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rutster/deploy/Caddyfile
Aaron D. Lee c772485f92
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deploy slice B + F: deploy/ artifacts + image-build + container smoke CI + tag-push publish (#26)
Co-authored-by: Aaron D. Lee <himself@adlee.work>
Co-committed-by: Aaron D. Lee <himself@adlee.work>
2026-07-06 19:53:32 +00:00

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Caddyfile

# deploy/Caddyfile — the edge config for rutster-edge (T2) + rutster-allinone (T1).
# Same file, same build (spec §3.2 + ADR-0011). Read by Caddy v2.8 (the
# custom xcaddy build from deploy/Dockerfile).
#
# Env vars (Caddyfile interpolation syntax {$VAR}):
# RUTSTER_DOMAIN — the public hostname (e.g. pbx.example.com). Required.
# RUTSTER_ACME_EMAIL — the Let's Encrypt account email. Required for ACME.
# RUTSTER_LOCAL_CERTS — set to "true" in CI to use Caddy's internal CA
# (no ACME round-trips, no rate-limit budget burns).
# Overrides the ACME block below via the `local_certs`
# global option.
#
# Timeouts (TLS brief §3(a); spec §2.1, §2.2, §3.1 invariant 3):
# * read_body 30s — Twilio webhooks fit comfortably in 30s (15s cap
# by invariant 6).
# * read_header 30s — same.
# * write 0 — disable; 20ms media frames must flush immediately.
# * idle 24h — the universal 60s-class default kills quiet WS;
# spec §2.1 invariant 3 sets max call duration 24h.
# * stream_close_delay 24h — above max call duration; the load-bearing
# mitigation for caddy #6420/#7222 (TLS brief §5
# risk 1; spec §9 reload-during-call smoke).
#
# X-Forwarded-* honesty (spec §3.1 invariant 5; plan-A Task 5
# reconstruct_public_url): Caddy sets these to the real client values via
# the `header_up` directives below. Engine-side RUTSTER_TRUSTED_PROXIES is
# the trust gate (fail-closed default).
{
# CI override: set RUTSTER_LOCAL_CERTS=true to use Caddy's internal CA
# (no ACME in CI; spec §9). Production leaves this unset.
{$RUTSTER_LOCAL_CERTS:local_certs_off} local_certs
# Send logs to stdout (s6-overlay / docker logs collects from there).
log {
output stdout
format console
}
}
# Default ACME email — overridden by RUTSTER_LOCAL_CERTS=true in CI.
{
email {$RUTSTER_ACME_EMAIL:you@example.com}
}
# Main site block — the public hostname.
{$RUTSTER_DOMAIN:localhost} {
encode zstd gzip
# The reverse_proxy to the FOB. 127.0.0.1:8080 is correct in T1
# (single container, loopback) AND T2 (compose: the engine service's
# `rutster-engine` DNS name resolves on the compose network; Caddy
# reaches it via that name — replace 127.0.0.1:8080 with
# http://engine:8080 in advance; here we use the loopback literal so
# the same Caddyfile works in both T1 and T2 spelled identically —
# for T2 deployments, the operator overrides the upstream via a env-
# substituted site-address block; the shipped default targets loopback
# for the bundled all-in-one single-container case which is the harder
# constraint).
#
# `header_up Host {host}` + X-Forwarded-* — sets the honest hop values
# (the engine's reconstruct_public_url reads these; spec §3.1 invariant 5).
# `header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host}` — included for completeness;
# the engine does NOT use X-Forwarded-For for signature validation, only
# X-Forwarded-Proto/Host. Forwarding the For header is standard proxy
# hygiene — engine-side RUTSTER_TRUSTED_PROXIES is the gate.
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080 {
header_up Host {host}
header_up X-Real-IP {remote_host}
header_up X-Forwarded-Proto {scheme}
header_up X-Forwarded-Host {host}
header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host}
# Tuned timeouts — the load-bearing ones for calls lasting hours.
transport http {
read_buffer 64KiB
write_buffer 64KiB
dial_timeout 5s
response_header_timeout 30s
}
# stream_close_delay above max call duration (24h) — the caddy
# #6420/#7222 mitigation (TLS brief §5 risk 1; spec §9 smoke).
# An operator Caddyfile reload mid-call would normally kill
# upgraded WS tunnels; the delay keeps them alive until the
# streams close naturally (the call ends) — verified by the
# reload-during-live-call CI smoke (Task 9).
stream_close_delay 24h
}
# Timeouts for the public-facing side.
servers {
read_body 30s
read_header 30s
write 0 # never write-timeout; 20ms frames self-flush
idle 24h # above max call duration — the universal 60s-class default kills quiet WS
}
}