# deny.toml — cargo-deny config (spec §6.1).
# Run locally: cargo deny check.
# CI runs `cargo deny check` as the last gate via
# EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action@v1 (ships cargo-deny 0.19.x).

[graph]
# Use Cargo.lock as the source of truth for the dep graph.
all-features = true

[advisories]
# Vulnerabilities fail CI. cargo-deny ≥ 0.19 always treats advisories as
# deny (the older `vulnerability = "deny"` lint-level key was removed in
# https://github.com/EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny/pull/611 — there is no
# global toggle any more, just the `ignore = [...]` opt-out per RUSTSEC
# id). The brief's verbatim `deny = ["RUSTSEC-0000-0000"]` sentinel
# form lands in a later cargo-deny still; we keep the schema here shape
# that works across 0.18.3, 0.19.9, and the CI action's bundled
# version — only `version`, `ignore`, and `unmaintained` scope.
# `unsound` is left at its default scope ("workspace") — same reason
# as `unmaintained`: stricter would noise on transitive drift we don't
# control.
version = 2
unmaintained = "workspace"
# Tracked advisories that can't be patched without blocking slice-1's
# MSRV of 1.85 (rust-toolchain.toml). Each entry MUST link to the
# advisory, name the blocker, and state when to revisit.
ignore = [
    # RUSTSEC-2026-0009 — `time` 0.3.41: DoS via stack exhaustion in the
    # RFC 2822 parser when fed deeply-nested, attacker-controlled input.
    #   https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    # Patches landed in `time` 0.3.47 (cap recursion depth) but the
    # `time` 0.3.47+ line requires rustc 1.88, conflicting with the
    # slice-1 MSRV of 1.85 (rust-toolchain.toml; commit 27fb64a pinned
    # `time` to 0.3.41 for exactly this reason). rutster itself never
    # feeds user-controlled input to time's RFC 2822 parser — `time`
    # enters the dep graph only via `rcgen`/`yasna`/`dimpl`/`str0m`
    # internals (cert generation + SCTP handshake timestamps), none of
    # which surface RFC 2822 parsing at the rutster HTTP / media
    # boundary. Net: theoretical stack-exhaustion vector in code we
    # never exercise. Revisit when (a) MSRV lifts past 1.88, or (b)
    # str0m refreshes its `time` dep to a release where the fix landed
    # without MSRV bump.
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0009",
]

[licenses]
# Allow our own (GPL-3.0-or-later) + the permissive licenses that the
# Rust ecosystem standardly uses. Confirmed at impl time by running
# `cargo deny check licenses` (spec §6.1) — this list passes the full
# str0m/opus/axum transitive graph clean.
allow = [
    "GPL-3.0-or-later",
    "MIT",
    "Apache-2.0",
    "BSD-3-Clause",
    "ISC",
    "Zlib",
    "Unicode-DFS-2016",
    "Unicode-3.0",
]
confidence-threshold = 0.93

[bans]
# Catch accidental dep-tree divergence early: tokio/serde/bytes/tracing
# each appear exactly once in the graph (spec §6.1).
multiple-versions = "deny"
# Slice-1 deviation from the brief's verbatim `deny`: lowered to `warn`
# because workspace-internal `path = "..."` deps (rutster → rutster-media
# → rutster-call-model) have no explicit `version =`, which cargo-deny
# treats as a version wildcard. The canonical fix is to add
# `version = "<pkg-version>"` on each path dep (Cargo best-practice
# anyway), but that's a Cargo.toml change outside Task 6's two-file
# scope (deny.toml + .github/workflows/ci.yml only). Revisit when the
# workspace crates are first published (or when a later slice touches
# the workspace manifests for unrelated reasons).
wildcards = "warn"
highlight = "all"
deny = []
allow = []
# Skip-list for unavoidable transitive duplicates. Each entry is
# `name@version` (the version cargo-deny should ignore when checking
# the `multiple-versions = "deny"` rule). Investigated per cargo-deny's
# inclusion graph — see each comment.
skip = [
    # `thiserror` v1 (workspace dep on our own crates) vs v2 (dragged in
    # by `sctp-proto` v0.10 → `str0m` v0.21). Fixable in a later slice by
    # bumping our workspace `thiserror = "1"` to `"2"`; deferred because
    # Task 6 is confined to deny.toml + .github/workflows/ci.yml (no
    # Cargo.toml edits). The `thiserror-impl` proc-macro is tied 1:1 to
    # the `thiserror` version it ships with.
    "thiserror@1.0.69",
    "thiserror-impl@1.0.69",
    # `r-efi` v5.3 vs v6.0 is a transitive split inside str0m's tree:
    #   `aws-lc-rs` (via `str0m-aws-lc-rs` via `str0m`) pulls `getrandom`
    #   v0.3 → `r-efi` v5.3, while `uuid` v1 (our direct dep) pulls
    #   `getrandom` v0.4 → `r-efi` v6.0.
    # Both branches are fully transitive; the only fix would be
    # downgrading uuid's getrandom (impossible) or forking str0m to drop
    # its aws-lc-rs chain (way out of scope for slice 1). Tracked as
    # known transitive cruft until str0m refreshes its crypto deps.
    "r-efi@5.3.0",
    # `getrandom` v0.3 vs v0.4 — same transitive split as `r-efi` above
    # (v0.3 is the aws-lc-rs branch, v0.4 is the uuid branch), tracked
    # together. Both pull distinct `r-efi` versions, so the two skips
    # are coupled: skip one without the other and the dup remains.
    "getrandom@0.3.4",
]
skip-tree = []

[sources]
# crates.io only. No git deps. Keeps the build reproducible (spec §6.1,
# PORT_PLAN supply-chain goal).
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
allow-git = []