo')).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(app.querySelector('.brand')?.textContent).toBe('Relicario');
+    expect(app.querySelector('.tagline')?.textContent).toContain('two-factor');
+  });
+
+  it('renders the unlock form inside a .glass card', () => {
+    renderUnlock(app);
+    const glass = app.querySelector('.glass');
+    expect(glass).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(glass!.querySelector('#passphrase-input')).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(glass!.querySelector('.btn-primary')).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('renders open-vault and settings as secondary buttons outside the card', () => {
+    renderUnlock(app);
+    const vaultBtn = app.querySelector('#vault-btn');
+    const settingsBtn = app.querySelector('#settings-btn');
+    expect(vaultBtn?.classList.contains('btn-secondary')).toBe(true);
+    expect(settingsBtn?.classList.contains('btn-secondary')).toBe(true);
+    // They should NOT be inside the .glass card
+    const glass = app.querySelector('.glass');
+    expect(glass!.contains(vaultBtn!)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

extension/src/popup/components/devices.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 import { setState, sendMessage, navigate, escapeHtml } from '../../shared/state';
 import type { Device } from '../../shared/types';
 
+interface RevokedEntry {
+  name: string;
+  public_key: string;
+  revoked_at: number;
+  revoked_by: string;
+}
+
 function relativeTime(unixSec: number): string {
   const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
   const diff = now - unixSec;
@@ -36,16 +43,62 @@ export async function renderDevices(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
   const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(['device_name']);
   const currentDeviceName: string | undefined = stored.device_name as string | undefined;
 
-  // Fetch device list
+  // Fetch active device list and revoked list in parallel
-  const resp = await sendMessage({ type: 'list_devices' });
+  const [devicesResp, revokedResp] = await Promise.all([
-  if (!resp.ok) {
+    sendMessage({ type: 'list_devices' }),
+    sendMessage({ type: 'list_revoked' }),
+  ]);
+
+  if (!devicesResp.ok) {
     app.innerHTML = `<div class="pad"><p class="error">Failed to load devices</p></div>`;
     return;
   }
 
-  const devices = (resp.data as { devices: Device[] }).devices;
+  const devices = (devicesResp.data as { devices: Device[] }).devices;
+  const revokedDevices: RevokedEntry[] = revokedResp.ok
+    ? (revokedResp.data as { revoked: RevokedEntry[] }).revoked
+    : [];
+
   const isRegistered = currentDeviceName && devices.some((d) => d.name === currentDeviceName);
 
+  const activeDevicesHtml = devices.length === 0
+    ? `<p class="muted" style="text-align:center;margin-top:32px;">No devices registered</p>`
+    : devices.map((d) => {
+        const isCurrentDevice = d.name === currentDeviceName;
+        return `
+          <div class="device-row">
+            <div class="device-row__info">
+              <span class="device-row__name">${escapeHtml(d.name)}${isCurrentDevice ? ' <span class="device-row__you">← you</span>' : ''}</span>
+              <span class="device-row__meta">added ${relativeTime(d.added_at)}</span>
+            </div>
+            ${isCurrentDevice ? '' : `<button class="device-row__revoke" data-revoke="${escapeHtml(d.name)}">revoke</button>`}
+          </div>
+        `;
+      }).join('');
+
+  const revokedSectionHtml = revokedDevices.length === 0 ? '' : `
+    <details class="revoked-section" style="margin-top:16px;">
+      <summary class="muted" style="cursor:pointer;font-size:0.85em;">
+        ${revokedDevices.length} revoked device${revokedDevices.length !== 1 ? 's' : ''}
+      </summary>
+      <div style="margin-top:8px;">
+        ${revokedDevices.map((r) => `
+          <div class="device-row device-row--revoked">
+            <div class="device-row__info">
+              <span class="device-row__name" style="text-decoration:line-through;opacity:0.5;">
+                ${escapeHtml(r.name)}
+              </span>
+              <span class="device-row__meta">
+                revoked ${relativeTime(r.revoked_at)}
+                ${r.revoked_by !== 'unknown' ? ` by ${escapeHtml(r.revoked_by)}` : ''}
+              </span>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        `).join('')}
+      </div>
+    </details>
+  `;
+
   app.innerHTML = `
     <div class="pad">
       <div class="devices-header">
@@ -58,20 +111,8 @@ export async function renderDevices(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
           <button class="btn btn-primary" id="register-btn">Register this device</button>
         </div>
       ` : ''}
-      ${devices.length === 0
+      ${activeDevicesHtml}
-        ? `<p class="muted" style="text-align:center;margin-top:32px;">No devices registered</p>`
+      ${revokedSectionHtml}
-        : devices.map((d) => {
-            const isCurrentDevice = d.name === currentDeviceName;
-            return `
-              <div class="device-row">
-                <div class="device-row__info">
-                  <span class="device-row__name">${escapeHtml(d.name)}${isCurrentDevice ? ' <span class="device-row__you">← you</span>' : ''}</span>
-                  <span class="device-row__meta">added ${relativeTime(d.added_at)}</span>
-                </div>
-                ${isCurrentDevice ? '' : `<button class="device-row__revoke" data-revoke="${escapeHtml(d.name)}">revoke</button>`}
-              </div>
-            `;
-          }).join('')}
     </div>
   `;
 

extension/src/popup/components/item-form.ts

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export function renderItemForm(app: HTMLElement, mode: 'add' | 'edit'): void {
   const type: ItemType = existing?.type ?? state.newType ?? 'login';
 
   switch (type) {
-    case 'login':       return login.renderForm(app, mode, existing);
+    case 'login':       return login.renderForm(app, mode, existing, { surface: isInTab() ? 'fullscreen' : 'popup', externalActions: isInTab() });
     case 'secure_note': return secureNote.renderForm(app, mode, existing);
     case 'identity':    return identity.renderForm(app, mode, existing);
     case 'card':        return card.renderForm(app, mode, existing);

extension/src/popup/components/settings-vault.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import type {
   VaultSettings, TrashRetention, HistoryRetention, GeneratorRequest,
 } from '../../shared/types';
 import { openGeneratorPanel, closeGeneratorPanel, isGeneratorPanelOpen } from './generator-panel';
+import { GLYPH_NEXT } from '../../shared/glyphs';
 
 let pendingSettings: VaultSettings | null = null;
 let activeKeyHandler: ((e: KeyboardEvent) => void) | null = null;
@@ -161,14 +162,14 @@ export function renderVaultSettings(app: HTMLElement): void {
         <div class="settings-section">
           <div class="settings-section__title">backup &amp; restore</div>
           <div class="settings-row">
-            <button class="btn" id="open-backup">Backup &amp; restore →</button>
+            <button class="btn" id="open-backup">Backup &amp; restore ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
           </div>
         </div>
 
         <div class="settings-section">
           <div class="settings-section__title">import</div>
           <div class="settings-row">
-            <button class="btn" id="open-import">LastPass CSV →</button>
+            <button class="btn" id="open-import">LastPass CSV ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
           </div>
         </div>
 

extension/src/popup/components/types/__tests__/login.test.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,40 @@ describe('login form smart inputs', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('renderForm surface flag', () => {
+  let app: HTMLElement;
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    document.body.innerHTML = '<div id="app"></div>';
+    app = document.getElementById('app')!;
+    (globalThis as any).chrome = {
+      storage: {
+        local: {
+          get: vi.fn().mockImplementation((_keys: any, cb: any) => cb({})),
+          set: vi.fn().mockImplementation((_obj: any, cb: any) => cb && cb()),
+        },
+      },
+      runtime: {
+        sendMessage: vi.fn(),
+      },
+    };
+    vi.mocked(sendMessage).mockReset();
+    vi.mocked(sendMessage).mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, data: { groups: [] } });
+  });
+
+  it('renders single-column when surface is "popup" (default)', () => {
+    renderForm(app, 'add', null);
+    expect(app.querySelector('.form-grid')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('renders two-column .form-grid wrapper when surface is "fullscreen"', () => {
+    renderForm(app, 'add', null, { surface: 'fullscreen' });
+    const grid = app.querySelector('.form-grid');
+    expect(grid).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(grid!.querySelector('[data-form-section="identity"]')).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(grid!.querySelector('[data-form-section="credentials"]')).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});
+
 describe('Login save shape', () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     document.body.innerHTML = '<div id="app"></div>';

extension/src/popup/components/types/login.ts

@@ -235,7 +235,20 @@ function startTotpTicker(id: ItemId): void {
 // Form (add / edit)
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-export function renderForm(app: HTMLElement, mode: 'add' | 'edit', existing: Item | null): void {
+export interface RenderFormOptions {
+  surface?: 'popup' | 'fullscreen';
+  /** When true, renderForm skips its own save/cancel buttons (caller provides them in a sticky bar). */
+  externalActions?: boolean;
+}
+
+export function renderForm(
+  app: HTMLElement,
+  mode: 'add' | 'edit',
+  existing: Item | null,
+  opts: RenderFormOptions = {}
+): void {
+  const surface = opts.surface ?? 'popup';
+  const externalActions = opts.externalActions ?? false;
   const state = getState();
   const existingCore = (existing?.core.type === 'login')
     ? (existing.core as LoginCore & { type: 'login' })
@@ -254,58 +267,86 @@ export function renderForm(app: HTMLElement, mode: 'add' | 'edit', existing: Ite
     : [];
   let attachmentsDraft: AttachmentRef[] = existing?.attachments ?? [];
 
+  const titleFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-title">title ${REQUIRED_PILL_HTML}</label>
+      <input id="f-title" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(title)}" placeholder="GitHub"></div>`;
+
+  const urlFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group">
+      <label class="label" for="f-url">url</label>
+      <div class="inline-row">
+        <input id="f-url" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(url)}" placeholder="https://github.com/login">
+        <button id="fill-from-tab-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="fill from active tab">⤓</button>
+      </div>
+      <div id="hostname-chip-row" class="hostname-chip-row" hidden></div>
+    </div>`;
+
+  const groupFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-group">group</label>
+      <input id="f-group" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(group)}" placeholder="work"></div>`;
+
+  const usernameFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-username">username</label>
+      <input id="f-username" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(username)}" placeholder="alice@example.com"></div>`;
+
+  const passwordFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group">
+      <label class="label" for="f-password">password</label>
+      <div class="inline-row">
+        <input id="f-password" type="password" value="${escapeHtml(password)}">
+        <button id="reveal-password-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="reveal">⊙</button>
+        <button class="gen-trigger" id="gen-btn" type="button" title="generate password" aria-expanded="false">↻</button>
+      </div>
+      <div id="strength-bar-row" class="strength-bar-row" hidden>
+        <div class="strength-bar"><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span></div>
+        <div class="strength-label"></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>`;
+
+  const totpFieldHtml = `
+    <div class="form-group">
+      <label class="label" for="f-totp">totp secret (base32)</label>
+      <div class="inline-row">
+        <input id="f-totp" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(totpStr)}" placeholder="JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP">
+        <button id="totp-qr-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="paste / upload QR">◫</button>
+      </div>
+      <div id="totp-preview-row" class="totp-preview" hidden>
+        <span class="totp-code">…</span>
+        <span class="totp-countdown">…</span>
+      </div>
+      <div id="totp-qr-panel" class="totp-qr-panel" hidden>
+        <input id="totp-qr-file" type="file" accept="image/*" />
+        <div style="font-size:10px;color:var(--text-dim,#6b7888);margin-top:4px;">paste image, drop image, or pick a file</div>
+        <div id="totp-qr-error" class="totp-qr-error"></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>`;
+
+  const identityHtml = `
+    <div data-form-section="identity" class="${surface === 'fullscreen' ? 'glass form-col' : ''}">
+      ${surface === 'fullscreen' ? '<div class="col-header">Identity</div>' : ''}
+      ${titleFieldHtml}
+      ${urlFieldHtml}
+      ${groupFieldHtml}
+    </div>`;
+
+  const credentialsHtml = `
+    <div data-form-section="credentials" class="${surface === 'fullscreen' ? 'glass form-col' : ''}">
+      ${surface === 'fullscreen' ? '<div class="col-header">Credentials</div>' : ''}
+      ${usernameFieldHtml}
+      ${passwordFieldHtml}
+      ${totpFieldHtml}
+    </div>`;
+
+  const sectionsHtml = surface === 'fullscreen'
+    ? `<div class="form-grid">${identityHtml}${credentialsHtml}</div>`
+    : `${identityHtml}${credentialsHtml}`;
+
   app.innerHTML = `
     <div class="pad">
-      ${renderFormHeader({ titleText: mode === 'add' ? 'new login' : 'edit login' })}
+      ${surface === 'popup' ? renderFormHeader({ titleText: mode === 'add' ? 'new login' : 'edit login' }) : ''}
       ${state.error ? `<div class="error">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
 
-      <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-title">title ${REQUIRED_PILL_HTML}</label>
+      ${sectionsHtml}
-        <input id="f-title" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(title)}" placeholder="GitHub"></div>
-
-      <div class="form-group">
-        <label class="label" for="f-url">url</label>
-        <div class="inline-row">
-          <input id="f-url" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(url)}" placeholder="https://github.com/login">
-          <button id="fill-from-tab-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="fill from active tab">⤓</button>
-        </div>
-        <div id="hostname-chip-row" class="hostname-chip-row" hidden></div>
-      </div>
-
-      <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-username">username</label>
-        <input id="f-username" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(username)}" placeholder="alice@example.com"></div>
-
-      <div class="form-group">
-        <label class="label" for="f-password">password</label>
-        <div class="inline-row">
-          <input id="f-password" type="password" value="${escapeHtml(password)}">
-          <button id="reveal-password-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="reveal">⊙</button>
-          <button class="gen-trigger" id="gen-btn" type="button" title="generate password" aria-expanded="false">↻</button>
-        </div>
-        <div id="strength-bar-row" class="strength-bar-row" hidden>
-          <div class="strength-bar"><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span></div>
-          <div class="strength-label"></div>
-        </div>
-      </div>
-
-      <div class="form-group">
-        <label class="label" for="f-totp">totp secret (base32)</label>
-        <div class="inline-row">
-          <input id="f-totp" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(totpStr)}" placeholder="JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP">
-          <button id="totp-qr-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="paste / upload QR">◫</button>
-        </div>
-        <div id="totp-preview-row" class="totp-preview" hidden>
-          <span class="totp-code">…</span>
-          <span class="totp-countdown">…</span>
-        </div>
-        <div id="totp-qr-panel" class="totp-qr-panel" hidden>
-          <input id="totp-qr-file" type="file" accept="image/*" />
-          <div style="font-size:10px;color:var(--text-dim,#6b7888);margin-top:4px;">paste image, drop image, or pick a file</div>
-          <div id="totp-qr-error" class="totp-qr-error"></div>
-        </div>
-      </div>
-
-      <div class="form-group"><label class="label" for="f-group">group</label>
-        <input id="f-group" type="text" value="${escapeHtml(group)}" placeholder="work"></div>
 
       <div class="form-group">
         <div class="notes-with-toggle">
@@ -317,7 +358,7 @@ export function renderForm(app: HTMLElement, mode: 'add' | 'edit', existing: Ite
 
       ${renderSectionsEditor(sectionsDraft, sectionsExpanded)}
       ${isInTab() ? renderAttachmentsDisclosure({ itemId: existing?.id ?? '', attachments: attachmentsDraft, mode: 'edit' }) : ''}
-      <div class="form-actions">
+      <div class="form-actions" ${externalActions ? 'hidden' : ''}>
         <button class="btn" id="cancel-btn">cancel</button>
         <button class="btn btn-primary" id="save-btn">${state.loading ? '<span class="spinner"></span>' : 'save'}</button>
       </div>
@@ -433,7 +474,7 @@ function normalizeUrl(raw: string): { ok: true; value: string } | { ok: false; e
   }
 }
 
-async function saveLogin(mode: 'add' | 'edit', existing: Item | null, sectionsDraft: Section[], attachmentsDraft: AttachmentRef[]): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveLogin(mode: 'add' | 'edit', existing: Item | null, sectionsDraft: Section[], attachmentsDraft: AttachmentRef[]): Promise<void> {
   const state = getState();
   const title = (document.getElementById('f-title') as HTMLInputElement).value.trim();
   const rawUrl = (document.getElementById('f-url') as HTMLInputElement).value;

extension/src/popup/components/unlock.ts

@@ -7,54 +7,63 @@ export function renderUnlock(app: HTMLElement): void {
   const state = getState();
 
   app.innerHTML = `
-    <div class="pad" style="text-align:center; padding-top:40px;">
+    <div class="pad" style="text-align:center; padding-top:32px;">
-      <img class="brand-logo" src="icons/relicario-logo.svg" alt="">
+      <div class="logo-lockup" style="margin-bottom:24px;">
-      <div class="brand">Relicario</div>
+        <img class="brand-logo" src="icons/relicario-logo.svg" alt="">
-      <p class="muted" style="margin:8px 0 24px;">two-factor vault</p>
+        <div class="brand">Relicario</div>
-      <div class="form-group">
+        <p class="tagline">two-factor vault</p>
-        <input
-          type="password"
-          id="passphrase-input"
-          placeholder="passphrase"
-          autocomplete="off"
-          ${state.loading ? 'disabled' : ''}
-        >
       </div>
-      ${state.loading ? '<div style="margin:12px 0;"><span class="spinner"></span></div>' : ''}
+
-      ${state.error ? `<div class="error">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
+      <div class="glass" style="padding:16px; text-align:left; margin-bottom:16px;">
-      <div style="margin-top:24px;">
+        <div class="card-label" style="font-size:10px;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:1.2px;color:var(--text-muted);margin-bottom:8px;">unlock</div>
-        <button class="btn" id="vault-btn" style="font-size:11px;">open vault</button>
+        <div class="form-group" style="margin-bottom:10px;">
-        <button class="btn" id="settings-btn" style="font-size:11px;">settings</button>
+          <input
+            type="password"
+            id="passphrase-input"
+            placeholder="passphrase"
+            autocomplete="off"
+            ${state.loading ? 'disabled' : ''}
+          >
+        </div>
+        ${state.loading ? '<div style="margin:12px 0;"><span class="spinner"></span></div>' : ''}
+        ${state.error ? `<div class="error">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
+        <button class="btn-primary" id="unlock-btn" style="width:100%;justify-content:center;" ${state.loading ? 'disabled' : ''}>unlock vault</button>
+      </div>
+
+      <div style="display:flex; gap:8px; justify-content:center;">
+        <button class="btn-secondary" id="vault-btn">open vault</button>
+        <button class="btn-secondary" id="settings-btn">settings</button>
       </div>
     </div>
   `;
 
   const input = document.getElementById('passphrase-input') as HTMLInputElement;
+  const unlockBtn = document.getElementById('unlock-btn') as HTMLButtonElement | null;
+
+  const submit = async () => {
+    const passphrase = input.value;
+    if (!passphrase) return;
+    setState({ loading: true, error: null });
+    const resp = await sendMessage({ type: 'unlock', passphrase });
+    if (resp.ok) {
+      const listResp = await sendMessage({ type: 'list_items' });
+      if (listResp.ok) {
+        const data = listResp.data as { items: Array<[ItemId, ManifestEntry]> };
+        navigate('list', { entries: data.items });
+      } else {
+        setState({ loading: false, error: listResp.error });
+      }
+    } else {
+      setState({ loading: false, error: resp.error });
+    }
+  };
+
   if (input && !state.loading) {
     input.focus();
-    input.addEventListener('keydown', async (e) => {
+    input.addEventListener('keydown', (e) => { if (e.key === 'Enter') submit(); });
-      if (e.key === 'Enter') {
-        const passphrase = input.value;
-        if (!passphrase) return;
-        setState({ loading: true, error: null });
-        const resp = await sendMessage({ type: 'unlock', passphrase });
-        if (resp.ok) {
-          const listResp = await sendMessage({ type: 'list_items' });
-          if (listResp.ok) {
-            const data = listResp.data as { items: Array<[ItemId, ManifestEntry]> };
-            navigate('list', { entries: data.items });
-          } else {
-            setState({ loading: false, error: listResp.error });
-          }
-        } else {
-          setState({ loading: false, error: resp.error });
-        }
-      }
-    });
   }
+  unlockBtn?.addEventListener('click', submit);
 
   document.getElementById('vault-btn')?.addEventListener('click', () => openVaultTab());
-
+  document.getElementById('settings-btn')?.addEventListener('click', () => navigate('settings'));
-  const settingsBtn = document.getElementById('settings-btn');
-  settingsBtn?.addEventListener('click', () => navigate('settings'));
 }

extension/src/popup/index.html

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   <link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css">
   <title>Relicario</title>
 </head>
-<body>
+<body class="surface-backdrop">
   <div id="app"></div>
   <script src="popup.js"></script>
 </body>

extension/src/popup/styles.css

@@ -1,22 +1,35 @@
 /* Relicario extension — terminal dark theme */
 
 :root {
-  /* Brand */
+  /* Patina gold (Phase 2B) */
-  --accent:        #d2ab43;
+  --gold-base:   #a88a4a;
-  --accent-soft:   rgba(210, 171, 67, 0.18);
+  --gold-mid:    #cdb47a;
-  --accent-strong: #aa812a;
+  --gold-shadow: #5a3f12;
+  --gold-text:   #c9a868;
+  --gold-soft:   rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.14);
+  --gold-ring:   rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.18);
+  --gold-stroke: #b89556;
+  --gold-hi-end: #dac8a0;
+
+  /* Brand alias (kept for backwards compatibility) */
+  --accent:        var(--gold-base);
+  --accent-soft:   var(--gold-soft);
+  --accent-strong: var(--gold-shadow);
 
   /* Surfaces */
-  --bg-page:       #0d1117;
+  --bg-page:       #0a0e14;
-  --bg-pane:       #161b22;
+  --bg-pane:       #11161e;
-  --bg-elevated:   #21262d;
+  --bg-elevated:   #1c2330;
-  --bg-input:      #161b22;
+  --bg-card:       rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.55);
-  --border-subtle: #30363d;
+  --bg-input:      #0a0e14;
+  --border-soft:   rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.05);
+  --border-mid:    #262d36;
+  --border-subtle: var(--border-mid);
 
   /* Text */
   --text:          #c9d1d9;
   --text-muted:    #8b949e;
-  --text-dim:      #484f58;
+  --text-dim:      #6b7888;
 
   /* Status */
   --danger:        #ab2b20;
@@ -24,7 +37,7 @@
   --success:       #6cb37a;
 
   /* Focus */
-  --focus-ring:    0 0 0 2px rgba(210, 171, 67, 0.35);
+  --focus-ring:    0 0 0 2px var(--gold-ring);
 }
 
 * {
@@ -37,7 +50,7 @@ body {
   width: 360px;
   max-height: 500px;
   overflow-y: auto;
-  background: #0d1117;
+  background: var(--bg-page);
   color: #c9d1d9;
   font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', 'Cascadia Code', 'Fira Code', 'SF Mono', Menlo, monospace;
   font-size: 13px;
@@ -62,7 +75,7 @@ body {
 .brand {
   font-size: 16px;
   font-weight: 700;
-  color: #d2ab43;
+  color: var(--gold-text);
   letter-spacing: 1px;
 }
 
@@ -1457,3 +1470,87 @@ textarea {
 .f-notes--mono {
   font-family: ui-monospace, "JetBrains Mono", "SF Mono", monospace !important;
 }
+
+/* Phase 2B: surface backdrop — subtle radial top-glow + grid texture.
+   Apply to body or a top-level wrapper. Children must sit above the ::before. */
+.surface-backdrop {
+  position: relative;
+  background:
+    radial-gradient(ellipse 700px 240px at 50% -40px, rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.05), transparent 65%),
+    linear-gradient(180deg, #11161e 0%, #0a0e14 100%);
+}
+.surface-backdrop::before {
+  content: '';
+  position: absolute;
+  inset: 0;
+  background-image:
+    linear-gradient(rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.012) 1px, transparent 1px),
+    linear-gradient(90deg, rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.012) 1px, transparent 1px);
+  background-size: 18px 18px;
+  pointer-events: none;
+  z-index: 0;
+}
+.surface-backdrop > * {
+  position: relative;
+  z-index: 1;
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: glass card. Translucent panel with backdrop blur for the
+   unlock card, setup step card, and form section panels. Falls back
+   gracefully on browsers without backdrop-filter (just stays translucent). */
+.glass {
+  background: var(--bg-card);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-soft);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 0 rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03) inset,
+    0 6px 18px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35);
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: button hierarchy. Existing .btn class kept for backwards
+   compatibility; .btn-primary and .btn-secondary express clearer intent
+   and are used in updated views. */
+.btn-primary {
+  background: var(--gold-base);
+  color: var(--bg-page);
+  border: none;
+  padding: 9px 14px;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  letter-spacing: 0.3px;
+  display: inline-flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 8px;
+  transition: background-color 0.15s;
+}
+.btn-primary:hover { background: var(--gold-stroke); }
+.btn-primary:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
+.btn-primary:focus-visible {
+  outline: none;
+  box-shadow: var(--focus-ring);
+}
+
+.btn-secondary {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06);
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+  padding: 6px 12px;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  border-radius: 5px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.btn-secondary:hover { border-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.12); color: var(--text); }
+.btn-secondary:focus-visible {
+  outline: none;
+  box-shadow: var(--focus-ring);
+}
+
+.logo-lockup .brand-logo { width: 42px; height: 42px; margin: 0 auto 10px; }
+.logo-lockup .brand { font-size: 17px; font-weight: 600; color: var(--gold-text); letter-spacing: 0.5px; }
+.tagline { color: var(--text-dim); font-size: 11px; margin-top: 4px; letter-spacing: 0.3px; }

extension/src/service-worker/devices.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
-/// Device management — reads/writes .relicario/devices.json
+/// Device management — reads/writes .relicario/devices.json and revoked.json
 
 import type { GitHost } from './git-host';
 import type { Device } from '../shared/types';
 
 const DEVICES_PATH = '.relicario/devices.json';
+const REVOKED_PATH = '.relicario/revoked.json';
 
 interface DevicesFile {
   devices: Device[];
 }
 
+export interface RevokedEntry {
+  name: string;
+  public_key: string;
+  revoked_at: number;   // unix timestamp
+  revoked_by: string;   // name of device that performed the revocation
+}
+
 export async function readDevices(gitHost: GitHost): Promise<Device[]> {
   try {
     const raw = await gitHost.readFile(DEVICES_PATH);
@@ -30,6 +38,25 @@ export async function writeDevices(
   await gitHost.writeFile(DEVICES_PATH, bytes, message);
 }
 
+export async function readRevoked(gitHost: GitHost): Promise<RevokedEntry[]> {
+  try {
+    const raw = await gitHost.readFile(REVOKED_PATH);
+    const text = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);
+    return JSON.parse(text) as RevokedEntry[];
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
+async function writeRevoked(
+  gitHost: GitHost,
+  revoked: RevokedEntry[],
+  message: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(revoked, null, 2));
+  await gitHost.writeFile(REVOKED_PATH, bytes, message);
+}
+
 export async function addDevice(
   gitHost: GitHost,
   device: Device,
@@ -45,11 +72,25 @@ export async function addDevice(
 export async function revokeDevice(
   gitHost: GitHost,
   name: string,
+  revokedBy?: string,
 ): Promise<void> {
   const existing = await readDevices(gitHost);
-  const filtered = existing.filter((d) => d.name !== name);
+  const device = existing.find((d) => d.name === name);
-  if (filtered.length === existing.length) {
+  if (!device) {
     throw new Error(`device '${name}' not found`);
   }
+
+  // Remove from devices.json
+  const filtered = existing.filter((d) => d.name !== name);
   await writeDevices(gitHost, filtered, `device: revoke ${name}`);
+
+  // Add to revoked.json
+  const revoked = await readRevoked(gitHost);
+  revoked.push({
+    name,
+    public_key: device.public_key,
+    revoked_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
+    revoked_by: revokedBy ?? 'unknown',
+  });
+  await writeRevoked(gitHost, revoked, `device: revoke ${name} (revoked log)`);
 }

extension/src/service-worker/gitea.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ export class GiteaHost implements GitHost {
   private baseUrl: string;
   private gitApiBase: string;
   private commitsUrl: string;
+  private keysUrl: string;
   private branch: string = 'main';
   private headers: Record<string, string>;
 
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ export class GiteaHost implements GitHost {
     this.baseUrl = `${apiUrl}/repos/${repoPath}/contents`;
     this.gitApiBase = `${apiUrl}/repos/${repoPath}/git`;
     this.commitsUrl = `${apiUrl}/repos/${repoPath}/commits`;
+    this.keysUrl = `${apiUrl}/repos/${repoPath}/keys`;
     this.headers = {
       'Authorization': `token ${apiToken}`,
       'Content-Type': 'application/json',
@@ -244,4 +246,31 @@ export class GiteaHost implements GitHost {
   async deleteBlob(path: string, message: string): Promise<void> {
     return this.deleteFile(path, message);
   }
+
+  /// Create a deploy key for this repo, returning its numeric ID.
+  async createDeployKey(title: string, publicKey: string): Promise<number> {
+    const resp = await fetch(this.keysUrl, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: this.headers,
+      body: JSON.stringify({ title, key: publicKey, read_only: false }),
+    });
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      const text = await resp.text();
+      throw new Error(`createDeployKey: ${resp.status} ${text}`);
+    }
+    const json = await resp.json() as { id: number };
+    return json.id;
+  }
+
+  /// Delete a deploy key by numeric ID. Ignores 404 (already gone).
+  async deleteDeployKey(keyId: number): Promise<void> {
+    const resp = await fetch(`${this.keysUrl}/${keyId}`, {
+      method: 'DELETE',
+      headers: this.headers,
+    });
+    if (!resp.ok && resp.status !== 404) {
+      const text = await resp.text();
+      throw new Error(`deleteDeployKey: ${resp.status} ${text}`);
+    }
+  }
 }

extension/src/service-worker/router/popup-only.ts

@@ -346,6 +346,12 @@ export async function handle(
       return { ok: true, data: { devices: list } };
     }
 
+    case 'list_revoked': {
+      if (!state.gitHost) return { ok: false, error: 'vault_locked' };
+      const revoked = await devices.readRevoked(state.gitHost);
+      return { ok: true, data: { revoked } };
+    }
+
     case 'add_device': {
       if (!state.gitHost) return { ok: false, error: 'vault_locked' };
       const device = {
@@ -359,17 +365,15 @@ export async function handle(
 
     case 'register_this_device': {
       if (!state.gitHost) return { ok: false, error: 'vault_locked' };
-      const keypair = state.wasm.generate_device_keypair() as {
+      // register_device keeps private keys internal — only public keys cross to JS
-        public_key_hex: string;
+      const keys = state.wasm.register_device(msg.name) as {
-        private_key_base64: string;
+        signing_public_key: string;
+        deploy_public_key: string;
       };
-      await chrome.storage.local.set({
+      await chrome.storage.local.set({ device_name: msg.name });
-        device_name: msg.name,
-        device_private_key: keypair.private_key_base64,
-      });
       await devices.addDevice(state.gitHost, {
         name: msg.name,
-        public_key: keypair.public_key_hex,
+        public_key: keys.signing_public_key,
         added_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       });
       return { ok: true };
@@ -377,7 +381,9 @@ export async function handle(
 
     case 'revoke_device': {
       if (!state.gitHost) return { ok: false, error: 'vault_locked' };
-      await devices.revokeDevice(state.gitHost, msg.name);
+      const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(['device_name']);
+      const revokedBy = stored.device_name as string | undefined;
+      await devices.revokeDevice(state.gitHost, msg.name, revokedBy);
       return { ok: true };
     }
 

extension/src/setup/setup.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
   STRENGTH_LABELS,
   entropyText,
 } from './setup-helpers';
+import { GLYPH_NEXT } from '../shared/glyphs';
 import type { VaultConfig } from '../shared/types';
 import type { SessionHandle } from 'relicario-wasm';
 
@@ -189,12 +190,14 @@ function render(): void {
   }
 
   app.innerHTML = `
-    <div class="pad" style="padding-top:12px;">
+    <div class="surface-backdrop" style="min-height:100vh;">
-      <img class="brand-logo" src="icons/relicario-logo.svg" alt="" style="margin-bottom:12px;">
+      <div class="pad" style="padding-top:12px;">
-      <div class="brand" style="margin-bottom:4px;">Relicario vault setup</div>
+        <img class="brand-logo" src="icons/relicario-logo.svg" alt="" style="margin-bottom:12px;">
-      ${progressHtml}
+        <div class="brand" style="margin-bottom:4px;">Relicario vault setup</div>
-      ${state.error ? `<div class="error">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
+        ${progressHtml}
-      ${stepHtml}
+        ${state.error ? `<div class="error">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
+        ${stepHtml}
+      </div>
     </div>
   `;
 
@@ -214,20 +217,20 @@ function renderStep0(): string {
   const isNew = state.mode === 'new';
   const isAttach = state.mode === 'attach';
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>set up Relicario</h3>
       <p class="muted" style="margin-bottom:16px;">
         How are you using Relicario on this device?
       </p>
       <div class="mode-cards">
-        <button class="mode-card ${isNew ? 'active' : ''}" data-mode="new">
+        <button class="mode-card glass ${isNew ? 'active' : ''}" data-mode="new">
           <div class="mode-card-title">create new vault</div>
           <p class="mode-card-blurb">
             I'm setting up Relicario for the first time. This will create a fresh
             encrypted vault on a new or empty git repository.
           </p>
         </button>
-        <button class="mode-card ${isAttach ? 'active' : ''}" data-mode="attach">
+        <button class="mode-card glass ${isAttach ? 'active' : ''}" data-mode="attach">
           <div class="mode-card-title">attach this device</div>
           <p class="mode-card-blurb">
             I already have a vault on another device. Connect this browser to it
@@ -236,7 +239,7 @@ function renderStep0(): string {
         </button>
       </div>
       <div class="form-actions" style="margin-top:24px;">
-        <button class="btn btn-primary" id="next-btn" ${state.mode ? '' : 'disabled'}>next</button>
+        <button class="btn-primary" id="next-btn" ${state.mode ? '' : 'disabled'}>next ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
       </div>
     </div>
   `;
@@ -267,7 +270,7 @@ function renderStep3Attach(): string {
   const gateDisabled = state.attaching || !p || !hasImage;
 
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>attach this device</h3>
       <p class="muted" style="margin-bottom:12px;">
         Use your existing passphrase and reference image to attach this browser
@@ -430,7 +433,7 @@ function renderStep1(): string {
   `;
 
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>choose host</h3>
       <div class="form-group">
         <label class="label">host type</label>
@@ -442,7 +445,7 @@ function renderStep1(): string {
       ${state.hostType === 'gitea' ? giteaInstructions : githubInstructions}
       <div class="form-actions">
         <button class="btn" id="back-btn">back</button>
-        <button class="btn btn-primary" id="next-btn">next</button>
+        <button class="btn-primary" id="next-btn">next ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
       </div>
     </div>
   `;
@@ -522,7 +525,7 @@ function renderStep2(): string {
     !!probe && ((state.mode === 'new' && probe.exists) || (state.mode === 'attach' && !probe.exists));
   const nextDisabled = !state.connectionTested || !probe || modeMismatch;
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>configure connection</h3>
       <div class="form-group" ${state.hostType === 'github' ? 'style="display:none;"' : ''}>
         <label class="label" for="host-url">host url</label>
@@ -543,7 +546,7 @@ function renderStep2(): string {
       ${renderProbeBanner()}
       <div class="form-actions" style="margin-top:12px;">
         <button class="btn" id="back-btn">back</button>
-        <button class="btn btn-primary" id="next-btn" ${nextDisabled ? 'disabled' : ''}>next</button>
+        <button class="btn-primary" id="next-btn" ${nextDisabled ? 'disabled' : ''}>next ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
       </div>
     </div>
   `;
@@ -643,7 +646,7 @@ function renderStep3New(): string {
   const counterText = nChars === 0 ? '' : `${nChars} character${nChars === 1 ? '' : 's'}`;
 
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>create vault</h3>
 
       <div class="form-group">
@@ -907,7 +910,7 @@ function renderStep4(): string {
   const defaultName = state.deviceName || `${browser} on ${os}`;
 
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <h3>name this device</h3>
       <p class="muted" style="margin-bottom:12px;">
         This helps you identify which devices have access to your vault.
@@ -918,7 +921,7 @@ function renderStep4(): string {
       </div>
       <div class="form-actions">
         <button class="btn" id="back-btn">back</button>
-        <button class="btn btn-primary" id="next-btn">continue</button>
+        <button class="btn-primary" id="next-btn">continue ${GLYPH_NEXT}</button>
       </div>
     </div>
   `;
@@ -979,7 +982,7 @@ function renderStep5(): string {
   const isAttach = state.mode === 'attach';
 
   return `
-    <div class="wizard-step">
+    <div class="wizard-step glass" style="padding: 24px; margin-top: 16px;">
       <div class="success-box">
         <h3>${isAttach ? 'device verified' : 'vault created'}</h3>
         <p class="secondary">
@@ -1049,12 +1052,12 @@ function attachStep5(): void {
 
     try {
       const w = await loadWasm();
-      const keypair = w.generate_device_keypair();
+      // register_device keeps private keys internal — only public keys returned
+      const keypair = w.register_device(state.deviceName);
 
-      // 1) Save private key + name locally.
+      // 1) Save device name locally (private keys stay in WASM memory).
       await chrome.storage.local.set({
         device_name: state.deviceName,
-        device_private_key: keypair.private_key_base64,
       });
 
       // 2) Save vault config + reference image to extension storage.
@@ -1086,7 +1089,7 @@ function attachStep5(): void {
       const host = createGitHost(state.hostType, hostUrl, state.repoPath, state.apiToken);
       await addDevice(host, {
         name: state.deviceName,
-        public_key: keypair.public_key_hex,
+        public_key: keypair.signing_public_key,
         added_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       });
 

extension/src/shared/__tests__/glyphs.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
 import * as glyphs from '../glyphs';
+import {
+  GLYPH_REVEAL, GLYPH_HIDE, GLYPH_GENERATE, GLYPH_FILL_FROM_TAB,
+  GLYPH_QR, GLYPH_MONO, GLYPH_TRASH, GLYPH_DEVICES, GLYPH_SETTINGS,
+  GLYPH_LOCK, GLYPH_NEXT,
+} from '../glyphs';
 
 describe('glyphs', () => {
   it('exports the documented glyph constants', () => {
@@ -19,3 +24,20 @@ describe('glyphs', () => {
     expect(glyphs.REQUIRED_PILL_HTML).toBe('<span class="req-pill">required</span>');
   });
 });
+
+describe('glyph constants', () => {
+  it('uses single unicode codepoints (no emoji multi-codepoint)', () => {
+    const all = [
+      GLYPH_REVEAL, GLYPH_HIDE, GLYPH_GENERATE, GLYPH_FILL_FROM_TAB,
+      GLYPH_QR, GLYPH_MONO, GLYPH_TRASH, GLYPH_DEVICES, GLYPH_SETTINGS,
+      GLYPH_LOCK, GLYPH_NEXT,
+    ];
+    for (const g of all) {
+      expect([...g].length).toBe(1);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('GLYPH_NEXT is the small right triangle (U+25B8)', () => {
+    expect(GLYPH_NEXT).toBe('▸');
+  });
+});

extension/src/shared/glyphs.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ export const GLYPH_TRASH         = '▦';   // sidebar trash nav
 export const GLYPH_DEVICES       = '⌬';   // sidebar devices nav
 export const GLYPH_SETTINGS      = '⚙';   // sidebar settings nav
 export const GLYPH_LOCK          = '⏻';   // sidebar lock nav
+export const GLYPH_NEXT          = '▸';   // forward / next button (matches ▾/▸ disclosure family)
 
 /// Inline HTML snippet for the required-field pill. Use after a label's text:
 ///   `<label class="label" for="f-title">title ${REQUIRED_PILL_HTML}</label>`

extension/src/shared/messages.ts

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ export type PopupMessage =
   | { type: 'upload_attachment'; itemId: string; filename: string; mimeType: string; bytes: ArrayBuffer }
   | { type: 'download_attachment'; itemId: string; attachmentId: string }
   | { type: 'list_devices' }
+  | { type: 'list_revoked' }
   | { type: 'add_device'; name: string; public_key: string }
   | { type: 'register_this_device'; name: string }
   | { type: 'revoke_device'; name: string }
@@ -139,6 +140,10 @@ export interface ListDevicesResponse extends Extract<Response, { ok: true }> {
   data: { devices: Device[] };
 }
 
+export interface ListRevokedResponse extends Extract<Response, { ok: true }> {
+  data: { revoked: Array<{ name: string; public_key: string; revoked_at: number; revoked_by: string }> };
+}
+
 export interface ListTrashedResponse extends Extract<Response, { ok: true }> {
   data: { items: Array<[ItemId, ManifestEntry]> };
 }
@@ -161,7 +166,7 @@ export const POPUP_ONLY_TYPES: ReadonlySet<PopupMessage['type']> = new Set([
   'ack_autofill_origin', 'get_settings', 'update_settings',
   'get_vault_settings', 'update_vault_settings', 'get_blacklist',
   'remove_blacklist', 'get_active_tab_url', 'list_groups', 'upload_attachment', 'download_attachment',
-  'list_devices', 'add_device', 'register_this_device', 'revoke_device',
+  'list_devices', 'list_revoked', 'add_device', 'register_this_device', 'revoke_device',
   'list_trashed', 'restore_item', 'purge_item', 'purge_all_trash',
   'get_field_history',
   'get_session_config', 'update_session_config',

extension/src/vault/__tests__/form-wrapper.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+import * as path from 'path';
+
+describe('fullscreen form dirty subtitle', () => {
+  const vaultSrc = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.resolve(__dirname, '../vault.ts'),
+    'utf-8',
+  );
+
+  it('contains renderFormWrapped function', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('function renderFormWrapped');
+  });
+
+  it('starts pristine: renders "no changes" subtitle', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain("'no changes'");
+  });
+
+  it('switches to dirty on first input event', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain("'unsaved · esc to cancel'");
+  });
+
+  it('listens on input and change events on the scroll element', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain("scrollEl.addEventListener('input', markDirty, true)");
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain("scrollEl.addEventListener('change', markDirty, true)");
+  });
+
+  it('marks clean on save', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('markClean()');
+  });
+
+  it('contains platform-aware SAVE_HINT', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('SAVE_HINT');
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('⌘+S to save');
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('Ctrl+S to save');
+  });
+
+  it('renders fullscreen-form-header element', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('fullscreen-form-header');
+  });
+
+  it('renders form-dirty-sub element', () => {
+    expect(vaultSrc).toContain('form-dirty-sub');
+  });
+});

extension/src/vault/vault.css

@@ -1,22 +1,35 @@
 /* Relicario vault — terminal dark theme (tab layout) */
 
 :root {
-  /* Brand */
+  /* Patina gold (Phase 2B) */
-  --accent:        #d2ab43;
+  --gold-base:   #a88a4a;
-  --accent-soft:   rgba(210, 171, 67, 0.18);
+  --gold-mid:    #cdb47a;
-  --accent-strong: #aa812a;
+  --gold-shadow: #5a3f12;
+  --gold-text:   #c9a868;
+  --gold-soft:   rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.14);
+  --gold-ring:   rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.18);
+  --gold-stroke: #b89556;
+  --gold-hi-end: #dac8a0;
+
+  /* Brand alias (kept for backwards compatibility) */
+  --accent:        var(--gold-base);
+  --accent-soft:   var(--gold-soft);
+  --accent-strong: var(--gold-shadow);
 
   /* Surfaces */
-  --bg-page:       #0d1117;
+  --bg-page:       #0a0e14;
-  --bg-pane:       #161b22;
+  --bg-pane:       #11161e;
-  --bg-elevated:   #21262d;
+  --bg-elevated:   #1c2330;
-  --bg-input:      #161b22;
+  --bg-card:       rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.55);
-  --border-subtle: #30363d;
+  --bg-input:      #0a0e14;
+  --border-soft:   rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.05);
+  --border-mid:    #262d36;
+  --border-subtle: var(--border-mid);
 
   /* Text */
   --text:          #c9d1d9;
   --text-muted:    #8b949e;
-  --text-dim:      #484f58;
+  --text-dim:      #6b7888;
 
   /* Status */
   --danger:        #ab2b20;
@@ -24,7 +37,7 @@
   --success:       #6cb37a;
 
   /* Focus */
-  --focus-ring:    0 0 0 2px rgba(210, 171, 67, 0.35);
+  --focus-ring:    0 0 0 2px var(--gold-ring);
 }
 
 * {
@@ -34,7 +47,7 @@
 }
 
 body {
-  background: #0d1117;
+  background: var(--bg-page);
   color: #c9d1d9;
   font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', 'Cascadia Code', 'Fira Code', 'SF Mono', Menlo, monospace;
   font-size: 13px;
@@ -62,7 +75,7 @@ body {
 .brand {
   font-size: 16px;
   font-weight: 700;
-  color: #d2ab43;
+  color: var(--gold-text);
   letter-spacing: 1px;
 }
 
@@ -1487,3 +1500,167 @@ textarea {
 .f-notes--mono {
   font-family: ui-monospace, "JetBrains Mono", "SF Mono", monospace !important;
 }
+
+/* Phase 2B: surface backdrop — subtle radial top-glow + grid texture.
+   Apply to body or a top-level wrapper. Children must sit above the ::before. */
+.surface-backdrop {
+  position: relative;
+  background:
+    radial-gradient(ellipse 700px 240px at 50% -40px, rgba(184, 149, 86, 0.05), transparent 65%),
+    linear-gradient(180deg, #11161e 0%, #0a0e14 100%);
+}
+.surface-backdrop::before {
+  content: '';
+  position: absolute;
+  inset: 0;
+  background-image:
+    linear-gradient(rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.012) 1px, transparent 1px),
+    linear-gradient(90deg, rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.012) 1px, transparent 1px);
+  background-size: 18px 18px;
+  pointer-events: none;
+  z-index: 0;
+}
+.surface-backdrop > * {
+  position: relative;
+  z-index: 1;
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: glass card. Translucent panel with backdrop blur for the
+   unlock card, setup step card, and form section panels. Falls back
+   gracefully on browsers without backdrop-filter (just stays translucent). */
+.glass {
+  background: var(--bg-card);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-soft);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 0 rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03) inset,
+    0 6px 18px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35);
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: button hierarchy. Existing .btn class kept for backwards
+   compatibility; .btn-primary and .btn-secondary express clearer intent
+   and are used in updated views. */
+.btn-primary {
+  background: var(--gold-base);
+  color: var(--bg-page);
+  border: none;
+  padding: 9px 14px;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  letter-spacing: 0.3px;
+  display: inline-flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 8px;
+  transition: background-color 0.15s;
+}
+.btn-primary:hover { background: var(--gold-stroke); }
+.btn-primary:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
+.btn-primary:focus-visible {
+  outline: none;
+  box-shadow: var(--focus-ring);
+}
+
+.btn-secondary {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06);
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+  padding: 6px 12px;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  border-radius: 5px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.btn-secondary:hover { border-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.12); color: var(--text); }
+.btn-secondary:focus-visible {
+  outline: none;
+  box-shadow: var(--focus-ring);
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: two-column form grid for fullscreen login */
+.form-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;
+  gap: 24px;
+  max-width: 960px;
+  margin: 0 auto;
+}
+@media (max-width: 720px) {
+  .form-grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }
+}
+.form-col {
+  padding: 14px 16px;
+}
+.col-header {
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+  letter-spacing: 1.2px;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border-mid);
+  padding-bottom: 6px;
+  margin-bottom: 12px;
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: fullscreen form header */
+.fullscreen-form-header {
+  padding: 14px 24px;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border-mid);
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  align-items: flex-start;
+}
+.fullscreen-form-header .title {
+  font-size: 16px;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+.fullscreen-form-header .sub {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+  margin-top: 2px;
+}
+.fullscreen-form-header .hint {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  color: var(--text-dim);
+}
+
+/* Phase 2B: sticky save bar + scrollable form pane */
+.form-pane {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  height: 100%;
+  overflow: hidden;
+}
+.form-scroll {
+  flex: 1;
+  overflow-y: auto;
+  padding: 20px 24px;
+}
+.sticky-save-bar {
+  position: sticky;
+  bottom: 0;
+  background: rgba(17, 22, 30, 0.7);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--border-mid);
+  padding: 12px 24px;
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: flex-end;
+  gap: 8px;
+  z-index: 10;
+}
+.sticky-save-bar::before {
+  content: '';
+  position: absolute;
+  top: -24px;
+  left: 0;
+  right: 0;
+  height: 24px;
+  background: linear-gradient(to top, rgba(17, 22, 30, 0.7), transparent);
+  pointer-events: none;
+}

extension/src/vault/vault.html

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
   <title>Relicario — vault</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" href="vault.css">
 </head>
-<body>
+<body class="surface-backdrop">
   <div id="vault-app"></div>
   <script src="vault.js"></script>
 </body>

extension/src/vault/vault.ts

@@ -415,6 +415,71 @@ async function selectItem(id: ItemId): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Platform-aware save hint
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const isMac = navigator.platform.toLowerCase().includes('mac');
+const SAVE_HINT = isMac ? '⌘+S to save' : 'Ctrl+S to save';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Fullscreen form wrapper — sticky save bar + scrollable content + header
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function renderFormWrapped(app: HTMLElement, mode: 'add' | 'edit'): void {
+  const itemType = state.selectedItem?.type ?? state.newType ?? 'login';
+  const typeLabel = itemType.replace('_', ' ');
+  const titleText = mode === 'add' ? `new ${typeLabel}` : `edit ${typeLabel}`;
+  const wrapper = document.createElement('div');
+  wrapper.className = 'form-pane';
+  wrapper.innerHTML = `
+    <div class="fullscreen-form-header">
+      <div>
+        <div class="title">${titleText}</div>
+        <div class="sub" id="form-dirty-sub">no changes</div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="hint">${SAVE_HINT}</div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="form-scroll" id="form-scroll"></div>
+    <div class="sticky-save-bar">
+      <button class="btn-secondary" id="form-cancel">cancel</button>
+      <button class="btn-primary" id="form-save">save</button>
+    </div>
+  `;
+  // Remove pane padding so form-pane can fill height cleanly
+  app.style.padding = '0';
+  app.style.overflow = 'hidden';
+  app.replaceChildren(wrapper);
+
+  const scrollEl = wrapper.querySelector('#form-scroll') as HTMLElement;
+  renderItemForm(scrollEl, mode);
+
+  const subEl = wrapper.querySelector('#form-dirty-sub') as HTMLElement;
+  let isDirty = false;
+  const markDirty = () => {
+    if (isDirty) return;
+    isDirty = true;
+    subEl.textContent = 'unsaved · esc to cancel';
+  };
+  const markClean = () => {
+    isDirty = false;
+    subEl.textContent = 'no changes';
+  };
+  scrollEl.addEventListener('input', markDirty, true);
+  scrollEl.addEventListener('change', markDirty, true);
+
+  wrapper.querySelector('#form-cancel')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
+    markClean();
+    (scrollEl.querySelector('#cancel-btn') as HTMLButtonElement | null)?.click();
+  });
+  wrapper.querySelector('#form-save')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
+    markClean();
+    (scrollEl.querySelector('#save-btn') as HTMLButtonElement | null)?.click();
+  });
+}
+
+export const __test__ = { renderFormWrapped };
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Pane rendering — delegates to shared popup components
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -453,10 +518,16 @@ function renderPane(): void {
       // set by the type-selection click handler (which calls setState →
       // renderPane before the URL hash has been updated to include the type).
       state.newType = (route.type as ItemType) ?? state.newType ?? null;
-      renderItemForm(pane, 'add');
+      // Use the form wrapper (sticky bar + header) when a type is already chosen.
+      // Without a type the type-selection screen renders — no sticky bar needed.
+      if (state.newType) {
+        renderFormWrapped(pane, 'add');
+      } else {
+        renderItemForm(pane, 'add');
+      }
       break;
     case 'edit':
-      renderItemForm(pane, 'edit');
+      renderFormWrapped(pane, 'edit');
       break;
     case 'trash':
       renderTrash(pane);

extension/src/wasm.d.ts

@@ -61,7 +61,22 @@ declare module 'relicario-wasm' {
 
   export function totp_compute(config_json: string, now_unix_seconds: bigint): TotpCode;
 
-  export function generate_device_keypair(): { public_key_hex: string; private_key_base64: string };
+  export function register_device(name: string): {
+    signing_public_key: string;
+    deploy_public_key: string;
+  };
+
+  export function sign_for_git(data: Uint8Array): {
+    signature: string;
+  };
+
+  export function get_device_info(): {
+    name: string;
+    signing_public_key: string;
+    deploy_public_key: string;
+  } | null;
+
+  export function clear_device(): void;
   export function get_field_history(item_json: string): unknown;
 
   export default function init(module_or_path?: unknown): Promise<void>;