Platform pivot from Raspberry Pi to three-tier model: - Tier 1: Bootable Debian Live USB for field reporters - Tier 2: Docker/K8s org server for newsrooms - Tier 3: Docker/K8s federation relay for VPS Tier 1 — Live USB (deploy/live-usb/): - build.sh: live-build based image builder for amd64 - Package list: Python + system deps + minimal GUI (openbox + Firefox) - Install hook: creates venv, pip installs soosef[web,cli,attest,...] - Hardening hook: disable swap/coredumps, UFW, auto-login to web UI - systemd service with security hardening (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem) - Auto-opens Firefox kiosk to http://127.0.0.1:5000 on boot Tier 2+3 — Docker (deploy/docker/): - Multi-stage Dockerfile with two targets: - server: full web UI + stego + attestation + federation (Tier 2) - relay: lightweight FastAPI attestation API only (Tier 3) - docker-compose.yml with both services and persistent volumes - .dockerignore for clean builds Kubernetes (deploy/kubernetes/): - namespace.yaml, server-deployment.yaml, relay-deployment.yaml - PVCs, services, health checks, resource limits - Single-writer strategy (Recreate, not RollingUpdate) for SQLite safety - README with architecture diagram and deployment instructions Config presets (deploy/config-presets/): - low-threat.json: press freedom country (no killswitch, 30min sessions) - medium-threat.json: restricted press (48h deadman, USB monitoring) - high-threat.json: conflict zone (12h deadman, tamper monitoring, 5min sessions) - critical-threat.json: targeted surveillance (127.0.0.1 only, 6h deadman, 3min sessions) Deployment guide rewritten for three-tier model with RPi as legacy appendix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .gitea/workflows | ||
| deploy | ||
| docker | ||
| docs | ||
| frontends | ||
| src/soosef | ||
| test_data | ||
| tests | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
SooSeF -- Soo Security Fieldkit
Offline-first security toolkit for journalists, NGOs, and at-risk organizations.
What is SooSeF?
SooSeF combines steganography, provenance attestation, and field security tools into a single package designed for airgapped and resource-constrained environments. It lets you:
- Hide messages in images, audio, and video using multiple steganographic techniques, with transport-aware encoding for lossy channels (WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram)
- Prove authenticity of photos, documents, and arbitrary files with Ed25519 signatures, Merkle-style hash chains, and RFC 3161 trusted timestamps
- Protect data in the field with a killswitch (including deep forensic scrub and self-uninstall), dead man's switch with webhook warnings, tamper detection, USB device whitelisting, and GPS geofencing
- Manage cryptographic keys with identity rotation, channel key generation, encrypted key bundle export/import, QR code sharing, trust store management, and identity recovery from chain
- Federate attestations across organizations with signed exchange bundles, delivery acknowledgments, selective disclosure for legal discovery, and investigation namespaces
- Accept anonymous submissions through a SecureDrop-style source drop box with token-gated uploads, client-side SHA-256 hashing, and automatic EXIF extraction/stripping
- Preserve evidence long-term with self-contained evidence packages and OAIS-aligned cold archives that include standalone verification scripts and algorithm documentation
Stegasoo (steganography, v4.3.0) and Verisoo (attestation, v0.1.0) are included as
subpackages (import soosef.stegasoo, import soosef.verisoo). Everything ships as one
install: pip install soosef.
Quick Start
pip install "soosef[web,cli]"
soosef init
soosef serve
This creates the ~/.soosef/ directory structure, generates an Ed25519 identity and
channel key, writes a default config, and starts an HTTPS web UI on
https://127.0.0.1:5000.
Features
Steganography (Stegasoo)
- LSB encoding -- bit-level message hiding in PNG images
- DCT encoding -- frequency-domain hiding in JPEG images (requires
stego-dctextra) - Audio steganography -- hide data in WAV/FLAC audio (requires
stego-audioextra) - Video steganography -- frame-level encoding
- Transport-aware encoding --
--transport whatsapp|signal|telegram|discord|email|directauto-selects the right encoding mode and carrier resolution for lossy messaging platforms. WhatsApp/Signal/Telegram force DCT/JPEG mode and pre-resize the carrier to survive recompression - Carrier reuse tracking -- warns when a carrier image has been used before, since comparing two versions of the same carrier trivially reveals steganographic modification
- AES-256-GCM encryption with Argon2id key derivation
- EXIF stripping on encode to prevent metadata leakage
- Compression support (zstandard, optional LZ4)
Attestation (Verisoo)
- Ed25519 digital signatures for images and arbitrary files (CSV, documents, sensor data)
- Perceptual hashing (pHash, dHash) for tamper-evident photo attestation; SHA-256-only mode for non-image files
- LMDB-backed attestation storage
- Append-only hash chain (CBOR-encoded) with Merkle tree verification
- Batch attestation for directories
- Investigation namespaces -- tag and filter attestations by case or project
- Derived work lineage -- parent-child attestation tracking for editorial workflows
- Chain position proof -- verification receipts include the record's position in the hash chain
Extract-Then-Strip EXIF Pipeline
Resolves the tension between steganography (strip everything to protect sources) and attestation (preserve everything to prove provenance):
- Extract all EXIF metadata from the original image bytes
- Classify fields as evidentiary (GPS coordinates, timestamp -- valuable for provenance) or dangerous (device serial number, firmware version -- could identify the source)
- Preserve evidentiary fields in the attestation record
- Strip all metadata from the stored/display copy
Cross-Organization Federation
- Attestation exchange -- export signed bundles of attestation records and chain data for offline transfer to partner organizations
- Delivery acknowledgments -- when an organization imports a bundle, a
soosef/delivery-ack-v1chain record is signed and can be shared back, creating a two-way federation handshake - Trust store -- import collaborator Ed25519 public keys; only records signed by trusted keys are imported during federation
- Investigation filtering -- export/import only records tagged with a specific investigation
External Timestamp Anchoring
Two mechanisms to externally prove that the chain head existed before a given time:
- RFC 3161 TSA -- automated submission to any RFC 3161 Timestamping Authority (e.g., FreeTSA). The signed timestamp token is saved alongside the chain
- Manual anchors -- export the chain head hash as a compact string for manual submission to any external witness (blockchain transaction, newspaper classified, tweet, email to a TSA)
A single anchor for the chain head implicitly timestamps every record that preceded it, because the chain is append-only with hash linkage.
Selective Disclosure
Produce verifiable proofs for specific chain records while keeping others redacted. Selected records are included in full; non-selected records appear only as hashes. A third party can verify that the disclosed records are part of an unbroken chain without seeing the contents of other records. Designed for legal discovery, court orders, and FOIA responses.
Evidence Packages
Self-contained ZIP bundles for handing evidence to lawyers, courts, or archives:
- Original images
- Attestation records with full Ed25519 signatures
- Chain segment with hash linkage
- Signer's public key
verify.py-- standalone verification script that requires only Python 3.11+ and thecryptographypip package (no SooSeF installation needed)- Human-readable README
Cold Archive
Full-state export for long-term evidence preservation (10+ year horizon), aligned with OAIS (ISO 14721):
- Raw chain binary and state checkpoint
- Attestation log and LMDB index
- External timestamp anchors
- Public key and trusted collaborator keys
- Encrypted key bundle (optional, password-protected)
ALGORITHMS.txtdocumenting every cryptographic algorithm, parameter, and format usedverify.pystandalone verifiermanifest.jsonwith SHA-256 integrity hashes of key files
Source Drop Box
SecureDrop-style anonymous intake built into the SooSeF web UI:
- Admin creates a time-limited upload token with a configurable file limit
- Source opens the token URL (no account or SooSeF branding -- source safety)
- Client-side SHA-256 via SubtleCrypto runs in the browser before upload, so the source can independently verify what they submitted
- Files are run through the extract-then-strip EXIF pipeline and auto-attested on receipt
- Source receives HMAC-derived receipt codes that prove delivery
- Tokens and receipts are stored in SQLite; tokens auto-expire
Key Rotation and Recovery
- Key rotation -- both identity (Ed25519) and channel (AES) keys can be rotated. The chain records the rotation as a
soosef/key-rotation-v1record signed by the OLD key, creating a cryptographic trust chain - Identity recovery -- after device loss, a new key can be introduced via a
soosef/key-recovery-v1chain record. The record carries the old fingerprint and optional cosigner fingerprints for audit - Channel key only export -- share just the channel key (not identity keys) with collaborators via encrypted file or QR code (
soosef-channel:URI scheme) - Backup tracking -- records when the last backup was taken and warns when overdue
Fieldkit
- Killswitch -- emergency destruction of all data under
~/.soosef/, ordered by sensitivity (keys first, then data, then logs). Includes:- Deep forensic scrub -- removes
__pycache__,.pyc, pipdist-info, pip download cache, and scrubs shell history entries containing "soosef" - Self-uninstall -- runs
pip uninstall -y soosefas the final step - System log clearing -- best-effort journald vacuum on Linux
- Deep forensic scrub -- removes
- Dead man's switch -- automated purge if check-in is missed, with a configurable grace period. During the grace period, a webhook warning is sent (POST to a configured URL) and a local warning file is written before the killswitch fires
- Tamper detection -- file integrity monitoring with baseline snapshots
- USB whitelist -- block or alert on unauthorized USB devices (Linux/pyudev)
- Geofence -- GPS boundary enforcement with configurable radius. Supports live GPS via gpsd (
get_current_location()connects to127.0.0.1:2947) - Hardware killswitch -- GPIO pin monitoring for Raspberry Pi physical button (configurable pin and hold duration)
Cover / Duress Mode
- Configurable certificate CN -- set
cover_namein config to replace "SooSeF Local" in the self-signed TLS certificate - Portable data directory -- set
SOOSEF_DATA_DIRto relocate all state to an arbitrary path (e.g., an innocuously named directory on a USB stick). All paths resolve lazily fromBASE_DIR, so runtime overrides propagate correctly
Installation
Basic install (core library only)
pip install soosef
With extras
pip install "soosef[web,cli]" # Web UI + CLI (most common)
pip install "soosef[all]" # Everything except dev tools
pip install "soosef[dev]" # All + pytest, black, ruff, mypy
Available extras
| Extra | What it adds |
|---|---|
stego-dct |
DCT steganography (numpy, scipy, jpeglib, reedsolo) |
stego-audio |
Audio steganography (pydub, soundfile, reedsolo) |
stego-compression |
LZ4 compression support |
attest |
Attestation features (imagehash, lmdb, exifread) |
cli |
Click CLI with rich output, QR code support, piexif |
web |
Flask web UI with Waitress/Gunicorn, pyzbar QR scanning, includes attest + stego-dct |
api |
FastAPI REST API with uvicorn, includes stego-dct |
fieldkit |
Tamper monitoring (watchdog) and USB whitelist (pyudev) |
federation |
Peer-to-peer attestation federation (aiohttp) |
rpi |
Raspberry Pi deployment (web + cli + fieldkit + gpiozero) |
all |
All of the above |
dev |
All + pytest, pytest-cov, black, ruff, mypy |
Airgapped / Raspberry Pi install
Bundle wheels on a networked machine, then install offline:
# On networked machine
pip download "soosef[rpi]" -d ./wheels
# Transfer ./wheels to target via USB
# On airgapped machine
pip install --no-index --find-links=./wheels "soosef[rpi]"
soosef init
soosef serve --host 0.0.0.0
CLI Reference
All commands accept --data-dir PATH to override the default ~/.soosef directory,
and --json for machine-readable output.
soosef [--data-dir PATH] [--json] COMMAND
Core commands
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
soosef init |
Create directory structure, generate identity + channel key, write default config |
soosef serve |
Start the web UI (default: https://127.0.0.1:5000) |
soosef status |
Show instance status: identity, keys, chain, fieldkit, config |
soosef serve options
| Option | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
--host |
127.0.0.1 |
Bind address |
--port |
5000 |
Bind port |
--no-https |
off | Disable HTTPS (use HTTP) |
--debug |
off | Use Flask dev server instead of Waitress |
--workers |
4 |
Number of Waitress/Gunicorn worker threads |
Steganography commands (soosef stego)
Stegasoo uses multi-factor authentication: a reference photo (shared image both parties have), a passphrase (4+ words), and a PIN (6-9 digits). All three are required to encode or decode. The passphrase and PIN are prompted interactively (hidden input) if not provided via options.
# Encode a text message into an image
# CARRIER is the image to hide data in, -r is the shared reference photo
soosef stego encode cover.png -r shared_photo.jpg -m "Secret message"
# Passphrase: **** (prompted, hidden)
# PIN: **** (prompted, hidden)
# -> writes encoded PNG to current directory
# Encode with explicit output path
soosef stego encode cover.png -r shared_photo.jpg -m "Secret" -o stego_output.png
# Encode a file instead of text
soosef stego encode cover.png -r shared_photo.jpg -f document.pdf
# Transport-aware encoding (auto-selects DCT/JPEG and resizes for the platform)
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared.jpg -m "Secret" --transport whatsapp
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared.jpg -m "Secret" --transport signal
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared.jpg -m "Secret" --transport telegram
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared.jpg -m "Secret" --transport email
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared.jpg -m "Secret" --transport direct
# Dry run -- check capacity without encoding
soosef stego encode cover.png -r shared_photo.jpg -m "Secret" --dry-run
# Decode a message from a stego image (same reference + passphrase + PIN)
soosef stego decode stego_output.png -r shared_photo.jpg
# Passphrase: ****
# PIN: ****
# -> prints decoded message or saves decoded file
# Decode and save file payload to specific path
soosef stego decode stego_output.png -r shared_photo.jpg -o recovered.pdf
# DCT mode for JPEG (survives social media compression)
soosef stego encode cover.jpg -r shared_photo.jpg -m "Secret" --platform telegram
# Audio steganography
soosef stego audio-encode audio.wav -r shared_photo.jpg -m "Hidden in audio"
soosef stego audio-decode stego.wav -r shared_photo.jpg
# Generate credentials
soosef stego generate # Generate passphrase + PIN
soosef stego generate --pin-length 8 # Longer PIN
# Channel key management
soosef stego channel status # Show current channel key
soosef stego channel generate # Generate new channel key
# Image info and capacity
soosef stego info cover.png # Image details + LSB/DCT capacity
Attestation commands (soosef attest)
# Attest an image (sign with Ed25519 identity)
soosef attest IMAGE photo.jpg
soosef attest IMAGE photo.jpg --caption "Field report" --location "Istanbul"
# Batch attest a directory
soosef attest batch ./photos/ --caption "Field report"
# Verify an image against the attestation log
soosef attest verify photo.jpg
# View attestation log
soosef attest log --limit 20
Fieldkit commands (soosef fieldkit)
soosef fieldkit status # Show fieldkit state
soosef fieldkit checkin # Reset dead man's switch timer
soosef fieldkit check-deadman # Check if deadman timer has expired
soosef fieldkit purge --confirm # Activate killswitch (destroys all data)
soosef fieldkit geofence set --lat 48.8566 --lon 2.3522 --radius 1000
soosef fieldkit geofence check --lat 48.8600 --lon 2.3500
soosef fieldkit geofence clear
soosef fieldkit usb snapshot # Snapshot current USB devices as whitelist
soosef fieldkit usb check # Check for unauthorized USB devices
Key management commands (soosef keys)
soosef keys show # Display current key info
soosef keys export -o backup.enc # Export encrypted key bundle
soosef keys import -b backup.enc # Import key bundle
soosef keys rotate-identity # Generate new Ed25519 identity (records rotation in chain)
soosef keys rotate-channel # Generate new channel key
Chain commands (soosef chain)
soosef chain status # Show chain head, length, integrity
soosef chain verify # Verify entire chain integrity (hashes + signatures)
soosef chain show INDEX # Show a specific chain record
soosef chain log --count 20 # Show recent chain entries
soosef chain backfill # Backfill existing attestations into chain
# Evidence export
soosef chain export --start 0 --end 100 -o chain.zip
# Selective disclosure (for legal discovery / court orders)
soosef chain disclose -i 5,12,47 -o disclosure.json
# External timestamp anchoring
soosef chain anchor # Manual anchor (prints hash for tweet/email/blockchain)
soosef chain anchor --tsa https://freetsa.org/tsr # RFC 3161 automated anchor
Web UI
Start with soosef serve. The web UI provides authenticated access to all features
through Flask blueprints. Served by Waitress (production WSGI server) by default.
Routes
| Blueprint | Routes | Description |
|---|---|---|
| stego | /encode, /decode, /generate |
Steganography operations |
| attest | /attest, /verify |
Attestation signing and verification |
| fieldkit | /fieldkit/* |
Killswitch, dead man's switch, status dashboard |
| keys | /keys/* |
Key management, rotation, export/import |
| admin | /admin/* |
User management (multi-user auth via SQLite) |
| dropbox | /dropbox/admin, /dropbox/upload/<token> |
Source drop box: token creation (admin), anonymous upload (source), receipt verification |
| health | /health |
Capability reporting endpoint (see API section) |
Configuration
SooSeF loads configuration from ~/.soosef/config.json. All fields have sensible defaults.
soosef init writes the default config file.
Config fields
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
host |
string | 127.0.0.1 |
Web UI bind address |
port |
int | 5000 |
Web UI bind port |
https_enabled |
bool | true |
Enable HTTPS with self-signed cert |
auth_enabled |
bool | true |
Require login for web UI |
max_upload_mb |
int | 50 |
Maximum upload size in MB |
session_timeout_minutes |
int | 15 |
Session expiry |
login_lockout_attempts |
int | 5 |
Failed logins before lockout |
login_lockout_minutes |
int | 15 |
Lockout duration |
default_embed_mode |
string | auto |
Stegasoo encoding mode |
killswitch_enabled |
bool | false |
Enable killswitch functionality |
deadman_enabled |
bool | false |
Enable dead man's switch |
deadman_interval_hours |
int | 24 |
Check-in interval |
deadman_grace_hours |
int | 2 |
Grace period after missed check-in |
deadman_warning_webhook |
string | "" |
URL to POST warning before auto-purge |
usb_monitoring_enabled |
bool | false |
Enable USB device whitelist enforcement |
tamper_monitoring_enabled |
bool | false |
Enable file integrity monitoring |
chain_enabled |
bool | true |
Enable attestation hash chain |
chain_auto_wrap |
bool | true |
Auto-wrap attestations in chain records |
backup_reminder_days |
int | 7 |
Days before backup reminder |
cover_name |
string | "" |
If set, used for SSL cert CN instead of "SooSeF Local" (cover/duress mode) |
gpio_killswitch_pin |
int | 17 |
Raspberry Pi GPIO pin for hardware killswitch |
gpio_killswitch_hold_seconds |
float | 5.0 |
Hold duration to trigger hardware killswitch |
Environment variables
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
SOOSEF_DATA_DIR |
Override the data directory (default: ~/.soosef). Enables portable USB mode and cover/duress directory naming |
Architecture
Source layout
src/soosef/
__init__.py Package init, __version__
cli.py Click CLI (entry point: soosef)
paths.py All path constants (lazy resolution from BASE_DIR)
config.py Unified config loader (dataclass + JSON)
exceptions.py SoosefError base exception
metadata.py Extract-then-strip EXIF pipeline
evidence.py Self-contained evidence package export
archive.py Cold archive for long-term preservation (OAIS-aligned)
stegasoo/ Steganography engine (subpackage)
encode.py Transport-aware encoding (--transport flag)
carrier_tracker.py Carrier reuse tracking and warnings
verisoo/ Attestation engine (subpackage)
models.py ImageHashes (images + arbitrary files), AttestationRecord
keystore/
manager.py Key material management (channel + identity + trust store + backup)
models.py KeyBundle, IdentityBundle dataclasses
export.py Full bundle export, channel-key-only export, QR code sharing
federation/
chain.py Append-only hash chain (key rotation, recovery, delivery ack, selective disclosure)
anchors.py RFC 3161 timestamps + manual chain anchors
exchange.py Cross-org attestation bundle export/import
fieldkit/
killswitch.py Emergency data destruction (deep forensic scrub, self-uninstall)
deadman.py Dead man's switch (webhook warnings)
tamper.py File integrity monitoring
usb_monitor.py USB device whitelist (Linux/pyudev)
geofence.py GPS boundary enforcement (gpsd integration)
frontends/web/
app.py Flask app factory (create_app())
auth.py SQLite3 multi-user auth
temp_storage.py File-based temp storage with expiry
subprocess_stego.py Crash-safe subprocess isolation
ssl_utils.py Self-signed HTTPS cert generation
blueprints/
stego.py /encode, /decode, /generate
attest.py /attest, /verify
fieldkit.py /fieldkit/*
keys.py /keys/*
admin.py /admin/*
dropbox.py /dropbox/* (source drop box)
Data directory (~/.soosef/)
~/.soosef/
config.json Unified configuration
audit.jsonl Append-only audit trail
carrier_history.json Carrier reuse tracking database
identity/ Ed25519 keypair (private.pem, public.pem, identity.meta.json)
stegasoo/ Channel key (channel.key)
attestations/ Verisoo attestation store (log.bin, index/, peers.json)
chain/ Hash chain (chain.bin, state.cbor, anchors/)
auth/ Web UI auth database (soosef.db, dropbox.db)
certs/ Self-signed TLS certificates
fieldkit/ Fieldkit state (deadman.json, tamper/, usb/, geofence.json)
temp/ Ephemeral file storage (dropbox uploads)
instance/ Flask instance (sessions, secret key)
trusted_keys/ Collaborator Ed25519 public keys (trust store)
Sensitive directories (identity/, auth/, certs/, and the root) are created with
0700 permissions.
Security Model
Two key domains, never merged. Stegasoo uses AES-256-GCM with keys derived via Argon2id from user-supplied factors. Verisoo uses Ed25519 for signing. These serve different security purposes and are kept strictly separate.
Killswitch priority. The killswitch destroys all data under ~/.soosef/, including
the audit log. This is intentional -- in a field compromise scenario, data destruction
takes precedence over audit trail preservation. The deep forensic scrub extends beyond
the data directory to remove Python bytecache, pip metadata, pip download cache, shell
history entries, and the soosef package itself.
Offline-first. All static assets are vendored (no CDN calls). Pip wheels can be bundled for fully airgapped installation. No network access is required for any core functionality. RFC 3161 timestamping and webhook warnings are optional features that gracefully degrade when offline.
Web UI hardening:
- CSRF protection via Flask-WTF
- Session timeout (default: 15 minutes)
- Login rate limiting with lockout (5 attempts, 15-minute lockout)
- HTTPS by default with auto-generated self-signed certificates
- EXIF stripping on steganographic encode to prevent metadata leakage
- Dead man's switch webhook SSRF protection (blocks private/internal targets)
Subprocess isolation. Steganographic operations run in a subprocess boundary
(subprocess_stego.py) to contain crashes and prevent memory corruption from affecting
the main web server process.
Chain integrity. The append-only hash chain uses Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 linkage. Key rotation records create a verifiable trust chain; identity recovery records are auditable. Selective disclosure uses Merkle-style proofs so third parties can verify specific records without accessing the full chain.
Cross-Domain Applications
While SooSeF was designed for journalist and NGO field security, the attestation chain, federation, and evidence packaging capabilities apply to a range of domains:
- Human rights documentation -- field workers attest photos and videos of incidents with GPS and timestamps, federate evidence to international partners, and produce court-ready evidence packages
- Research integrity -- researchers attest datasets (CSV, sensor readings) at collection time, creating a tamper-evident chain of custody.
ImageHashes.from_file()supports arbitrary file types via SHA-256 - Election monitoring -- observers attest ballot images and tally sheets with location metadata, anchor the chain to an RFC 3161 TSA for independent time proof, and use selective disclosure for audit requests
- Supply chain verification -- attest inspection photos, sensor data, and certificates of origin at each stage. Federation enables multi-party chains across organizations
- Art authentication -- attest high-resolution photographs of artworks with device and location metadata, creating provenance records that survive format conversion via perceptual hashing
- Corporate whistleblowing -- the source drop box accepts anonymous uploads with client-side hashing. Cover mode (
cover_name,SOOSEF_DATA_DIR) disguises the installation. The killswitch provides emergency destruction if the instance is compromised - Environmental monitoring -- attest sensor data, satellite imagery, and field photographs. Cold archives with
ALGORITHMS.txtensure evidence remains verifiable decades later
API
/health endpoint
The web UI exposes a /health endpoint that reports installed capabilities:
{
"status": "ok",
"version": "0.2.0",
"capabilities": ["stego-lsb", "stego-dct", "attest", "fieldkit", "chain"]
}
Useful for monitoring and for clients to discover which extras are installed.
FastAPI (optional)
Install the api extra for a standalone FastAPI REST interface:
pip install "soosef[api]"
This provides soosef.api with a FastAPI application served by uvicorn, suitable for
programmatic integration.
Development
Setup
git clone https://github.com/alee/soosef.git
cd soosef
pip install -e ".[dev]"
Commands
pytest # Run tests with coverage
black src/ tests/ frontends/ # Format (100-char line length)
ruff check src/ tests/ frontends/ --fix # Lint
mypy src/ # Type check
Code style
- Black with 100-character line length
- Ruff with E, F, I, N, W, UP rule sets
- mypy strict mode with missing imports ignored
- Imperative commit messages (e.g., "Add killswitch purge confirmation")
Python support
Python 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14.
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.