Files
relicario/crates/relicario-server/tests/verify_commit.rs
adlee-was-taken efac53d527 fix(server): real signature verification in pre-receive hook (audit S1)
verify_commit previously loaded devices.json/revoked.json and threw
both away, accepting any commit whose stderr contained "GOODSIG" or
"Good signature". This left device registration and revocation as
no-ops: unregistered keys could push, revoked keys kept working.

The fix:
- Build a temp gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile from devices.json at the
  commit, passed via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY/VALUE env (no global git
  config mutation).
- Run git verify-commit --raw and parse SHA256 fingerprint from stderr
  regardless of exit code (SSH git outputs the "Good" line even for
  keys not in allowed-signers, with "No principal matched" + exit 1).
- Check revoked.json FIRST: reject if committer_ts >= revoked_at;
  accept historical commits (committer_ts < revoked_at).
- Reject if fingerprint is not in active devices.json.
- Bootstrap: accept only when BOTH devices.json AND revoked.json are
  empty/absent (not just devices.json alone).

Acceptance: 4 integration tests covering the matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 16:34:37 -04:00

231 lines
7.0 KiB
Rust

//! Acceptance tests for `relicario-server verify-commit`.
//!
//! Four scenarios from audit S1:
//! 1. Registered non-revoked key → exit 0
//! 2. Unregistered key → exit 1 (stderr contains "unregistered")
//! 3. Revoked key, commit AFTER revoked_at → exit 1 (stderr contains "revoked")
//! 4. Revoked key, commit BEFORE revoked_at (historical) → exit 0
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use assert_cmd::Command as AssertCommand;
use predicates::prelude::*;
use relicario_core::device::{generate_keypair, DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry};
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn write_keypair(dir: &Path, name: &str) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf, String) {
let (priv_pem, pub_line) = generate_keypair().expect("generate keypair");
let priv_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.key"));
let pub_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.pub"));
fs::write(&priv_path, priv_pem.as_str()).unwrap();
fs::write(&pub_path, &pub_line).unwrap();
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fs::set_permissions(&priv_path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
}
(priv_path, pub_path, pub_line)
}
fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str], extra_env: &[(&str, &str)]) {
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.current_dir(repo).args(args);
for (k, v) in extra_env {
cmd.env(k, v);
}
let status = cmd.status().expect("spawn git");
assert!(status.success(), "git {args:?} failed");
}
fn init_repo(repo: &Path) {
git(repo, &["init", "-q", "-b", "main"], &[]);
git(repo, &["config", "user.email", "test@test"], &[]);
git(repo, &["config", "user.name", "test"], &[]);
git(repo, &["commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "init"], &[]);
}
fn sign_commit(
repo: &Path,
signing_key: &Path,
allowed_signers: &Path,
committer_unix: i64,
msg: &str,
file_path: &str,
file_content: &str,
) -> String {
fs::write(repo.join(file_path), file_content).unwrap();
git(repo, &["add", file_path], &[]);
let date = format!("@{committer_unix} +0000");
git(
repo,
&[
"-c", "gpg.format=ssh",
"-c", &format!("user.signingkey={}", signing_key.display()),
"-c", &format!("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile={}", allowed_signers.display()),
"commit", "-S", "-q", "-m", msg,
],
&[
("GIT_AUTHOR_DATE", &date),
("GIT_COMMITTER_DATE", &date),
],
);
let out = Command::new("git")
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
.output()
.unwrap();
String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string()
}
fn write_device_files(repo: &Path, devices: &[DeviceEntry], revoked: &[RevokedEntry]) {
let dir = repo.join(".relicario");
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
fs::write(dir.join("devices.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(devices).unwrap()).unwrap();
fs::write(dir.join("revoked.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(revoked).unwrap()).unwrap();
git(repo, &["add", ".relicario"], &[]);
git(repo, &["commit", "-q", "-m", "device files"], &[]);
}
#[test]
fn registered_non_revoked_key_accepted() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
write_device_files(
repo,
&[DeviceEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
added_at: 1_700_000_000,
added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
}],
&[],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "x", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.success();
}
#[test]
fn unregistered_key_rejected() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (_, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
let (priv_evil, _, pub_evil) = write_keypair(repo, "evil");
// Only Alice is registered.
write_device_files(
repo,
&[DeviceEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
added_at: 1_700_000_000,
added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
}],
&[],
);
// Evil signs against a file containing both keys so git commit signing works,
// but the binary's allowed-signers (from devices.json) only has Alice.
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(
&allowed,
format!("relicario {}\nrelicario {}\n", pub_a.trim(), pub_evil.trim()),
)
.unwrap();
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_evil, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "evil", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.failure()
.stderr(predicate::str::contains("unregistered"));
}
#[test]
fn revoked_key_after_revoked_at_rejected() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
// Alice's entry is only in revoked.json (was removed from devices.json after revocation).
write_device_files(
repo,
&[],
&[RevokedEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
revoked_by: "admin".into(),
}],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
// Commit dated AFTER revocation.
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "post", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.failure()
.stderr(predicate::str::contains("revoked"));
}
#[test]
fn revoked_key_before_revoked_at_accepted_historical() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
// Same as above: Alice only in revoked.json.
write_device_files(
repo,
&[],
&[RevokedEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
revoked_by: "admin".into(),
}],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
// Commit dated BEFORE revocation -- historical case must pass.
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_700_000_000, "historical", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.success();
}