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adlee-was-taken 1342228a51 docs(security): name relicario-server in device-auth section (audit F11/F12)

- F12: Device Authentication section now names the relicario-server crate
  and its two subcommands (generate-hook, verify-commit), and notes that
  signed commits without the server-side hook provide authorship only —
  any pusher can still land an unsigned commit.
- F11: drop the "optional before v0.4.0" version line (v0.4.0 was never
  tagged; v0.5.0 is the first release with the hook) and replace with a
  one-liner: registration is optional but recommended for shared vaults.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-02 16:25:21 -04:00

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Relicario Security Model

Cryptographic Protection

Relicario uses two-factor vault decryption:

Passphrase — user-memorized, zxcvbn score ≥3 required
Reference image — JPEG carrying 256-bit secret via DCT steganography

Key derivation: Argon2id (64 MiB memory, 3 iterations, 4 parallelism) Encryption: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (192-bit nonce, 256-bit key)

Manifest Integrity

The manifest (manifest.enc) is encrypted with AEAD, which provides:

Confidentiality: Contents unreadable without master key
Integrity: Any modification detected and rejected on decrypt
Authenticity: Only master key holders can create valid ciphertexts

What AEAD Does NOT Protect

Item deletion: An attacker with write access can delete .enc files or git-revert commits. The manifest decrypts successfully but won't contain the deleted items.
Rollback attacks: An attacker can replace manifest.enc with an older valid version. AEAD accepts any ciphertext created with the key.

Mitigation

Item deletion and rollback are detectable via git history:

git log --oneline items/

For environments where git history could be rewritten (force-push):

Enable device authentication (commit signing + pre-receive hook)
Use a git server that rejects non-fast-forward pushes
Regular backups with relicario backup export

Device Authentication

When enabled, device authentication provides:

Commit authorship: All commits signed by registered device keys
Push access control: Deploy keys managed via Gitea API
Instant revocation: One command cuts off both signing and push

Enforcement requires deploying the relicario-server pre-receive hook on the vault remote. The crate provides two subcommands:

relicario-server generate-hook — emits the hook script to install at <repo>/hooks/pre-receive
relicario-server verify-commit <sha> — checks one commit's signature against .relicario/devices.json and .relicario/revoked.json as of that commit; the hook calls this for every pushed ref

Without the server hook, signed commits provide authorship metadata only — any process with push access can land an unsigned commit, since verification is otherwise advisory.

See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-02-device-authentication-design.md.

Access Control

Without device authentication, access control is transport-layer only:

CLI: SSH key authentication to git remote
Extension: Git credentials in browser storage

Device registration is optional but recommended for shared vaults.

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