org_audit.rs (B8 verified-signer test) + the two uncommitted org.rs diffs (item-CRUD B9-B13, status/audit B8) from the wf_22020aea first-run worktrees. All superseded by v0.8.0 main; also committed on the -r2 branches. Kept so nothing is lost when the stale worktrees are removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L5JvzEse4xUxLZKhofyeCD
157 lines
6.6 KiB
Rust
157 lines
6.6 KiB
Rust
//! B8 `org audit` verified-signer attribution — integration coverage.
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//!
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//! The audit logic (`resolve_signer`, `parse_audit_log`, `run_org_audit`) lives
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//! in the bin crate's private `commands::org` module and the CLI dispatch is not
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//! wired until B14, so we cannot drive `org audit` through the binary yet. What
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//! we CAN do is build a real signed org vault via `org init` and assert that the
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//! exact verification mechanism `resolve_signer` uses — a temp `allowed_signers`
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//! prefixed `relicario `, injected via `GIT_CONFIG_*`, then
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//! `git verify-commit --raw`, then the `key (SHA256:...)` regex over stderr —
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//! resolves the genesis commit's signature to the seeded member's fingerprint.
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//!
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//! This pins the security-critical half of B8 (attribute to the VERIFIED signer,
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//! mirroring the pre-receive hook) against a genuine SSH signature rather than
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//! the synthetic-log unit tests, which only cover the "no member matched ->
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//! TAMPERED" fallback.
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use std::fs;
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use std::io::Write;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::process::Command;
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use tempfile::{NamedTempFile, TempDir};
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fn relicario_with_git_identity(config_home: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
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Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_relicario"))
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.env("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", config_home)
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.env("HOME", config_home)
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.env("GIT_AUTHOR_NAME", "Test Device")
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.env("GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL", "test@relicario.test")
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.env("GIT_COMMITTER_NAME", "Test Device")
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.env("GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL", "test@relicario.test")
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.args(args)
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.output()
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.expect("run relicario")
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}
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/// Lay out a device keypair under `<config_home>/relicario/devices/<name>/` and
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/// mark it current. Mirrors `org_init_signing::seed_device`. Returns the OpenSSH
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/// public key string.
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fn seed_device(config_home: &Path, name: &str) -> String {
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let (priv_openssh, pub_openssh) =
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relicario_core::device::generate_keypair().expect("generate_keypair");
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let dev_dir = config_home.join("relicario").join("devices").join(name);
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fs::create_dir_all(&dev_dir).expect("create device dir");
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let signing_key_path = dev_dir.join("signing.key");
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fs::write(&signing_key_path, priv_openssh.as_str()).expect("write signing.key");
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#[cfg(unix)]
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{
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use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
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fs::set_permissions(&signing_key_path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
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.expect("chmod signing.key");
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}
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fs::write(dev_dir.join("signing.pub"), &pub_openssh).expect("write signing.pub");
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fs::write(dev_dir.join("deploy.key"), "").expect("write stub deploy.key");
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fs::write(dev_dir.join("deploy.pub"), "").expect("write stub deploy.pub");
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let devices_dir = config_home.join("relicario").join("devices");
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fs::write(devices_dir.join("current"), format!("{name}\n")).expect("write current");
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pub_openssh
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}
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/// Replicate `commands::org::resolve_signer`'s verification: build an
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/// allowed_signers file from the given pubkeys (prefixed `relicario `), inject it
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/// via GIT_CONFIG_*, run `git verify-commit --raw`, and parse the SHA256 key
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/// fingerprint from stderr.
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fn resolve_signer_fp(org_root: &Path, commit: &str, pubkeys: &[&str]) -> Option<String> {
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let mut tmp = NamedTempFile::new().ok()?;
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for pk in pubkeys {
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writeln!(tmp, "relicario {}", pk.trim()).ok()?;
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}
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let allowed_path = tmp.path();
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let output = Command::new("git")
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.current_dir(org_root)
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.args(["verify-commit", "--raw", commit])
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.env("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT", "1")
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.env("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0", "gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile")
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.env("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0", allowed_path.as_os_str())
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.output()
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.ok()?;
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// The clean exit IS the gate (matches the hook): a non-member signature fails.
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if !output.status.success() {
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return None;
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}
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let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
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let re = regex::Regex::new(r"key (SHA256:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+)").ok()?;
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Some(re.captures(&stderr)?.get(1)?.as_str().to_string())
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}
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#[test]
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fn audit_resolves_genesis_commit_to_the_signing_member() {
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let cfg = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let org = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let pub_openssh = seed_device(cfg.path(), "test-dev");
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let init = relicario_with_git_identity(
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cfg.path(),
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&["org", "init", "--dir", org.path().to_str().unwrap(), "--name", "Acme"],
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);
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assert!(
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init.status.success(),
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"org init failed:\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&init.stdout),
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&init.stderr)
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);
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// The signing member's pubkey is recorded in members.json. resolve_signer
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// builds allowed_signers from exactly that set.
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let members_json =
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fs::read_to_string(org.path().join("members.json")).expect("read members.json");
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let members: relicario_core::OrgMembers =
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serde_json::from_str(&members_json).expect("parse members.json");
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assert_eq!(members.members.len(), 1, "init seeds exactly one owner member");
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let owner = &members.members[0];
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// The genesis commit must resolve to the owner's fingerprint.
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let signing_fp = resolve_signer_fp(org.path(), "HEAD", &[owner.ed25519_pubkey.as_str()])
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.expect("genesis commit signature must verify against the member set");
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let expected = relicario_core::fingerprint(&owner.ed25519_pubkey).expect("fingerprint owner");
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assert_eq!(
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signing_fp, expected,
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"verified signer fingerprint must equal the owner member's fingerprint"
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);
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// The seeded pubkey and the members.json pubkey are the same key.
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assert_eq!(owner.ed25519_pubkey.trim(), pub_openssh.trim());
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}
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#[test]
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fn audit_rejects_signature_from_a_non_member_key() {
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// A commit signed by the owner must NOT resolve when the allowed_signers set
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// contains only some OTHER (non-member) key — this is the TAMPERED path:
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// "signer is not a current member".
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let cfg = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let org = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let _owner_pub = seed_device(cfg.path(), "test-dev");
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let init = relicario_with_git_identity(
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cfg.path(),
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&["org", "init", "--dir", org.path().to_str().unwrap(), "--name", "Acme"],
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);
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assert!(init.status.success(), "org init failed");
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// A stranger keypair that never signed anything in this repo.
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let (_stranger_priv, stranger_pub) =
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relicario_core::device::generate_keypair().expect("generate stranger keypair");
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let resolved = resolve_signer_fp(org.path(), "HEAD", &[stranger_pub.as_str()]);
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assert!(
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resolved.is_none(),
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"a commit signed by the owner must not verify against a stranger-only signer set"
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);
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}
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