71d51c0bea
- 2026-04-18 initial audit verification (all fixed except H8) - 2026-05-01 audit with 8 new findings (B1-B4, I1-I6) - Plan 4: Security Blocker Fixes implementation plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
114 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
114 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# Verification: 2026-05-01 Security Audit
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**Verified by:** Claude Opus 4.5
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**Date:** 2026-05-01
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**Methodology:** Code inspection of referenced file paths and line numbers
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---
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## Summary
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| Finding | File Exists | Lines Accurate | Vulnerability Real | Confidence |
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|---------|-------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|
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| 1 - Backup KDF NFC | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 2 - Commit injection | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 3 - WASM private key exposure | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 4 - Test env vars in prod | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 5 - AttachmentId 64-bit | ✅ | ⚠️ off-by-1 | ✅ | 9/10 |
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| 6 - Field history plaintext | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 7 - Device keys non-functional | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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| 8 - Path traversal restore | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 10/10 |
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**Verdict:** All 8 findings are verified as real vulnerabilities in the current codebase.
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---
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## Finding-by-Finding Verification
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### Finding 1 — Backup KDF missing NFC normalization
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-core/src/backup.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 303-312
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- **Verified:** ✅ `derive_backup_key` at lines 303-312 passes `passphrase` directly to `argon.hash_password_into()` without NFC normalization. Compare to `derive_master_key` in `crypto.rs:224-227` which explicitly normalizes.
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- **Impact confirmed:** Cross-platform restore failure for non-ASCII passphrases.
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### Finding 2 — Commit message injection via item titles
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 565, 899-901, 1110, 1327
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- **Verified:** ✅
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- Line 565: `format!("add: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
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- Line 1110: `format!("edit: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
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- Line 1327: `format!("trash: {} ({})", item.title, item.id.as_str())`
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- **Impact confirmed:** Newlines/control chars in titles corrupt git log output.
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### Finding 3 — WASM `generate_device_keypair` crosses private key to JS
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 215-227
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- **Verified:** ✅ Function returns `{ "private_key_base64": "..." }` as `JsValue`, exposing ed25519 private key to JavaScript heap.
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- **Impact confirmed:** Key material accessible to any JS in service worker context.
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### Finding 4 — Test env vars ship in production binary
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 445-446, 421-423, 1425-1426
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- **Verified:** ✅
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- Lines 421-423: `RELICARIO_TEST_ITEM_SECRET`
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- Lines 445-446: `RELICARIO_TEST_PASSPHRASE`
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- Lines 1425-1426: `RELICARIO_TEST_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE`
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- **Impact confirmed:** All checked in production code without `#[cfg(test)]`. Passphrase visible in `/proc/<pid>/environ`.
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### Finding 5 — `AttachmentId` truncated to 64 bits
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-core/src/ids.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 52-57
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- **Actual lines:** 51-56 (off by 1)
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- **Verified:** ✅ `&digest[..8]` = 8 bytes = 64 bits. Birthday collision at ~2³² work.
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- **Impact confirmed:** Attacker with attachment upload can cause silent overwrites.
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### Finding 6 — `get_field_history` returns plaintext to JS
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-wasm/src/lib.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 232-265
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- **Verified:** ✅ Returns historical `Password`/`Concealed` values as plaintext JSON via `v.as_str().to_owned()`.
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- **Impact confirmed:** Password history exposed to JS heap without Zeroizing.
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### Finding 7 — Device key system is security theater
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 2151-2221
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- **Verified:** ✅ `cmd_device()` handles Add/List/Revoke but:
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- No `sign_commit` or `verify_signature` functions exist anywhere
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- `devices.json` is plaintext and unauthenticated
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- Revocation has no enforcement mechanism
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- **Impact confirmed:** Users falsely believe device revocation provides security.
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### Finding 8 — Path traversal on backup restore
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- **File:** `crates/relicario-cli/src/main.rs`
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- **Claimed lines:** 1619-1626
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- **Verified:** ✅
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```rust
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for item in &unpacked.items {
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fs::write(target.join("items").join(format!("{}.enc", item.id)), ...)?;
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}
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```
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`item.id` and `attachment_id` used directly in path construction with no validation.
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- **Impact confirmed:** Crafted `.relbak` with `id = "../../.bashrc"` escapes target directory.
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---
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## Blockers Assessment
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The audit's "Path to Certifiable Safety" section is accurate:
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| Blocker | Verified | Severity |
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|---------|----------|----------|
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| B1 - Device key theater | ✅ Real | High |
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| B2 - Backup KDF NFC | ✅ Real | Medium |
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| B3 - Test env vars | ✅ Real | Medium |
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| B4 - Path traversal | ✅ Real | Medium |
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All four blockers are confirmed. B1 is the most dangerous as it misleads users about their security posture.
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