feat(wasm): org_unwrap_key — ECIES unwrap into a session handle
Expose org_unwrap_key(keys_blob, device_private_openssh) to let the extension SW unwrap a member's ECIES-wrapped org master key into an ordinary Zeroizing session handle. The returned handle is key-agnostic and works with the existing item_decrypt/manifest_decrypt AEAD. Key-form finding: device private keys are OpenSSH PEM blobs produced by relicario_core::device::generate_keypair(), not base64 raw bytes. The plan's "device_private_key_base64" parameter name was misleading; all code and the .d.ts declaration use "device_private_openssh" to match the spec and reality. Adds ssh-key dep to relicario-wasm for PEM parsing in decode_device_seed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014s527M917W47LDrfQ4t47g
This commit is contained in:
1
Cargo.lock
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1
Cargo.lock
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@@ -2248,6 +2248,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"serde",
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"serde-wasm-bindgen",
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"serde_json",
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"ssh-key",
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"wasm-bindgen",
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"wasm-bindgen-test",
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"zeroize",
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ base64 = "0.22"
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hex = "0.4"
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rand = "0.8"
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once_cell = "1"
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ssh-key = { version = "0.6", features = ["ed25519", "std"] }
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[dev-dependencies]
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wasm-bindgen-test = "0.3"
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@@ -568,6 +568,106 @@ pub fn wasm_unwrap_recovery_qr(
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Ok(recovered.to_vec())
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}
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// ── Org vault WASM bridge ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Decode an OpenSSH ed25519 private key string into a Zeroizing 32-byte seed.
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///
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/// **Key-form finding (Step 1 of the task brief):**
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/// `relicario_core::device::generate_keypair()` returns the private key as an
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/// OpenSSH PEM blob — the multiline `-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----...` format,
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/// the same form the `ssh_key` crate emits via `PrivateKey::to_openssh()`. It is
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/// NOT a raw-bytes base64 string. The plan's `device_private_key_base64` parameter
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/// name is therefore misleading; the spec name `device_private_openssh` matches
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/// reality. The SW stores this blob in WASM `DEVICE_STATE` and never exposes it
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/// to JS. If it were ever serialised for cross-session persistence (future work),
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/// it would travel as this same PEM string.
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///
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/// This mirrors the first half of `relicario_core::device::sign()`.
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fn decode_device_seed(private_key_openssh: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, String> {
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use ssh_key::PrivateKey;
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let private = PrivateKey::from_openssh(private_key_openssh)
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.map_err(|e| format!("parse private key: {e}"))?;
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let key_data = private
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.key_data()
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.ed25519()
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.ok_or_else(|| "not an ed25519 key".to_string())?;
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let secret_slice: &[u8] = key_data.private.as_ref();
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let secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = secret_slice
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.try_into()
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.map_err(|_| "invalid ed25519 seed length".to_string())?;
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let mut seed = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
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seed.copy_from_slice(&secret_bytes);
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Ok(seed)
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}
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/// Unwrap a member's ECIES-wrapped org master key into a session handle.
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///
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/// `keys_blob` is the raw wrapped-key blob at `keys/<member_id>.enc` in the org
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/// repo — produced by `relicario_core::org::wrap_org_key`. `device_private_openssh`
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/// is the device's ed25519 private key in OpenSSH PEM format (held in WASM memory
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/// via `crates/relicario-wasm/src/device.rs`; never exposed to JS).
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///
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/// The org key is held in the same Zeroizing WASM session registry as the personal
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/// master key; org items share the personal `.enc` AEAD format, so the returned
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/// handle works with `item_decrypt`/`manifest_decrypt` unchanged.
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn org_unwrap_key(
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keys_blob: &[u8],
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device_private_openssh: &str,
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) -> Result<SessionHandle, JsError> {
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let seed = decode_device_seed(device_private_openssh)
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.map_err(|e| JsError::new(&format!("bad device key: {e}")))?;
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let org_key = relicario_core::org::unwrap_org_key(keys_blob, &seed)
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.map_err(|e| JsError::new(&format!("org unwrap failed: {e}")))?;
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// image_secret slot is unused for org sessions; store a zeroized placeholder.
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let handle = session::insert(org_key, Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]));
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Ok(SessionHandle(handle))
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod org_tests {
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use super::*;
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use relicario_core::org::wrap_org_key;
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use zeroize::Zeroizing;
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/// Returns (public_openssh, private_openssh) using the real core keypair generator.
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///
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/// Device private keys are produced by `relicario_core::device::generate_keypair()`
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/// in OpenSSH PEM format ("-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----..."),
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/// NOT base64-encoded raw bytes. The plan parameter name "device_private_key_base64"
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/// is misleading; the spec name "device_private_openssh" matches the actual format.
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/// We call the real generator here (not a hand-rolled helper) so the test exercises
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/// the exact production key format and cannot silently drift.
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fn test_device_keypair() -> (String, String) {
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let (priv_openssh, pub_openssh) = relicario_core::generate_keypair().unwrap();
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(pub_openssh, priv_openssh.to_string())
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}
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#[test]
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fn org_unwrap_key_yields_a_session_that_decrypts_org_blobs() {
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// Generate a device keypair, wrap a known org key to it, unwrap via the WASM
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// path, then encrypt+decrypt an item through the returned handle to assert
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// round-trip.
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let org_key = Zeroizing::new([7u8; 32]);
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let (pub_openssh, priv_openssh) = test_device_keypair();
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let wrapped = wrap_org_key(&org_key, &pub_openssh).unwrap();
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let handle = org_unwrap_key(&wrapped, &priv_openssh).unwrap();
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// item_encrypt is native-safe: returns Vec<u8>; JsError is only reachable on
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// the error path, which is not exercised here.
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let ct = item_encrypt(
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&handle,
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r#"{"id":"a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8","title":"Test","type":"secure_note","created":0,"modified":0,"core":{"type":"secure_note","body":"x"}}"#,
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)
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.unwrap();
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// item_decrypt calls serde_wasm_bindgen::Serializer which panics off-wasm.
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// Use relicario_core::decrypt_item directly, mirroring the
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// manifest_round_trip_via_handle approach in session_tests.
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let pt: relicario_core::Item = relicario_core::decrypt_item(&ct, &org_key).unwrap();
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assert!(format!("{:?}", pt.core).contains("SecureNote"));
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod session_tests {
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use super::*;
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2
extension/src/wasm.d.ts
vendored
2
extension/src/wasm.d.ts
vendored
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ declare module 'relicario-wasm' {
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export function wasm_generate_recovery_qr(handle: SessionHandle, passphrase: string): string;
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export function wasm_unwrap_recovery_qr(payload_b64: string, passphrase: string): Uint8Array;
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export function org_unwrap_key(keys_blob: Uint8Array, device_private_openssh: string): SessionHandle;
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export default function init(module_or_path?: unknown): Promise<void>;
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export function initSync(args: { module: WebAssembly.Module }): void;
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}
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