Complete project rebrand for better positioning in the press freedom and digital security space. FieldWitness communicates both field deployment and evidence testimony — appropriate for the target audience of journalists, NGOs, and human rights organizations. Rename mapping: - soosef → fieldwitness (package, CLI, all imports) - soosef.stegasoo → fieldwitness.stego - soosef.verisoo → fieldwitness.attest - ~/.soosef/ → ~/.fwmetadata/ (innocuous data dir name) - SOOSEF_DATA_DIR → FIELDWITNESS_DATA_DIR - SoosefConfig → FieldWitnessConfig - SoosefError → FieldWitnessError Also includes: - License switch from MIT to GPL-3.0 - C2PA bridge module (Phase 0-2 MVP): cert.py, export.py, vendor_assertions.py - README repositioned to lead with provenance/federation, stego backgrounded - Threat model skeleton at docs/security/threat-model.md - Planning docs: docs/planning/c2pa-integration.md, docs/planning/gtm-feasibility.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.2 KiB
2.2 KiB
FieldWitness Kubernetes Deployment
Architecture
Field Devices (Tier 1)
(Bootable USB + laptop)
|
| LAN / sneakernet
v
┌───────────────────────┐
│ Org Server (Tier 2) │ <-- server-deployment.yaml
│ Full web UI + stego │
│ + attestation + fed │
│ Newsroom mini PC │
└───────────┬───────────┘
|
| gossip / federation API
v
┌───────────────────────┐
│ Fed Relay (Tier 3) │ <-- relay-deployment.yaml
│ Attestation API only │
│ VPS (Iceland, CH) │
│ Zero key knowledge │
└───────────────────────┘
Quick Start
# Build images
docker build -t fieldwitness-server --target server -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile .
docker build -t fieldwitness-relay --target relay -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile .
# Deploy to Kubernetes
kubectl apply -f deploy/kubernetes/namespace.yaml
kubectl apply -f deploy/kubernetes/server-deployment.yaml
kubectl apply -f deploy/kubernetes/relay-deployment.yaml
Notes
- Single writer: Both deployments use
replicas: 1withRecreatestrategy. FieldWitness uses SQLite and append-only binary logs that require single-writer access. Do not scale horizontally. - PVCs: Both deployments require persistent volumes. The server needs 10Gi, the relay needs 5Gi. Adjust based on expected attestation volume.
- Security: The relay stores only attestation records (image hashes + signatures). It never sees encryption keys, plaintext messages, or original images. If the relay is seized, the attacker gets cryptographic hashes — nothing actionable.
- Ingress: Not included. Configure your own ingress controller with TLS termination. The federation API should be TLS-encrypted in transit.