Complete project rebrand for better positioning in the press freedom and digital security space. FieldWitness communicates both field deployment and evidence testimony — appropriate for the target audience of journalists, NGOs, and human rights organizations. Rename mapping: - soosef → fieldwitness (package, CLI, all imports) - soosef.stegasoo → fieldwitness.stego - soosef.verisoo → fieldwitness.attest - ~/.soosef/ → ~/.fwmetadata/ (innocuous data dir name) - SOOSEF_DATA_DIR → FIELDWITNESS_DATA_DIR - SoosefConfig → FieldWitnessConfig - SoosefError → FieldWitnessError Also includes: - License switch from MIT to GPL-3.0 - C2PA bridge module (Phase 0-2 MVP): cert.py, export.py, vendor_assertions.py - README repositioned to lead with provenance/federation, stego backgrounded - Threat model skeleton at docs/security/threat-model.md - Planning docs: docs/planning/c2pa-integration.md, docs/planning/gtm-feasibility.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Federation Guide
Audience: System administrators and technical leads setting up cross-organization attestation sync between FieldWitness instances.
Prerequisites: A running FieldWitness instance (Tier 2 org server or Tier 3 relay), familiarity with the CLI, and trusted public keys from partner organizations.
Overview
FieldWitness federation synchronizes attestation records between organizations using a gossip protocol. Nodes periodically exchange Merkle roots, detect divergence, and fetch missing records. The system is eventually consistent with no central coordinator, no leader election, and no consensus protocol -- just append-only logs that converge.
Federation operates at two levels:
- Offline bundles -- JSON export/import via sneakernet (USB drive). Works on all tiers including fully airgapped Tier 1 field devices.
- Live gossip -- HTTP-based periodic sync between Tier 2 org servers and Tier 3
federation relays. Requires the
federationextra (pip install fieldwitness[federation]).
Warning: Federation shares attestation records (image hashes, Ed25519 signatures, timestamps, and signer public keys). It never shares encryption keys, plaintext messages, original images, or steganographic payloads.
Architecture
Tier 1: Field Device Tier 2: Org Server A Tier 3: Relay (Iceland)
(Bootable USB) (Docker / mini PC) (VPS, zero key knowledge)
| |
USB sneakernet ------> Port 5000 (Web UI) |
Port 8000 (Federation API) <-----> Port 8000
| |
Tier 2: Org Server B <------------>
(Docker / mini PC)
Federation traffic flows:
- Tier 1 to Tier 2: USB sneakernet (offline bundles only)
- Tier 2 to Tier 3: gossip API over HTTPS (port 8000)
- Tier 2 to Tier 2: through a Tier 3 relay, or directly via sneakernet
- Tier 3 to Tier 3: gossip between relays in different jurisdictions
Gossip Protocol
How sync works
- Node A sends its Merkle root and log size to Node B via
GET /federation/status - If roots differ and B has more records, A requests a consistency proof via
GET /federation/consistency-proof?old_size=N - If the proof verifies (B's log is a valid extension of A's), A fetches the missing
records via
GET /federation/records?start=N&count=50 - A appends the new records to its local log
- B performs the same process in reverse (bidirectional sync)
Records are capped at 100 per request to protect memory on resource-constrained devices.
Peer health tracking
Each peer tracks:
last_seen-- timestamp of last successful contactlast_root-- most recent Merkle root received from the peerlast_size-- most recent log sizehealthy-- markedfalseafter 3 consecutive failuresconsecutive_failures-- reset to 0 on success
Unhealthy peers are skipped during gossip rounds but remain registered. They are retried
on the next full gossip round. Peer state persists in SQLite at
~/.fwmetadata/attestations/federation/peers.db.
Gossip interval
The default gossip interval is 60 seconds, configurable via the FIELDWITNESS_GOSSIP_INTERVAL
environment variable. In Docker Compose, set it in the environment section:
environment:
- FIELDWITNESS_GOSSIP_INTERVAL=60
Lower intervals mean faster convergence but more network traffic.
Setting Up Federation
Step 1: Exchange trust keys
Before two organizations can federate, they must trust each other's Ed25519 identity keys. Always verify fingerprints out-of-band (in person or over a known-secure voice channel).
On Organization A:
$ cp ~/.fwmetadata/identity/public.pem /media/usb/org-a-pubkey.pem
On Organization B:
$ fieldwitness keys trust --import /media/usb/org-a-pubkey.pem
Repeat in both directions so each organization trusts the other.
Warning: Do not skip fingerprint verification. If an adversary substitutes their own public key, they can forge attestation records that your instance will accept as trusted.
Step 2: Register peers (live gossip)
Through the web UI at /federation, or via the peer store directly:
# On Org A's server, register Org B's federation endpoint
$ fieldwitness federation peer add \
--url https://orgb.example.org:8000 \
--fingerprint a1b2c3d4e5f6...
Or through the web UI:
- Navigate to
/federation - Enter the peer's federation API URL and Ed25519 fingerprint
- Click "Add Peer"
Step 3: Start the gossip loop
The gossip loop starts automatically when the server starts. On Docker deployments, the federation API runs on port 8000. Ensure this port is accessible between peers (firewall, security groups, etc.).
For manual one-time sync:
$ fieldwitness federation sync --peer https://orgb.example.org:8000
Step 4: Monitor sync status
The web UI at /federation shows:
- Local node status (Merkle root, log size, record count)
- Registered peers with health indicators
- Recent sync history (records received, errors)
Offline Federation (Sneakernet)
For Tier 1 field devices and airgapped environments, use offline bundles.
Exporting a bundle
$ fieldwitness chain export --output /media/usb/bundle.zip
To export only records from a specific investigation:
$ fieldwitness chain export --investigation "case-2026-001" --output /media/usb/bundle.zip
To export a specific index range:
$ fieldwitness chain export --start 100 --end 200 --output /media/usb/partial.zip
Importing a bundle
On the receiving instance:
$ fieldwitness chain import /media/usb/bundle.zip
During import:
- Records signed by untrusted fingerprints are rejected
- Duplicate records (matching SHA-256) are skipped
- Imported records are tagged with
federated_frommetadata - A delivery acknowledgment record (
fieldwitness/delivery-ack-v1) is automatically appended to the local chain
Delivery acknowledgments
When a bundle is imported, FieldWitness signs a fieldwitness/delivery-ack-v1 chain record that
contains:
- The SHA-256 of the imported bundle file
- The sender's fingerprint
- The count of records received
This acknowledgment can be exported back to the sending organization as proof that the bundle was delivered and ingested. It creates a two-way federation handshake.
# On receiving org: export the acknowledgment back
$ fieldwitness chain export --start <ack_index> --end <ack_index> \
--output /media/usb/delivery-ack.zip
Federation API Endpoints
The federation API is served by FastAPI/uvicorn on port 8000.
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|---|---|---|
GET |
/federation/status |
Current Merkle root and log size |
GET |
/federation/records?start=N&count=M |
Fetch attestation records (max 100) |
GET |
/federation/consistency-proof?old_size=N |
Merkle consistency proof |
POST |
/federation/records |
Push records to this node |
GET |
/health |
Health check |
Trust filtering on push
When records are pushed via POST /federation/records, the receiving node checks each
record's attestor_fingerprint against its trust store. Records from unknown attestors
are rejected. If no trust store is configured (empty trusted keys), all records are
accepted (trust-on-first-use).
Federation Relay (Tier 3)
The federation relay is a minimal Docker container that runs only the federation API.
What the relay stores
- Attestation records: image SHA-256 hashes, perceptual hashes, Ed25519 signatures
- Chain linkage data: prev_hash, chain_index, claimed_ts
- Signer public keys
What the relay never sees
- AES-256-GCM channel keys or Ed25519 private keys
- Original images or media files
- Steganographic payloads or plaintext messages
- User credentials or session data
- Web UI content
Deploying a relay
$ cd deploy/docker
$ docker compose up relay -d
The relay listens on port 8001 (mapped to internal 8000). See docs/deployment.md
Section 3 for full deployment details.
Jurisdiction considerations
Deploy relays in jurisdictions with strong press freedom protections:
- Iceland -- strong source protection laws, no mandatory data retention for this type of data
- Switzerland -- strict privacy laws, resistance to foreign legal requests
- Netherlands -- strong press freedom, EU GDPR protections
Consult with a press freedom lawyer for your specific situation.
Troubleshooting
Peer marked unhealthy
After 3 consecutive sync failures, a peer is marked unhealthy and skipped. Check:
- Is the peer's federation API reachable?
curl https://peer.example.org:8000/health - Is TLS configured correctly? The peer's API must be accessible over HTTPS in production.
- Are firewall rules open for port 8000?
- The peer will be retried on subsequent gossip rounds. Once a sync succeeds, the peer is marked healthy again.
Records rejected on import
Records are rejected if the signer's fingerprint is not in the local trust store. Import the sender's public key first:
$ fieldwitness keys trust --import /path/to/sender-pubkey.pem
Consistency proof failure
A consistency proof failure means the peer's log is not a valid extension of the local log. This indicates a potential fork -- the peer may have a different chain history. Investigate before proceeding:
- Compare chain heads:
fieldwitness chain statuson both instances - If a fork is confirmed, one instance's records must be exported and re-imported into a fresh chain
Gossip not starting
The gossip loop requires the federation extra:
$ pip install "fieldwitness[federation]"
This installs aiohttp for async HTTP communication.