fieldwitness/deploy/live-usb/config/hooks/live/0200-harden.hook.chroot
Aaron D. Lee 496198d49a
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Add three-tier deployment infrastructure
Platform pivot from Raspberry Pi to three-tier model:
- Tier 1: Bootable Debian Live USB for field reporters
- Tier 2: Docker/K8s org server for newsrooms
- Tier 3: Docker/K8s federation relay for VPS

Tier 1 — Live USB (deploy/live-usb/):
- build.sh: live-build based image builder for amd64
- Package list: Python + system deps + minimal GUI (openbox + Firefox)
- Install hook: creates venv, pip installs soosef[web,cli,attest,...]
- Hardening hook: disable swap/coredumps, UFW, auto-login to web UI
- systemd service with security hardening (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem)
- Auto-opens Firefox kiosk to http://127.0.0.1:5000 on boot

Tier 2+3 — Docker (deploy/docker/):
- Multi-stage Dockerfile with two targets:
  - server: full web UI + stego + attestation + federation (Tier 2)
  - relay: lightweight FastAPI attestation API only (Tier 3)
- docker-compose.yml with both services and persistent volumes
- .dockerignore for clean builds

Kubernetes (deploy/kubernetes/):
- namespace.yaml, server-deployment.yaml, relay-deployment.yaml
- PVCs, services, health checks, resource limits
- Single-writer strategy (Recreate, not RollingUpdate) for SQLite safety
- README with architecture diagram and deployment instructions

Config presets (deploy/config-presets/):
- low-threat.json: press freedom country (no killswitch, 30min sessions)
- medium-threat.json: restricted press (48h deadman, USB monitoring)
- high-threat.json: conflict zone (12h deadman, tamper monitoring, 5min sessions)
- critical-threat.json: targeted surveillance (127.0.0.1 only, 6h deadman, 3min sessions)

Deployment guide rewritten for three-tier model with RPi as legacy appendix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-01 22:52:38 -04:00

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#!/bin/bash
# Security hardening for the live image.
set -euo pipefail
echo "=== Applying security hardening ==="
# Disable core dumps (Python doesn't zero memory — core dumps leak keys)
echo "* hard core 0" >> /etc/security/limits.conf
echo "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/99-soosef.conf
echo "kernel.core_pattern=|/bin/false" >> /etc/sysctl.d/99-soosef.conf
# Disable swap (keys persist in swap pages)
systemctl mask swap.target || true
echo "vm.swappiness = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/99-soosef.conf
# Enable UFW with deny-all + allow web UI
ufw default deny incoming
ufw default allow outgoing
ufw allow 5000/tcp comment "SooSeF Web UI"
ufw allow 22/tcp comment "SSH"
ufw --force enable || true
# Disable unnecessary services
systemctl disable bluetooth.service 2>/dev/null || true
systemctl disable avahi-daemon.service 2>/dev/null || true
systemctl disable cups.service 2>/dev/null || true
# Enable SooSeF service
systemctl enable soosef.service
# Auto-login to openbox (so the browser opens without login prompt)
mkdir -p /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf.d
cat > /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf.d/50-autologin.conf << 'EOF'
[Seat:*]
autologin-user=soosef
autologin-user-timeout=0
EOF
echo "=== Hardening complete ==="