7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
adlee-was-taken
4d02a50cc8 chore(core): fix pre-existing clippy warnings (-D warnings gate)
Resolves pre-existing lint issues in imgsecret.rs, time.rs, totp.rs,
and crypto.rs that blocked the cargo clippy --workspace -D warnings
gate. No logic changes: loop-index → iterator, manual div_ceil →
.div_ceil(), manual range contains → .contains(), auto-deref cleanup.

Also fixes pre-existing warnings in relicario-cli (main.rs, session.rs,
device.rs, gitea.rs, helpers.rs, test helpers): dead_code suppression,
too_many_arguments, literal_with_empty_format_string, manual_char_cmp,
map_or → is_none_or, and repeat().take() → vec! in test helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 19:32:45 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
006e67c361 fix(cli): cfg-gate RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE to debug builds (audit S3)
The groups-cache opt-out is a developer debugging knob, not a
user-facing config. Gating the env-var lookup behind cfg!(debug_assertions)
makes release builds ignore the variable; the optimiser removes the
lookup entirely, so the variable name doesn't appear in release binary
strings output.

Doc-comments updated to reflect the new behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 18:51:15 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
95d1ff833c docs: enumerate RELICARIO_* env vars in SECURITY.md (audit S3)
Adds a "Configuration env vars" section listing every RELICARIO_*
variable read by production code, with purpose and trust boundary.
Splits user-facing vars from debug-only ones (cfg(debug_assertions))
to make the attack surface explicit for security reviewers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 18:50:44 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
6a1c6d5875 fix(core,cli): harden backup-restore tar unpack against path traversal (audit S2)
cmd_backup_restore previously called tar::Archive::unpack with default
settings, allowing malicious .relbak archives to escape the target
directory via .. entries, absolute paths, or symlinks. No size cap
meant tar bombs could exhaust disk space.

Replaced with relicario_core::safe_unpack_git_archive which:
- Rejects .. (ParentDir), absolute (RootDir), and drive-prefix
  (Prefix) components with "path traversal blocked" error.
- Rejects symlinks and hardlinks outright.
- Checks declared header size before reading body; rejects entries or
  cumulative totals exceeding the caller's cap.
- Returns (relative-path, bytes) pairs; the CLI re-checks
  dest.starts_with(git_dir) after OS-level path resolution.
- CLI cap: min(100 × compressed size, 1 GiB).

Acceptance: 5 unit tests in relicario-core (traversal, absolute path,
symlink, size bomb, happy path); existing CLI backup roundtrip tests
remain green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 17:16:11 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
efac53d527 fix(server): real signature verification in pre-receive hook (audit S1)
verify_commit previously loaded devices.json/revoked.json and threw
both away, accepting any commit whose stderr contained "GOODSIG" or
"Good signature". This left device registration and revocation as
no-ops: unregistered keys could push, revoked keys kept working.

The fix:
- Build a temp gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile from devices.json at the
  commit, passed via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY/VALUE env (no global git
  config mutation).
- Run git verify-commit --raw and parse SHA256 fingerprint from stderr
  regardless of exit code (SSH git outputs the "Good" line even for
  keys not in allowed-signers, with "No principal matched" + exit 1).
- Check revoked.json FIRST: reject if committer_ts >= revoked_at;
  accept historical commits (committer_ts < revoked_at).
- Reject if fingerprint is not in active devices.json.
- Bootstrap: accept only when BOTH devices.json AND revoked.json are
  empty/absent (not just devices.json alone).

Acceptance: 4 integration tests covering the matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 16:34:37 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
d539050aec chore(server): add assert_cmd/predicates/tempfile dev-deps
Needed for the upcoming verify-commit acceptance suite (audit S1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 16:23:24 -04:00
adlee-was-taken
8a72b5e192 feat(core): add device::fingerprint helper for SSH SHA256 fingerprints
Wraps ssh-key's PublicKey::fingerprint(HashAlg::Sha256). Output format
matches ssh-keygen -lf and git verify-commit --raw stderr
(SHA256:<43-char base64>). Used by the upcoming relicario-server
verify-commit rewrite (audit S1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 16:23:10 -04:00
42 changed files with 835 additions and 917 deletions

View File

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ pub fn store_device_keys(
}
/// Load the signing private key for a device.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn load_signing_key(name: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
let path = device_dir(name)?.join("signing.key");
let key = fs::read_to_string(&path)
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ pub fn load_signing_key(name: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
}
/// Load the deploy private key for a device.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn load_deploy_key(name: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
let path = device_dir(name)?.join("deploy.key");
let key = fs::read_to_string(&path)
@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ pub fn load_gitea_key_id(name: &str) -> Result<u64> {
}
/// Delete the local key directory for a device.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn delete_device_keys(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
let dir = device_dir(name)?;
if dir.exists() {

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ struct CreateKeyRequest<'a> {
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeployKey {
pub id: u64,
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub title: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub key: String,
}
@@ -89,6 +91,7 @@ impl GiteaClient {
}
/// List all deploy keys.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn list_deploy_keys(&self) -> Result<Vec<DeployKey>> {
let url = format!(
"{}/repos/{}/{}/keys",

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ pub fn vault_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
}
/// Path to the `.relicario/` configuration directory within the vault.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn relicario_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
Ok(vault_dir()?.join(".relicario"))
}
@@ -88,19 +89,21 @@ fn plural(n: i64) -> &'static str { if n == 1 { "" } else { "s" } }
///
/// **Plaintext leak:** group names land on disk in cleartext alongside the
/// vault directory. This is intentional — the file feeds shell completion,
/// which cannot prompt for a passphrase. Set `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1`
/// to suppress the write.
/// which cannot prompt for a passphrase. In debug builds, set
/// `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1` to suppress the write.
pub fn groups_cache_path(vault_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
vault_dir.join(".relicario").join("groups.cache")
}
/// Write the sorted set of group names to `<vault_dir>/.relicario/groups.cache`,
/// one name per line. A no-op if `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` is set.
/// one name per line. In debug builds, setting `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE`
/// suppresses the write (developer debugging tool). In release builds the env
/// var is ignored.
pub fn write_groups_cache(
vault_dir: &Path,
groups: &std::collections::BTreeSet<String>,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE").is_some() {
if cfg!(debug_assertions) && std::env::var_os("RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE").is_some() {
return Ok(());
}
let path = groups_cache_path(vault_dir);

View File

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ enum Commands {
///
/// For `--group <TAB>` autocomplete, the bash/zsh/fish scripts read
/// the plaintext `${RELICARIO_VAULT}/.relicario/groups.cache` file,
/// which the CLI refreshes on every manifest read. Set
/// which the CLI refreshes on every manifest read. In debug builds, set
/// `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE=1` to opt out of the cache (completion
/// will fall back to no value enumeration).
///
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
};
let carrier = fs::read(&image)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to read carrier image {}", image.display()))?;
let stego = imgsecret::embed(&carrier, &*image_secret)?;
let stego = imgsecret::embed(&carrier, &image_secret)?;
fs::write(&output, &stego)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to write reference image {}", output.display()))?;
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ fn cmd_init(image: PathBuf, output: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
let params = KdfParams { argon2_m: 65536, argon2_t: 3, argon2_p: 4 };
// Derive master key, then persist an empty Manifest + default VaultSettings.
let master_key = derive_master_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), &*image_secret, &salt, &params)?;
let master_key = derive_master_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), &image_secret, &salt, &params)?;
fs::create_dir_all(&relicario_dir)?;
fs::create_dir_all(root.join("items"))?;
@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ fn cmd_add(kind: AddKind) -> Result<()> {
// (for attachment-cap settings + writing the encrypted blob alongside
// the item).
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
fn build_login_item(
title: Option<String>,
username: Option<String>,
@@ -860,6 +861,7 @@ fn build_document_item(
Ok(item)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
fn build_totp_item(
title: Option<String>,
issuer: Option<String>,
@@ -924,7 +926,7 @@ fn prompt_optional(label: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
fn parse_month_year(s: &str) -> Result<relicario_core::MonthYear> {
// Accepts MM/YYYY or MM-YYYY or MM/YY.
let (m_str, y_str) = s.split_once(|c: char| c == '/' || c == '-')
let (m_str, y_str) = s.split_once(['/', '-'])
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("expected MM/YYYY"))?;
let month: u8 = m_str.parse().context("invalid month")?;
let year: u16 = if y_str.len() == 2 {
@@ -998,12 +1000,12 @@ fn cmd_get(query: String, show: bool, copy: bool) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(u) = &l.url { println!("URL: {u}"); }
if let Some(t) = &l.totp {
if show {
println!("TOTP: {}", data_encoding::BASE32.encode(&*t.secret));
println!("TOTP: {}", data_encoding::BASE32.encode(&t.secret));
} else {
println!("TOTP: **** (use --show to reveal)");
}
}
if let Some(p) = &l.password { Some(p.clone()) } else { None }
l.password.clone()
}
ItemCore::SecureNote(n) => {
if show { println!("Body:\n{}", n.body.as_str()); }
@@ -1125,8 +1127,8 @@ fn cmd_list(
Some(t) => e.r#type == t,
None => true,
})
.filter(|e| group_filter.as_ref().map_or(true, |g| e.group.as_deref() == Some(g.as_str())))
.filter(|e| tag_filter.as_ref().map_or(true, |t| e.tags.iter().any(|x| x == t)))
.filter(|e| group_filter.as_ref().is_none_or(|g| e.group.as_deref() == Some(g.as_str())))
.filter(|e| tag_filter.as_ref().is_none_or(|t| e.tags.iter().any(|x| x == t)))
.collect();
entries.sort_by(|a, b| a.title.to_lowercase().cmp(&b.title.to_lowercase()));
@@ -1135,7 +1137,7 @@ fn cmd_list(
return Ok(());
}
println!("{:<16} {:<14} {:<6} {}", "ID", "TYPE", "FAV", "TITLE");
println!("{:<16} {:<14} {:<6} TITLE", "ID", "TYPE", "FAV");
for e in entries {
let fav = if e.favorite { " *" } else { "" };
println!("{:<16} {:<14} {:<6} {}", e.id.as_str(), format!("{:?}", e.r#type), fav, e.title);
@@ -1718,9 +1720,32 @@ fn cmd_backup_restore(input: PathBuf, target: PathBuf) -> Result<()> {
// .git/ history.
if let Some(tar_bytes) = &unpacked.git_archive {
let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(tar_bytes.as_slice());
archive.unpack(target.join(".git"))
.with_context(|| "failed to untar .git/")?;
// Cap: 100× the compressed bundle size, or 1 GiB, whichever is lower.
let cap = std::cmp::min(
(tar_bytes.len() as u64).saturating_mul(100),
relicario_core::DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED,
);
let entries = relicario_core::safe_unpack_git_archive(tar_bytes, cap)
.with_context(|| "failed to safely unpack .git/ archive")?;
let git_dir = target.join(".git");
for (rel_path, body) in entries {
let dest = git_dir.join(&rel_path);
// Paranoid OS-level check even after textual validation in core.
if !dest.starts_with(&git_dir) {
anyhow::bail!(
"tar entry {} resolved outside .git/ (path traversal blocked)",
rel_path.display()
);
}
if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| {
format!("create parent {}", parent.display())
})?;
}
fs::write(&dest, &body).with_context(|| {
format!("write {}", dest.display())
})?;
}
} else {
// No history bundled — start a fresh git repo.
let status = crate::helpers::git_command(&target, &["init"]).status()?;
@@ -1950,7 +1975,7 @@ fn cmd_attachments(query: String) -> Result<()> {
let entry = resolve_query(&manifest, &query)?;
let item = vault.load_item(&entry.id)?;
if item.attachments.is_empty() { eprintln!("(no attachments)"); return Ok(()); }
println!("{:<17} {:>12} {:<22} {}", "AID", "SIZE", "MIME", "FILENAME");
println!("{:<17} {:>12} {:<22} FILENAME", "AID", "SIZE", "MIME");
for a in &item.attachments {
println!("{:<17} {:>12} {:<22} {}", a.id.as_str(), a.size, a.mime_type, a.filename);
}
@@ -2518,7 +2543,7 @@ fn cmd_device(action: DeviceAction) -> Result<()> {
return Ok(());
}
println!("{:<20} {:<20} {}", "NAME", "ADDED", "SIGNING KEY (prefix)");
println!("{:<20} {:<20} SIGNING KEY (prefix)", "NAME", "ADDED");
println!("{}", "-".repeat(72));
for d in &devices {
let marker = if d.name == current { " *" } else { "" };

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ impl UnlockedVault {
let master_key = derive_master_key(
passphrase.as_bytes(),
&*image_secret,
&image_secret,
&salt,
&params,
)?;

View File

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ fn detach_removes_attachment_and_blob() {
// Encrypted blob file is gone.
let blob_path = v.path()
.join("attachments")
.join(stdout.lines().nth(1).is_some().then_some("").unwrap_or(""));
.join("");
let item_attach_dir = std::fs::read_dir(v.path().join("attachments"))
.unwrap().next().unwrap().unwrap().path();
let blob = item_attach_dir.join(format!("{aid}.enc"));

View File

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ impl TestVault {
cmd.output().unwrap()
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn run_with_backup_pass(&self, args: &[&str], backup_pass: &str) -> std::process::Output {
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("relicario").unwrap();
cmd.current_dir(self.dir.path())
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ impl TestVault {
cmd.output().unwrap()
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn run_with_input(&self, args: &[&str], extra: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("relicario").unwrap();
cmd.current_dir(self.dir.path())

View File

@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ mod tests {
blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 16]);
let key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
let err = decrypt(&*key, &blob).expect_err("v1 blob should fail decrypt");
let err = decrypt(&key, &blob).expect_err("v1 blob should fail decrypt");
match err {
RelicarioError::UnsupportedFormatVersion { found, expected } => {
assert_eq!(found, 0x01);

View File

@@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ pub fn verify(public_key_openssh: &str, data: &[u8], signature_b64: &str) -> Res
Ok(verifying_key.verify(data, &signature).is_ok())
}
/// Compute the OpenSSH SHA-256 fingerprint of a public key.
/// Output format matches `ssh-keygen -lf` and `git verify-commit --raw`:
/// `SHA256:<43-char base64 without padding>`.
pub fn fingerprint(public_key_openssh: &str) -> Result<String> {
use ssh_key::HashAlg;
let public = PublicKey::from_openssh(public_key_openssh)
.map_err(|e| RelicarioError::DeviceKey(format!("parse public key: {e}")))?;
Ok(public.fingerprint(HashAlg::Sha256).to_string())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -132,4 +142,27 @@ mod tests {
let sig = sign(&private, b"hello").unwrap();
assert!(!verify(&other_public, b"hello", &sig).unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn fingerprint_matches_ssh_keygen_format() {
let (_, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
let fp = fingerprint(&public).unwrap();
assert!(fp.starts_with("SHA256:"), "fingerprint should start with SHA256: prefix, got {fp}");
let body = fp.strip_prefix("SHA256:").unwrap();
assert_eq!(body.len(), 43, "SHA-256 fingerprint body is 43 base64 chars (no padding)");
assert!(body.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '+' || c == '/'));
}
#[test]
fn fingerprint_is_deterministic() {
let (_, public) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
assert_eq!(fingerprint(&public).unwrap(), fingerprint(&public).unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn fingerprint_differs_per_key() {
let (_, p1) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
let (_, p2) = generate_keypair().unwrap();
assert_ne!(fingerprint(&p1).unwrap(), fingerprint(&p2).unwrap());
}
}

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ pub enum RelicarioError {
#[error("backup envelope schema v{found}; this Relicario reads v{expected}")]
BackupSchemaMismatch { found: u32, expected: u32 },
/// An error during backup restore (e.g., tar safety validation failure).
#[error("backup restore: {0}")]
BackupRestore(String),
/// CSV header doesn't match the LastPass column layout.
#[error("unrecognized CSV header — expected LastPass export format ({0})")]
ImportCsvHeader(String),

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const BITS_PER_BLOCK: usize = 12; // EMBED_POSITIONS.len()
/// Number of 8x8 blocks needed to hold one complete copy of the 256-bit secret.
/// ceil(256 / 12) = 22 blocks per copy.
const BLOCKS_PER_COPY: usize = (SECRET_BITS + BITS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / BITS_PER_BLOCK; // 22
const BLOCKS_PER_COPY: usize = SECRET_BITS.div_ceil(BITS_PER_BLOCK); // 22
/// Mid-frequency DCT coefficient positions for embedding, specified as
/// (row, col) indices into the 8x8 DCT coefficient matrix.
@@ -302,9 +302,9 @@ fn read_block_abs(y: &YChannel, px: usize, py: usize) -> Option<[[f64; 8]; 8]> {
return None;
}
let mut block = [[0.0f64; 8]; 8];
for row in 0..8 {
for col in 0..8 {
block[row][col] = y.get(px + col, py + row);
for (row, block_row) in block.iter_mut().enumerate() {
for (col, cell) in block_row.iter_mut().enumerate() {
*cell = y.get(px + col, py + row);
}
}
Some(block)
@@ -323,9 +323,9 @@ fn read_block(y: &YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion) -> [[f64
fn write_block(y: &mut YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion, block: &[[f64; 8]; 8]) {
let start_x = region.x_offset + bx * BLOCK_SIZE;
let start_y = region.y_offset + by * BLOCK_SIZE;
for row in 0..8 {
for col in 0..8 {
y.set(start_x + col, start_y + row, block[row][col]);
for (row, block_row) in block.iter().enumerate() {
for (col, &cell) in block_row.iter().enumerate() {
y.set(start_x + col, start_y + row, cell);
}
}
}
@@ -349,17 +349,17 @@ fn write_block(y: &mut YChannel, bx: usize, by: usize, region: &EmbedRegion, blo
/// where c(0) = sqrt(1/8) and c(k) = sqrt(2/8) for k > 0.
fn dct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
let mut output = [0.0f64; 8];
for k in 0..8 {
for (k, out_k) in output.iter_mut().enumerate() {
let ck = if k == 0 {
(1.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
} else {
(2.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
};
let mut sum = 0.0;
for i in 0..8 {
sum += input[i] * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
for (i, &x) in input.iter().enumerate() {
sum += x * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
}
output[k] = ck * sum;
*out_k = ck * sum;
}
output
}
@@ -370,17 +370,17 @@ fn dct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
/// x[i] = sum_{k=0}^{7} c(k) * X[k] * cos((2i+1)*k*pi/16)
fn idct1d(input: &[f64; 8]) -> [f64; 8] {
let mut output = [0.0f64; 8];
for i in 0..8 {
for (i, out_i) in output.iter_mut().enumerate() {
let mut sum = 0.0;
for k in 0..8 {
for (k, &x) in input.iter().enumerate() {
let ck = if k == 0 {
(1.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
} else {
(2.0 / 8.0_f64).sqrt()
};
sum += ck * input[k] * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
sum += ck * x * ((2 * i + 1) as f64 * k as f64 * PI / 16.0).cos();
}
output[i] = sum;
*out_i = sum;
}
output
}
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ fn bytes_to_bits(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
///
/// Pads the last byte with zeros if the bit count is not a multiple of 8.
fn bits_to_bytes(bits: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity((bits.len() + 7) / 8);
let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(bits.len().div_ceil(8));
for chunk in bits.chunks(8) {
let mut byte = 0u8;
for (i, &bit) in chunk.iter().enumerate() {

View File

@@ -52,18 +52,15 @@ pub enum TotpAlgorithm {
Sha512,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum TotpKind {
#[default]
Totp,
Hotp { counter: u64 },
Steam,
}
impl Default for TotpKind {
fn default() -> Self { TotpKind::Totp }
}
/// Compute a TOTP/Steam code for `config` at the given Unix timestamp.
///
/// For TOTP and Steam: counter = `now_unix_seconds / period_seconds`.

View File

@@ -85,4 +85,7 @@ pub mod import_lastpass;
pub use import_lastpass::{parse_lastpass_csv, ImportWarning};
pub mod device;
pub use device::{DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry, generate_keypair, sign, verify};
pub use device::{fingerprint, DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry, generate_keypair, sign, verify};
pub mod tar_safe;
pub use tar_safe::{safe_unpack_git_archive, DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED};

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
//! Safe tar unpacking for backup restore.
//!
//! The standard `tar::Archive::unpack` has no guards against path traversal,
//! absolute paths, symlinks, hardlinks, or tar bombs. This module replaces it
//! with `safe_unpack_git_archive`, which validates every entry before returning
//! `(relative_path, bytes)` pairs to the caller.
use std::io::Read;
use std::path::{Component, PathBuf};
use tar::EntryType;
use crate::error::{RelicarioError, Result};
/// Default cap on total uncompressed bytes extracted in one restore (1 GiB).
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED: u64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Decode `tar_bytes` and return `(relative_path, file_bytes)` pairs for
/// regular files only.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(...))` if:
///
/// - Any path component is `..` (`Component::ParentDir`) — "path traversal blocked".
/// - Any path starts with `/` (`Component::RootDir`) — "path traversal blocked".
/// - Any path has a Windows drive prefix (`Component::Prefix`) — "path traversal blocked".
/// - An entry is a symlink or hardlink — "symlink/link rejected".
/// - An entry's declared size exceeds `max_uncompressed_bytes` — "size cap exceeded".
/// - The running total of all entry sizes exceeds `max_uncompressed_bytes` — "size cap exceeded".
/// - An entry has an unexpected type (not regular file, not directory) — "unexpected entry type".
pub fn safe_unpack_git_archive(
tar_bytes: &[u8],
max_uncompressed_bytes: u64,
) -> Result<Vec<(PathBuf, Vec<u8>)>> {
let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(tar_bytes);
let entries = archive
.entries()
.map_err(|e| RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read tar entries: {e}")))?;
let mut result: Vec<(PathBuf, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
let mut cumulative: u64 = 0;
for entry in entries {
let mut entry = entry.map_err(|e| {
RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read tar entry: {e}"))
})?;
let header = entry.header();
let entry_type = header.entry_type();
// Reject symlinks and hardlinks.
match entry_type {
EntryType::Symlink => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
"symlink entry rejected".to_string(),
));
}
EntryType::Link => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
"hardlink entry rejected".to_string(),
));
}
EntryType::Directory => {
// Directories are implicit — skip without reading body.
continue;
}
EntryType::Regular | EntryType::Continuous | EntryType::GNUSparse => {
// These are normal file types; fall through to path checks.
}
_ => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
"unexpected entry type: {:?}",
entry_type
)));
}
}
// Validate the path.
let path = entry.path().map_err(|e| {
RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("invalid path in tar entry: {e}"))
})?;
let path = path.into_owned();
for component in path.components() {
match component {
Component::ParentDir => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
"path traversal blocked: entry contains '..' component".to_string(),
));
}
Component::RootDir => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
"path traversal blocked: entry has absolute path".to_string(),
));
}
Component::Prefix(_) => {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(
"path traversal blocked: entry has Windows drive prefix".to_string(),
));
}
Component::Normal(_) | Component::CurDir => {
// Acceptable components.
}
}
}
// Check declared size before reading body.
let claimed = header.size().map_err(|e| {
RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("could not read entry size: {e}"))
})?;
if claimed > max_uncompressed_bytes {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
"size cap exceeded: entry claims {claimed} bytes (cap {max_uncompressed_bytes})"
)));
}
let new_total = cumulative.saturating_add(claimed);
if new_total > max_uncompressed_bytes {
return Err(RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!(
"size cap exceeded: cumulative size would reach {new_total} bytes (cap {max_uncompressed_bytes})"
)));
}
// Read the file body.
let mut body = Vec::with_capacity(claimed as usize);
entry.read_to_end(&mut body).map_err(|e| {
RelicarioError::BackupRestore(format!("failed to read entry body: {e}"))
})?;
cumulative += body.len() as u64;
result.push((path, body));
}
Ok(result)
}

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ impl MonthYear {
if !(1..=12).contains(&month) {
return Err("month must be 1..=12");
}
if year < 2000 || year > 2099 {
if !(2000..=2099).contains(&year) {
return Err("year must be 2000..=2099");
}
Ok(Self { month, year })

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tar::{Builder, Header, EntryType};
use relicario_core::safe_unpack_git_archive;
/// Craft a raw POSIX ustar tar with a single entry using the given raw path bytes.
/// The tar crate's `Builder` sanitises paths, so we write the 512-byte header
/// manually to produce truly malicious archives.
fn raw_tar_with_path(raw_path: &[u8], content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 512]; // one header block
// Bytes 0-99: name field (null-padded)
let name_len = raw_path.len().min(100);
buf[..name_len].copy_from_slice(&raw_path[..name_len]);
// Bytes 100-107: mode = "0000644\0"
buf[100..108].copy_from_slice(b"0000644\0");
// Bytes 108-115: uid
buf[108..116].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
// Bytes 116-123: gid
buf[116..124].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
// Bytes 124-135: size (octal, 11 digits + null)
let size_str = format!("{:011o}\0", content.len());
buf[124..136].copy_from_slice(size_str.as_bytes());
// Bytes 136-147: mtime
buf[136..148].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
// Bytes 148-155: checksum placeholder (spaces during compute)
buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(b" ");
// Byte 156: typeflag = '0' (regular file)
buf[156] = b'0';
// Bytes 257-262: magic "ustar\0"
buf[257..263].copy_from_slice(b"ustar\0");
// Bytes 263-264: version "00"
buf[263..265].copy_from_slice(b"00");
// Compute checksum (sum of all bytes, checksum field treated as spaces).
let checksum: u32 = buf.iter().map(|&b| b as u32).sum();
let cksum_str = format!("{:06o}\0 ", checksum);
buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(cksum_str.as_bytes());
// Append padded content blocks.
let mut out = buf;
if !content.is_empty() {
out.extend_from_slice(content);
// Pad to 512-byte boundary.
let remainder = content.len() % 512;
if remainder != 0 {
out.extend(vec![0u8; 512 - remainder]);
}
}
// Two zero blocks = end-of-archive.
out.extend(vec![0u8; 1024]);
out
}
/// Build a tar with a raw symlink entry (typeflag = '2').
fn raw_symlink_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 512];
// name
buf[..9].copy_from_slice(b"evil_link");
// mode
buf[100..108].copy_from_slice(b"0000755\0");
// uid/gid
buf[108..116].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
buf[116..124].copy_from_slice(b"0000000\0");
// size = 0
buf[124..136].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
// mtime
buf[136..148].copy_from_slice(b"00000000000\0");
// checksum placeholder
buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(b" ");
// typeflag = '2' (symlink)
buf[156] = b'2';
// linkname
let target = b"/etc/passwd";
buf[157..157 + target.len()].copy_from_slice(target);
// magic
buf[257..263].copy_from_slice(b"ustar\0");
buf[263..265].copy_from_slice(b"00");
// Compute checksum.
let checksum: u32 = buf.iter().map(|&b| b as u32).sum();
let cksum_str = format!("{:06o}\0 ", checksum);
buf[148..156].copy_from_slice(cksum_str.as_bytes());
let mut out = buf;
out.extend(vec![0u8; 1024]); // end-of-archive
out
}
fn build_normal_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
{
let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);
let content = b"hello";
let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
header.set_size(content.len() as u64);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, "subdir/hello.txt", content.as_ref())
.unwrap();
builder.finish().unwrap();
}
buf
}
fn build_oversize_tar() -> Vec<u8> {
// Actual 2048-byte body; test will use cap=1024
let mut buf = Vec::new();
{
let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);
let content = vec![0u8; 2048];
let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
header.set_size(content.len() as u64);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, "bigfile.bin", content.as_slice())
.unwrap();
builder.finish().unwrap();
}
buf
}
#[test]
fn restore_rejects_path_traversal() {
// Craft a tar with "../../escaped.txt" using raw bytes (Builder sanitises paths).
let bytes = raw_tar_with_path(b"../../escaped.txt", b"evil content");
let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("path traversal") || msg.contains(".."),
"got: {msg}"
);
}
#[test]
fn restore_rejects_absolute_path() {
// Craft a tar with "/etc/escaped.txt" using raw bytes.
let bytes = raw_tar_with_path(b"/etc/escaped.txt", b"evil content");
let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("path traversal") || msg.contains("absolute"),
"got: {msg}"
);
}
#[test]
fn restore_rejects_symlink() {
let bytes = raw_symlink_tar();
let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024 * 1024).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("symlink") || msg.contains("link"),
"got: {msg}"
);
}
#[test]
fn restore_rejects_size_bomb() {
let bytes = build_oversize_tar(); // actual 2048-byte entry
let err = safe_unpack_git_archive(&bytes, 1024).unwrap_err(); // cap = 1024 bytes
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("size") || msg.contains("cap") || msg.contains("too large"),
"got: {msg}"
);
}
#[test]
fn restore_accepts_normal_files() {
let buf = build_normal_tar();
let entries = safe_unpack_git_archive(&buf, 1024 * 1024).expect("happy path");
assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(entries[0].0, PathBuf::from("subdir/hello.txt"));
assert_eq!(entries[0].1, b"hello");
}

View File

@@ -9,3 +9,10 @@ anyhow = "1"
clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
tempfile = "3"
regex = "1"
[dev-dependencies]
assert_cmd = "2"
predicates = "3"
tempfile = "3"

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
//! relicario-server -- pre-receive hook for signature verification.
use std::fs;
use std::process::Command;
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
@@ -34,49 +35,120 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
}
fn verify_commit(commit: &str) -> Result<()> {
// Get devices.json at this commit
let devices_json = match git_show(commit, ".relicario/devices.json") {
Ok(json) => json,
Err(_) => {
// No devices.json yet -- bootstrap mode, allow unsigned
eprintln!("OK: commit {} (bootstrap - no devices.json)", commit);
eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} (bootstrap - no devices.json)");
return Ok(());
}
};
let devices: Vec<DeviceEntry> = serde_json::from_str(&devices_json)
.context("parse devices.json")?;
// Bootstrap: if devices.json is empty, allow unsigned
if devices.is_empty() {
eprintln!("OK: commit {} (bootstrap - empty devices.json)", commit);
return Ok(());
}
// Get revoked.json (may not exist)
let revoked: Vec<RevokedEntry> = git_show(commit, ".relicario/revoked.json")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str(&s).ok())
.unwrap_or_default();
// Get commit signature
// True bootstrap: no devices ever registered and none revoked.
if devices.is_empty() && revoked.is_empty() {
eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} (bootstrap - no devices registered)");
return Ok(());
}
// Build temp allowed-signers file from registered devices.
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().context("create tempdir")?;
let allowed_path = tmp.path().join("allowed_signers");
let mut allowed_body = String::new();
for d in &devices {
allowed_body.push_str("relicario ");
allowed_body.push_str(d.public_key.trim());
allowed_body.push('\n');
}
fs::write(&allowed_path, &allowed_body).context("write allowed_signers")?;
// Run git verify-commit --raw. Capture both exit code and stderr.
// NOTE: we do NOT short-circuit on non-zero exit here because even for
// unregistered keys git still outputs "Good ... key SHA256:..." on stderr.
let output = Command::new("git")
.args(["verify-commit", "--raw", commit])
.env("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT", "1")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0", "gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0", allowed_path.as_os_str())
.output()
.context("git verify-commit")?;
// Check if signed
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
if !stderr.contains("GOODSIG") && !stderr.contains("Good signature") {
eprintln!("REJECT: commit {} is not signed by a registered device", commit);
// Parse the SHA-256 fingerprint from stderr.
// SSH signature output: "Good "git" signature ... with ED25519 key SHA256:<base64>"
let re = regex::Regex::new(r"key (SHA256:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+)").expect("static regex");
let signing_fp = match re.captures(&stderr).and_then(|c| c.get(1)) {
Some(m) => m.as_str().to_string(),
None => {
// No fingerprint in stderr = unsigned or completely malformed signature.
eprintln!(
"REJECT: commit {commit} — no valid signature found (stderr: {})",
stderr.trim()
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
};
// Build fingerprint → entry maps.
let mut device_by_fp: std::collections::HashMap<String, &DeviceEntry> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for d in &devices {
if let Ok(fp) = relicario_core::device::fingerprint(&d.public_key) {
device_by_fp.insert(fp, d);
}
}
let mut revoked_by_fp: std::collections::HashMap<String, &RevokedEntry> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for r in &revoked {
if let Ok(fp) = relicario_core::device::fingerprint(&r.public_key) {
revoked_by_fp.insert(fp, r);
}
}
// Get committer date (NOT author date).
let ct_out = Command::new("git")
.args(["show", "-s", "--format=%ct", commit])
.output()
.context("git show committer date")?;
let committer_ts: i64 = String::from_utf8_lossy(&ct_out.stdout)
.trim()
.parse()
.context("parse committer timestamp")?;
// Check revocation FIRST (revoked entries may not be in devices anymore).
if let Some(r) = revoked_by_fp.get(&signing_fp) {
if committer_ts >= r.revoked_at {
eprintln!(
"REJECT: commit {commit} — signed by revoked device '{}' \
(committer ts {committer_ts} >= revoked_at {})",
r.name, r.revoked_at
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
// Historical commit: committer_ts < revoked_at → was valid when signed.
eprintln!(
"OK: commit {commit} — historical commit signed by '{}' before revocation",
r.name
);
return Ok(());
}
// Not revoked — must be in active devices.
if !device_by_fp.contains_key(&signing_fp) {
eprintln!(
"REJECT: commit {commit} — signed by unregistered device (fingerprint {signing_fp})"
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
// Ensure the signing key is not revoked.
// The allowed-signers file approach means git verify-commit already checks
// against the list; we additionally guard against revoked.json entries.
let _ = &revoked; // revoked list is loaded; enforcement via git allowed-signers
eprintln!("OK: commit {} verified", commit);
eprintln!("OK: commit {commit} verified (signed by '{}')", device_by_fp[&signing_fp].name);
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
//! Acceptance tests for `relicario-server verify-commit`.
//!
//! Four scenarios from audit S1:
//! 1. Registered non-revoked key → exit 0
//! 2. Unregistered key → exit 1 (stderr contains "unregistered")
//! 3. Revoked key, commit AFTER revoked_at → exit 1 (stderr contains "revoked")
//! 4. Revoked key, commit BEFORE revoked_at (historical) → exit 0
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use assert_cmd::Command as AssertCommand;
use predicates::prelude::*;
use relicario_core::device::{generate_keypair, DeviceEntry, RevokedEntry};
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn write_keypair(dir: &Path, name: &str) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf, String) {
let (priv_pem, pub_line) = generate_keypair().expect("generate keypair");
let priv_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.key"));
let pub_path = dir.join(format!("{name}.pub"));
fs::write(&priv_path, priv_pem.as_str()).unwrap();
fs::write(&pub_path, &pub_line).unwrap();
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fs::set_permissions(&priv_path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
}
(priv_path, pub_path, pub_line)
}
fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str], extra_env: &[(&str, &str)]) {
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.current_dir(repo).args(args);
for (k, v) in extra_env {
cmd.env(k, v);
}
let status = cmd.status().expect("spawn git");
assert!(status.success(), "git {args:?} failed");
}
fn init_repo(repo: &Path) {
git(repo, &["init", "-q", "-b", "main"], &[]);
git(repo, &["config", "user.email", "test@test"], &[]);
git(repo, &["config", "user.name", "test"], &[]);
git(repo, &["commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "init"], &[]);
}
fn sign_commit(
repo: &Path,
signing_key: &Path,
allowed_signers: &Path,
committer_unix: i64,
msg: &str,
file_path: &str,
file_content: &str,
) -> String {
fs::write(repo.join(file_path), file_content).unwrap();
git(repo, &["add", file_path], &[]);
let date = format!("@{committer_unix} +0000");
git(
repo,
&[
"-c", "gpg.format=ssh",
"-c", &format!("user.signingkey={}", signing_key.display()),
"-c", &format!("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile={}", allowed_signers.display()),
"commit", "-S", "-q", "-m", msg,
],
&[
("GIT_AUTHOR_DATE", &date),
("GIT_COMMITTER_DATE", &date),
],
);
let out = Command::new("git")
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
.output()
.unwrap();
String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string()
}
fn write_device_files(repo: &Path, devices: &[DeviceEntry], revoked: &[RevokedEntry]) {
let dir = repo.join(".relicario");
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
fs::write(dir.join("devices.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(devices).unwrap()).unwrap();
fs::write(dir.join("revoked.json"), serde_json::to_string_pretty(revoked).unwrap()).unwrap();
git(repo, &["add", ".relicario"], &[]);
git(repo, &["commit", "-q", "-m", "device files"], &[]);
}
#[test]
fn registered_non_revoked_key_accepted() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
write_device_files(
repo,
&[DeviceEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
added_at: 1_700_000_000,
added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
}],
&[],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "x", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.success();
}
#[test]
fn unregistered_key_rejected() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (_, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
let (priv_evil, _, pub_evil) = write_keypair(repo, "evil");
// Only Alice is registered.
write_device_files(
repo,
&[DeviceEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
added_at: 1_700_000_000,
added_by: "bootstrap".into(),
}],
&[],
);
// Evil signs against a file containing both keys so git commit signing works,
// but the binary's allowed-signers (from devices.json) only has Alice.
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(
&allowed,
format!("relicario {}\nrelicario {}\n", pub_a.trim(), pub_evil.trim()),
)
.unwrap();
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_evil, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "evil", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.failure()
.stderr(predicate::str::contains("unregistered"));
}
#[test]
fn revoked_key_after_revoked_at_rejected() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
// Alice's entry is only in revoked.json (was removed from devices.json after revocation).
write_device_files(
repo,
&[],
&[RevokedEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
revoked_by: "admin".into(),
}],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
// Commit dated AFTER revocation.
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_710_000_000, "post", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.failure()
.stderr(predicate::str::contains("revoked"));
}
#[test]
fn revoked_key_before_revoked_at_accepted_historical() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path();
init_repo(repo);
let (priv_a, _, pub_a) = write_keypair(repo, "alice");
// Same as above: Alice only in revoked.json.
write_device_files(
repo,
&[],
&[RevokedEntry {
name: "alice".into(),
public_key: pub_a.clone(),
revoked_at: 1_705_000_000,
revoked_by: "admin".into(),
}],
);
let allowed = repo.join("test_allowed_signers");
fs::write(&allowed, format!("relicario {}\n", pub_a.trim())).unwrap();
// Commit dated BEFORE revocation -- historical case must pass.
let sha = sign_commit(repo, &priv_a, &allowed, 1_700_000_000, "historical", "a.txt", "hi");
AssertCommand::cargo_bin("relicario-server")
.unwrap()
.current_dir(repo)
.args(["verify-commit", &sha])
.assert()
.success();
}

View File

@@ -59,3 +59,34 @@ Without device authentication, access control is transport-layer only:
Device registration was optional before v0.4.0. With device auth enabled,
all commits must be signed by a registered device.
## Configuration env vars
Relicario reads the following environment variables. Each is a trust
boundary: an attacker who can set them in the user's environment can
influence Relicario's behavior. They are listed here for security
reviewers to audit the surface in one place.
### User-facing (active in all builds)
| Variable | Purpose | Trust |
|---|---|---|
| `RELICARIO_IMAGE` | Override the reference-image JPEG path used during vault unlock. | Trusted: filesystem path under the user's control. Read-only; its bytes feed `imgsecret::extract_secret`. |
| `RELICARIO_GITEA_URL` | Gitea API base URL for `relicario device add`. Equivalent to `--gitea-url`. | Trusted: HTTPS URL. Used only in the device-add code path. |
| `RELICARIO_GITEA_TOKEN` | Gitea personal-access token. Equivalent to `--gitea-token`. | **Secret**: anyone who can read this env var can manage the user's deploy keys via the Gitea API. The CLI never logs it. |
| `RELICARIO_GITEA_OWNER` | Gitea repository owner (e.g. `alee`). Equivalent to `--owner`. | Trusted: opaque string. |
| `RELICARIO_GITEA_REPO` | Gitea repository name (e.g. `vault`). Equivalent to `--repo`. | Trusted: opaque string. |
### Debug-only (compiled out of `cargo build --release`)
The following variables are gated behind `cfg(debug_assertions)` and
are **no-ops** in release builds. The env-var lookup is removed by the
optimiser from any binary built without debug assertions (i.e. the
standard `--release` profile).
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `RELICARIO_NO_GROUPS_CACHE` | Suppress the plaintext `groups.cache` write. Developer debugging tool for the cache logic. |
| `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt during integration tests. |
| `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt for item-secret fields during integration tests. |
| `RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` | Bypass the `rpassword` prompt for backup export/restore passphrases during integration tests. |

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
// Stub for the runtime-only WASM module. Used by vitest so that modules
// importing relicario_wasm.js can be loaded in a Node/happy-dom environment.
// Individual tests that exercise WASM calls should mock the relevant exports.
export default async function init(): Promise<void> {}
export const unlock = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: unlock not mocked'); };
export const lock = (): void => {};
export const manifest_encrypt = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: manifest_encrypt not mocked'); };
export const manifest_decrypt = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: manifest_decrypt not mocked'); };
export const settings_encrypt = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: settings_encrypt not mocked'); };
export const default_vault_settings_json = (): string => '{}';
export const embed_image_secret = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: embed_image_secret not mocked'); };
export const register_device = (): never => { throw new Error('wasm stub: register_device not mocked'); };

View File

@@ -12,22 +12,6 @@ vi.mock('../../../shared/state', () => ({
}));
import { sendMessage } from '../../../shared/state';
import { DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR, DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR } from '../../../shared/color-scheme';
function mockChromeStorage(initial: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
const store: Record<string, unknown> = { ...initial };
(global as any).chrome = {
storage: {
sync: {
get: vi.fn((key: string) => Promise.resolve(
key in store ? { [key]: store[key] } : {})),
set: vi.fn((kv: Record<string, unknown>) => { Object.assign(store, kv); return Promise.resolve(); }),
remove: vi.fn((key: string) => { delete store[key]; return Promise.resolve(); }),
},
},
};
return store;
}
function settingsResponses() {
// Two parallel calls in renderSettings: get_settings + get_blacklist.
@@ -46,7 +30,6 @@ describe('settings view', () => {
});
it('renders a Sync now button', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
@@ -55,7 +38,6 @@ describe('settings view', () => {
});
it('clicking Sync now sends a sync message and shows feedback on success', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
(sendMessage as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockResolvedValueOnce({ ok: true });
@@ -70,7 +52,6 @@ describe('settings view', () => {
});
it('shows the error when sync fails', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
(sendMessage as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockResolvedValueOnce({ ok: false, error: 'remote_unreachable' });
@@ -83,109 +64,3 @@ describe('settings view', () => {
expect(status.textContent).toMatch(/remote_unreachable/);
});
});
describe('settings Display section', () => {
let app: HTMLElement;
beforeEach(() => {
document.body.innerHTML = '<div id="app"></div>';
app = document.getElementById('app')!;
(sendMessage as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockReset();
});
it('renders digit and symbol color pickers with default values when storage is empty', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
const digitInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-digit-color');
const symbolInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-symbol-color');
expect(digitInput).not.toBeNull();
expect(symbolInput).not.toBeNull();
expect(digitInput!.value).toBe(DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR);
expect(symbolInput!.value).toBe(DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR);
});
it('renders pickers with stored values when storage has a scheme', async () => {
mockChromeStorage({
password_display_scheme: { digit_color: '#112233', symbol_color: '#aabbcc' },
});
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
const digitInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-digit-color');
const symbolInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-symbol-color');
expect(digitInput!.value).toBe('#112233');
expect(symbolInput!.value).toBe('#aabbcc');
});
it('renders a color-preview-swatch element', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
expect(app.querySelector('#display-swatch')).not.toBeNull();
});
it('changing digit color calls saveColorScheme with updated scheme', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
const digitInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-digit-color')!;
digitInput.value = '#ff0000';
digitInput.dispatchEvent(new Event('change'));
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
const syncSet = (global as any).chrome.storage.sync.set as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
expect(syncSet).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
password_display_scheme: expect.objectContaining({ digit_color: '#ff0000' }),
}),
);
});
it('changing symbol color calls saveColorScheme with updated scheme', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
const symbolInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-symbol-color')!;
symbolInput.value = '#00ff00';
symbolInput.dispatchEvent(new Event('change'));
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
const syncSet = (global as any).chrome.storage.sync.set as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
expect(syncSet).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
password_display_scheme: expect.objectContaining({ symbol_color: '#00ff00' }),
}),
);
});
it('clicking reset calls chrome.storage.sync.remove and restores defaults', async () => {
mockChromeStorage({
password_display_scheme: { digit_color: '#112233', symbol_color: '#aabbcc' },
});
settingsResponses();
await renderSettings(app);
const resetBtn = app.querySelector<HTMLButtonElement>('#display-reset')!;
resetBtn.click();
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
const syncRemove = (global as any).chrome.storage.sync.remove as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
expect(syncRemove).toHaveBeenCalledWith('password_display_scheme');
const digitInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-digit-color')!;
const symbolInput = app.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#display-symbol-color')!;
expect(digitInput.value).toBe(DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR);
expect(symbolInput.value).toBe(DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
/// Field history view — shows password/concealed field history for an item.
import { getState, setState, sendMessage, navigate, escapeHtml } from '../../shared/state';
import { colorizePassword } from '../../shared/password-coloring';
import type { FieldHistoryView } from '../../shared/types';
function relativeTime(unixSec: number): string {
@@ -104,16 +103,6 @@ export async function renderFieldHistory(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
</div>
`;
// Colorize revealed entries: replace plain-text content with colorized spans
app.querySelectorAll<HTMLElement>('.history-entry__value.revealed').forEach((el) => {
const key = el.closest<HTMLElement>('.history-entry')?.dataset.entry ?? '';
const plaintext = valueStore.get(key);
if (plaintext !== undefined) {
el.textContent = '';
el.appendChild(colorizePassword(plaintext));
}
});
// Wire handlers
app.querySelector<HTMLButtonElement>('#back-btn')?.addEventListener('click', () => navigate('detail'));

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
/// copy click handlers on any rendered rows.
import { escapeHtml } from '../../shared/state';
import { colorizePassword } from '../../shared/password-coloring';
import type { Item, Section, Field, FieldValue } from '../../shared/types';
export interface RowOpts {
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ export interface ConcealedRowOpts {
id: string;
label: string;
value: string;
kind?: 'password' | 'concealed';
monospace?: boolean;
multiline?: boolean;
}
@@ -55,15 +53,12 @@ export interface ConcealedRowOpts {
/// Concealed row — value rendered hidden until the user clicks "show".
/// Plaintext is stored in `data-field-value` on the row element and copied
/// to the visible value span on reveal. Copy button always copies plaintext.
/// When `kind` is "password", wireFieldHandlers applies colorizePassword on
/// reveal so digits/symbols/letters are rendered in distinct colours.
export function renderConcealedRow(opts: ConcealedRowOpts): string {
const { id, label, value, kind, monospace, multiline } = opts;
const { id, label, value, monospace, multiline } = opts;
const placeholder = multiline ? `•••• (${value.length} chars)` : '••••';
const valueClass = `field-row__value${monospace ? ' monospace' : ''}`;
const kindAttr = kind ? ` data-field-kind="${escapeHtml(kind)}"` : '';
return `
<div class="field-row" data-field-id="${escapeHtml(id)}" data-revealed="false" data-field-value="${escapeHtml(value)}" data-field-multiline="${multiline ? 'true' : 'false'}"${kindAttr}>
<div class="field-row" data-field-id="${escapeHtml(id)}" data-revealed="false" data-field-value="${escapeHtml(value)}" data-field-multiline="${multiline ? 'true' : 'false'}">
<span class="field-row__label">${escapeHtml(label)}</span>
<span class="${valueClass}" data-field-role="value">${escapeHtml(placeholder)}</span>
<span class="field-row__actions">
@@ -106,13 +101,7 @@ export function wireFieldHandlers(scope: HTMLElement): void {
row.setAttribute('data-revealed', 'false');
btn.textContent = 'show';
} else {
const isPassword = row.getAttribute('data-field-kind') === 'password';
valueEl.textContent = '';
if (isPassword) {
valueEl.appendChild(colorizePassword(plaintext));
} else {
valueEl.textContent = plaintext;
}
valueEl.textContent = plaintext;
row.setAttribute('data-revealed', 'true');
btn.textContent = 'hide';
}
@@ -161,7 +150,6 @@ export function renderSections(item: Item, idPrefix: string): string {
id: `${idPrefix}-s${sIdx}-f${fIdx}`,
label: field.label,
value: field.value.value,
kind: field.value.kind,
});
}
});

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
import { sendMessage } from '../../shared/state';
import type { GeneratorRequest, VaultSettings } from '../../shared/types';
import { colorizePassword } from '../../shared/password-coloring';
interface UiKnobs {
kind: 'random' | 'bip39';
@@ -139,10 +138,7 @@ export function openGeneratorPanel(opts: OpenPanelOpts): void {
const d = resp.data as { password?: string; passphrase?: string };
currentPreview = d.password ?? d.passphrase ?? '';
const el = host.querySelector('.preview__value');
if (el) {
el.textContent = '';
el.appendChild(colorizePassword(currentPreview));
}
if (el) el.textContent = currentPreview;
updateValidation();
}
}, 150);

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,6 @@
import { sendMessage, navigate, escapeHtml } from '../../shared/state';
import type { DeviceSettings } from '../../shared/types';
import { GLYPH_TRASH, GLYPH_DEVICES } from '../../shared/glyphs';
import {
loadColorScheme, saveColorScheme, resetColorScheme,
DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR, DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR,
} from '../../shared/color-scheme';
import { colorizePassword } from '../../shared/password-coloring';
export async function renderSettings(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
app.innerHTML = '<div class="pad" style="text-align:center; padding-top:20px;"><span class="spinner"></span></div>';
@@ -67,9 +62,6 @@ export async function renderSettings(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
<div id="sync-status" class="muted" style="font-size:12px;min-height:16px;"></div>
</div>
<div style="margin-bottom:16px;" id="display-section-container">
</div>
<div>
<div style="font-size:12px; color:#8b949e; margin-bottom:6px;">blacklisted sites</div>
<div id="blacklist-container">
@@ -127,65 +119,4 @@ export async function renderSettings(app: HTMLElement): Promise<void> {
}
});
});
// Render Display section after the rest of the DOM is ready
await renderDisplaySection();
}
function updateSwatch(swatch: HTMLElement, digitColor: string, symbolColor: string): void {
swatch.style.setProperty('--relicario-pwd-digit-color', digitColor);
swatch.style.setProperty('--relicario-pwd-symbol-color', symbolColor);
swatch.innerHTML = '';
swatch.appendChild(colorizePassword('Abc123!@#xyz'));
}
async function renderDisplaySection(): Promise<void> {
// The Display section container must be present in the DOM before we call this
const container = document.getElementById('display-section-container');
if (!container) return;
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
container.innerHTML = `
<div style="font-size:12px; color:#8b949e; margin-bottom:6px;">display</div>
<div style="margin-bottom:8px;">
<label style="display:flex; align-items:center; gap:8px; font-size:13px;">
<input type="color" id="display-digit-color" value="${escapeHtml(scheme.digit_color)}">
digit color
</label>
</div>
<div style="margin-bottom:8px;">
<label style="display:flex; align-items:center; gap:8px; font-size:13px;">
<input type="color" id="display-symbol-color" value="${escapeHtml(scheme.symbol_color)}">
symbol color
</label>
</div>
<div id="display-swatch" class="color-preview-swatch"></div>
<div style="margin-top:8px;">
<button id="display-reset" class="btn" style="font-size:11px;">reset to defaults</button>
</div>
`;
const digitInput = document.getElementById('display-digit-color') as HTMLInputElement;
const symbolInput = document.getElementById('display-symbol-color') as HTMLInputElement;
const swatch = document.getElementById('display-swatch') as HTMLElement;
// Render initial swatch
updateSwatch(swatch, scheme.digit_color, scheme.symbol_color);
async function onColorChange(): Promise<void> {
const newScheme = { digit_color: digitInput.value, symbol_color: symbolInput.value };
await saveColorScheme(newScheme);
updateSwatch(swatch, newScheme.digit_color, newScheme.symbol_color);
}
digitInput.addEventListener('change', () => void onColorChange());
symbolInput.addEventListener('change', () => void onColorChange());
document.getElementById('display-reset')?.addEventListener('click', async () => {
await resetColorScheme();
digitInput.value = DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR;
symbolInput.value = DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR;
updateSwatch(swatch, DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR, DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR);
});
}

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ vi.mock('../../../../setup/setup-helpers', () => ({
entropyText: vi.fn(() => ''),
}));
import { renderForm, applyGeneratedPassword } from '../login';
import { renderForm } from '../login';
import { sendMessage } from '../../../../shared/state';
describe('login form smart inputs', () => {
@@ -154,37 +154,3 @@ describe('Login save shape', () => {
expect(addCall).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('regenerate handler dispatches input event', () => {
it('dispatches an InputEvent on the input after value is set', () => {
const input = document.createElement('input');
input.type = 'password';
document.body.appendChild(input);
const dispatchSpy = vi.spyOn(input, 'dispatchEvent');
applyGeneratedPassword(input, 'sCMtTJkF%GN^mF#-N6D%');
expect(input.value).toBe('sCMtTJkF%GN^mF#-N6D%');
expect(input.type).toBe('text');
expect(dispatchSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
const evt = dispatchSpy.mock.calls.find(c => c[0] instanceof InputEvent)?.[0] as InputEvent;
expect(evt).toBeDefined();
expect(evt.type).toBe('input');
expect(evt.bubbles).toBe(true);
document.body.removeChild(input);
});
it('bubbling listener fires when applyGeneratedPassword is called', () => {
const input = document.createElement('input');
document.body.appendChild(input);
let listenerFired = false;
input.addEventListener('input', () => { listenerFired = true; });
applyGeneratedPassword(input, 'newpass');
expect(listenerFired).toBe(true);
document.body.removeChild(input);
});
});

View File

@@ -29,15 +29,6 @@ import { wireTotpPreview, wireTotpQr } from '../../../shared/form-affordances/to
import { wireNotesMonoToggle } from '../../../shared/form-affordances/notes-tools';
import { scheduleRate } from '../../../setup/setup-helpers';
/// Sets a generated password on an input, reveals it as plain text, then
/// dispatches a synthetic InputEvent so listeners (e.g. the strength meter)
/// re-evaluate the new value.
export function applyGeneratedPassword(input: HTMLInputElement, value: string): void {
input.value = value;
input.type = 'text';
input.dispatchEvent(new InputEvent('input', { bubbles: true }));
}
/// Called by the dispatcher before each render. Stops any in-flight
/// tickers / intervals / listeners the previous view may have attached.
export function teardown(): void {
@@ -84,7 +75,7 @@ export async function renderDetail(app: HTMLElement, item: Item): Promise<void>
${renderSignatureBlock({ accent: 'gold', children: sigInner })}
</div>
${username ? renderRow({ label: 'username', value: username, copyable: true }) : ''}
${renderConcealedRow({ id: 'login-password', label: 'password', value: password, kind: 'password' })}
${renderConcealedRow({ id: 'login-password', label: 'password', value: password })}
${url ? renderRow({ label: 'url', value: url, href: url }) : ''}
${hasTotp ? `
<div class="field-row">
@@ -357,21 +348,19 @@ export function renderForm(
${sectionsHtml}
<div class="${surface === 'fullscreen' ? 'form-lower' : ''}">
<div class="form-group">
<div class="notes-with-toggle">
<label class="label" for="f-notes" style="margin:0;flex:1;">notes</label>
<button id="notes-mono-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="toggle monospace">≡</button>
</div>
<textarea id="f-notes" placeholder="recovery codes, security questions...">${escapeHtml(notes)}</textarea>
<div class="form-group">
<div class="notes-with-toggle">
<label class="label" for="f-notes" style="margin:0;flex:1;">notes</label>
<button id="notes-mono-btn" class="glyph-btn" type="button" title="toggle monospace">≡</button>
</div>
<textarea id="f-notes" placeholder="recovery codes, security questions...">${escapeHtml(notes)}</textarea>
</div>
${renderSectionsEditor(sectionsDraft, sectionsExpanded)}
${isInTab() ? renderAttachmentsDisclosure({ itemId: existing?.id ?? '', attachments: attachmentsDraft, mode: 'edit' }) : ''}
<div class="form-actions" ${externalActions ? 'hidden' : ''}>
<button class="btn" id="cancel-btn">cancel</button>
<button class="btn btn-primary" id="save-btn">${state.loading ? '<span class="spinner"></span>' : 'save'}</button>
</div>
${renderSectionsEditor(sectionsDraft, sectionsExpanded)}
${isInTab() ? renderAttachmentsDisclosure({ itemId: existing?.id ?? '', attachments: attachmentsDraft, mode: 'edit' }) : ''}
<div class="form-actions" ${externalActions ? 'hidden' : ''}>
<button class="btn" id="cancel-btn">cancel</button>
<button class="btn btn-primary" id="save-btn">${state.loading ? '<span class="spinner"></span>' : 'save'}</button>
</div>
</div>
`;
@@ -444,7 +433,7 @@ export function renderForm(
context: 'fill-field',
onPicked: (value) => {
const pw = document.getElementById('f-password') as HTMLInputElement | null;
if (pw) applyGeneratedPassword(pw, value);
if (pw) { pw.value = value; pw.type = 'text'; }
},
});
});

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
/// Navigation works by updating `currentState` and calling `render()`.
import type { Request, Response } from '../shared/messages';
import { lookupErrorCopy } from '../shared/error-copy';
import type { ItemId, ManifestEntry, Item } from '../shared/types';
import { registerHost } from '../shared/state';
import { renderUnlock } from './components/unlock';
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ import { renderFieldHistory } from './components/field-history';
import { teardown as teardownTrash } from './components/trash';
import { teardown as teardownDevices } from './components/devices';
import { teardown as teardownFieldHistory } from './components/field-history';
import { applyColorScheme } from '../shared/color-scheme';
// --- Escape HTML to prevent XSS ---
export function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
@@ -146,8 +144,19 @@ export function humanizeError(err: string): string {
if (/settings json:/i.test(err)) {
return 'Settings are in an invalid format — try reloading the extension.';
}
const copy = lookupErrorCopy(err);
return copy.body;
if (/vault_locked/i.test(err)) {
return 'Vault is locked. Unlock and try again.';
}
if (/origin_mismatch/i.test(err)) {
return 'This login belongs to a different site — refusing to leak credentials cross-origin.';
}
if (/unauthorized_sender/i.test(err)) {
return 'This action is not allowed from here.';
}
if (/tab_navigated|captured_tab_gone/i.test(err)) {
return 'The browser tab changed before the fill could complete — try again.';
}
return err;
}
// --- Navigation ---
@@ -216,14 +225,6 @@ function render(): void {
// --- Init ---
async function init(): Promise<void> {
await applyColorScheme();
chrome.storage.onChanged.addListener((changes, area) => {
if (area === 'sync' && 'password_display_scheme' in changes) {
void applyColorScheme();
}
});
// Snapshot the active tab at popup-open — the fill path uses this
// tabId/url pair so the SW can verify the tab hasn't navigated before
// forwarding credentials (audit M5 + TOCTOU close via expectedHost).

View File

@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@
/* Focus */
--focus-ring: 0 0 0 2px var(--gold-ring);
/* Password coloring (P1) */
--relicario-pwd-digit-color: #2563eb;
--relicario-pwd-symbol-color: #dc2626;
}
* {
@@ -1558,18 +1554,3 @@ textarea {
.logo-lockup .brand-logo { width: 42px; height: 42px; margin: 0 auto 10px; }
.logo-lockup .brand { font-size: 17px; font-weight: 600; color: var(--gold-text); letter-spacing: 0.5px; }
.tagline { color: var(--text-dim); font-size: 11px; margin-top: 4px; letter-spacing: 0.3px; }
/* Password character-class coloring */
.pwd-digit { color: var(--relicario-pwd-digit-color); }
.pwd-symbol { color: var(--relicario-pwd-symbol-color); }
.pwd-letter { color: inherit; }
.color-preview-swatch {
font-family: ui-monospace, monospace;
font-size: 1.1rem;
padding: 8px 12px;
border: 1px solid var(--border-mid);
border-radius: 4px;
margin-top: 8px;
background: var(--bg-input);
}

View File

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { finishSetup } from '../setup';
describe('finishSetup', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
(global as any).chrome = {
tabs: {
create: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve({ id: 999 })),
getCurrent: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve({ id: 42 })),
remove: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve()),
},
runtime: {
getURL: vi.fn((p: string) => `chrome-extension://abc/${p}`),
},
};
});
it('opens vault.html in a new tab', async () => {
await finishSetup();
expect(chrome.runtime.getURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('vault.html');
expect(chrome.tabs.create).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
url: 'chrome-extension://abc/vault.html',
});
});
it('closes the current setup tab after opening the vault tab', async () => {
await finishSetup();
expect(chrome.tabs.getCurrent).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(chrome.tabs.remove).toHaveBeenCalledWith(42);
});
it('still opens the vault tab even if closing the setup tab fails', async () => {
(chrome.tabs.remove as any).mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('no permission'));
await expect(finishSetup()).resolves.not.toThrow();
expect(chrome.tabs.create).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});

View File

@@ -1101,7 +1101,6 @@ function attachStep5(): void {
state.configPushed = true;
render();
void finishSetup();
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.error('[relicario setup] register device failed:', err);
state.error = `Failed to register device: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`;
@@ -1132,23 +1131,6 @@ function attachStep5(): void {
});
}
// --- Completion handoff ---
/// Open the fullscreen vault tab and best-effort close the setup tab.
export async function finishSetup(): Promise<void> {
const vaultUrl = chrome.runtime.getURL('vault.html');
await chrome.tabs.create({ url: vaultUrl });
try {
const current = await chrome.tabs.getCurrent();
if (current?.id !== undefined) {
await chrome.tabs.remove(current.id);
}
} catch {
// Setup tab may not be closeable (e.g., opened as popup rather than a tab).
// The vault tab is open — that's the user-visible success.
}
}
// --- Boot ---
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
loadColorScheme, saveColorScheme, resetColorScheme, applyColorScheme,
DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR, DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR,
} from '../color-scheme';
function mockChromeStorage(initial: any = {}) {
const store = { ...initial };
(global as any).chrome = {
storage: {
sync: {
get: vi.fn((key: string) => Promise.resolve(
key in store ? { [key]: store[key] } : {})),
set: vi.fn((kv: any) => { Object.assign(store, kv); return Promise.resolve(); }),
remove: vi.fn((key: string) => { delete store[key]; return Promise.resolve(); }),
},
},
};
return store;
}
describe('color-scheme storage', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
// happy-dom provides document globally; reset inline styles between tests
document.documentElement.removeAttribute('style');
});
it('load returns defaults when storage is empty', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
expect(scheme.digit_color).toBe(DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR);
expect(scheme.symbol_color).toBe(DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR);
});
it('load returns stored values when present', async () => {
mockChromeStorage({
password_display_scheme: { digit_color: '#123456', symbol_color: '#abcdef' },
});
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
expect(scheme.digit_color).toBe('#123456');
expect(scheme.symbol_color).toBe('#abcdef');
});
it('save round-trips', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
await saveColorScheme({ digit_color: '#111111', symbol_color: '#222222' });
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
expect(scheme).toEqual({ digit_color: '#111111', symbol_color: '#222222' });
});
it('reset removes the storage key', async () => {
const store = mockChromeStorage({
password_display_scheme: { digit_color: '#000000', symbol_color: '#ffffff' },
});
await resetColorScheme();
expect(store.password_display_scheme).toBeUndefined();
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
expect(scheme.digit_color).toBe(DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR);
});
it('apply sets CSS custom properties on document.documentElement', async () => {
mockChromeStorage({
password_display_scheme: { digit_color: '#deadbe', symbol_color: '#feed00' },
});
await applyColorScheme();
const root = document.documentElement.style;
expect(root.getPropertyValue('--relicario-pwd-digit-color').trim()).toBe('#deadbe');
expect(root.getPropertyValue('--relicario-pwd-symbol-color').trim()).toBe('#feed00');
});
it('save rejects malformed hex values', async () => {
mockChromeStorage();
await expect(saveColorScheme({ digit_color: 'not-a-color', symbol_color: '#ffffff' }))
.rejects.toThrow();
});
});

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { ERROR_COPY, lookupErrorCopy } from '../error-copy';
const repoRoot = resolve(__dirname, '../../../..');
function discoverCodes(): Set<string> {
const out = execSync(
`grep -rohE "ok: false, error: '[^']+'" extension/src/service-worker/ \
--include="*.ts" --exclude-dir=__tests__`,
{ cwd: repoRoot, encoding: 'utf-8' },
);
const codes = new Set<string>();
for (const line of out.split('\n')) {
const m = line.match(/error: '([^']+)'/);
if (m) codes.add(m[1]);
}
return codes;
}
describe('ERROR_COPY', () => {
it('contains an entry for every error code returned by the service worker', () => {
const discovered = discoverCodes();
expect(discovered.size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const code of discovered) {
if (!ERROR_COPY[code]) missing.push(code);
}
expect(missing).toEqual([]);
});
it('lookupErrorCopy returns the mapped entry for known codes', () => {
const copy = lookupErrorCopy('vault_locked');
expect(copy.title).toBe('Vault locked');
expect(copy.body).toMatch(/unlock/i);
});
it('lookupErrorCopy falls back to a generic shape for unknown codes', () => {
const copy = lookupErrorCopy('made_up_code_xyz');
expect(copy.title).toBe('Something went wrong');
expect(copy.body).toContain('made_up_code_xyz');
});
});

View File

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { colorizePassword, PWD_DIGIT, PWD_SYMBOL, PWD_LETTER } from '../password-coloring';
describe('colorizePassword', () => {
function classes(frag: DocumentFragment): string[] {
return Array.from(frag.querySelectorAll('span')).map(s => s.className);
}
function texts(frag: DocumentFragment): string[] {
return Array.from(frag.querySelectorAll('span')).map(s => s.textContent ?? '');
}
it('returns empty fragment for empty input', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('');
expect(frag.childNodes.length).toBe(0);
});
it('classifies a mixed-class run', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('aB3$xY');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_LETTER, PWD_DIGIT, PWD_SYMBOL, PWD_LETTER]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['aB', '3', '$', 'xY']);
});
it('all-letters produces a single letter span', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('passwd');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_LETTER]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['passwd']);
});
it('all-digits produces a single digit span', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('123456');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_DIGIT]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['123456']);
});
it('all-symbols produces a single symbol span', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('!@#$%^');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_SYMBOL]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['!@#$%^']);
});
it('classifies unicode letters as letters', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('áñü');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_LETTER]);
});
it('classifies whitespace as symbol', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('a b');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([PWD_LETTER, PWD_SYMBOL, PWD_LETTER]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['a', ' ', 'b']);
});
it('representative password snapshot: aB3$xY7&_!', () => {
const frag = colorizePassword('aB3$xY7&_!');
expect(classes(frag)).toEqual([
PWD_LETTER, PWD_DIGIT, PWD_SYMBOL, PWD_LETTER, PWD_DIGIT, PWD_SYMBOL,
]);
expect(texts(frag)).toEqual(['aB', '3', '$', 'xY', '7', '&_!']);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
export const DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR = '#2563eb';
export const DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR = '#dc2626';
const STORAGE_KEY = 'password_display_scheme';
const HEX_RE = /^#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}$/;
export interface ColorScheme {
digit_color: string;
symbol_color: string;
}
export const DEFAULT_SCHEME: ColorScheme = {
digit_color: DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR,
symbol_color: DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR,
};
function isValid(s: ColorScheme): boolean {
return HEX_RE.test(s.digit_color) && HEX_RE.test(s.symbol_color);
}
export async function loadColorScheme(): Promise<ColorScheme> {
const result = await chrome.storage.sync.get(STORAGE_KEY);
const stored = result[STORAGE_KEY] as Partial<ColorScheme> | undefined;
if (!stored) return { ...DEFAULT_SCHEME };
return {
digit_color: typeof stored.digit_color === 'string' && HEX_RE.test(stored.digit_color)
? stored.digit_color : DEFAULT_DIGIT_COLOR,
symbol_color: typeof stored.symbol_color === 'string' && HEX_RE.test(stored.symbol_color)
? stored.symbol_color : DEFAULT_SYMBOL_COLOR,
};
}
export async function saveColorScheme(scheme: ColorScheme): Promise<void> {
if (!isValid(scheme)) {
throw new Error('Invalid color values; expected #rrggbb hex strings.');
}
await chrome.storage.sync.set({ [STORAGE_KEY]: scheme });
}
export async function resetColorScheme(): Promise<void> {
await chrome.storage.sync.remove(STORAGE_KEY);
}
export async function applyColorScheme(): Promise<void> {
const scheme = await loadColorScheme();
const root = document.documentElement.style;
root.setProperty('--relicario-pwd-digit-color', scheme.digit_color);
root.setProperty('--relicario-pwd-symbol-color', scheme.symbol_color);
}

View File

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
export interface ErrorCta {
label: string;
action?: 'unlock' | 'reload_extension' | 'open_setup';
}
export interface ErrorCopy {
title: string;
body: string;
cta?: ErrorCta;
}
const UNLOCK_CTA: ErrorCta = { label: 'Unlock vault', action: 'unlock' };
export const ERROR_COPY: Record<string, ErrorCopy> = {
vault_locked: {
title: 'Vault locked',
body: 'Unlock your vault to continue.',
cta: UNLOCK_CTA,
},
unauthorized_sender: {
title: 'Action not allowed',
body: 'This action is not allowed from here.',
},
unknown_message_type: {
title: 'Internal error',
body: 'The extension received an unknown request — try reloading.',
cta: { label: 'Reload extension', action: 'reload_extension' },
},
origin_mismatch: {
title: 'Wrong site',
body: 'This login belongs to a different site — refusing to leak credentials cross-origin.',
},
not_a_login: {
title: 'Not a login',
body: 'That item does not have a username and password to fill.',
},
no_totp: {
title: 'No 2FA on this item',
body: 'This item does not have a TOTP secret configured.',
},
invalid_sender_url: {
title: 'Cannot read tab URL',
body: 'The current tab has no recognizable URL — try reloading the page.',
},
tab_navigated: {
title: 'Tab changed',
body: 'The browser tab changed before the action could complete — try again.',
},
captured_tab_gone: {
title: 'Tab is gone',
body: 'The browser tab closed before the action could complete — try again.',
},
item_not_found: {
title: 'Item not found',
body: 'That item is no longer in the vault — it may have been deleted from another device.',
},
attachment_not_found: {
title: 'Attachment missing',
body: 'The attachment is referenced in the item but is not present in the vault.',
},
upload_failed: {
title: 'Upload failed',
body: 'Could not upload the attachment — check your connection and try again.',
},
download_failed: {
title: 'Download failed',
body: 'Could not download the attachment — check your connection and try again.',
},
'invalid base32 secret': {
title: 'Invalid secret',
body: 'The TOTP secret must be valid Base32 (letters A-Z and digits 2-7 only).',
},
'no items to import': {
title: 'Nothing to import',
body: 'The CSV did not contain any importable items.',
},
'no reference image stored locally': {
title: 'No reference image',
body: 'This device has no reference image saved locally — re-attach the device or restore from backup.',
},
'remote already contains a Relicario vault': {
title: 'Vault already exists',
body: 'The selected repository already contains a vault — use Attach existing instead of Create new.',
},
'Extension not configured. Run setup first.': {
title: 'Extension not configured',
body: 'Run setup before using this action.',
cta: { label: 'Open setup', action: 'open_setup' },
},
'Reference image not set. Run setup first.': {
title: 'Reference image missing',
body: 'Run setup to save your reference image.',
cta: { label: 'Open setup', action: 'open_setup' },
},
};
export function lookupErrorCopy(code: string): ErrorCopy {
return ERROR_COPY[code] ?? {
title: 'Something went wrong',
body: code,
};
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
export const PWD_DIGIT = 'pwd-digit';
export const PWD_SYMBOL = 'pwd-symbol';
export const PWD_LETTER = 'pwd-letter';
type Class = typeof PWD_DIGIT | typeof PWD_SYMBOL | typeof PWD_LETTER;
function classify(ch: string): Class {
if (/^\d$/.test(ch)) return PWD_DIGIT;
if (/^\p{L}$/u.test(ch)) return PWD_LETTER;
return PWD_SYMBOL;
}
export function colorizePassword(text: string): DocumentFragment {
const frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
if (text.length === 0) return frag;
const codepoints = Array.from(text);
let runStart = 0;
let runClass = classify(codepoints[0]);
for (let i = 1; i <= codepoints.length; i++) {
const c = i < codepoints.length ? classify(codepoints[i]) : null;
if (c !== runClass) {
const span = document.createElement('span');
span.className = runClass;
span.textContent = codepoints.slice(runStart, i).join('');
frag.appendChild(span);
if (c !== null) {
runStart = i;
runClass = c;
}
}
}
return frag;
}

View File

@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@
/* Focus */
--focus-ring: 0 0 0 2px var(--gold-ring);
/* Password coloring (P1) */
--relicario-pwd-digit-color: #2563eb;
--relicario-pwd-symbol-color: #dc2626;
}
* {
@@ -148,36 +144,6 @@ body {
margin-top: 8px;
}
.error-block {
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
align-items: center;
gap: 6px;
padding: 12px 16px;
/* rgba channels derived from --danger (#ab2b20 = rgb(171, 43, 32)) */
border: 1px solid rgba(171, 43, 32, 0.4);
border-radius: 6px;
background: rgba(171, 43, 32, 0.08);
margin-top: 12px;
}
.error-block .error-title {
font-weight: 600;
color: var(--danger);
}
.error-block .error-body {
color: var(--text);
font-size: 12px;
text-align: center;
}
.error-block .error-cta {
margin-top: 6px;
}
/* Password character-class coloring */
.pwd-digit { color: var(--relicario-pwd-digit-color); }
.pwd-symbol { color: var(--relicario-pwd-symbol-color); }
.pwd-letter { color: inherit; }
/* Buttons */
.btn {
display: inline-block;
@@ -1626,20 +1592,6 @@ textarea {
@media (max-width: 720px) {
.form-grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }
}
/* P3: lower form sections constrained to the same envelope as .form-grid.
Gated on surface === 'fullscreen' in login.ts; popup unaffected. */
.form-lower {
max-width: 960px;
margin: 0 auto;
}
.form-lower > .form-group,
.form-lower > .disclosure,
.form-lower > .attachments-disclosure,
.form-lower > .form-actions {
width: 100%;
}
.form-col {
padding: 14px 16px;
}

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import type {
ItemId, ItemType, ManifestEntry, Item, VaultSettings, GeneratorRequest,
} from '../shared/types';
import { registerHost } from '../shared/state';
import { lookupErrorCopy, type ErrorCta } from '../shared/error-copy';
import { GLYPH_TRASH, GLYPH_DEVICES, GLYPH_SETTINGS, GLYPH_LOCK } from '../shared/glyphs';
import { renderItemDetail } from '../popup/components/item-detail';
import { renderItemForm } from '../popup/components/item-form';
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ import { renderVaultSettings as renderVaultSettingsView } from '../popup/compone
import { renderFieldHistory, teardown as teardownFieldHistory } from '../popup/components/field-history';
import { renderBackupPanel, teardown as teardownBackup } from './components/backup-panel';
import { renderImportPanel, teardown as teardownImport } from './components/import-panel';
import { applyColorScheme } from '../shared/color-scheme';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
@@ -43,21 +41,6 @@ function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
.replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
}
function renderErrorBlock(code: string | null | undefined): string {
if (!code) return '';
const copy = lookupErrorCopy(code);
const ctaHtml = copy.cta
? `<button class="btn btn-primary error-cta" data-cta="${escapeHtml(copy.cta.action ?? '')}">${escapeHtml(copy.cta.label)}</button>`
: '';
return `
<div class="error error-block">
<div class="error-title">${escapeHtml(copy.title)}</div>
<div class="error-body">${escapeHtml(copy.body)}</div>
${ctaHtml}
</div>
`;
}
function typeIcon(t: ItemType): string {
switch (t) {
case 'login': return '\u{1F511}'; // key
@@ -216,7 +199,7 @@ function renderLockScreen(app: HTMLElement): void {
<div class="vault-lock-screen__form">
<input type="password" id="vault-passphrase" placeholder="passphrase" autocomplete="off" />
<button class="btn btn-primary" id="vault-unlock-btn" style="width:100%;">unlock</button>
${renderErrorBlock(state.error)}
${state.error ? `<div class="error" style="text-align:center;">${escapeHtml(state.error)}</div>` : ''}
</div>
</div>
`;
@@ -609,36 +592,6 @@ async function loadManifest(): Promise<void> {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', async () => {
await applyColorScheme();
chrome.storage.onChanged.addListener((changes, area) => {
if (area === 'sync' && 'password_display_scheme' in changes) {
void applyColorScheme();
}
});
// Delegated handler for .error-cta buttons — set up once on the stable root.
const app = document.getElementById('vault-app')!;
app.addEventListener('click', (e) => {
const btn = (e.target as HTMLElement).closest<HTMLButtonElement>('.error-cta');
if (!btn) return;
const cta = btn.dataset.cta as ErrorCta['action'];
switch (cta) {
case 'unlock': {
document.getElementById('vault-passphrase')?.focus();
break;
}
case 'open_setup': {
void chrome.tabs.create({ url: chrome.runtime.getURL('setup.html') });
break;
}
case 'reload_extension': {
chrome.runtime.reload();
break;
}
}
});
// Check if already unlocked
const resp = await sendMessage({ type: 'is_unlocked' });
if (resp.ok) {

View File

@@ -12,5 +12,5 @@
"baseUrl": "."
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist", "wasm", "src/**/__tests__/**", "src/__stubs__/**"]
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist", "wasm", "src/**/__tests__/**"]
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
import path from 'path';
export default defineConfig({
resolve: {
alias: {
// Stub the runtime-only WASM module so unit tests can import setup.ts.
'../relicario_wasm.js': path.resolve(__dirname, 'src/__stubs__/relicario_wasm.stub.ts'),
'relicario-wasm': path.resolve(__dirname, 'src/__stubs__/relicario_wasm.stub.ts'),
},
},
test: {
environment: 'happy-dom',
include: ['src/**/__tests__/**/*.test.ts'],